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What motivated big changes in constitutional law doctrine during 
the twentieth century? Rarely did important constitutional doctrine or 
theory change because of formal amendments to the document's text, ' 
and rarer still because scholars or judges "discovered" new informa­
tion about the Constitution's original meaning.2 Precedent and com­
mon law reasoning were the mechanisms by which changes occurred 
rather than their driving force. My thesis is that most twentieth cen­
tury changes in the constitutional protection of individual rights were 
driven by or in response to the great identity-based social movements 
("IBSMs") of the twentieth century.3 
Race, sex, and sexual orientation were markers of social inferiority 
and legal exclusion throughout the twentieth century. People of color, 
women, and gay4 people all came to resist their social and legal dis­
abilities in the civil rights movement seeking to end apartheid; various 
feminist movements seeking women's control over their own bodies 
and equal rights with men; and the gay rights movement, seeking 
equal rights for lesbigay and transgendered people. All these social 
1. See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 1457 (2001) .  
2. Although scholars and judges are "discovering" new constitutional meanings al l  the 
time, most (maybe almost all) of the "discoveries" rest upon thin historiography. See gener­
ally Martin Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitlllionalism, 95 COLUM. L. 
REV. 523 (1995); Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case of History-in­
Law. 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909 (1996). 
3. Social movements have driven most of the big changes in American constitutional 
law. The American Revolution and the founding period were the products of a generation­
based social movement. The Reconstruction amendments were the ultimate fruition of the 
abolitionist movement. The union movement and reactions against it drove much of consti­
tutional law during the Lochner era and overlapped with the civil rights movement that 
commences the story I am telling in this Article. 
4. I use the term "gay people" to refer to lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men. Sometimes, I 
shall use the term "lesbigay." 
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movements sought to change positive law and social norms. In both 
endeavors, constitutional litigation was critically important. Specifi­
cally, these IBSMs became involved in constitutional litigation as part 
of three different kinds of politics in which they were engaged: their 
own politics of protection against state-sponsored threats to the life, 
liberty, and property of its members; their politics of recognition, 
seeking to end legal discriminations and exclusions of group members 
and to establish legal protections against private discrimination; and a 
politics of remediation, to rectify material as well as stigmatic legacies 
of previous state discrimination. At every stage, but particularly the 
last, these IBSMs were confronted with a politics of preservation, 
whereby countermovements sought to limit or roll back legal protec­
tions won or sought by the social movement.5 Each kind of politics of­
fered opportunities for different kinds of constitutional arguments. 
The politics of protection most successfully invoked the First Amend­
ment and the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution; the poli­
tics of recognition and remediation were most closely associated with 
the Equal Protection Clause; and the politics of preservation invoked 
arguments based upon constitutional federalism, separation of powers, 
and various libertarian doctrines. 
The first part of this Article will survey the deployment of constitu­
tional doctrine by each IBSM as it engaged in these politics of protec­
tion, recognition, and preservation. Its perspective will be that of the 
constitutional litigators acting on behalf of those social movements.6 
Accordingly, I shall rely heavily on their own words and ideas, as ex­
pressed in appellate briefs and oral arguments, especially those in U.S. 
Supreme Court cases. What interests me most is how movement law­
yers translated the problems and aspirations of women and minorities 
into constitutional discourse, and how their arguments fared. 
The perspective of the second part will be that of the Justices of 
the Supreme Court, to whom these arguments were ultimately ad­
dressed. There, I shall explore the ways in which these social move­
ments affected the evolution of constitutional doctrine. IBSMs and 
their countermovements brought constitutional litigation that required 
the Court to apply old constitutional texts and precedents to new cir­
cumstances, not just in a single case, but in a string of cases that ran 
like a chain novel whose audience shifted in the course of narration. 
Moreover, IBSMs transformed the normative context in which these 
5. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Pub­
lic Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 468-91 (2001) [hereinafter Eskridge, Channeling] (giving a 
detailed development of this typology). 
6. I make no claim that these lawyers or the institutions with which they were associated 
were "representative" of the people who constituted or benefited from their respective 
IBSMs. For my discussion of ideological debates among social movement lawyers, see Sec­
tion 111.C. 
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cases were decided, either by linking the new cases with established 
norms or by persuading society and its judges to change the normative 
context in which social traits were evaluated. As to the latter, IBSMs 
have moved public norms away from understanding race, sex, and 
sexual orientation as malign variations toward understanding them as 
tolerable and (for race and sex) benign variations. Finally, as these so­
cial movements and countermovements have become institutionalized 
players in American constitutional litigation and politics, they have 
become ongoing constituencies for particular ways of thinking about 
certain provisions of the Constitution. Thus, the oxymoronic notion of 
"substantive" due process has become an established part of constitu­
tional jurisprudence because of the importance of the privacy right to 
women and sexual minorities; waves of minority groups' politics of 
recognition have transformed the Equal Protection Clause from the 
last resort to the cutting edge of individual rights claims; and the First 
Amendment's imperialism in constitutional law owes much to its abil­
ity to protect speech and expressive activities most dear to tradition­
alists as well as gay people, pro-life protesters as well as pro-choice 
advocates, and racial segregationists as well as people of color. IBSMs 
and their allies did not single-handedly work these transformations, 
but they have provided impetus and then support for judges when they 
have moved in the direction of those stances. 
The story of doctrinal transformation has occurred just as dramati­
cally at less general levels as well. In the course of their litigation cam­
paigns, social movement lawyers came up with a variety of innovative 
constitutional arguments for advancing their groups' goals. Some of 
them were accepted by the judiciary as a basis for new doctrinal rules 
or exceptions. Many of the Supreme Court's most radical doctrinal in­
novations in the last century were originally developed and pressed 
(often for decades) by social movement or countermovement lawyers: 
• selective incorporation of criminal procedure rules in the Bill of 
Rights into the Due Process Clause, especially Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth 
Amendment rights (Section 11.A.l-2); 
• dialectical federalism, whereby federal courts not only monitor 
state courts in criminal cases, but also engage in a constitutional dia­
logue (Section 11.A.3); 
• the due process right of sexual privacy, protecting Americans 
against state direction of their intimate lives and feelings (Section 
11.B); 
• the equal protection idea of presumptively suspect classifica­
tions that will trigger heightened judicial scrutiny of statutory distinc­
tions (Section 11.C.1), as well as a sliding scale for heightened scrutiny 
that also considers the importance (including the constitutional impor-
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tance) of the interests of groups disadvantaged by legislative distinc­
tions (Section 11.C.3); 
• the relevance of legislative motivations in constitutional cases, 
especially equal protection ones (Section II.C.2); 
• the notion that the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment (Section II.D); 
• the erosion and displacement of the political question doctrine, 
and its demise in voting cases (Section II.E.1); 
• the expansion of congressional authority to enforce the 
Reconstruction amendments (Section II.E.2); 
• the creation of a liberalized state action doctrine, including at­
tribution of responsibility to the state for some actions by private par­
ties and corporations (Section 11.E.3); 
• the extension of the First Amendment speech and assembly 
protection to expressive conduct and expressive association (Section 
II.F.1), and to sexual speech (Section II.F.2); and 
• the anti-subordination principle as a way to ameliorate free 
speech/equal protection clashes (Section 11.F.3) . 
Judges adopting these constitutional transformations have usually 
not accepted the IBSM perspective uncritically or without amend­
ment, however. Judges have rejected the most radical proposals, such 
as a bar to the death penalty, and have diluted other proposals, such as 
a robust de novo review of state criminal convictions by federal 
judges, an anti-subordination reading of the Equal Protection Clause, 
and strong First Amendment protection for sexual speech. Even when 
judges have accepted IBSM constitutional visions and doctrines, the 
constitutional transformations movement lawyers argued for have had 
limited utility for actual minority group members. Some IBSM­
inspired doctrines have been turned to the advantage of counter­
movements. Examples include heightened scrutiny for suspect classifi­
cations, which has discouraged open affirmative action measures, and 
the First Amendment rights of expressive conduct and association, 
which now protect enclaves of exclusion against state antidiscrimina­
tion laws. 
The fate of particular proposals and doctrines has depended on 
context, but one rule stands out: judges are rarely willing to insist on 
massive transfers of social or economic entitlements in American soci­
ety, and when they have - as with school desegregation and abortion 
- they have been incompletely successful. This rule owes much to the 
institutional limits of the federal judiciary. Judges do not have the re­
sources to undertake initiatives requiring administrative capacity, nor 
do they have the political legitimacy to engage in much activism not 
otherwise acceptable to the political system. When, by historical acci-
2068 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:2062 
dent, the Supreme Court was willing to press for redistribution of 
status and state resources in a number of arenas (1962-69), the politi­
cal system responded with the elections of Richard Nixon and Ronald 
Reagan, who appointed Justices who were more institutionally cau­
tious or even hostile to IBSM claims. Nonetheless, it is remarkable 
that the Burger Court - constituted to go slowly on race matters -
engaged in significant activism responding to the women's movements 
and that the Rehnquist Court - constituted to roll back affirmative 
action and abortion - has opened up the U.S. Constitution to lesbigay 
people. 
In the third part of this Article, I maintain that IBSMs have also 
contributed to meta-developments in constitutional theory and dis­
course. Social movement lawyers, by and large, were not legal phi­
losophers, but their work from the field has been fodder for three dif­
ferent stories about American constitutionalism in the last century; 
each story illustrates the continuing insights of legal realist, legal proc­
ess, and critical theories of jurisprudence. Thus, consistent with legal 
realists' predictions, none of the foregoing areas of law developed in 
ways that would have been predictable from the original intent ani­
mating the constitutional provisions or from the precedents existing in 
1900. The Supreme Court interpreted all of these constitutional provi­
sions highly dynamically during the twentieth century. IBSMs pio­
neered the idea of a Living Constitution and inspired and drove the 
Court's dynamic interpretations by bringing cases that required judges 
to consider new circumstances for the application of old principles, by 
motivating judges to reconsider old principles in light of new norms, 
and by changing the face of the judiciary itself. Dynamic constitutional 
interpretation has been the death of serious originalism and of Article 
V as a means for making fundamental changes to the Constitution. 
In addition, IBSMs were the key impulse supporting a global shift 
in the way the Supreme Court applied the Constitution in the twenti­
eth century. The shift was away from the structural Constitution of the 
founding generation and the vested property/contract rights 
Constitution of the Lochner era and toward the Carotene 
Constitution, which justified judicial activism along legal process lines. 
Under the Carotene Constitution, the role of the Court is to protect 
the integrity of the pluralist political process, and especially to check 
the political process' tendency toward self-perpetuation and persecu­
tion or suppression of minorities. This entails protecting despised 
minority groups against state Kutturkampfs, assuring groups that are 
able to organize themselves into mass movements that they will be 
integrated into the political process, and protecting traditionalists from 
excessive state burdens once a formerly subordinated minority has 
become part of the political mainstream. 
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Finally, the inevitable disappointments of IBSMs in constitutional 
litigation has fueled a constitutional skepticism.7 Any viable IBSM ul­
timately demands full equality from the state (normative recognition 
that its defining trait is a benign variation) - but any substantial suc­
cess will generate a countermovement seeking to preserve old forms 
or new enclaves of segregation (normative recognition that the minor­
ity's trait is malign or, at best, tolerable) .  Through most of the twenti­
eth century, various movements and countermovements were evenly 
enough balanced, politically, to motivate judges to seek compromises. 
The typical compromise would recognize only some of the minority's 
rights or would decline to implement their rights as soon as the mi­
nority desired, or both. Although social movement moderates em­
braced these compromises on pragmatic grounds and even heralded 
them as "victories," the partiality and, sometimes, the emptiness of the 
victories has soured many women, people of color, and lesbigay peo­
ple on constitutionalism as an enterprise or, more interestingly, on 
constitutionalism as defined by Supreme Court decisions. This has 
given rise to constitutional law drop-out as well as popular constitu­
tionalism approaches. The mix of constitutional pragmatism, skepti­
cism, and nihilism is the most ambiguous legacy of identity-based so­
cial movements for constitutional law in the twentieth century. Among 
other things, it is headed toward a possible showdown with a Supreme 
Court that is more aggrandizing today - partly as a result of its past 
glory in civil rights cases - than at any previous point in our history. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS AND STRATEGIES DEPLOYED BY 
THREE TWENTIETH CENTURY IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS 
By 1900, American statutory and common law not only pervasively 
discriminated against people of color, women, and sexual and gender 
minorities, but also guaranteed a social and legal structure that com­
mitted violence against these citizens. American constitutional law 
provided little protection against discrimination or violence. Because 
most of the discrimination and much of the violence was by state and 
local governments, the checks provided by federalism, national sepa­
ration of powers, and the Bill of Rights (then considered applicable 
only to the federal government) did women and minorities no good. 
Surprisingly, the Reconstruction amendments, protecting people of 
color against state government oppression, had shown few teeth for 
these groups. Although the Supreme Court construed the Thirteenth 
Amendment to protect people of color against state peonage ar-
7. See Robin West, Constitutional Skepticism, 72 B.U. L. REV. 765 (1992) [hereinafter 
West, Constitutional Skepticism]. 
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rangements8 and the Fourteenth Amendment to protect them against 
blatantly discriminatory "class legislation,"9 the Court also ruled that 
these amendments permitted the state to require racial segregation in 
railroad cars and public schools10 and to impose voting rules that effec­
tively barred almost all people of color from the franchise. 1 1  Laws ex­
cluding women from professions and the franchise had from the be­
ginning been upheld against Fourteenth Amendment attack.12 People 
of color and feminists in the late nineteenth century did resist their 
second-class citizenship, but the Supreme Court rejected their consti­
tutional claims and vision.° Laws criminalizing sodomy or the "crime 
against nature," lewd behavior, the promulgation of indecent books or 
plays or movies, the depiction of sexual inversion, public indecency, 
and cross-dressing were not even subject to serious constitutional 
challenge at the turn of the twentieth century.14 
As I have argued elsewhere, the existence of pervasive state exclu­
sion, discrimination, and violence was a necessary factor in the forma­
tion of the civil rights, women's, and gay peoples' mass social move­
ments. For each movement, the law was critical in creating a social 
identity as "colored," female, or "homosexual"; the subordinate social 
role reinforced by law was uncongenial to increasing numbers of 
women, gay people, and people of color as the nation urbanized, and 
courts were a natural forum for politically marginalized minorities to 
resist their subordination; legal actors and institutions were the scenes 
for traumatic encounters whose publicity transformed elite social 
movements into mass ones.15 
8. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911). 
9. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368 (1886); see also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 
U.S. 303, 308 (1879). 
10. See Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (arguendo, 
public schools); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (railroad cars). 
11 .  See Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903). 
12. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall) 162 (1874) (holding that women have no 
right to vote); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130 (1873) (holding that women have no 
right to practice law). 
13. For a striking analysis of the background to Plessy, that is, the political struggle by 
communities of color in post-Reconstruction Louisiana, see Rebecca J. Scott, Fault Lines, 
Color Lines, and Party Lines: Race, Labor, and Collective Action in Louisiana and Cuba, 
1862-1912, in BEYOND SLAVERY: EXPLORATIONS OF RACE, LABOR, AND CITIZENSHIP IN 
POSTEMANCIPA TION SOCIETIES 61, 65-83 (Frederick Cooper et al. eds., 2000). 
14. On the emergence of visible communities of "inverts," "fairies," "prostitutes," and 
other gender-benders in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and their constitu­
tional helplessness, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE 
APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET ch. 1 (1999) (hereinafter ESKRIDGE, GA YLAW]. 
15. See Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 5, at 423-59 (2001 ) . 
August 2002] Identity-Based Social Movements 2071 
With African Americans leading the way, each group formed insti­
tutions of resistance, critique, and normative aspiration.16 Initially, and 
before there was mass mobilization, the dominant (but not the only) 
public goal of those institutions was a politics of protection, urging that 
governmental authorities ought not be able to deploy the apparatus of 
the state to control the bodies and lives of women and minority peo­
ples. The normative goal of such a politics was to persuade the main­
stream that the group-defining trait (color, sex, sexual or gender orien­
tation) was a tolerable variation from the norm and that stigmatized 
persons ought to have minimal rights. Generally, minority leaders in 
this phase did not contest the propositions that whiteness, maleness, 
and heterosexuality were the norm and that color, femininity, and 
homosexuality merited less social esteem. If the social group was able 
to show political strength, however, its organizational leaders would 
move toward a public stance which denied the inferiority of the 
group's defining trait: there is no material difference between blacks 
and whites, except those created by society and law; women can per­
form any social role that men can; gay is as good as straight. 
Once this step was taken, the ISBM was engaged in a politics of 
recognition, demanding full respect and equal rights within the polity. 
To the extent this politics was successful in changing traditional laws 
and social attitudes, it was succeeded by a politics of remediation, 
whereby the group would seek state correction and even restructuring 
to "cure" the effects of past discrimination. IBSMs' politics of recogni­
tion and remediation inevitably triggered a politics of preservation. 
There, a countermovement would reassert traditional normative and 
legal baselines and the inferiority of the minority group. Such a poli­
tics might ease up if the minority gained acceptance within the nation's 
social and political pluralist system; although extremists would still in­
sist on traditional baselines and the minority's inferiority, moderates 
in the countermovement would concede toleration of the minority, but 
with social and legally protected space for traditional ingroup mem­
bers to retain their dominance. 
For each kind of politics, the social movement's political argu­
ments were translated into constitutional arguments. Even though the 
doctrinal bases for such arguments did not exist in 1900, movement 
lawyers ran various doctrinal trial balloons through the century. Many 
of them were embraced by judges. Although the doctrinal story could 
have evolved in a variety of different ways, it evolved in the following 
16. The model in this paragraph is most obviously applicable to the experience of Afri­
can Americans, women, and lesbigay people (the IBSMs which are the focus of this Part), 
but is also applicable to other IBSMs that are not my focus here: Asian and Hispanic Ameri­
cans, people with disabilities, and (to a lesser extent) poor people. I shall take up issues 
raised by these social movements in the next part of the Article. 
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thematically sensible way: IBSMs' libertarian politics of protection 
was confirmed and developed under the banner of the Due Process 
Clause's protection of "liberty" and the First Amendment's protection 
of speech, press, and assembly; their egalitarian politics of recognition 
and remediation gravitated to the Equal Protection Clause; their ad­
versaries' arguments grounded on concepts of localism, majoritarian 
attachment to tradition, and liberty found voice in constitutional fed­
eralism, separation of powers, and freedom of speech and association. 
A. The Civil Rights Movement 
The defining experience for IBSMs in the United States has been 
that of African Americans, the social group most violently oppressed, 
most dramatically resistant, and most tragically unsuccessful. The 
normative triumph of the civil rights movement was the greatest yet 
most incomplete. Its story is told in riveting detail by a number of 
authors.17 All I wish to accomplish here is to show how the move­
ment's lawyers - Moorfield Storey, William Hastie, Charles Houston, 
Thurgood Marshall, Spottswood Robinson, Constance Baker Motley, 
Jack Greenberg, Julius Chambers - translated the social, moral, and 
political goals of the movement into constitutional discourse. 
At the outset, three points bear emphasis. First, my survey focuses 
on the dialogue between civil rights lawyers and judges. The more 
complex and internally debated normative goals of the social move­
ment itself are secondary to my project, although they are of overrid­
ing importance to the larger history of the civil rights movement. Sec­
ond, the lawyers bringing constitutional cases and arguing 
constitutional appeals did not "represent" all people of color in the 
United States; they represented particular organizations which re­
flected particular stances within communities of color (NAACP) and 
within the larger society (ACLU). To the extent that the NAACP's 
lawyers presented an "integrationist" agenda through constitutional 
attacks on apartheid, they were advancing a norm that was controver­
sial within the African-American community and were deploying a 
strategy that they themselves realized was incomplete.18 Third, I am 
17. The classic accounts are DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN 
LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1986) 
[hereinafter GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS]; RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE 
HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR 
EQUALITY (1976); ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: 
BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE (1984). For a briefer and more popular 
account, see ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, BETTER DAY COMING: BLACKS AND EQUALITY 1890-
2000 (2001 ). 
18. Contrast the NAACP's integrationist and pragmatic philosophy with the more con­
frontationalist philosophy of organizations such as the International Labor Defense, a radi­
cal class-based organization in the 1930s, the Civil Rights Congress in the 1940s, and the 
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presenting their constitutional politics as a progression of what was the 
primary - but not necessarily the only - goal of the social movement 
at different points in time: so long as black people were politically im­
potent in this country, the lawyers mainly sought protection for those 
in their group most brutalized by the state. Once blacks became more 
politically and socially significant, the lawyers made recognition and 
then remediation the overriding item on their agenda, which triggered 
overt counter-organization by traditionalists insisting on preservation.19 
1. The Politics of Protection, 1913-40 
Notwithstanding the regime of apartheid that settled over much of 
the nation between 1890 and 1910, many people of color rejected the 
notion that their race was "inferior" (as apartheid claimed) - and al­
most all people of color rejected the violence African Americans suf­
fered at the hands of private and public actors. Founded in 1909 by a 
biracial collection of persons, the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP") sought to refute erro­
neous stereotypes about black people and to protect blacks against 
public and private violence (especially lynching), loss of their rights to 
vote, and denial of housing where they could flourish.2° From its be­
ginning, the NAACP involved itself in cases where black people's lib­
erties were threatened by the state (or by private actors usurping state 
roles). The first case in which the Association became involved arose 
out of the capital conviction of a black man, Pink Franklin, for killing 
a police officer while resisting arrest for violating the state peonage 
law. The NAACP arranged for counsel to take Franklin's case to the 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee of the 1960s; with the economic boycott and 
protest strategy for reform by grass-roots mobilization reflected in the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference of the 1950s and 1960s; and with the black nationalist (separatist) 
philosophy of the Nation of Islam in the 1960s. All of these groups spoke for many blacks in 
America, and all sought to change attitudes and laws, but only the NAACP and like­
oriented groups (the ACLU, the Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law) regularly 
spoke for blacks to the Supreme Court in constitutional cases. 
19. That there was this kind of rough progression in the lawyers' presentation and, per­
haps, in the priorities of the social movement does not mean that recognition was not impor­
tant to many minorities during the early stages; that protection did not remain critically im­
portant even after the politics of recognition became predominant; or that preservation was 
not strongly favored by most people in the majority throughout the whole period. That the 
various politics I describe are overlapping should not obscure my central point, which is that 
the public debate stimulated by the civil rights movement went through discernible stages of 
political and constitutional presentation. 
20. On the founding of the NAACP, see 1 CHARLES FLINT KELLOGG, NAACP: A 
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COLORED PEOPLE 9-45 (1967); DAVID 
LEVERING LEWIS, W.E.B. DUBOIS: BIOGRAPHY OF A RACE 1868-1919 (1993) (biography of 
an important founding member); JAMES M. McPHERSON, THE ABOLITIONIST LEGACY: 
FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE FOUNDING OF THE NAACP (1975); MARY WARE 
OVINGTON, THE WALLS CAME TUMBLING DOWN (1947) (giving a first-person account). 
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Supreme Court. Although the peonage statute was a blatant violation 
of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court denied Franklin's poorly ar­
ticulated constitutional appeal that this should have affected his mur­
der conviction.21 After this disappointing debut, the NAACP estab­
lished a formal legal committee that regularly handled or coordinated 
cases where the liberties - and typically the lives - of African 
Americans were threatened. 
Thus, most of the NAACP's early cases involved criminal prosecu­
tions against black men.22 Some of these were little more than mob­
inspired lynchings railroaded through the legal process.23 Moore v. 
Dempsey,24 an early and important example, involved a habeas appeal 
of the death sentences meted out to six of the black men convicted in 
Phillips County, Arkansas for the asserted murder of a white man. His 
death occurred in the wake of a spree of murders of black men by a 
hysterical white mob during the Red Summer of 1919. The NAACP 
presented the Supreme Court with a detailed factual record which 
showed the outrageous setting of the case: more than 200 blacks were 
slaughtered without a single indictment, while the death of one white 
man called forth seventy-nine black scapegoats without credible evi­
dence of their guilt; once arrested, the black men were beaten and tor­
tured by the authorities until some agreed to testify against others; 
twelve of the remaining defendants were railroaded through a "trial" 
in which they were perfunctorily represented by an appointed counsel 
who did not consult them and were convicted by an all-white jury 
which deliberated for two to three minutes before reaching the verdict 
of guilty and a penalty of death.25 The only evidence against the de­
fendants was that extracted by torture, and the whole climate was 
tainted by news reports that they were leaders of an insurrection and 
by mobs of white men surrounding the courtroom and poised to lynch 
21. Franklin v. South Carolina, 218 U.S. 161, 170-72 (1910). Eight months later, the 
Court invalidated an Alabama peonage law similar to the one that indirectly brought the 
death penalty (later commuted to life in prison) to Pink Franklin. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 
U.S. 219 (1911). See generally Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme 
Court and Race in the Progressive Era, Part 2: The Peonage Cases, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 646 
(1982). 
22. See KELLOGG, supra note 20, at 64. 
23. An NAACP study documented 3,224 lynchings between 1889 and 1918. See id. at 
210. See generally id. at 209-46 (detailing anti-black violence in the 1910s and the NAACP's 
legislative and publicity campaign against lynching). 
24. 261 U.S. 86 (1923); see also infra Section II.A infra (discussing Moore). 
25. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, reprinted in Record on Appeal at 1-11 ,  
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S.  86 (1923) (1922 Term, No. 199); Brief for Appellants at 1-33, 
Moore (1922 Term, No. 199) (Moorfield Storey, counsel for appellants); RICHARD C. 
CORTNER, A MOB INTENT ON DEATH: THE NAACP AND THE ARKANSAS RIOT CASES 5-
105 (1988) (providing a detailed account of the riots, the arrests and trials, and the early in­
volvement of the NAACP in defending the men). 
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them if the verdict had been otherwise than death. Defendants' claim 
was that because of the outside "mob domination," the "entire trial, 
verdict, and judgment against them was but an empty ceremony," its 
resulting death penalty nothing but "judicial murder."26 Given such a 
damning factual record, the Court agreed, holding that such a trial, 
"hurried to conviction under the pressure of a mob without any regard 
for . . .  [the defendants'] rights and without according to them due 
process of law [was void] ."27 
The Phillips County case was one of the NAACP's greatest tri­
umphs. It was the first of a series of cases where the NAACP not only 
sought to protect innocent black defendants, but also sought judicial 
recognition of due process rules that would inure to the benefit of all 
black defendants. In Brown v. Mississippi,28 for example, the Supreme 
Court overturned three convictions based on confessions obtained by 
whipping and physical torture. The Court's opinion established as an 
enduring principle of its due process jurisprudence that compelled 
confessions cannot be the basis for state court convictions and held 
that federal courts will enforce this rule even when not timely raised in 
the state courts.29 Moore was also a harbinger of the famous 
Scottsboro cases, where the NAACP's role was only a supporting 
one.30 The cases arose in 1931 out of alleged rapes of two white women 
by nine black youths hitching rides on railway cars in Jackson County, 
Alabama. Mindful that a proceeding as openly mob-driven as that in 
Moore would trigger federal intervention, the newspapers and the 
authorities discouraged mobs from forming. Nor was there indication 
that the accused were tortured, as there would be in other cases. There 
was still plenty of evidence that the defendants were railroaded to 
guilty verdicts, with death sentences. As Samuel Liebowitz's Supreme 
26. Record on Appeal at 6-7, Moore (1922 Term, No. 199); Brief for Appellants at 33, 
Moore (1922 Term, No. 199). 
27. Moore, 261 U.S. at 87. The actual disposition of the case was a remand to the federal 
trial court to hold a hearing to determine whether the asserted facts were correct; if so, ha­
beas would be granted. Before the trial court decided the matter, the Governor commuted 
the six men's death sentences to short prison terms. By 1925, all of the sixty-seven men who 
had been sentenced to prison for unproven roles in the single white man's death had been 
released. KELLOGG, supra note 20, at 244. 
28. 297 U.S. 278 (1936); see also Section 11.A.l (discussing Brown); RICHARD C. 
CORTNER, A "SCOTTSBORO" CASE IN MISSISSIPPI: THE SUPREME COURT AND BROWN V. 
MISSISSIPPI (1986) [hereinafter CORTNER, A "SCOTTSBORO" CASE IN MISSISSIPPI]. 
29. Brown, 297 U.S. at 285-87. 
30. Although the NAACP procured lawyers for the "Scottsboro boys," the Communist­
affiliated International Labor Defense won their Supreme Court cases with the excellent 
representation of Samuel Leibowitz. See generally Hugh T. Murray, Jr., The NAACP versus 
the Communist Party: The Scottsboro Rape Cases, 1931-32, in THE NEGRO IN THE 
DEPRESSION AND WAR: PRELUDE TO REVOLUTION, 1930-1945, at 276 (Bernard Sternsher 
ed., 1969). 
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Court brief for the Scottsboro defendants maintained, the cases were 
like Moore in that the evidence of guilt was slim and suspect; the de­
fendants were not afforded their choice of counsel and were essen­
tially unrepresented; and people of color were excluded from serving 
on the jury.3' In Powell v. Alabama,32 the Court reversed the defen­
dants' convictions on the ground that they were denied due process, 
which the Court interpreted to require effective representation by 
counsel before defendants could be sentenced to death for conviction 
of a capital crime. The defendants were retried and re-convicted, but 
the trial judge (remarkably) overturned their convictions on the 
ground that the testimony of their accuser was incredible. Some of 
them were tried and convicted yet again. 
In Norris v. Alabama,33 the Supreme Court reversed these third 
capital convictions, on the ground that the state had violated the 
Equal Protection Clause by effectively excluding people of color from 
the juries. Norris was the first case in which the Supreme Court over­
turned a criminal conviction on grounds of exclusion of blacks from 
the juries without any admission to that effect by state officials or 
judges.34 Chief Justice Hughes' opinion for a unanimous Court care­
fully examined the evidence presented (and probably fabricated) by 
the local officials, and found that it did not rebut the prima facie case 
of discrimination made out by the utter absence of black people on ju­
ries in Jackson County, Alabama "within the memory of witnesses 
who had lived there all their lives."35 This precedent proved fruitful for 
the NAACP as a weapon to challenge death sentences for people of 
color convicted in southern jurisdictions where blacks had long been 
excluded de facto from jury service. Not only did the Supreme Court 
overturn convictions of a number of black defendants on this ground,36 
but the Fifth Circuit enforced Norris in the 1940s and 1950s, sending 
31. See Brief for Petitioners at 36-62, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (1931 Term, 
Nos. 98-100). See generally DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN 
SOUTH (rev. ed. 1969); JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO (1994). 
32. 287 U.S. 45 (1932); see also infra Section II.A.Lb (discussing Powell). 
33. 294 U.S. 587 (1935); see also infra Section II.A.Le (discussing Norris). 
34. See Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and Race Discrimination: The Lost 
Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEXAS L. REV. 1401 (1983) [hereinafter Schmidt, 
Juries]. Compare Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881) (holding that state cannot exclude 
people of color from juries as a matter of law; admission of race discrimination by officials 
meets this test), with Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278 (1909) (rejecting race discrimination 
claim because state courts had found insufficient proof of such discrimination). 
35. Norris, 294 U.S. at 59L 
36. See Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Pierre v. 
Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938); Hollins v. Oklahoma, 
295 U.S. 394 (1935). See generally Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth 
Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1, 83 (1990). 
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an important message to southern jurisdictions that whites-only jury 
policies were costly.37 Norris also saved the remainder of the 
Scottsboro defendants from death sentences - except (ironically) 
Clarence Norris, who was convicted in a fourth trial. His death sen­
tence was later commuted, and he emerged from prison in 1950, hav­
ing lost almost twenty years of his life for what is now considered "the 
most notorious racial hoax case in our history."38 
The jury cases reflected a broader challenge: knowing that open 
exclusion of black people by law might be held to violate the Equal 
Protection Clause, southern officials devised subterfuges that weeded 
out blacks from jury lists de facto.39 They did the same thing with vot­
ing: knowing that open exclusion of black people by law might be held 
to violate the Fifteenth Amendment, southern officials found ways to 
discourage or exclude blacks from voting lists indirectly. As in the jury 
cases, the NAACP's strategy was to document the dearth of black 
people on voting lists and to show how white officials accomplished 
their exclusion. Indeed, the NAACP's first Supreme Court amicus 
brief was in a voting case, Guinn v. United States.40 Oklahoma required 
that citizens pass a literacy test in order to vote; exempted from the 
test were people who or whose ancestors were entitled to vote in 1866, 
just before the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were adopted. 
The NAACP's Moorfield Storey argued that this law effectively de­
barred most people of color from voting because they could not read, 
without imposing the same disability on illiterate whites, whose ances­
tors were voters in 1866. The Supreme Court ruled that a literacy test 
standing alone was permissible, but its joinder with a grandfather 
clause violated the Fifteenth Amendment's requirement that the right 
to vote not be "denied or abridged . . .  on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude."41 Guinn would seem like an easy case 
- but only to today's eyes. During the "progressive" era, it was a 
rather bold decision because it analyzed the state law in terms of its 
37. See John Andrew Martin, The Fifth Circuit and Jury Selection Cases: The Negro De­
fendant and His Peerless Jury, 4 HOUSTON L. REV. 448 (1966). 
38. Katherine K. Russell, The Racial Hoax as Crime: The Law as Affirmation, 71 IND. 
L.J. 593, 598 (1996). 
39. In Norris, for example, the local officials testified that no people of color were quali­
fied to serve on juries; the NAACP produced black men who were obviously well-qualified, 
and the Supreme Court refused to credit the officials' "sweeping characterization of the lack 
of qualifications." 294 U.S. at 599. Additionally, Norris's lawyers demonstrated to the Court 
that officials had tried to cover up their discrimination by adding black names to the rolls 
after the lawsuit was brought. See Schmidt, Juries, supra note 34, at 1479. 
40. 238 U.S. 347 (1915); see also infra Section 11.E.l (discussing Guinn).  See generally 
Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progres­
sive Era, Part 3: Black Disenfranchisement from the KKK to the Grandfather Clause, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 835 (1982) [hereinafter Schmidt, Principle and Prejudice]. 
41. Guinn, 238 U.S. at 362. 
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practical application. The decision was only "rather" bold, because 
Oklahoma's scheme was more transparent than that followed in any 
other state, because the Court approved the use of literacy tests gen­
erally, and because even Oklahoma evaded the Court's mandate with 
a new grandfather clause for two decades.42 Guinn did not assure that 
people of color would be able to vote in the South. There were as 
many subterfuges as there were voters of color. 
Deterred by Guinn from directly barring people of color from 
voting in general elections, several southern states barred them from 
participating in the Democratic Party primary, where electoral deci­
sions were effectively made. The NAACP challenged the Texas stat­
ute instantiating a whites-only primary. Although the Supreme Court 
had ruled that primaries were not "elections" that Congress could 
regulate under Article I, section 4 and had suggested that voting prac­
tices might be political questions, Storey urged the Court to recognize 
the Texas statute as a "flagrant, unjust discrimination against a citizen 
solely on account of race and color."43 Following Guinn and essentially 
ignoring the earlier precedents, the Supreme Court ruled in Nixon v. 
Herndon44 that the Fourteenth Amendment prevented Texas from ex­
cluding blacks in primary elections. Texas responded by ceding 
authority over primaries to the State Democratic Convention of 
Texas, which maintained that it was not a state actor accountable un­
der the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The NAACP chal­
lenged this scheme as an unconstitutional subterfuge,45 but the 
Supreme Court permitted the practice in 1935.46 
The NAACP got a second shot at the issue after the reconstituted 
New Deal Court ruled in United States v. Classic41 that interference 
with the right to vote in a primary involves a right "secured or pro­
tected by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Arguing 
42. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (invalidating Oklahoma's next voting law, 
which gave people of color eleven days in May 1916 to register or suffer permanent loss of 
their franchise). 
43. Brief for Plaintiff-in-Error at 31 ,  Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (1926 Term, 
No. 117) (distinguishing Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921), stating that 
Congress's power to prescribe the manner for holding "Elections" for its members does not 
include authority over primaries); Reply Brief for Plaintiff-in-Error at 19-23, Nixon (1926 
Term, No. 1 17) (distinguishing Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) and refusing to entertain 
claim for injunction in voting rights case). 
44. 273 U.S. 536 (1927); see also infra Sections 11.C.1 and 11.E.1 (discussing Nixon). 
45. Brief on the Merits (for the Petitioner] at 12-19, Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 
(1935) (1934 Term, No. 563). 
46. The Supreme Court initially declined to accept the state's claim that the Democratic 
Party rather than the state was responsible for the exclusion, Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 
(1932), but once that matter was clarified the Court ruled that the state was no longer re­
sponsible. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935). 
47. 313 U.S. 299 (1941). 
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that the Texas white primary set-up was a patent effort to disenfran­
chise people of color and that Classic required the state to be held re­
sponsible, the NAACP, joined now by the ACLU, persuaded the 
Court to overrule the earlier precedent in Smith v. Allwright.48 This 
decision, handed down in 1943, had more tangible consequences than 
the Court's earlier decisions. Only three percent of southern blacks 
were registered to vote in 1940, but twenty percent were registered by 
1952 - in part due to the NAACP's post-Allwright litigation cam­
paign against white primaries and the willingness of judges to enforce 
Allwright broadly.49 The voting cases, even more than the mob pres­
sure and the jury cases, pressed the Court to look beneath the formally 
neutral rules and find the underlying exclusionary project for which 
the state bore responsibility. 
By the time the NAACP was founded, apartheid was well­
established in the South, and it probably would have been futile to 
challenge it in the period before World War II, especially given the 
Association's limited resources. But the NAACP was alert to local ef­
forts expanding the reach of legal segregation of the races. It was not 
until 1910 that a major city (Baltimore) legally restricted black people 
to residing in designated ghettoes.50 The Baltimore branch of the 
NAACP thrice challenged the 1910 ordinance and its two successors 
as a violation of the Due Process Clause. Twice the Maryland Court of 
Appeals invalidated the ordinance; it held the third appeal pending 
the NAACP's challenge to a similar Louisville ordinance before the 
Supreme Court.51 Moorfield Storey's brief in the Louisville case main­
tained that the ordinance invaded vested property rights in violation 
of the due process, equal protection, and privileges and immunities 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. He distinguished Plessy and 
the public school cases, where: 
it is possible to say that no harm is suffered through the separation of the 
races, if the facilities enjoyed by either race are the same as those en­
joyed by the other. In the case at bar, no such argument can be made, be­
cause every parcel of land has qualities peculiar to itself . . . .  One of the 
48. 321 U.S. 649 (1943) (overruling the Court's unanimous opinion in Grovey). The 
Court followed and extended Al/wright in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (the Jaybird 
case, where the Court invalidated yet another elaborate subterfuge to disenfranchise black 
voters). See also Section 11.E.3 (discussing Terry). 
49. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Wright, 154 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1946); Dean v. Thomas, 93 F. 
Supp. 129 (E.D. La. 1950); Adams v. Whittaker, 195 S.W.2d 634 (Ark. 1946). See generally J. 
MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE 
UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION (1999). 
50. See Garrett Power, Apartheid Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation Ordi­
nances of 1910-1913, 42 Mo. L. REV. 289 (1983); R.L. Rice, Residential Segregation by Law, 
1910-1917, 34 J. SO. HIST. 179 (1968). 
51. See KELLOGG, supra note 20, at 184; George C. Wright, The NAACP and Residen­
tial Segregation in Louisville, Kentucky, 1914-1917, 78 REG. KY. HIST. Soc. 39 (1980). 
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first essentials of a free government is the right of every citizen to estab­
lish his residence where he sees fit and to move from place to place at 
pleasure. Such an ordinance as that now in question does not affect sim­
ply the convenience and comfort of those citizens to whom it applies, but 
strikes at their right to live at all.52 
Storey closed his brief with a bold echo of Justice Harlan's dissenting 
opinion in Plessy, charging that the innovative ordinance would "pro­
voke conflict between the races and [could] reduce negro citizens to a 
position of inferiority."53 Also far-sighted and a bit radical was an ami­
cus brief filed by Wells H. Blodgett and Frederick Lehmann, 
American Bar Association moguls who insisted "strenuously . . .  upon 
a single and undivided American citizenship - no hyphens."54 Innova­
tions such as the Louisville ordinance would generate a spiral of race 
animosity, for " [t]he prejudice of race grows by what it feeds upon. Its 
appetite is insatiable. "55 
Deciding Buchanan v. Warley,56 the Supreme Court agreed, refus­
ing to extend Plessy to permit legally required residential segregation. 
Because the ordinance destroyed the right of the individual to acquire, 
enjoy, and dispose of his property, it violated the Due Process Clause. 
Justice Day's opinion for the Court did not follow the radical rhetoric 
of the NAACP briefs, nor did it actually protect people of color 
against housing discrimination. After Buchanan, segregationists relied 
on discriminatory zoning ordinances and racially restrictive covenants 
in leases to preserve racially segregated housing patterns. Defending a 
white homeowner wanting to sell to a black purchaser in the District 
of Columbia, the NAACP challenged racially restrictive covenants as 
inconsistent with Buchanan. The District's court of appeals upheld an 
injunction against the sale. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal 
in Corrigan v. Buckley,57 with a written opinion ruling that the Equal 
Protection Clause is applicable to public but not private discrimina­
tion; hence, the discriminatory terms of the owner's lease were not 
constitutionally reviewable. The Court did not address the NAACP's 
argument that a judicial decree enforcing the racially restrictive cove-
52. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 35-36, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (1915 
Term, No. 33). 
53. Id. at 44. 
54. Brief of Amici Curiae Wells H. Blodgett and Frederick W. Lehmann at 7, Buchanan 
v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (1915 Term, No. 33). 
55. Id. at 8. 
56. 245 U.S. 60 (1917); see also infra Section II.C.1 (discussing Buchanan). 
57. 271 U.S. 323 (1926). Even after Corrigan, the Court continued to apply Buchanan's 
rule against ordinances requiring housing segregation. E.g., Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 
(1927) (affirming lower court decision invalidating ordinance requiring consent of a majority 
of community homeowners before a black person could establish a home there); Richmond 
v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930) (similar). 
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nant was state action, on the ground that the issue was not properly 
presented on appeal. Although the Supreme Court would later revisit 
the constitutional status of racially restrictive covenants, state and fed­
eral courts read Corrigan as placing racially restrictive covenants be­
yond the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.58 Such covenants were 
widely deployed, and residential segregation was the practical result 
almost everywhere in the United States. 
From the NAACP's point of view, the greatest price of Plessy was 
segregated education. The Association believed that opportunities for 
black people could not be realized without education and literacy. 
Most of its early efforts focused on publicizing the poor quality of 
education for blacks in the South and lobbying for funds to remedy 
that,59 but in the early 1930s the NAACP challenged the inadequate 
resources through constitutional litigation. Between 1933 and 1950, 
the Association brought or supported litigation to desegregate gradu­
ate and professional schools and to equalize the salaries and facilities 
in white and black primary and secondary schools.60 As to the latter, 
litigation was most successful when a strong attorney was in charge of 
the cases and had the support of a well-organized black community 
and a potentially receptive community of white moderates. The classic 
success story was Thurgood Marshall's work with the community in 
Maryland, a moderate state in racial politics.61 As to the former, the 
NAACP maintained that states offering black citizens no graduate 
school opportunities - not even meaningful separate ones - was 
open discrimination that even Plessy did not justify.62 Charles Houston 
litigated a number of these cases, and won · a significant victory in 
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada.63 The NAACP's brief objected to 
the state's complete exclusion of blacks from its professional schools 
and documented their under-representation as a systematic problem 
in the South. The Supreme Court agreed. After this victory, the 
NAACP established a separate NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
58. See CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, 
AND THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES 19 (1959); id. at 22-24 (Corrigan was consistent 
with the liberty of contract ideology of the era). 
59. See KELLOGG, supra note 20, at 187-99. 
60. MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED 
EDUCATION, 1925-1950, at 34 (1987). Tushnet's account of the education litigation is a less 
triumphalist interpretation than that in what is still the main authority, KLUGER, supra note 
17. 
61. See TUSHNET, supra note 60, at 34-69. 
62. See McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914) (invalidating 
an Oklahoma law excluding blacks from dining and sleeping cars, without providing compa­
rable accommodations of any sort). 
63. 305 U.S. 337 (1938); see TUSHNET, supra note 60, at 70-81 (providing an account of 
this litigation). 
2082 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:2062 
tional Fund, Inc. ("Inc. Fund"), which pressed the Association to a 
new level of constitutional discourse. 
2. The Politics of Recognition and Some Remediation, 1940-72 
Although the NAACP's agenda in its early years was dominated 
by efforts to protect the lives, liberties, and property rights of African 
Americans against state-sanctioned violence and discrimination, the 
Association was also committed to "complete equality before the law" 
for people of color.64 This aspiration reflected a nascent, albeit little­
fulfilled, politics of recognition. I view the 1930s as a transitional dec­
ade, during which that politics began to overtake the still-necessary 
politics of protection. The Texas primary cases, culminating in the tri­
umph in Allwright, reflected this transition: the right to vote was im­
portant to assure that local politics would be even somewhat protec­
tive of black people's safety and needs, but was also symbolically 
important to both people of color and the judiciary. The full citizen­
ship promised by the Reconstruction amendments was an empty 
promise without the franchise, and a democracy that formally ex­
cluded people because of their race looked more than a little like Nazi 
Germany. 
The civil rights movement's shift from a politics of protection to a 
politics of recognition was formally made when the NAACP changed 
its constitutional stance toward apartheid. During the period described 
above, its lawyers pressed constitutional arguments from within the 
Plessy framework, whereby the state had no obligation to correct so­
cial prejudice or force unwilling whites to associate with blacks, but 
did have an obligation not to be a conduit through which prejudiced 
whites could deprive blacks of their lives (Moore, Powell), fundamen­
tal liberties (Norris), or property rights (Buchanan). Tangible even if 
limited gains accompanied and may have resulted in part from this 
litigation: new apartheid laws had been stopped in their tracks even as 
old ones remained in place; black literacy had soared to eighty percent 
and the black-white ratio of teachers' salaries had risen to sixty-five 
percent (the teacher salary cases); lynching and state execution of 
black people for crimes had fallen off significantly; blacks for the first 
time in the century were able to register and vote in primary and gen­
eral elections.65 All of these gains were affected and generally acceler­
ated by the nation's experiences in and around World War II. At this 
point, Plessy itself came under siege on all fronts. 
64. Brief for Petitioner at 3, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (1957 Term, No. 
91) (quoting the NAACP's articles of incorporation). 
65. See TUSHNET, supra note 60, at 103 (teachers' salaries). 
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In 1941, A. Philip Randolph and other prominent black leaders or­
ganized a March on Washington Movement ("MOWM") insisting that 
the federal government desegregate: if people of color were going to 
be asked to die for their country, their country was obliged to afford 
them equal dignity and respect.66 Gunnar Myrdal's An American 
Dilemma, published in 1944, rubbed America's public face in the hy­
pocrisy of demonizing the Nazis as racist while practicing racial segre­
gation at home. In the Japanese curfew and evacuation cases decided 
in 1943-44, the Supreme Court announced that race-based classifica­
tions were odious to a free people, even as the Justices upheld race­
based liberty deprivations against Japanese-American citizens (to vig­
orous critique after the war).67 At the urging of the Solicitor General, 
the Supreme Court interpreted the Railway Labor Act to bar race­
based employment discrimination by railroad unions.68 
World War II cemented the case against racist policies. Not only 
did Asian as well as African Americans serve valorously during the 
war, but whites as well as people of color noticed the incongruity of 
their returning to an apartheid society after fighting a war against "the 
apostles of racism." This was the term the NAACP used in its brief 
successfully urging the Supreme Court to strike down a state law re­
quiring race segregation in interstate bus trips.69 The war also acceler­
ated the demographic shift of blacks from the rural south to urban ar­
eas in the north. The NAACP's membership soared tenfold,70 giving 
its leaders greater political credibility in national politics. To Secure 
These Rights, the 1947 report of President Truman's Committee on 
Civil Rights, called for "the elimination of segregation . . . from 
American life."71 In 1948, Truman issued an executive order requiring 
66. In response to the movement, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802, 
which prohibited race-based discrimination in federal government employment (but not in 
the armed services) as well as in defense industries doing business with the government. Af­
ter the order, which was tepidly carried out, the MOWM fizzled. See FAIRCLOUGH, supra 
note 17, at 152-59. 
67. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United 
States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943); see also infra Section II.CJ (discussing Korematsu). 
68. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
69. Brief for Appellant at 28, Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) (1945 Term, No. 
704); see [ACLU's] Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae and Brief in Support 
Thereof at 14-15, Morgan (1945 Term, No. 704) (arguing that race-based categories are in­
herently stigmatic in our society). The Supreme Court struck down the state law in Morgan 
v. Virginia. 328 U.S. 373 (1946). See also Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 97 (1941) 
(holding that forcing a black customer with a first-class ticket to ride second-class violates 
the Interstate Commerce Act). 
70. FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 17, at 182 (NAACP membership went from 50,000 in 1940 
to 500,000 in 1946). 
71 .  TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON 
CIVIL RIGHTS 166 (1947) (urging the elimination of racial segregation from the armed 
forces, public transport, housing, health care, and education). 
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desegregation in the armed forces. Public norms had changed; support 
for state-imposed segregation outside the South was waning. In the 
same year as Truman's order, the NAACP's Board of Directors offi­
cially endorsed Thurgood Marshall's position that the Association 
"not undertake any case or cooperate in any case which recognizes or 
purports to recognize the validity of segregation statutes or ordi­
nances . . . .  "72 
During the 1947 Term, Marshall pressed the NAACP's new posi­
tion in Sipuel v. Board of Regents,73 another graduate school case. The 
Inc. Fund, for the first time, urged the Court to re-examine the sepa­
rate but equal doctrine and overrule Plessy.74 Although the Court 
invalidated the state's program on the narrower ground that it was 
grossly unequal, the Justices were moving toward a renunciation of 
apartheid, albeit sensitive that they not be perceived as moving too 
precipitously or writing their opinions provocatively.75 Both the 
NAACP and the Court got a push from private litigants that same 
Term, when Shelley v. Kraemer76 presented the Court with the consti­
tutionality of judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants in 
property contracts. At the urging of the NAACP, the Solicitor 
General filed an amicus brief invoking the report of the President's 
Committee on Civil Rights to support forceful judicial anti­
discrimination rules and to criticize the destructiveness of housing seg­
regation in particular.77 Abrogating the broad reading of Corrigan by 
most lower courts, the Supreme Court unanimously held that judicial 
enforcement of the covenants was state action violating the Equal 
Protection Clause.78 That the Court was willing to fill the doctrinal 
loophole left open in Buchanan was cheering to civil rights lawyers, 
encouraging them to press ahead with an anti-apartheid campaign that 
72. TUSHNET, supra note 60, at 115 (quoting resolution). 
73. 332 U.S. 631 (1948). 
74. Brief for Petitioner at 18-51, Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (1947 
Term, No. 369). 
75. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Su­
preme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1 ,  4-13 (1979) (discussing Sipuel and several other race 
cases of the 1947 Term). 
76. 334 U.S. 1 (1948); see also Section 11.E.l (discussing Shelley). See generally VOSE, 
supra note 58, at 158-96 (providing a detailed examination of NAACP's and amici's argu­
ments in Shelley); Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. 
PA. L. REV. 473 (1962). 
77. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 1-25, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) 
(1947 Term, Nos. 72, 87, 290 & 291) (arguing that the interest of the United States is in pre­
venting racial ghettoes and an international image of apartheid); see also id. at 92-103 (ar­
guing that the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants is contrary to the public policy of 
the United States). 
78. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 14-18 (state action); id. at 18-23 (equal protection violation). 
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clearly had the support of both the Solicitor General's Office79 and a 
growing number of amici. Fifteen amicus briefs supported the Inc. 
Fund in Shelley - many more than had ever been filed in any civil 
rights case before 1948.80 Virtually sealing the case against apartheid, 
the Court in 1948 struck down two state laws discriminating on the ba­
sis of Asian race or ethnicity.81 
Within the Court, the Justices were struggling to find the right 
strategy and the best pace for leading the country away from the race­
based policies of apartheid.82 During the 1949 Term, the Court heard 
three NAACP challenges to state segregation. In two graduate school 
cases, the NAACP and supporting amici urged the Court either to 
overrule Plessy or to hold its principle inapplicable to public educa­
tion.83 The United States filed amicus briefs in both cases questioning 
Plessy and insisting that it not be extended to public graduate educa­
tion.84 In the NAACP's third case of the Term, Henderson v. United 
States,85 Solicitor General Philip Perlman (representing the respon­
dent) confessed error, and for the first time the United States directly 
urged the Court to overrule Plessy.86 "Segregation of Negroes, as prac-
79. See Philip Elman, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights 
Litigation, 1 946-1960: An Oral History, 1 00 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1 987) (reporting that the 
Solicitor General's Office informally cooperated with NAACP and with Justice Frankfurter 
within the Court during this period). 
80. In addition to the United States, other supportive amici included the ACLU, the 
AFL, the CIO, the American Jewish Committee, and the National Bar Association. Shelley, 
334 U.S. at 3-4. Three amici supported the restrictive covenants. Id. at 4. 
81. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (invalidating law barring Japanese ali­
ens from holding land through their minor children who were American citizens); Takahashi 
v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (striking down law barring the issuance of 
fishing licenses to aliens ineligible for citizenship (a category limited to Asians)); see also 
Section II.C.1 (discussing Oyama). In both cases, Justice Murphy wrote pointed concurring 
opinions linking the challenged statutes to western prejudice against Japanese immigrants. 
Oyama, 332 U.S. at 650; Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 422-27. 
82. Justices Murphy and Rutledge favored sharp anti-racism rhetoric and swift doctrinal 
action; Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Frankfurter, Reed, and Jackson favored a slow but 
sure approach; Justices Black, Douglas, and Burton were between these warring groups. See 
Hutchinson, supra note 75, at 8-13. 
83. Brief for Petitioner at 44-52, McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 
(1950) (1949 Term, No. 34) (urging the Court to overrule Plessy); id. at 36 (differentiating 
public transportation in Plessy from public education in McLaurin); Brief for Appellant at 5, 
Sweat v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (1949 Term, No. 44) (similar); see also Brief for Amici 
Curiae [Committee of Law Teachers Against Segregation in Legal Education] in Support of 
Petition for Certiorari at 4, Sweat (1949 Term, No. 44) (arguing that Plessy is flatly inconsis­
tent with the Equal Protection Clause and should be overruled). There was significant sup­
port within the Court for the NAACP's point. See Hutchinson, supra note 75, at 15-17, 19-21 .  
84. Memorandum o f  Amicus Curiae United States at 14, McLaurin (1949 Term, No. 
34); Memorandum of Amicus Curiae United States at 4-5, Sweat (1949 Term, No. 44). 
85. 339 U.S. 816 (1950). 
86. Brief for the United States at 40, Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) 
(1949 Term, No. 25) ("[T]he legal and factual assumptions" of Plessy "have been under-
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ticed in this country, is universally understood as imposing on them a 
badge of inferiority . . . .  Forbidding this group of American citizens 'to 
associate with other citizens in the ordinary course of daily living cre­
ates inequality by imposing a caste status on the minority group.' "87 
The government's argument in Henderson stirred up discussion within 
the Court as to how broadly to decide the graduate school cases. Ac­
cording to Dennis Hutchinson's careful reconstruction, the Justices 
were almost unanimous in their determination to overrule segregation 
in all three cases but were fearful that a broad rationale might trigger a 
firestorm of protest in the South.88 Under these circumstances, the 
Court found equal protection violations in the graduate school cases, 
based upon intangible differences marking the black graduate school 
as insufficient.89 In Henderson, the Court did not reach the constitu­
tional issue and simply ruled that the Interstate Commerce Act barred 
racial discrimination in railroad dining cars.90 Although Plessy had sur­
vived, its days were numbered - a prospect that filled the Justices 
with anxiety. 
Marshall and the Inc. Fund persuaded the Court to take five public 
school cases in 1952 that, they hoped, would repudiate Plessy. Brown 
v. Board of Education and its associated cases were both the 
Austerlitz and the Waterloo of the NAACP's strategy of deploying 
constitutional law to advance the status and condition of black peo­
ple. 91 On the one hand, the school segregation cases represented the 
apotheosis of blacks' politics of recognition. Supported by the Solicitor 
General, the ACLU, and four other hefty amici, the NAACP carefully 
developed the constitutional case for full and unequivocal equality. 
The Inc. Fund's briefs in the cases made three kinds of arguments 
for overruling Plessy, at least insofar as public education was con­
cerned. First, they maintained that the purpose of the Fourteenth 
mined and refuted" and the " 'separate but equal' doctrine should now be overruled and 
discarded."). 
87. Id. at 27-28. Attorney General J .  Howard McGrath argued the case along the same 
lines: "Segregation signifies and is intended to signify that a member of the colored race is 
not equal to a member of the white race." 
88. See Hutchinson, supra note 75, at 19-30 (providing a detailed account of the Justices' 
deliberations in the 1949 Term Cases). 
89. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Mclaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 
U.S. 637 (1950). 
90. 339 U.S. at 826. 
91 .  On the Austerlitz (triumphal) part, see KLUGER, supra note 17; TUSHNET, supra 
note 60 (less triumphalist). On the Waterloo part, see JACQUELINE IRVINE, BLACK 
STUDENTS AND SCHOOL FAILURE: POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND PRESCRIPTIONS (1990); 
GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? (1991) (no); Sonia Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 YALE L.J. 
1285 (1992). For something of both, see DERRICK BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND 
AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 1 992). 
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Amendment was "to eliminate race distinctions from American law," 
specifically including race-based segregation of public schools.92 The 
early cases had enforced this understanding, but later cases like Plessy 
confused the Equal Protection Clause's reasonable distinction ap­
proach, applicable to the general run of statutes, with its intended 
"prohibition of color differentiation."93 Second, the civil rights lawyers 
argued that the more recent cases had returned to the Fourteenth 
Amendment's original goal and its intended bar to race-based classifi­
cations. Justice Holmes' opinion in Herndon had it right when he 
found it "too clear for extended argument that color cannot be made 
the basis of a statutory classification affecting the right set up in this 
case."94 The brief carefully laid out for the Court the steps it had al­
ready taken to limit and trim back Plessy and argued that it was only a 
short step to overruling the precedent altogether.95 
Third, and most important for my purposes, the Inc. Fund briefs 
emphasized normative arguments for the moral, social, and political 
evils of apartheid. This was most explicit in the appendix to its opening 
brief, "The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of 
Desegregation: A Social Science Statement."96 The central point of the 
statement was the pervasive and harmful psychological effects of law­
endorsed segregation on its objects, namely, people of color, especially 
schoolchildren. Such laws signal their inferiority because of race and 
92. See Brief for Appellants at 79-120, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (1953 
Term, Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 10) (general purpose); id. at 120-89 (specific intent of Congress and 
ratifying states to bar racially segregated schools). These materials were developed in re­
sponse to the Court's order for reargument of the cases. 
93. Id. at 45-46. 
94. Id. at 46 (quoting Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927)). It is odd that the 
NAACP did not emphasize dicta in the Japanese war cases, where the Court said that race­
based classifications of all sorts were presumptively unconstitutional. See supra note 67 and 
accompanying text. That the Court in both cases upheld race-based directives in time of war 
perhaps made these authorities particularly unsavory for the NAACP, which had not par­
ticipated in them. In any event, other briefs in the case did rely on those earlier precedents 
to argue that race-based discrimination is all but prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. 
See Brief of Amici Curiae American Veterans Comm. at 4-5, 12-13, Brown (1953 Term, No. 
8). 
95. Brief for Appellants at 47-50, Brown (1953 Term, Nos. 1 ,  2, 4, 5, 10). The Inc. Fund 
argued that Buchanan refused to extend Plessy to property and housing segregation, a re­
fusal dramatically extended in Shelley. Even in the arena of transportation, subsequent cases 
- McCabe, Henderson - trimmed back Plessy's ambit, and Morgan v. Virginia overruled its 
application to interstate transportation. In the education arena, the Court had never thor­
oughly considered the application of Plessy, and the intangible benefits rationale of the 
graduate school cases - Gaines, Sipuel, Sweatt, McLaurin - provided a sound reason to 
reject Plessy in elementary and secondary schools as well. 
96. The Statement was appended to the first set of Appellants' Briefs, Brown (1953 
Term, Nos. 8, 101, 191) [hereinafter Social Science Statement]. It was signed by thirty-two 
eminent scientists, including Gordon Allport, Kenneth and Mamie Clark, Robert Merton, 
and Samuel Stouffer. 
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undermine their ability to see "their own dignity as human beings."97 
Racial segregation also contributes to rigid and authoritarian person­
alities among white schoolchildren and gives them a "distorted sense 
of social reality,"98 perpetuates absurd stereotypes and "leads to a 
blockage in the communications and interaction between the two 
groups,"99 and contributes to interracial violence and discord. This part 
of the statement supported the NAACP's longstanding position that 
segregation denied black people the respect they deserved as human 
beings and the full rights of citizenship guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In this stance, the Inc. Fund was powerfully backed up 
by the amicus brief for the United States, which asserted that 
apartheid was profoundly undemocratic.100 The latter half of the 
NAACP's supplemental statement maintained that racial variation is 
benign from a scientific point of view.101 From a policy perspective, not 
only does segregation contribute to psychological and social turmoil, 
but " [  u ]nder certain circumstances desegregation not only proceeds 
without major difficulties, but has been observed to lead to the emer­
gence of more favorable attitudes and friendlier relations between 
races." 102 
Most of the Justices accepted the NAACP's normative arguments, 
but several were uncertain that they were decisive as to the constitu­
tional issues, and all were fearful of the political turmoil they believed 
would follow any decision requiring desegregation of public schools.103 
After reargument, and much soul-searching, a surprisingly unanimous 
Court in Brown v. Board of Education ("Brown 1")104 accepted the Inc. 
Fund's invitation to declare that race-based segregation in public 
schools violated the Equal Protection Clause. In Bolling v. Sharpe,105 
the Court reached the same result for schools in the District of 
Columbia, under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
Chief Justice Warren's Brown opinion invoked the importance of edu-
97. Id. at 4. 
98. Id. at 6-7. 
99. Id. at 8. 
100. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 2-8, Brown (1952 Term, Nos. 8, 101, 191, 
412, 448). 
101 .  Social Science Statement, supra note 96, at 12. 
102. Id. at 15 .  
103. The Court's internal deliberations, including several conferences, two rearguments, 
and the deft work of Chief Justice Warren (who joined the Court between the first argument 
(1952 Term) and the second (1953 Term)), are comprehensively set forth in KLUGER, supra 
note 17, at 543-747; Hutchinson, supra note 75, at 34-44; Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What 
Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867 (1991). 
104. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see infra Sections 11.C.1 and III.A. (discussing Brown l). 
105. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
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cation to citizenship, the demonstrated harms that segregated educa­
tion visited on minority schoolchildren, and the intangible as well as 
tangible ways that a segregated school system could not deliver equal 
education.106 The opinion did not exactly overrule Plessy and only dis­
avowed its reasoning to the extent inconsistent with its own ration­
ale. 101 Nonetheless, lower courts immediately agreed with the NAACP 
that Brown's disapproval of racial segregation extended beyond edu­
cation. In a series of per curiam opinions, the Supreme Court silently 
affirmed those decisions.108 Brown I was a great victory for the 
NAACP. 
One year later, the Court decided Brown v. Board of Education 
("Brown 11") ,109 where the Court announced its remedy for the viola­
tions found in Brown I. This was not a victory for the NAACP. The 
Inc. Fund argued for "immediate" relief once the Court invalidated 
apartheid and for decrees requiring desegregation "as quickly as pre­
requisite administrative and mechanical procedures can be com­
pleted. " 1 10 The Eisenhower Administration argued for remands to the 
various local courts where the cases originated, "with directions to 
carry out this Court's decision as rapidly as the particular circum­
stances permit[.]"11 1 Most of the states of the South submitted amicus 
briefs to the Court arguing for "a gradual adjustment" away from seg­
regated schools, so as to accommodate the needs of school administra­
tors and of those people unwilling to send their children to integrated 
public schools.112 The Supreme Court took the middle road, following 
the Eisenhower Administration and not the NAACP. Brown II re­
manded the cases to their originating courts to fashion injunctive relief 
106. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493-94. 
107. Id. at 495. 
108. See New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per 
curiam) (invalidating segregation in municipal parks and golf course); Gayle v. Browder, 352 
U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (city buses); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City v. Daw­
son, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (public bathhouses and beaches); Holmes v. Atlanta, 
350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (municipal golf course). 
109. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
110. Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2, and 3 and for Respondents in No. 5 on Further 
Reargument at 10-24, Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (1954 Term, No. 1 ). 
1 1 1 .  Brief for the United States on the Further Argument of the Questions of Relief at 
27-29, Brown II (1954 Term, No. 1) . 
112. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae John Ben Shepperd Attorney General of Texas at 
3-4, Brown (1954 Term, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4) ; Brief of Amicus Curiae Harry McMullan Attorney 
General of North Carolina at 13-18, Brown JI (1954 Term, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4); Brief of Amicus 
Curiae Attorney General of Florida Richard W. Ervin at 3-56, Brown JI (1954 Term, Nos. 1,  
2, 3 ,  5) (justifying the "gradual adjustment" criterion by reference to an empirical survey by 
the state); Brief of Amicus Curiae Attorney General of Arkansas Tom Gentry at 13-21, 
Brown JI (1954 Term, Nos. 1, 2, 3 ,  5), (arguing that the remedy in the case should be left to 
Congress, legislating pursuant to its authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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through "such orders and decrees . . .  as are necessary and proper to 
admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis and with 
all deliberate speed the parties to these cases." 1 13 What I am calling a 
politics of remediation got off to an exceedingly slow start with Brown 
II. As discussed below, the NAACP's petition that the Equal 
Protection Clause required an integrated restructuring of American 
public education had a very uneven reception by judges in the half 
century since Brown. 
At the same time the NAACP was closing in on its ambiguous vic­
tory in Brown, other grass-roots groups of African Americans were 
pursuing other kinds of campaigns against apartheid. The most famous 
were boycotts and sit-ins seeking to pressure private as well as public 
institutions to desegregate. The Montgomery bus boycott of 1955-56 
was a grass-roots movement of black citizens who organized them­
selves to overturn racially segregated bus service. The boycott cam­
paign not only revealed the power of grass-roots organizing (a fact 
well-appreciated by the NAACP as key features of its equal 
pay/facilities and desegregation litigations), but brought regional and 
then national publicity to the struggle of African Americans and to 
their leaders, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and the new Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference ("SCLC").114 The civil rights move­
ment became a truly mass social movement. Although the SCLC and 
NAACP enjoyed a rivalrous relationship, they were both dedicated to 
a politics of recognition similar to that articulated in the NAACP's 
constitutional briefs. The Inc. Fund's victory in Brown I not only gave 
people of color tangible hope and inspiration that their normative vi­
sion was both right and achievable, but also gave them valuable white 
allies in their specific activities. 1 15 For example, the boycotters in 
Montgomery were able to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat when 
the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court order declaring segregated 
municipal bus service unconstitutional under Brown l. 1 16 
Triumph in Brown I and Montgomery not only fueled a mass so­
cial movement of African Americans and their allies, but also trig­
gered a politically intense "states rights" countermovement of whites 
1 13. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301. 
114. See generally TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING 
YEARS 1954-63 (1988); GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, supra note 17; ALDON D. MORRIS, 
THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR 
CHANGE (1984). 
1 15. See David J. Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown 
v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 151, 152-57 (1994) (responding to Michael J. Klar­
man, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994), and 
ROSENBERG, supra note 91). 
1 16. See Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam); MORRIS, supra note 1 14, 
at 63. 
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opposed to racial integration.117 The negative political reaction antici­
pated by the NAACP and the Supreme Court slowly but inexorably 
grew into a regional revolt. Southern whites not only denounced 
Brown I with increasing fervor, but many of them openly argued for 
nullifying it, and not a few resorted to violence.118 The result was a se­
ries of confrontations between black people's politics of recognition 
and southern white people's politics of prese·rvation. The confronta­
tions took the form of official defiance or refusal to desegregate public 
schools, state laws barring or harassing the NAACP and other groups, 
and (in the early 1960s) mass arrests of peaceful black protesters by 
sometimes violent white police.119 
The most apparent manifestation of southern resistance was the 
almost complete refusal of southern school districts to desegregate in 
compliance with Brown I and Brown II. Most of this resistance was 
passive, whereby school districts ignored Brown II or made minimal 
gestures toward token compliance, but much resistance was open and 
aggressive.12° For a famous example of the latter, the governor and 
legislature of Arkansas directed the Little Rock school district to defy 
Brown, but the federal appeals court rejected this as a basis for delay­
ing desegregation. In Cooper v. Aaron,121 the Supreme Court not only 
held the district to the terms of the lawful court decree, as the 
NAACP and Solicitor General urged, but went beyond the briefs to 
say that state officials had an obligation to obey the Constitution as it 
was construed by the Court.122 The Eisenhower Administration reluc­
tantly supported the Court in Little Rock, and Congress in 1957 gave 
the Court further support by authorizing, in the first civil rights legisla­
tion since 1875, the Department of Justice to initiate litigation to sup­
port voting and other civil rights against recalcitrant localities. In 
Griffin v. County School Board,123 the Court held that Prince Edward 
1 17. See generally NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE (1969); 
BENJAMIN MUSE, VIRGINIA'S MASSIVE RESISTANCE (1961); FRANCIS M. WILHOIT, THE 
POLITICS OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE (1973). 
1 18. NEIL R. MCMILLEN, THE CITIZENS' COUNCIL: ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE 
SECOND RECONSTRUCTION, 1954-64 (1971). 
1 19. For detailed accounts of these and other means of segregationist resistance, see 
BARTLEY, supra note 1 17; ROSENBERG, supra note 91, at 107-56. 
120. J. HARVIE WILKINSON 111, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
SCHOOL INTEGRATION, 1954-1978, at 79-102 (1979); cf Mary Dudziak, The Limits of Good 
Faith: Desegregation in Topeka, Kansas: 1950-1956, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 351 (1987) (noting 
that there was little integration even in Topeka). 
121 .  358 U.S. 1 (1958) (signed by all nine Justices); see also Daniel A. Farber, The Su­
preme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387; Sec­
tion 11.E.1 (discussing Cooper). 
122. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18-19. 
123. 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
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County could not close down its public schools in an effort to evade 
Brown's mandate. 
Southern states also lashed out at the persons and groups sup­
porting civil rights for people of color. A number of states adopted 
laws aimed at the NAACP.124 For example, Alabama adopted a law 
requiring the NAACP to register and reveal its membership lists, and 
then prosecuted and fined the Association for failing to comply. The 
NAACP challenged the state action as inconsistent with the "free 
speech and free association" rights guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.125 This freedom, the NAACP maintained, was essential 
to the peaceful political " [ s ]olution of the American race problem. "126 
The Supreme Court unanimously agreed in NAA CP v. Alabama,127 
holding that the state could not interfere with the NAACP's politics of 
recognition. Crippled by local penalties, the NAACP was able to sur­
vive in the South only because of these constitutional protections. 128 
Starting in 1960, civil rights activism took the form of peaceful sit­
ins at segregated lunch counters and protest marches objecting to 
apartheid. Although the protesters were uniformly peaceful, they were 
often arrested for violating ordinances prohibiting breaches of the 
peace, disorderly conduct, obstruction of sidewalks, or parading with­
out licenses. One after another, convictions of civil rights protesters 
rolled through southern state courts - only to be reversed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.129 The constitutional policy animating the reversals 
was that local authorities were treating civil rights dissenters differ­
ently than they would have treated any other group. Doctrinally, the 
reversals depended upon the facts of the different cases. Some went 
off on the due process ground that there was not sufficient evidence to 
124. See Walter Murphy, The South Counterattacks: The Anti-NAACP Laws, 12 W. 
POL. Q. 371 (1959). 
125. See Brief for Petitioner at 21-25, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (1957 
Term, No. 91). 
126. Id. at 21. 
127. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
128. The NAACP successfully relied on the Alabama precedent to challenge other indi­
rect harassments in Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960), NAA CP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 
(1 963), and Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963). See 
also Section 11.F.1 (discussing these precedents) . 
129. See William J. Brennan Papers, Library of Congress, Container I: 77, Folder 6 
[hereinafter Brennan Papers]. About two dozen appeals or petitions for certiorari by sit-in 
defendants, convicted by courts in seven southern states, came to the Court during the 1962 
Term. In a series of memoranda to the Conference, the Chief Justice summarized each of 
the cases and presented a preliminary constitutional analysis. The Court reversed six convic­
tions in opinions issued on May 23, 1963, and the remainder were subsequently reversed, for 
the most part summarily. 
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meet the statutory criteria for punishment,130 others on the equal pro­
tection ground that protesters were discriminated against because of 
their race,131 and a good many on the First Amendment ground that 
the state was unreasonably regulating expressive activity.132 
Even without constitutional protections, the protests and marches 
of the early 1960s would have transformed America, for the interna­
tional news coverage displayed images of idealistic black bodies pom­
meled by bigoted white clubs and firehoses.133 Dr. King's pivotal 
Birmingham campaign energized the civil rights movement.134 Within 
ten weeks of the city's capitulation to the SCLC's demands in May 
1963, as many as 758 demonstrations occurred in 186 cities throughout 
the South.135 Within six months, the movement had triumphed in its 
bold March on Washington, where Dr. King's "I Have a Dream" 
speech (a classic articulation of the politics of recognition) inspired a 
generation.136 Less than a year after the march, President Johnson 
sign'ed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provided federal enforce­
ment mechanisms, including the withholding of funds from discrimina­
tory programs, as a means for finally making actual progress against 
public segregation and further established rules against discrimination 
by private employers and accommodations as well.137 A year after that, 
Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which gave teeth to the 
NAACP's arguments in Guinn and Allwright by establishing strong 
130. E.g., Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (relying on the principle of Thomp­
son v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960)). 
131. E.g., Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); see also Section 11.E.3 
(discussing Peterson) . 
132. E.g., Shuttlesworth v. B irmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 
559 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). But see Walker v. City of Bir­
mingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1969) (upholding conviction of protesters for violating state court 
injunction, even though based upon ordinance invalidated in Shuttlesworth) . See also Section 
11.F.1 (discussing Shuttlesworth, Cox, and Edwards) . 
133. See Michael J. Klarman, Civil Rights Law: Who Made It and How Much Did It 
Matter?, 83 GEO. L.J. 433 (1994) (arguing that Brown I contributed indirectly to public rejec­
tion of apartheid, by galvanizing a series of confrontations between heroic blacks and idiotic 
whites which provoked international shock) [hereinafter Klarman, Civil Rights Law] . 
134. See GLENN ESKEW, BUT FOR BIRMINGHAM: THE LOCAL AND NATIONAL 
MOVEMENTS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE (1997). 
135. THOMAS R. BROOKS, WALLS COME TUMBLING DOWN: A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1940-1970 at 210 (1974). 
136. See TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1963-65 
(1998); GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, supra note 17, at 277-86. 
137. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-h (2000). On the background of the CRA and the critical impor­
tance of civil rights activism, see HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS 
AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1960-1972 (1990). 
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direct as well as prophylactic protections against efforts to deny peo­
ple of color their right to vote.138 
The political energy released by these developments pressed the 
civil rights agenda in many different directions. One was the comple­
tion of the NAACP's politics of recognition: invalidation of laws bar­
ring or criminalizing different-race marriages and cohabitation. The 
Supreme Court had ducked the issue in the 1950s,139 presumably be­
cause white hysteria about interracial sexuality would have explosively 
mobilized further hostility to Brown /. 140 The NAACP renewed its 
objections in 1964, when it challenged the Court to strike down a 
Florida law criminalizing different-race cohabitation. Invoking the 
Japanese curfew and evacuation cases as well as Brown I, the Inc. 
Fund maintained that the statute was per se invidious; race must 
henceforth be "irrelevant" to statutory policies.141 The civil rights law­
yers also directly challenged the normative coherence of the state's 
"racial purity" justification for the policy: scientists have debunked the 
idea of pure races and have shown that there are no relevant differ­
ences among the races, except perhaps for some superficial physical 
features; racial variation is not only benign, but Florida's treatment of 
it as a matter of consequence is a legacy of slavery that the 
Reconstruction amendments were centrally aimed at eradicating.142 A 
unanimous Court agreed with the NAACP in McLaughlin v. 
Florida,143 and at the Inc. Fund's further petition the Court declared 
unconstitutional laws barring different-race marriages in Loving v. 
Virginia.144 Part I of Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the unanimous 
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a-p (2000). On the background of the VRA and the critical impor­
tance of civil rights activism, see DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER 
KING, JR. AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 (1978). The best compilation of primary 
source material appears in 1 RACE, VOTING, REDISTRICTING AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 73-248 (Marsha J. Tyson 
Darling ed., 2001). 
139. Nairn v. Nairn, 350 U.S. 985 (mem) (1956) (declining to review the Virginia Su­
preme Court decision, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), which upheld Virginia's racist anti­
miscegenation law). 
140. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 174 (1962) (hereinafter BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH]; cf Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985 
DUKE L.J. 624 (arguing that hysteria about interracial sexuality was at the heart of southern 
devotion to racial segregation generally). 
141 . Brief for Appellants at 12-13, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (1964 
Term, No. 11). 
142. See id. at 20-26. 
143. 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (overruling Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883)); see also 
Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (striking down Louisiana law requiring that elec­
tion ballots signify race of candidates). 
144. 388 U.S. 1 (1967); see Brief for Appellants, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) 
(1966 Term, No. 395) (making same arguments as the Inc. Fund's brief in McLaughlin) .  
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Loving Court reasoned that racial classifications resting upon policies 
of white purity or, even worse, white supremacy were per se invalid 
under the Equal Protection Clause.145 
A second consequence of the new political support for civil rights 
was that there was finally progress toward the post-Brown politics of 
remediation for public school segregation. After enactment of the 
Civil Rights Act, the nation seemed publicly committed to the norm of 
desegregation, and the financial and legal resources of the federal 
government provided critical pressure on school districts to desegre­
gate with more speed than deliberateness.146 The new political climate 
emboldened the Inc. Fund to argue more insistently for transitions 
from dual systems of black and white schools to unitary systems of 
fully integrated schools. Judge John Minor Wisdom of the Fifth 
Circuit accepted the NAACP's understanding of Brown in a series of 
decisions culminating in United States v. Jefferson County Board of 
Education.147 " [T]he only adequate redress for a previously overt sys­
tem-wide policy of segregation directed against Negroes as a collective 
entity is a system-wide policy of integration."148 Systemic injury re­
quired a systemic remedy. Wisdom directed that a strong remedial de­
cree be entered, setting forth in detail how the school districts were to 
proceed in order to make the transition to a unitary system.149 
The Inc. Fund and the Johnson Administration's Solicitor General 
Erwin Griswold pressed Jefferson and the idea of immediate systemic 
remediation onto the Supreme Court in Green v. County School 
Board. 150 After leaving district courts with virtually no guidance as to 
what steps Brown II required segregated school districts to take, the 
Court interpreted Brown II to impose an "affirmative duty to take 
whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in 
145. Loving, 388 U.S. at 9-12; see also Section 11.C.l (discussing Loving). 
146. Frank Read, Judicial Evolution and the Law of School Integration Since Brown v. 
Board of Education, 39 LA w & CONTEMP. PRO BS. 7 (Winter 1975). The Act authorized the 
Justice Department to bring school desegregation lawsuits, which relieved the Inc. Fund of 
the full burden of litigating the cases. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 407(a), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
2000c-6(a). The same law also barred federal monies from going to programs discriminating 
on the basis of race, under which HEW in 1965-66 promulgated tough guidelines requiring 
segregated school districts to improve their numbers if they wanted to receive federal funds. 
Id. ; see also James Dunn, Title VI, the Guidelines and School Desegregation in the South, 53 
VA. L. REV. 42 (1967). 
. 
147. 372 F.2d. 836 (5th Cir. 1966). 
148. Id. at 869. 
149. Id. at 897-900. 
150. 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (striking down a freedom-of-choice plan). See Brief for Peti­
tioners at 28, Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (1967 Term, No. 695); Memo­
randum of Amicus Curiae United States at 4-5, Green (1967 Term, No. 695). 
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which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch. "151 
The duty of root and branch reform would, the Court suggested, be 
measured by results: if most black students were left in segregated 
schools by a plan, that was probably not a unitary system. 
A third feature of the invigorated civil rights agenda was a more 
ambitious version of the old politics of protection that included some 
lessons from the newer politics of remediation. The NAACP and a 
growing array of allied groups continued to challenge state efforts to 
deprive people of color of their liberties, especially their electoral and 
criminal procedural rights. 152 But the Association and its allies (like the 
ACLU) now conceptualized their objections more broadly and posed 
structural solutions to repeated rights violations. Thus, various civil 
rights groups pressed for elimination of poll taxes and other facially 
race-neutral means of black disenfranchisement. 153 They worked with 
the Department of Justice to craft the Voting Rights Act, which not 
only protected against discrimination, but also established tough pro­
phylactic measures to assure federal monitoring of southern voting 
practices and rules. Lawsuits challenged a whole array of structures 
that assertedly undermined equal service of blacks on juries, and in 
1964 the NAACP persuaded the Supreme Court to allow weak judi­
cial monitoring of prosecutors' use of peremptory challenges that ex­
cluded blacks from juries.154 In 1963, the NAACP initiated a campaign 
against the death penalty, which had long been applied in a racially 
discriminatory manner. (Section II.D discusses this campaign in some 
detail.) 
3. The Politics of Remediation and the New Politics of Preservation, 
1972-Present 
Before World War II, most white opposition to desegregation or 
racial equality was driven by open commitments to a natural law phi­
losophy in which racial differences were viewed as profound and ma-
1 51. Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38. This was a burden on the school board "to come forward 
with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now." Id. at 
439. 
152. See, e.g. , United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965) (striking down literacy 
tests applied in a racially discriminatory manner); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 
(1960) (invalidating a gerrymander designed to minimize black voting); see infra Section 
II.E.l (discussing Gomillion). 
153. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (barring poll taxes); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 
396 U.S. 320 (1970) (challenging a structure for jury selection that yielded discriminatory 
patterns). 
154. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
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lignant and the white race's purity was threatened by racial mixing.155 
Such natural law attitudes were the primary engine for southern white 
"massive resistance" to Brown I and any form of racial integration in 
the 1950s.156 As the civil rights movement gained political support out­
side the South, a more moderate oppositionist stance developed: de­
nying that they viewed racial differences as malignant and sometimes 
conceding that change must come to the South, moderates opposed 
legal or constitutional requirements on pragmatic grounds - they 
were not needed, they would not work, they would be counterproduc­
tive, and so forth.157 Whereas natural law conservatives sought to pre­
serve as much of an enclave for racial segregation as they could, prag­
matic conservatives did not publicly claim segregation as a goal, but 
instead argued against remedial responses that were "excessive" from 
the community's perspective. 
Although driven by different substantive commitments and pres­
entation, both natural law and pragmatic preservationists invoked the 
Constitution. For them, desegregation imposed by judges in 
Washington, D.C. was at war with (1) the federalist structure, where 
states were entitled to set local policy, without interference from the 
national government; (2) the constitutional separation of powers, 
whereby the popularly elected legislature is both the most legitimate 
and the most institutionally competent state organ to handle complex, 
polycentric issues of educational policy; and (3) the liberties of white 
people, such as their right not to associate with black people (and vice 
versa) and their right not to be subject to "reverse discrimination."158 
However expressed, the politics of preservation was a losing reac­
tionary cause in the 1950s and early 1960s, when its "massive resis­
tance" was dominated by natural law extremists who stubbornly in­
sisted on formal apartheid. Once the civil rights agenda shifted in the 
155. See Hovenkamp, supra note 140, at 627-37. This kind of thinking remained popular 
in the South after the war. See, e.g., DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF RAGE: GEORGE 
WALLACE, THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW CONSERVATISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS (1995) [hereinafter CARTER, POLITICS OF RAGE]. 
156. See BARTLEY, supra note 117, at 237-39, 320-22, 326-32 (providing detailed re­
porting of stated opposition to integration grounded in natural law); MCMILLEN, supra note 
118, at 161-88 (giving a complicated description of the "scientific," religious, historical, and 
sociological strands of local oppositionists' natural law attitudes). 
157. See BARTLEY, supra note 117, at 338-39 (documenting the decline of massive resis­
tance and ascendance of pragmatic opposition); ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON 
JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE 182-201 (2002) (contrasting old-style segregationists 
like Theodore Bilbo with pragmatic segregationist Richard Russell, but icily demonstrating 
that Russell was privately just as racist as Bilbo). 
158. For examples of these constitutionalized arguments against integration "forced" by 
federal judges upon unwilling states, see CARTER, POLITICS OF RAGE, supra note 155, at 
136-38, 157-58 (Governor George Wallace); WILKINSON, supra note 120, at 80-84 (southern 
state court judges, mainly hysterical opponents). 
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late 1960s, from the virtually completed recognition phase (Loving v. 
Virginia) to a serious process of remediation, the politics of preserva­
tion shifted its focus to pragmatic arguments and gained support from 
moderates and nonracists. Once people of color could no longer claim 
that the state was openly disrespecting their equal citizenship, moder­
ate whites were less impressed with the urgency of their claims. And 
when their constitutional demands shifted from formal equality to ac­
tual equality, preservationists could emphasize practical rather than 
dignitary arguments. The white audience was particularly receptive to 
pragmatic claims that black people's remedial demands would impose 
significant costs on the white community - not just the monetary 
costs of implementation, but more fundamentally (and speculatively) 
degradation in public schooling, reallocation of economic entitle­
ments, and intrusions of federal bureaucrats and judges into local mat­
ters. 1 59 Elected President in 1968, Richard Nixon appealed to the new 
centrist politics of preservation: his campaign reaffirmed the anti­
apartheid norm but aligned Nixon with southern and blue-collar 
whites by endorsing localism and equality of opportunity, shibboleths 
for the new opposition to civil rights.160 Nixon's four Supreme Court 
appointments (1969-71) echoed his civil rights pragmatism. Always re­
asserting formal equality for Americans of all races and ethnicities, the 
Burger Court between 1970 and 1978 set forth limits to the Warren 
Court's potentially expansive constitutional protections for people of 
color.161 A moderate politics of preservation won an even bigger vic­
tory when Ronald Reagan was elected president in 1980. Prodded by 
post-civil rights federalists, the Reagan Court has more vigorously 
protected the racial status quo against civil rights perturbation, under 
the same doctrinal flags (localism, institutional competence, and white 
people's rights), but more aggressively waved. 
The dialectic between a civil rights politics of remediation and 
159. See generally Jonathan Rieder, The Rise of the Silent Majority, in THE RISE AND 
FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980, at 243-66 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 
1989). On the changing white opposition to the civil rights movement after the 1950s, see 
How ARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND 
INTERPRETATIONS 99-170 (1997); ROBERT C. SMITH, RACISM IN THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS 
ERA: Now You SEE IT, Now You DON'T (1995); DA YID T. WELLMAN, PORTRAITS OF 
WHITE RACISM 27-62, 223-47 (1993). 
160. See CARTER, POLITICS OF RAGE, supra note 155, at 326-31, 349-51,  386-99; DEAN 
J. KOTLOWSKI, NIXON'S CIVIL RIGHTS (2001); STEVEN F. LAWSON, IN PURSUIT OF POWER: 
SOUTHERN BLACKS AND ELECTORAL POLITICS, 1965-1982 at 121-57 (1985) (describing 
Nixon's "southern strategy" in 1968). 
161. The relationship of the Burger Court to the Warren Court is complicated. The 
Burger Court expanded many Warren Court initiatives (criminal procedure, see Section 
11.A.1; the death penalty, see Section 11.D), but on matters touching racial justice the Burger 
Court typically drew the line at issues settled by the Warren Court and refused to proceed 
further (see this Section, Section 11.C, and Section 11.E). 
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preservationist objections played out most dramatically in the Brown 
II cases. As public schools were actually integrated, often through fed­
eral busing orders, white communities often accepted pragmatic ar­
guments that the civil rights remedy was undermining public education 
and that their own children were being harmed. Because moderates 
were unwilling to retreat from Brown I, the open battleground was 
what Brown II and Green required. Similar debates resulted from the 
civil rights movement's demands that the state revisit allocational poli­
cies that were racially neutral on their face but had racially discrimina­
tory effects and that governments engage in affirmative action to inte­
grate state workforces and public works projects. Although the 
doctrinal playing out of the constitutional arguments differed, the 
school desegregation, discriminatory effects, and affirmative action 
cases all illustrated the normative debate between the civil rights vi­
sion of an actually integrated America and the preservationist vision 
of a formally colorblind America. 
a. Busing and the School Desegregation Decrees. As suggested 
above, the NAACP's politics of remediation insisted on more than 
formal desegregation of public schools, and the Supreme Court 
seemed to accept that vision in Green. After Green, district judges de­
veloped detailed decrees for actual school integration, usually in con­
sultation with education experts and the school districts. For rural dis­
tricts such as the one in Green, remediation was fairly straightforward, 
as there were few schools and students could be shifted around with­
out much physical difficulty. Larger urban districts presented harder 
remedial trade-offs, for segregated housing patterns meant that more 
ambitious changes would have to occur - and the plans yielding the 
most integration were those requiring busing of students away from 
their neighborhood schools. The most famous effort was that of Judge 
Jam es McMillan, whose decree reconfigured the Charlotte­
Mecklenburg (North Carolina) school system, pervasively reassigned 
teachers and students with an eye toward achieving racial balance, and 
required that thousands of students be bused to school every day. The 
Fourth Circuit reversed this ambitious decree as overenforcing Brown 
II. The Supreme Court reinstated Judge McMillan's decree in Swann 
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.162 
The briefs in the case reflected the shift in preservationist constitu­
tionalism toward pragmatic arguments for going slowly, and away 
from abrasive claims of absolute entitlement. In Green, the state had 
argued that integration such as that pressed by the Inc. Fund was at 
war with the "fundamental right of parents to direct the education of 
162. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). For a detailed account of the Justices' deliberation, see 
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SWANN'S WAY: THE SCHOOL BUSING CASE AND THE SUPREME 
COURT (1986) (hereinafter SCHWARTZ, SWANN'S WAY). 
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their children" and with the deference courts should show to local 
educators.163 The briefs in Swann hardly neglected these themes, but 
the most sophisticated brief, authored by Richmond attorney Lewis 
Powell, emphasized pragmatic reasons why Judge McMillan should 
not have required massive busing. On the one hand, Powell empha­
sized the enormous costs of busing - the psychic harms to children 
removed from familiar environments and the loss of the huge advan­
tages of neighborhood schools. 164 On the other hand, he argued that 
the apparent advantage of busing - actual school integration - was 
unrealistic, because in the longer term busing would accelerate the 
flight of white parents and their children toward private schools or 
schools in areas without busing orders. 165 
Powell's argument appealed to Chief Justice Burger, who sought to 
impose federalism and cost-benefit limits on trial judges crafting 
Green remedial decrees. But Burger's colleagues insisted on revisions 
to his draft opinions that were so extensive that the final, unanimous 
opinion in Swann was a complete triumph for the Inc. Fund. 166 Its cen­
tral holding was that once a Brown I violation had been shown, the 
federal district court has broad equitable powers to remedy the viola­
tion. The opinion in Swann praised Judge McMillan and affirmed his 
decree, including his goal of achieving a 71/29 white/black balance in 
as many schools as possible. Although this remedy was explicitly race­
based, the Court construed it as not imposing a rigid quota onto the 
school system and justified it as a flexible goal.167 As a warning to 
judges in other cases, the Court admonished that Brown violations 
warranted "a presumption against schools that are substantially dis­
proportionate in their racial composition."168 Finally, the Court upheld 
the busing requirement, based upon the trial judge's finding that it was 
necessary to remedy the Brown violations and notwithstanding the 
163. Brief for Respondents at 26, Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) 
(1967 Term, No. 695). This brief, in turn, was much more moderate than the fervent appeal 
to states rights and freedom of association in Brief for the Board of Supervisors of Prince 
Edward County, Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (1963 Term, No. 592). 
164. Brief of Amicus Curiae Commonwealth of Virginia at 22-25, Swann v. Charlotte­
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971 ) (1970 Term, Nos. 281, 349). 
165. Id. at 16. 
166. Although Burger assigned the opinion for the Court to himself, Justices Brennan 
and Stewart engineered a palace coup that essentially took over the opinion-drafting proc­
ess. See SCHWARTZ, SWANN'S WAY, supra note 162, at 100-84. 
167. Swann, 402 U.S. at 22-25. 
168. id. at 26. 
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cost-benefit, federalism, and separation of powers objections raised by 
the various briefs.169 
As had earlier cases, Swann came from a southern or border state, 
but segregated schools were a national phenomenon. Keyes v. School 
District No. 1 170 was the first post-Brown Supreme Court desegrega­
tion case outside the South. Part of the Denver school system had 
been manipulated to achieve racially segregated schools in violation of 
Brown I, and the issue presented was whether that justified a city-wide 
remedy under Green. The Court was narrowly divided but inclined to 
follow Justice Brennan's proposal of a remand with instructions to 
consider city-wide busing. There was a complication. Lewis Powell, 
the pragmatic advocate in Swann but a Justice in Keyes, proposed that 
the Court extend Green's broad remedial obligations beyond districts 
that had been segregated de jure to those that were segregated de 
facto. Powell's biographer maintains that there was a Court majority 
for his position, but because Powell parted company with these col­
leagues on the busing issue he was unwilling to join forces with 
Brennan to write his de facto segregation views into law.171 Because 
the Court never revisited the issue, the de jure/de facto distinction 
serendipitously became a controlling principle of law in the school 
desegregation cases. 
In Milliken v. Bradley,172 Justice Powell's pragmatic preservation­
ism placed an important limit on the Green-Swann remedial jugger­
naut. The issue was whether a finding of de jure school segregation in 
one school district (Detroit) justified a remedial order extending to 
other districts (the suburbs) if the district court found that racial inte­
gration was not possible otherwise. The state objected that this broad 
a remedy not only violated the due process rights of the non-culpable 
districts, but was at war with the principle of local control of public 
education.173 The Nixon Justices, joined by Stewart, rested on a legal-
169. Id. at 29-31; cf id. at 17-18 (noting that Title IV precluded the Justice Department 
from seeking busing as a remedy for school segregation but disclaiming that as a limitation 
on judicial orders). 
170. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
171. According to JOHN c. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 302-05 (1994) 
[hereinafter JEFFRIES, JUSTICE POWELL], Brennan offered to redraft his opinion to discard 
the de facto-de jure distinction, but not at the cost of diluting Swann's approval of busing. 
Because he was so opposed to busing for pragmatic reasons, Keyes, 413 U.S. at 237-52 (Pow­
ell, J . ,  concurring in part and dissenting in part), Powell went his own way, and his attack on 
the distinction, id. at 223-36, drew the support only of Justice Douglas in the end. Id. at 214-
17 (Douglas, J.). 
172. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
173. See Brief for Petitioners at 82-85, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (No. 73-
434) (citing Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 469 (1972), and San An­
tonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-50, 54 (1973) (Powell, J.)); see also Sec­
tion 1 1 .C (discussing Rodriguez). 
2102 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:2062 
ism (the remedy should match the violation) but also endorsed 
Powell's pragmatic concerns with busing. "No single tradition in public 
education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation 
of schools," wrote the Chief Justice; "local autonomy has long been 
thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and 
support for public schools and to quality of the educational process."174 
Although the Supreme Court, often over the dissents of Powell and 
Rehnquist, sometimes approved broad remedial orders sought by the 
Inc. Fund and other civil rights lawyers,175 the tide turned with 
Milliken: for reasons of both federalism and pragmatism, local control 
of schools was a value that had to be considered alongside the rights of 
black schoolchildren.176 
Milliken can be viewed as a self-fulfilling prophecy: once white 
parents could count on the Supreme Court to respect district lines, 
they could predictably avoid integration by moving across those lines. 
And they did, in large numbers.177 The complex interaction between 
private choice and public policy that generated white flight posed a 
dilemma for both the civil rights movement and the Supreme Court. 
The former pressed for ever-expanding (and expensive) remedial or­
ders, which federal judges often issued, and which the Court some­
times affirmed, but only after soul-searching as to whether the orders 
struck the right balance between the goal of integration and the costs 
accompanying movement away from neighborhood schools.178 Experi­
ence with this process has moved public debate beyond Brennan's 
faith in the efficacy of remedial injunctions (Green) and Powell's nos­
talgia for the neighborhood school (Milliken) . 
In the last decades of the millennium, the Inc. Fund maintained 
that white flight and ongoing school (re )segregation were in part a 
consequence of a multitude of public policies (especially housing) that 
174. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741-42 (citing the same cases as the state). 
175. See, e.g. , Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). 
176. See, e.g. , Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977); Pasadena Bd. 
of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). 
177. See JAMES COLEMAN ET AL., TRENDS IN SCHOOL SEGREGATION, 1968-73 (1975) 
(laying out and supporting white flight thesis); RAYMOND WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF 
BROWN: THIRTY YEARS OF DESEGREGATION (1984) (documenting the effects of white 
flight to resegregate the school districts involved in the Brown litigation). But see GARY 
0RFIELD, THE GROWTH OF SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS: CHANGING PATTERNS 
OF SEPARATION AND POVERTY SINCE 1968, at 6 (1994) (disputing "white flight" thesis). 
178. Divided Courts upheld broad and expensive remedial orders in Missouri v. Jenkins, 
495 U.S. 33 (1990), and Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) ("Milliken II"), but even 
great expenditures of money toward magnet schools and other integrative measures have 
generated disappointing levels of actual integration. 
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influenced private choices.179 Hence, civil rights attorneys defended 
not only extensive remedial decrees embodying attractive and com­
prehensive educational reform, but also housing desegregation, as 
people's preferences changed in response to new government pro­
grams.180 In the same period, neo-federalists opposing further judicial 
remediation of a resegregated status quo denied the relevance of such 
a complex chain of causation or the capacity of remedial decrees to 
break that chain. Moreover, they questioned whether school districts 
in the 1990s had any continuing accountability for segregationist poli­
cies that ended in the 1960s.181 They insisted that, because primary ac­
countability for educational policy must rest with state and local gov­
ernments, district courts must tailor their remedial orders so as to 
protect the "local autonomy" of the school district.182 Populated by 
Reagan-Bush Justices, the Supreme Court has cautiously moved in the 
neo-federalist direction.183 As Justice Kennedy put it, " [r]eturning 
schools to the control of local authorities at the earliest practicable 
date is essential to restore their true accountability in our governmen­
tal system."184 The Rehnquist Court's message is that once local gov­
ernments resume full control of school systems, they will be responsive 
to their obligation to preserve a unitary school system. That remains 
to be seen. 
b. The Disparate Impact Cases. Well before Loving, the NAACP 
recognized that, even as apartheid was dying as a formal matter, its 
legacy remained strong as a functional matter. Especially in the South, 
many policies that did not deploy race as a classification still had 
strong race-based effects, either because they were devised or en-
179. See "School Segregation and Residential Segregation: A Social Science Statement," 
appendix to Brief for Respondents at app. la-28a, Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 
U.S. 449 (1979) (No. 78-610). 
180. See "School Desegregation: A Social Science Statement," appendix to Brief of 
Amici Curiae NAACP et al. in Support of Respondents, Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 
(1992) (No. 89-1290) (signed by fifty-two eminent social scientists). 
181. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 28-29, Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 
498 U.S. 237 (1991) (No. 89-1080) [hereinafter U.S. Amicus Brief in Dowell] (signed by Bush 
Administration Solicitor General Kenneth Starr); accord Brief of the DeKalb County 
Board of Education as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 24-28, Bd. of Educ. v. 
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (No. 89-1080) (signed by former Reagan Administration Solici­
tor General Rex Lee). 
182. U.S. Amicus Brief in Dowell, supra note 181, at 21-24. 
183. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) (holding that the district court has Swann­
based discretion to order partial withdrawal of its jurisdiction once it finds local authorities 
have remedied the de jure violations, even though de facto segregation may persist); Board 
of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 238 (1991) (holding that the principle of local control re­
quires dissolution of a Green remedial decree "after the local authorities have operated in 
compliance with it for a reasonable period [of time]"). 
184. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490; see id. at 506-07 (Scalia, J., concurring) (ridiculing the 
notion that school districts have responsibility for continuing segregation). 
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forced in a race-based way or because they impacted people of color 
disproportionately for some other reason, such as poverty or jobless­
ness, that could be understood as a legacy of apartheid.1 85 In the early 
1960s, the NAACP initiated constitutional litigation against the death 
penalty and the poll tax because they systematically disadvantaged 
people of color as a class. 186 These campaigns were relatively success­
ful because they spoke to important deprivations that were historically 
tied to the policy of white supremacy and because remediation was not 
considered costly. 
In the late 1960s, the Inc. Fund and other groups turned their at­
tention to state and local policies allocating resources to government 
services and social welfare. Allocative policies that were formally race­
neutral often operated in racially discriminatory ways, and civil rights 
attorneys argued that state and local governments were constitution­
ally obliged to revamp their policies to erase or ameliorate the race­
based effects. Note the parallel with Keyes' de jure/de facto distinc­
tion. As in the school desegregation cases, preservationists and their 
allies were able to refocus the debate. When the state was not de­
ploying a race-based classification, it was harder to understand its ac­
tion as a violation of Brown and easier to worry about the costs of re­
mediation. Because any remedy would explicitly redistribute resources 
away from white people to people of color, the former were especially 
open to objections. Supported by a cost-conscious Nixon 
Administration, state and local governments strongly resisted civil 
rights challenges to their allocative policies. As with school desegrega­
tion cases, state and local governments invoked principles of federal­
ism and their own superior competence to make allocational choices. 
These arguments first showed up in constitutional challenges to 
policies by which states apportioned welfare benefits. 187 In Dandridge 
v. Williams,188 the Supreme Court rejected an equal protection attack 
on Maryland's policy of capping family grants irregardless of the size 
of the family. Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court found the policy 
indistinguishable from other social and economic regulations routinely 
afforded lenient judicial scrutiny but recognized that welfare laws "in­
fected with a racially discriminatory purpose or effect" would be "in-
185. See Charles Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). 
186. Brief for Appellants at 19-22, Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 
663 (1966) (1965 Term, No. 48) (poll tax); Section 11.D (death penalty). 
187. On the welfare rights movement, see MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: 
LA WYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973 (1993). 
188. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
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herently suspect" and therefore subject to heightened scrutiny.189 This 
dictum triggered a challenge to Texas's welfare program, which in­
cluded a computation procedure which funded recipients of Aid for 
Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") benefits at 75% of their 
recognized need, whereas recipients of other, adult-only programs 
were funded at 95-100% of their recognized need. Professor Ed 
Sparer's brief for the challengers demonstrated in painful detail that 
the three advantaged programs had largely white beneficiaries, while 
the disadvantaged program (AFDC) was 85% minority (45 % black, 
40% latino) .190 The state claimed that governments could not reasona­
bly be held liable for racially disparate consequences of their policies, 
unless there was evidence of discriminatory motives (none in the 
Texas case). Sparer responded that legislative motive was irrelevant: it 
was hard to prove, especially after Loving exposed any kind of race­
based preference to lethal review; the reason for discrimination had 
little bearing on its effect on racial minorities deprived of needed state 
benefits and confronted with legislative indifference to their plight; if 
legislative motive were key, then the legislature could easily fix old 
discriminatory policies by reenacting them under a clean record.191 
The four Nixon Justices were unreceptive to Sparer's arguments; 
they and Justice White lined up behind Chief Justice Burger's view 
that "Texas' allocation among the groups is beyond our reach absent 
invidious discrimination," namely, a showing of discriminatory in­
tent.192 Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Jefferson v. 
Hackney193 ruled that, notwithstanding the significantly different racial 
impact, Texas's allocation scheme was legitimate under the Equal 
Protection Clause, so long as it was "lacking in racial motivation" and 
was otherwise rational. Rehnquist's reasoning was institutional: any 
allocative state program is going to affect different racial groups dif­
ferently, and so heightened scrutiny for disparate racial impacts, as 
Sparer was arguing, would inject the Court into " 'intractable eco­
nomic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by public 
189. Id. at 485 n.17; see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (interpreting 
Title VII to regulate employment policies having racially disparate impacts unless they can 
be justified by business necessity). 
190. Brief for Appellants at 29, Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (No. 70-5064). 
191. Id. at 49-51 (elaborating on the Court's holding and reasoning in Palmer v. Thomp­
son, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (holding legislative intent irrelevant to show city closed down 
swimming pools rather than integrate them)). 
192. Douglas Conference Notes for Jefferson v. Hackney (Feb. 25, 1972), in William 0. 
Douglas Papers, Library of Congress, Container 1559 (O.T. 1971, Opinions, Misc. Mems. 
No. 70-5064) [hereinafter Douglas Papers). 
193. 406 U.S. 535, 548 (1972). 
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welfare assistance programs [which] are not the business of this 
Court. , , ,194 
Following immediately on the heels of Hackney was a challenge to 
Texas's system for financing public schools, San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez. 195 Plaintiffs' main argument was that the 
neediest districts were shortchanged by the Texas system because of 
their poverty, but they and their amici (including the Inc. Fund and 
the ACLU) more broadly argued that the Texas system was subject to 
heightened scrutiny because it was grounded upon wealth-based clas­
sifications or had strong race-based effects; the education deficit as­
sured by the financing inequities fell mostly on latino and black 
schoolchildren.196 Justice Powell's opinion for the Court (the Nixon 
Justices plus Stewart) ignored the racial impact argument but, tell­
ingly, responded to the wealth argument with the admonition, citing 
Hackney, that the challengers had failed to show that "the financing 
system is designed to operate to the peculiar disadvantage of the com­
paratively poor."197 At the same time the Court was embracing a re­
strictive view of judicial review of policies having race-based effects in 
Rodriguez, it was accepting the importance of the de jure/de facto dis­
tinction for school segregation in Keyes. The die was cast against vigi­
lant judicial scrutiny of public policies with disproportionate effects on 
people of color by the end of 1973. 
Before the Inc. Fund could engineer a better test case for its view 
that state policies bearing disproportionately on people of color 
should be subjected to heightened scrutiny, the Court seized upon a 
statutory case to settle the issue. Washington v. Davis198 involved 
claims that the District of Columbia's reading test for police officers 
excluded a disproportionate number of black applicants. Plaintiffs' 
original complaint alleged a constitutional violation, but the lower 
court granted relief under Title VII, which went into effect after the 
complaint had been filed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the parties 
treated this as a Title VII case. Even after constant (almost comical) 
194. Id. at 551 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487). Three Justices dis­
sented from this constitutional analysis. Id. at 551 (Douglas, Brennan, J.J. dissenting); id. at 
558 (Marshall, Brennan, J.J., dissenting). 
195. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
196. This was an ancillary point in the Brief for Appellees at 16-17, San Antonio Inde­
pendent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (No. 71-1332), but was the lead argu­
ment in Brief [Amici Curiae] of ACLU [et al.] at 14-23, Rodriguez (No. 71-1332), and Brief 
of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense Fund and Educational Fund, Inc. at 3-9, Rodri­
guez (No. 71-1 332). 
197. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 26 (emphasis added); see also id. at 27 n.62 (citing Jefferson 
v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 547-49 (1972), and John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative 
Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1258-59 (1970)). 
198. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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prompting from the Nixon Justices to take a harder line, both federal 
and D.C. respondents repeatedly conceded at oral argument that Title 
VII applied and that its disparate impact approach was the same as the 
equal protection approach.199 Undeterred by lack of support from the 
government, the Court ruled that it would not apply heightened scru­
tiny to a state policy having a racially discriminatory impact unless the 
policy was also racially motivated.200 The reasons were the same insti­
tutional process ones given in Hackney. 
Although they did not litigate any of these cases (and participated 
only in Rodriguez, as an amicus), the Inc. Fund and its allies found its 
subsequent disparate impact challenges doomed by the difficulties in 
proving racial motivation. Precisely as Sparer had predicted in 
Hackney, racial motivation has been all but impossible to prove in 
most cases, because everyone now knows not to make public racist 
statements and most government decisions are complicated enough 
that they can be plausibly defended along non-racial lines. Accord­
ingly, serious challenges, backed up by impressive statistics, have 
failed against racially disparate public housing policies,201 sentencing 
for drug crimes,202 and impositions of the death penalty.203 Moreover, 
neo-federalists have deployed Washington v. Davis to support their re­
strictive understanding of state responsibility for continuing school 
segregation: once the local government has taken steps to end de jure 
segregation, courts should not impose further responsibility on it un­
less there is evidence of discriminatory intent.204 
c. The Affirmative Action Cases. Even under the regime of 
Washington v. Davis, public as well as private institutions had incen­
tives to integrate and to do so in a non-token manner.205 These incen-
199. See Oral Argument in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), in 88 LANDMARK 
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 355, 362, 366-67, 380-81 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 
1977) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS]. After Mark Evans, representing the federal re­
spondents, made this concession, id. at 369, Justice Rehnquist tossed Jefferson v. Hackney in 
his face - and Evans still backed away from the argument that won him the case! Id. at 370-
71.  
200. Washington v .  Davis, 426 U.S.  at 239-45. 
201. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Co., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
202. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996). The equal protection issue is ex­
haustively discussed in RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 357-59, 364-86 
(1997) [hereinafter KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME]; David Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal 
Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995). 
203. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); see also KENNEDY, supra note 202, at 
328-50 (exhaustively discussing McCleskey); Section 11.D (discussing McCleskey) . 
204. See U.S. Amicus Brief in Dowell, supra note 181, at 19-20, 27-29 (submitted by 
Bush Administration Solicitor General Kenneth Starr). 
205. (1) Many of the institutions had a history of racial discrimination and so were vul­
nerable to challenges under Washington v. Davis. (2) After 1972, Title VII applied to fed­
eral, state, and local employers, which risked Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,  401 U.S. 424 (1971), 
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tives generated a variety of policies using race as a basis for preference 
or even a quota for allocating jobs, college spots, and government con­
tracts. Although there was some diversity of opinion, most civil rights 
leaders favored affirmative state action as a swift, and perhaps neces­
sary, mechanism to integrate state colleges, workforces, and public 
programs. Were these policies constitutional? The Court in Swann had 
approved remedial uses of race-based classifications by trial judges 
crafting Green decrees.206 But the "benign" use of race in allocating 
scarce benefits posed more intense political and constitutional 
issues.207 "Affirmative action" was an object of a civil rights politics of 
remediation - but "reverse discrimination" became an intense focus 
of a new post-apartheid politics of preservation, because it was an 
issue that infuriated extremists who hated the idea of integration, 
irked pragmatists who supported integration only so long as it was 
costless, and disturbed liberals who believed in the "colorblind 
constitution. "208 
The multifaceted opposition to affirmative action showed up in the 
first major Supreme Court case, DeFunis v. Odegaard.209 Marco 
DeFunis, a Sephardic Jew, was denied admission to the University of 
Washington School of Law, while people of color with lower test 
scores were admitted under an affirmative action plan. DeFunis's law­
yers argued that affirmative action violated the colorblindness re­
quirement of Loving and created "special privileges" for blacks while 
it denied whites "fundamental" rights.210 Writing for amicus B 'nai 
B 'rith, Professors Alexander Bickel of Yale and Philip Kurland of 
Chicago took a broader oppositionist view. Linking quotas for blacks 
with the numerus clausus that has traditionally been deployed to ex-
lawsuits if their workforces were racially imbalanced. (3) Most important, social norms had 
changed in many locales: diversity within the institution was increasingly considered a posi­
tive goal, not just something the institution "had" to do. 
206. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (holding that 
it is allowable for school officials to aim at a racial balance in assigning students and teachers 
to various schools, "in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society[,]" and that 
trial judges have "broad power to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary school sys­
tem"). 
207. Note that the use of race in redistricting also raises identity politics as well as con­
stitutional issues. The Supreme Court upheld state decisions challenged on race grounds, see 
United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 ( 1977), until Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), 
and its progeny. See also Section 1 1 .E. 1 (discussing gerrymandering cases). 
208. For intense opposition from legal liberals, see Lino A. Graglia, Special Admission 
of the "Cullllrally Deprived" to Law School, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 351 (1970); John Kaplan, 
Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro - The Problem of Special Treat­
ment, 61 NW. U. L. REV. 363 (1966). 
209. 416 U.S. 312 (1974). 
210. Petitioners' Opening Brief at 12, 14, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) 
(No. 73-235) (emphasis in original). 
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elude Jews, they objected that affirmative action was inconsistent with 
the fundamental values of a liberal society: "For a quota is not merely 
a racial classification. It is an attribution of status - of caste - fixed 
by race. A quota necessarily legislates not equality, but a governmen­
tal rule of racial differences without regard to an individual's attrib­
utes or merits."211 The state's position was that affirmative action in 
service of racial integration was "benign" and therefore not unconsti­
tutional under Loving; considering race was a means to undermine ra­
cism, not support it. Civil rights amid argued that race-based prefer­
ences were not "invidious" when they were deployed for remedial 
purposes, to implement long-overdue integration and overcome his­
torical racial disadvantages.212 Bickel and Kurland responded that a 
"quota system is admittedly not 'benign' so far as the excluded [white] 
majority applicants are concerned" - nor was there any basis for de­
nying that it is " 'invidious' and 'stigmatizing' for the category of ap­
plicant labeled by race as incapable of meeting the standards applied 
to others."213 Quotas would tar all people of color, as a symbolic 
statement that " 'black people just don't have it' " and need special 
government help.214 In short, race-based preferences are unconstitu­
tional for two interrelated reasons: preferring a black person because 
of her race deprives the white person of his right to be treated fairly 
and promotes rather than undermines racist stereotypes and preju­
dices. 
Reflecting their collective uncertainty, the Court dismissed the ap­
peal as moot.215 Only Justice Douglas reached the merits; he agreed 
with Bickel and Kurland that the race-based preference should be 
subjected to strict scrutiny and invalidated.216 The issue returned to the 
Court when Allan Bakke challenged the racial quota program for ad­
mission to the University of California (Davis) School of Medicine. By 
1978, people's views on affirmative action had hardened, and it had 
211 .  Brief of Amicus Curiae Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith at 19, DeFunis v. 
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (No. 73-235) (hereinafter Brief of Anti-Defamation League 
in DeFunis]. 
212. Brief of The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of the Decision Below at 9-20, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (No. 73-
235); accord Brief of NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae, 
DeFunis (No. 73-235); Motion of the EEOC for Leave to File a Memorandum as Amicus 
Curiae and Memorandum, DeFunis (No. 73-235). 
213. Brief of Anti-Defamation League in DeFunis, supra note 211, at 24 (citing Lino A. 
Graglia, Special Admission of the "Culturally Deprived" to Law School, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 
351,  353-59 (1970)). 
214. Id. at 25 (quoting THOMAS SOWELL, BLACK EDUCATION, MYTHS AND 
TRAGEDIES 292 (1972)). 
215. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 319-20; cf id. at 348 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (finding, with 
three other Justices, the case not moot). 
216. Id. at 333-44 (Douglas, J. dissenting). 
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become a highly polarizing issue: liberals were for it, whatever mis­
givings they had previously; conservatives were against it, as a viola­
tion of white people's rights and as a promotion of race divisions; and 
ambivalent moderates searched for mediating solutions that accom­
modated different interests and did not exacerbate racial divisions. 
Accordingly, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke217 at­
tracted more amicus briefs than any previous civil rights case, and the 
briefs were more apocalyptic than in DeFunis. The state and the ami­
cus briefs for the ABA, ACLU, the NAACP, and various college and 
university groups emphasized the discretion universities needed to 
admit racial minorities for either remedial or diversity purposes. In an 
ironic twist, the Inc. Fund emphasized that judicial activism against af­
firmative action was inconsistent with the original intent of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's framers.218 The challenger and his amici 
(including Professor Kurland's brief for B'nai B 'rith) argued that the 
quota system violated white men's equality rights and promoted race 
divisions. 
A highly polarized Court agonized all term over Bakke (Section 
II.C.3). Its Solomonic resolution was delivered by Justice Powell, who 
subjected the race-based quota to strict scrutiny and invalidated it -
but with a roadmap that the government could use to craft policies 
that would pass muster.219 Powell accepted the preservationist argu­
ments for strict scrutiny, namely, that race-based quotas not only vio­
lated white people's rights, but also promoted race animosity.220 But he 
also accepted the civil rights argument that remediation of past dis­
crimination or the attainment of a diverse student body could justify 
race-based affirmative action, albeit (for Powell) only if the program 
were narrowly tailored.221 Although Powell's solo opinion did not for-
217. 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see also Section II .C.3 (discussing Bakke). The leading account 
is BERNARD SCHWARTZ, BEHIND BAKKE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE SUPREME 
COURT (1988). See also HOWARD BALL, THE BAKKE CASE: RACE, EDUCATION, AND 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (2000); JEFFRIES, JUSTICE POWELL, supra note 171, at 455-501. 
218. Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. at 10-
53, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811). This is ironic be­
cause the Inc. Fund believed in a dynamic Equal Protection Clause and because the Justices 
most interested in original intent (Burger and Rehnquist) were least open to the Inc. Fund's 
position. 
219. Technically, Powell delivered the judgment of the Court, but he spoke only for 
himself on the constitutional issue. Four Justices (Burger, Stewart, Rehnquist, Stevens) be­
lieved the preference program violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act; four other Jus­
tices (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun) believed the program consistent with both Title 
VI and the Constitution. 
220. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294-95 n.34 (Powell, J.) . 
221. Id. at 307-10 (accepting the remediation goal); id. at 311-15 (accepting the diverse 
student body goal). But see id. at 315-19 (finding that this odd quota program was not nar­
rowly tailored to the diversity goal in Bakke's case). Procedurally, Powell made a point not 
suggested by the parties, that it ought to make a difference which governmental body 
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mally resolve the affirmative action issue, it held out that possibility. A 
divided Court more or less followed Powell's roadmap in Fullilove v. 
Klutznick,222 which upheld a set-aside program for federal contracts to 
racial minorities. The Chief Justice's plurality opinion found the racial 
quotas defensible because they were adopted by Congress after full 
debate and persuasive findings that the program was needed to rem­
edy past discrimination against minority contractors.223 
An emboldened politics of preservation in the 1980s challenged 
Powell's pragmatic compromise. Although traditionalist and civil 
rights groups generated few new arguments beyond those already de­
veloped in DeFunis and Bakke,224 the former gained ground politically 
and, as a result, judicially. The Reagan Administration's Solicitor 
General Charles Fried powerfully supported the critics of affirmative 
action in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education225 and City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 226 The Wygant brief is a preservationist 
classic. It led with the idea that affirmative action is an unfortunate re­
treat from the NAACP's correct argument in Brown that the 
Constitution " 'prohibits a state from making racial distinctions in the 
exercise of governmental power.' "227 The NAACP's Inc. Fund, of 
adopted the affirmative action program. Thus, an unelected group of administrators is not 
the most legitimate body to decide this important issue; the considered judgment, with fac­
tual findings, of a state or (better yet) national legislature is entitled to greater constitutional 
leeway. Id. at 308-10. 
222. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
223. Id. at 475-77 (Burger, CJ., joined by White & Powell, JJ.) (holding that Congress 
has authority to adopt set-aside legislation and its findings support the remediation of past 
discrimination goal); id. at 480-92 (finding that set-aside law's means are reasonably related 
to the remediation goal); id. at 496-517 (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining why the congres­
sional set-aside program met all the procedural findings by a legitimate policy organ and 
substantive remediation requirements of his Bakke roadmap); see also id. at 517-21 (Mar­
shall, J., joined by Brennan & Blackmun, JJ, concurring) (federal program satisfies the in­
termediate scrutiny standard followed by these Justices in Bakke). 
224. The briefs for all sides in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 
(1989), City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989), and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), were more voluminous, less original, and more repetitious than 
the briefs in the earlier cases. By the 1990s, there were a number of talented empiricists 
working on affirmative action issues, but their work cut in several different directions and 
conclusions were mired in controversy. See, e.g., Symposium: The Law and Economics of 
Racial Discrimination in Employment, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619 (1991) (providing an excellent sur­
vey of, and contributing to, the empirical literature). 
225. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
226. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
227. Brief for Amicus Curiae United States in Support of Petitioners at 4, Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (No. 84-1340) (quoting Brief for Appellants in 
Nos. 1 ,  2, and 4 and Respondent in No. 10 at 21, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S 483 (1954)) 
[hereinafter U.S. Wygant Brief]. To the same effect was Brief for the United States as Ami­
cus Curiae Supporting Appellee, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) 
(No. 87-998). 
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course, did not believe its argument in Brown supported the same 
level of scrutiny for remedial racial preferences, to which Fried re­
sponded that a neutral-as-to-beneficiary approach was required by the 
original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment's framers, by the 
Court's precedents (starting with Hirabayashi and including the 
Court's sex discrimination precedents),  and by the nation's political 
experience, which revealed that racial minorities were no longer po­
litically powerless.228 In closing, Fried set the prestige of the 
Department of Justice behind Bickel and Kurland's "promotion of ra­
cism" argument - remedial preferences just as easily reinforce stereo­
types and deepen hostility as reduce the same.229 The punch line: the 
state cannot use race-based preferences. 
The Court struck down the racial preference in Wygant, but again, 
as in Bakke and Fullilove, without a majority opinion. Once four 
Reagan Justices were in place (Rehnquist [elevated to Chief Justice, 
1986), O'Connor [1981) ,  Scalia [1986), and Kennedy [1988)) ,  there was 
a Court. Croson ruled that any race-based classification - whatever 
its motivation - would be subject to strict scrutiny and that the state 
can justify some race-based preference with nothing less than a show­
ing that the underrepresentation of minorities is a product of past dis­
crimination.230 Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor concluded that 
generalized assertions of past discrimination constitute no sufficient 
justification for a race-based preference, and quotas are generally not 
reasonable remedies even when there has been a showing of past dis­
crimination. 231 
The politics of preservation scored a further triumph in Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.232 Not only did a majority - the four 
Reagan Justices and Bush appointee Clarence Thomas - announce 
the same strict scrutiny for federal race-based set-aside programs, 
overruling or narrowing Fullilove,233 but Justices Scalia and Thomas 
issued statements urging a completely colorblind Constitution. Scalia's 
228. See U.S. Wygant Brief, supra note 227, at 8-10 (arguing that precedent requires the 
same approach); id. at 11-15 (arguing that original intent requires the same approach); id. at 
16-20 (arguing that political theory requires the same approach). 
229. Id. at 20-21.  
230. Croson, 488 U.S.  at 493-98 (O'Connor, J . ,  joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White & 
Kennedy, JJ.); see id. at 520-25 (Scalia, J., concurring) (endorsing strict scrutiny as well, but 
stricter than O'Connor). 
231. Id. at 498-99 (O'Connor, J., for the Court). 
232. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
233. See id. at 213-27. Justice O'Connor spoke for the Court here, except insofar as her 
opinion was inconsistent with Justice Scalia's concurrence. See id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concur­
ring). Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court, id. at 227, overruled in part Metro Broad­
casting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), which held that intermediate scrutiny is the stan­
dard required for judicial review of federal "benign" racial preferences. 
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statement, " [i]n the eyes of the government, we are just one race here. 
It is American[,]"234 is half schmaltz, half inspiration. Thomas's was a 
new voice of color, giving greater authenticity to the promotion of ra­
cism argument: "racial paternalism and its unintended consequences 
can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other form of discrimina­
tion . . . .  Inevitably . . .  [benign discrimination] programs engender at­
titudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke resentment among 
those who believe that they have been wronged by the government's 
use of race. "235 
B .  Women's Rights Movements 
White women were disadvantaged differently than African 
Americans at the end of the nineteenth century. They were of course 
the largest group in the population. Men did not fear and hate them in 
the same way they feared and hated people of color; women were dif­
ferently situated by biology in a way black men were not, for they and 
they alone bore the promise and the costs of pregnancy. Violence 
against white women was within the intimate reserves of the family, 
including marital rape and unwanted pregnancies. Where people of 
color were subordinated by the white supremacy ideology, enforced 
through public segregation and anti-miscegenation laws, women were 
subordinated by the ideology of separate spheres, enforced through 
their legal exclusion from voting, jury service, military service, and 
public and private employment. Black women, of course, suffered 
under both kinds of discrimination: they were denigrated by both 
apartheid and by women's exclusions.236 Also unlike the cause of civil 
rights, which seemed all but crushed in the first decades of the new 
century, women's causes were flourishing: the women's temperance 
movement won ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment instantiat­
ing Prohibition, and the Nineteenth Amendment gave women the 
right to vote in 1920.237 Yet once they had won the franchise, feminist 
234. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
235. Id. at 240-41 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
236. See generally ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE, AND CLASS (1981); GLENDA 
GILMORE, GENDER AND JIM CROW (1996); ROSALYN TERBORG-PENN, AFRICAN 
AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE VOTE, 1850-1920 (1998). 
237. On these remarkable but different feminist campaigns, see JOSEPH GUSFIELD, 
SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT 
(1986) (discussing the Eighteenth Amendment); Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nine­
teenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 960-
1022 (2001) [hereinafter Siegel, She the People] (discussing the Nineteenth Amendment). 
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politics went into partial hibernation, at exactly the same time when 
blacks were becoming more politically and constitutionally active.238 
Notwithstanding these and other differences, women's movements 
shared a core similarity with civil rights ones: their politics, including 
their constitutional politics, was driven by the traits (race and sex) that 
set them apart from "the norm" (white males). Like blacks, women 
objected that the state not only failed to protect them against private 
violence, but was itself an instrument of violence against them. Just as 
the state tolerated violence, including lynching, against black men, so 
it tolerated rape, including marital rape, against women. And the state 
was a direct instrument of violence against women insofar as it crimi­
nalized medical technologies by which women could control the terms 
of their pregnancies, specifically, the promulgation of articles of con­
traception and the practice of abortion. Like increasing numbers of 
black people, increasing numbers of women objected that the law un­
fairly disrespected them as well as denied them tangible opportunities. 
If apartheid laws effectively excluded people of color from full citizen­
ship because of their race, sex-exclusionary laws did the same for 
women. The disrespect and exclusion were normatively indefensible: 
just as people of color ought to have all the opportunities and duties as 
white people, so women ought to have the same opportunities and du­
ties as men. Sex, like race, is a benign variation, largely irrelevant to 
state policy. 
Inspired by the successes of the civil rights movement, women en­
gaged in a similar politics of recognition, sweeping away most state 
discriminations on the basis of sex in Supreme Court opinions of the 
1970s - at the very same time the country was debating and ulti­
mately rejecting the Equal Rights Amendment. Also like the civil 
rights movement, the women's rights movement focused on issues of 
affirmative state remediation as soon as it had significantly achieved 
its equality goals; many of women's remedial measures have been suc­
cessfully blocked by traditionalists, however. The biggest differences 
between the constitutional experiences of blacks and women relate to 
abortion. Although initially conceived as a matter of protecting 
women against health dangers and economic depletion, the politics of 
abortion was reconceived as a matter of women's equal citizenship, 
followed by the view that the state has an affirmative duty to provide 
women with support for their family planning choices. Viewing the fe­
tus as a human person, the politics of preservation saw matters exactly 
the other way: its members were protecting fetuses, seeking recogni-
238. See NANCY F. COTT, THE GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMINISM 96-97 (1987); 
ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 222-345 (2d ed. 1975); AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN 
SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1890-1920, at 261-64 (1965). 
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tion of the value of human life, and opposing any policy that promoted 
abortion as a method of family planning. 
1. The Politics of Protection: Women's Control of Their Own 
Bodies, 1916-72 
After ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, various politics 
of protection dominated public discourse about women's rights for the 
next half-century. There were three kinds of politics that sought to 
protect women against harm; only one of these was to emerge as a 
vigorous feminist politics, however. To begin with, there was a modest 
sexual politics that sought better enforcement of existing rape laws and 
reform of the many loopholes that effectively immunized much sexual 
assault from legal prosecution. Although rape reform was a matter of 
feminist and legislative attention throughout the twentieth century,239 
it was not notably successful in changing the law to protect women's 
interests until the 1970s.240 
In contrast, a paternalist politics of protection was highly success­
ful, albeit ambiguously feminist. Such politics created special rules for 
women's participation in the workplace, protecting them and their 
families against dangerous or excessive work.241 Progressives success­
fully defended these laws against charges that they violated the liberty 
of contract judges found in the Due Process Clause. Less than three 
years after Lochner struck down a state law setting maximum hours 
for bakery employees, Muller v. Oregon242 evaluated a state law setting 
maximum hours for female employees. A unanimous Supreme Court 
239. See generally SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1992) (tracing the slow evolution of 
rape law in the twentieth century); Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History 
of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373 (2000) (detailing women's resistance to the criminal 
law's exemption for marital rape, starting in the nineteenth century but not successfully nul­
lifying or even modifying such exemptions until the late twentieth). 
240. See, e.g., People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984) (invalidating marital rape 
exemption as constituting an invidious discrimination against women and resting upon "ar­
chaic notions" of the family). See generally William E. Nelson, Criminality and Sexual Mo­
rality in New York, 1920-1980, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 265, 301-11 ,  318-32 (1993) (providing 
a detailed case study of sex laws and women's interests in New York). 
241. The classic description is Elizabeth Brandeis, Labor Legislation, in 3 HISTORY OF 
LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1896-1932, at 399, 457-66 (John Commons ed., 1935). For 
modern feminist analyses critical of such laws, see JUDITH BAER, THE CHAINS OF 
PROTECTION: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO WOMEN'S LABOR LEGISLATION (1978), and 
ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1982). Also, compare Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU et al., California Sav­
ing & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (No. 85-494) (critical of women's "protec­
tive" legislation), with Brief of Amici Curiae Coalition for Reproductive Equality in the 
Workplace et al., Guerra (No. 85-494) (supporting protective legislation when it remedies 
women's disadvantages in the workplace). 
242. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
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upheld the Oregon law, based upon the data presented in an amicus 
brief drafted by Louis Brandeis. The original "Brandeis brief" demon­
strated not only that such protective legislation was universal in west­
ern culture, but that its rationale was a happy wedding of modern sci­
ence and traditional mores: " 'The reasons for the reduction of the 
working day to ten hours - (a) the physical organization of women, 
(b) her maternal functions, ( c) the rearing and education of the chil­
dren, ( d) the maintenance of the home - are all so important and so 
far reaching that the need for such reduction need hardly be dis­
cussed.' "243 Justice Brewer's opinion for the Court ruled that women, 
like minors, should be treated by the courts "as needing especial 
care. "244 
Most feminists as well as progressives supported this kind of pro­
tective legislation, but the voices of women were underrepresented 
and often absent in legislative debates and legal briefs. They could 
more often be found in the printed records of the cases. In Radice v. 
New York,245 involving a liberty of contract challenge to a law barring 
nightwork by women in urban restaurants, working class women testi­
fied at trial that such work was both congenial and necessary for them. 
"It is easier to work in a restaurant than it is to do housework."246 The 
Court nevertheless upheld the law. After World War II, during which 
women did virtually every kind of work men had done and under 
similar circumstances, women spoke for themselves and often objected 
to laws cutting off economic opportunities for them. Attorney Anne 
Davidow challenged a Michigan law barring women from acting as 
bartenders unless they were wives or daughters of male owners in 
Goesaert v. Cleary.247 Two dozen women testified at trial that they 
were barmaids who needed the job to support families and were with-
243. Id. at 420 n.1 (quoting from the Brandeis brief); see id. at 421 (" [H]istory discloses 
the fact that woman has always been dependent upon man."). 
244. Id. at 421. The Court later upheld similar statutes. See Radice v. New York, 264 
U.S. 292 (1924) (Brandeis filed a brief as a supplement to the state's brief by Carl Sherman 
in this case); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915) (Brandeis filed a brief in support of the 
state); Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915) (same); see also Quong Wing v. Kirken­
dall, 223 U.S. 59 (1912) (upholding law exempting laundries run by women from a tax). The 
Court eventually struck down this line of "protective" reasoning in Adkins v.  Children's 
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (Felix Frankfurter, Brandeis's protege, filed a brief in support 
of the restrictive statute). 
245. 264 U.S. 292 (1924). 
246. Record on Appeal at 39, Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924) (1923 Term, No. 
176) (testimony of Anna Schmitt). On redirect examination, Schmitt was asked, "There was 
nothing in the work which you did . . .  which a man could not have done, was there?" Id. at 
41. 
247. 335 U.S. 464 (1948). 
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out other skills.248 Notwithstanding the seriousness of these women's 
plight and of Davidow's arguments, the Supreme Court spent only a 
few minutes discussing the case at conference.249 Justice Frankfurter's 
opinion for the Court treated the challenge as a lark, playfully recall­
ing "the alewife, sprightly and ribald, in Shakespeare" and dishing off 
the women's challenges in three pages of the United States Reports.250 
Nonetheless, Goesaert reflects the social fact that many women no 
longer considered such legislation truly "protective" of their interests. 
At the same time some women were turning against the kind of 
"protective" legislation illustrated by Muller and Goesaert, a large 
number were turning against morals laws that laid much more striking 
burdens on women. Between 1850 and 1880, most states adopted laws 
criminalizing abortion.251 The federal Comstock Act of 1873 made it 
an obscenity crime to sell or distribute articles of contraception or 
abortion; to send such articles in the federal mail system; or to import 
such articles from abroad.252 By 1885, twenty-four states had enacted 
their own versions of the Comstock Act, many of which were more 
stringent than the federal law.253 These laws bore harshly on women, 
who assumed most burdens of unwanted pregnancies. Many of those 
women mobilized in a politics of pregnancy that was both feminist 
(unlike some of the labor protections) and successful (unlike rape re­
form). The most articulate voices for their concerns were those of 
Emma Goldman and her follower Margaret Sanger. Goldman's phi­
losophy was that women should have life opportunities of their own 
248. Record on Appeal at 18-39, Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (1948 Term, 
No. 49). 
249. I make the observation in text based upon the perfunctory comments in the confer­
ence notes for both Justices Douglas (who took detailed notes) and Burton. 
250. Goesaert, 335 U.S. at 465-67. Davidow did win the votes of three dissenting Jus­
tices. Id. at 467-68 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
251. See JANET FARRELL BRODIE, CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION IN NINETEENTH­
CENTURY AMERICA (1994); JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND 
EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900 (1978); LESLIE REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION 
WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, 1967-1973 (1997). 
For nineteenth century documents, see 2 ABORTION LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (Jenni 
Parrish ed., 1995). 
252. 17 Stat. 598 (1873), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1461 et seq.; 19 U.S.C. § 1305 et seq. 
("An Act for the Suppression of Trade in, and Circulation of, obscene Literature and Arti­
cles of immoral Use"). See generally BRODIE, supra note 251, at 255-56, 263-66, 281-88; 
HEYWOOD BROUN & MARGARET LEECH, ANTHONY COMSTOCK: ROUNDSMAN OF THE 
LORD (1927); ROBERT W. HANEY, COMSTOCKERY IN AMERICA: PATTERNS OF 
CENSORSHIP AND CONTROL (1960). 
253. See BRODIE, supra note 251, at 257 (stating that fourteen states barred any speech 
providing information on contraception and abortion; eleven states criminalized possession 
of such information; seventeen states barred doctors from discussing contraception with 
their patients); see also c. THOMAS DIENES, LAW, POLITICS, AND BIRTH CONTROL 33-48 
(1972). 
2118 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:2062 
choosing - and not those dictated by their fathers, husbands, chil­
dren, or the state.254 
If Goldman was the theorist of a new women's politics of claiming 
control over their own bodies, Sanger was the organizer and imple­
menter. 255 The government censored both women: Goldman was de­
ported for her antiwar speech in 1917; Sanger left the country after she 
was arrested for violating the Comstock Act in August 1914.256 The 
trial of her husband William in September 1915 for distributing copies 
of Woman Rebel inflamed public opinion sufficiently to impel the U.S. 
Attorney to drop all charges against Margaret, who returned trium­
phantly in 1916.257 She then opened the nation's first birth control 
clinic, in Brooklyn, New York. The New York police arrested Sanger 
and her sister, Ethel Byrne, for violating a pre-Comstock state law 
prohibiting circulation of "articles of indecent or immoral use,'' in­
cluding articles "for the prevention of conception."258 The sisters were 
both convicted in well-publicized trials and went to jail as martyrs for 
the new cause. 
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed Sanger's conviction,259 
and she appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Jonah Goldstein's brief, 
including a supplement (compiled by Sanger) on the medical and so­
ciological "Case for Birth Control,'' is a landmark in the history of 
women's rights litigation. The brief's central normative point was a 
wedding of women's sexual politics of rape and their politics of preg­
nancy: " The State has no more right to compel 'motherhood' than the 
254. Emma Goldman, Marriage and Love (1910), reprinted in WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 207-08 (Winston E. Langley & Vivian c. Fox 
eds., 1994) (criticizing marriage because it "makes a parasite of a woman, an absolute de­
pendent"); see BRODIE, supra note 251 ,  at 36 (stating that Goldman advocated contracep­
tion because it would free women to enjoy sex without worrying about pregnancy); Hasday, 
supra note 239, at 1413-33 (finding the roots of Goldman's arguments in nineteenth-century 
feminism). 
255. There are many excellent pieces on Sanger and the birth control movement. See 
ELLEN CHESLER, WOMAN OF VALOR: MARGARET SANGER AND THE BIRTH CONTROL 
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (1992); LINDA GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT: A 
SOCIAL HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA (1976); DAVID M. KENNEDY, BIRTH 
CONTROL IN AMERICA: THE CAREER OF MARGARET SANGER (1970); JAMES REED, THE 
BIRTH CONTROL MOVEMENT AND AMERICAN SOCIETY: FROM PRIVATE VICE TO PUBLIC 
VIRTUE (1984). There are outstanding sources on the legal and litigation features of the 
birth control movement as well. See CHESLER, supra; DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND 
SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 1-269 (1994) 
(hereinafter GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY]. 
256. See CHESLER, supra note 255, at 99. In 1913, the Post Office refused to mail The 
Call because of Sanger's feminist libertarian column but relented after Sanger went to court 
with a First Amendment claim. See id. at 65-66. 
257. See id. at 127-29, 138-40. 
258. N.Y. Penal Law § 1142. 
259. People v. Sanger, 118 N.E. 637 (N.Y. 1918). 
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individual to compel [sexual} relations. "260 The state's suppression of 
contraceptive devices and information was a severe and unacceptable 
intrusion into a married woman's personal liberty protected by the 
Due Process Clause.261 "In this enlightened age, when we are accus­
tomed to listen to the discussion of the rights of women to economic 
freedom and independence . . .  does it not appear most unreasonable 
that she be deprived of the freedom of her person?"262 The brief also 
powerfully argued that the breadth of the state's prohibition was often 
a deprivation of life as well as liberty, because pregnancy for many 
women was life-threatening. By barring even dissemination of infor­
mation that could be life-saving to these women, the state was placing 
their lives at risk.263 Finally, Goldstein's brief maintained that the stat­
ute was irrational in its effect and, therefore, unconstitutional even if 
no fundamental interest were involved. That is, the state's bar served 
no legitimate state interest and, indeed, undermined many legitimate 
ones, such as the health and safety of women, families, and children.264 
Goldstein's and Sanger's massively documented and normatively 
charged brief was met by one argument from the state: the social and 
economic aspects of the birth control issue are subject to reasonable 
debate which should either be left to the legislature or should be re­
solved in favor of regulation, as most states and the federal govern­
ment had precisely the same kind of laws.265 This argument apparently 
prevailed with the Supreme Court, which dismissed Sanger's appeal as 
raising no substantial federal question.266 The Lochner-era Court was 
not receptive to an interpretation of due process protecting sexual as 
opposed to family liberty.267 On the constitutional front, Sanger v. New 
260. Brief on Behalf of the Plaintiff-in-Error at 31,  Sanger v. New York, 251 U.S. 537 
(1919) (1919 Term, No. 75) (emphasis in original); see id. at 39 ("[A] married woman has the 
fundamental right to determine whether she shall or shall not conceive and when she shall 
not conceive."); id. at 43 (stating that men and women have.a "natural right to say how many 
children they will bring into the world and when"). 
261. See id. at 43-48 (relying on Lochner v. New York, 198 U .S. 45 (1905), among other 
authorities). 
262. Id. at 45. 
263. See id. at 50-57; cf id. at 51-52 (this problem is not solved by the statutory allow­
ance for physicians to prescribe articles for the "cure or prevention of disease"). The brief 
argued that a law barring abortions would still violate the Due Process Clause if it did not 
include an exception for situations where the mother's life was at stake. Id. at 54-55. 
264. See id. at 33-34 (arguing that "too frequent pregnancies" injure women's health and 
decrease the "virility of the children"); id. at 35-36 (positing that the statutory bar to useful 
information leads many women to resort to celibacy and abortion, harmful to both women 
and society) id. at 36-38 (statute contributes to poverty, overcrowding, illegitimacy, high in­
fant mortality, and increased numbers of "unwanted" and "feeble-minded" children). 
265. See Brief for Defendant-in-Error at 9-12, Sanger (1919 Term, No. 75). 
266. Sanger v. New York, 251 U.S. 537 (1919) (per curiam). 
267. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding state sterilization law). 
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York failed in the short term. But the constitutional failure begat a 
statutory success, for in Sanger the New York Court of Appeals con­
strued its state law as authorizing physicians to prescribe contracep­
tives for their patients to treat "disease," which the court broadly de­
fined to include any "alteration in the state of body . . .  [which] 
caus[ed] or threaten[ed] pain and sickness."268 As a practical matter, 
that decision opened up a strategy by which birth control clinics could 
operate in New York, and Sanger created a clinic run by doctors in 
New York City and in 1922 founded the American Birth Control 
League. Harassment by authorities, and a raid by the police in 1929, 
only fueled public support for the birth control movement. By 1935, 
local leagues existed in more than half the states, and there were as 
many as 300 clinics, typically run by doctors.269 
Because birth control advocates were not able to bestir Congress 
to repeal the federal Comstock Act,270 that law remained a potential 
problem, which activists attacked in court as violating the then-anemic 
First Amendment. Mary Dennett was prosecuted under the Comstock 
Act for mailing sex education materials. Following Morris Ernst's 
brief for Dennett, Judge Augustus Hand of the Second Circuit refused 
to interpret the statute to apply to "serious instruction regarding sex 
matters unless the terms in which the information is conveyed are 
clearly indecent."271 Judge Swan applied similar reasoning to rule, in a 
trademark case, that contraceptives could be legally imported into the 
United States, so long as they might be capable of legitimate use.272 
The judicial evisceration of the Act was completed in United States v. 
One Package.273 Judge Hand's opinion reasoned that Congress did not 
intend to bar importation of diaphragms by Dr. Hannah Stone, who 
ran Sanger's clinic in New York City; a doctor's goal of promoting 
health and saving lives was surely not "immoral" within the legislative 
intendment.274 The experience of birth control advocates with the 
Comstock Act was echoed at the state level: they were able to gain 
268. People v. Sanger, 118 N.E. 637, 638 (N.Y. 1918) (quoting Webster's Dictionary). 
269. See CHESLER, supra note 255, at 231. 
270. On birth control advocates' inability to move Congress to repeal the Comstock 
Act, see id. at 232-33 (detailing Dennett's 1923 effort), and id. at 341-48 (detailing Sanger's 
1934 effort). 
271. United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564, 569 (2d Cir.1930); see Appellant's Brief at 
11-13, 32-33, Dennett (No. 238). 
272. Youngs Rubber Corp. v. C.I. Lee & Co., 45 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1930); see also Davis 
v. United States, 62 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1933) (following Youngs Rubber). 
273. 86 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936). 
274. Id. at 739-40; cf id. at 740 (Learned Hand, J., concurring) (remarking on the highly 
dynamic reading of the statute by his cousin). Again, the court's judgment carefully tracked 
Morris Ernst's Brief for Claimant-Appellee at 7-11 ,  19-23, 38, One Package (No. 62). 
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administrative and judicial acquiescence of advice and distribution of 
contraceptives under the auspices of doctors' prescriptions. By the be­
ginning of World War II, thirty-six states had medically-supervised 
birth control clinics supported at least in part by public funds, and an­
other ten allowed such clinics to operate privately because of statutory 
loopholes allowing contraceptives by prescription.275 
Sanger and her allies were not satisfied with this progress, in part 
because the medical-exception strategy left many poor and working 
class women, as well as single women, without sufficient access to con­
traceptives. Also, this strategy failed in Roman Catholic Connecticut 
and Massachusetts, whose judiciaries refused to construe their anti­
contraceptive statutes to allow a broad medical-needs exception.276 
These decisions closed down the flourishing birth control clinics in 
those states, and activists resorted to constitutional claims, just as they 
had in response to earlier setbacks. In 1941, Dr. Wilder Tileston sued 
to nullify Connecticut's anti-contraception law on the ground that it 
unconstitutionally barred him from prescribing contraceptives needed 
to protect the health and lives of his female patients. The state courts 
rejected his claims on the merits, and the U.S. Supreme Court dis­
missed the constitutional appeal in Tileston v. Ullman ,277 on the ground 
that the doctor had no standing to raise the life and liberty depriva­
tions of his patients. 
Planned Parenthood (as Sanger's birth control organization was 
renamed in 1942) of Connecticut remained interested in challenges to 
Connecticut's law. Director Estelle Griswold worked with Professor 
Fowler Harper of the Yale Law School and lawyer Catherine 
Roraback to bring a new challenge on behalf of several patients (in­
cluding a married couple) and a doctor in Poe v. Ullman.278 Planned 
Parenthood, the ACLU, and several dozen doctors argued that the 
married couple enjoyed a right of privacy protecting their intimate 
relations.279 A majority of the internally fragmented Court went along 
with a per curiam opinion dismissing the appeal. Justices Douglas and 
275. See Brief of Appellants app. C at 30, Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (1942 
Term, No. 420) (map of "States Having Contraceptive Services Under Medical Supervi­
sion"). 
276. State v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 856 (Conn. 1940); Commonwealth v. Gardner, 15 N.E.2d 
222 (Mass. 1938); see also GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 255, at 44-78 
(providing a detailed account of the litigation and strategic context of these cases). 
277. 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (per curiam); see also GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, su­
pra note 255, at 94-106 (providing a detailed account of the Tileston litigation). 
278. 367 U.S. 497 (1961 ) (dismissing appeal of Buxton v. Ullman, 156 A.2d 508 (Conn. 
1959)); see also GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 255, at 152-95 (providing 
detailed account of the Poe litigation). 
279. See Section 11.B (discussing the briefs in Poe, Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe v. 
Wade). 
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Harlan wrote impassioned dissenting opinions, arguing that there was 
a justiciable case and that the statute was unconstitutional.280 
Poe's odd disposition was a bit of a fluke, and the Yale professors 
and Planned Parenthood pressed one final challenge. In 1965, the 
Supreme Court finally struck down the Connecticut contraception law 
in Griswold v. Connecticut.281 Five Justices joined Douglas's opinion 
for the Court, which carved a "zone of privacy" for married couples 
out of the "penumbras" of various guarantees in the Bill of Rights;282 
three of the majority Justices also relied on the Ninth Amendment to 
support the recognition of a nontextual right of privacy;283 two Justices 
concurred in the judgment on the ground that the law deprived plain­
tiffs of their liberty without due process;284 and two Justices dis­
sented.285 Notwithstanding the doctrinal diversity, at least six Justices 
spoke clearly to this effect: married couples have a fundamental right 
to plan their families and enjoy consensual sexual intercourse without 
interference from the state. 
In spite of its narrow and offbeat reasoning, Griswold was a sensa­
tional vindication of Margaret Sanger's politics of protection.286 
Massachusetts amended its law to allow married couples (but not sin­
gle persons) to obtain contraceptives with a doctor's prescription. A 
divided Supreme Court expanded Griswold to strike down that state's 
discrimination between married and unmarried couples in Eisenstadt 
v. Baird.287 Justice Brennan's majority opinion for a seven-Justice 
Court ruled that, " [i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a per­
son as the decision whether to bear or begat a child."288 Even more 
280. Poe, 367 U.S. at 509 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 522 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
281. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 255, 
at 196-269 (providing a detailed account of the Griswold litigation). 
282. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (Douglas, J., for the Court). 
283. Id. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Brennan, J., concurring). 
284. Id. at 500-02 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 502-07 (White, J., con­
curring in the judgment). 
285. Id. at 507-27 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 527-31 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
286. On the very positive reception of the Griswold result and its privacy right, see, e.g., 
GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 255, at 263-67; Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., 
The Legacy of Griswold, 16 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 511,  527 (1989); Symposium on the Griswold 
Case and the Right of Privacy, 64 MICH. L. REV. 197 (1965) . Between 1963 and 1965, popular 
support for the proposition, "Should birth control information be available to anyone that 
wants it?," went up from 74% to 81 % (from 53% to 78% among Catholics). GEORGE H. 
GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL, 1935-1971, at 1823, 1915-16 (1972) . 
287. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) . 
288. Id. at 453. Brennan spoke for himself and Justices Douglas, Stewart, and Marshall. 
Justices White and Blackmun concurred in the result on narrow grounds, and Chief Justice 
Burger dissented. (Newly appointed Justices Rehnquist and Powell did not participate.) 
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momentous was Griswold's effect on another dimension of women's 
maturing politics of protection: the right not only to prevent preg­
nancy, but also to terminate it. 
Many early birth control advocates (including Goldman and 
Sanger) had personally favored a woman's freedom to choose abor­
tion, but that issue was purposely downplayed in the campaign to lib­
eralize contraception laws.289 During the 1950s and 1960s, there was 
growing interest in liberalizing nineteenth century abortion laws, and 
by the late 1960s large numbers of women and doctors were organized 
as a new "pro-choice" movement for repeal rather than just liberaliza­
tion of laws prohibiting abortions.290 Unlike the birth control move­
ment, the pro-choice movement achieved immediate successes in some 
state legislatures, in part because large numbers of women were allied 
with the medical establishment (whose members feared prosecution 
under the older laws). By 1970, four states - Hawaii, Alaska, New 
York, and Washington - had decriminalized abortion, and twelve 
others (including California) had liberalized their laws. Buoyed by 
Planned Parenthood's success in the courts, the pro-choice movement 
immediately sought to constitutionalize its members' claims. Courts all 
over the United States read Griswold to protect single women seeking 
to abort unwanted pregnancies. Abortion statutes - liberalized laws 
as well as archaic ones - fell right and left.291 
The Supreme Court granted review in two of the cases, one in­
volving Texas's nineteenth century law, which had no exception for 
the mother's health, and one involving Georgia's recent law, allowing 
abortions if approved by the mother's doctor and two others on a hos­
pital panel. Sarah Weddington, the lawyer for "Jane Roe" in the Texas 
289. See Brief on Behalf of the Plaintiff-in-Error at 35, Sanger v. New York, 251 U.S. 
537 (1919) (1919 Term, No. 75) (arguing that anti-contraception laws lead to more "danger­
ous abortions"); Morris Ernst & Harriet Pilpel, Release from the Comstock Era, BIRTH 
CONTROL REV., Dec. 1939 at 24 (sharply distinguishing abortion as "the antithesis of con­
traception"). 
290. There is a formidable literature on the evolving legislative and judicial campaigns 
of the early pro-choice movement. See GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 255, 
at 270-334 (providing an account of early voices, from 1933 to 1967); id. at 335-88 (providing 
an account from reform to repeal, 1967 to 1969); LAWRENCE LADER, ABORTION II :  
MAKING THE REVOLUTION (1973); KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF 
MOTHERHOOD (1984); ROSEMARY NOSSIFF, BEFORE ROE: ABORTION POLICY IN THE 
STATES 35-37, 65-68 (2001) (examining the different tactics of the ALI, NOW, and radical 
feminists); SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT: ORGANIZATION AND 
ACTIVISM IN THE ABORTION CONFLICT (1991); REAGAN, supra note 251, at 216-34. 
291. See Abele v. Markle, 369 F. Supp. 807 (D. Conn. 1973); Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 
1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970), affd, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973); Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970), affd in part, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); 
People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970): see also United 
States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969) (striking down D.C. abortion law as 
vague), rev'd, 402 U.S. 62 (1971) (upholding statute based upon liberal construction of al­
lowance for abortion to protect mother's "health"). 
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case, argued that "pregnancy to a woman is perhaps one of the most 
determinative aspects of her life. It disrupts her body. It disrupts her 
education. It disrupts her employment." Because of this impact, this is 
a "matter which is of such fundamental and basic concern to the 
woman . . . that she should be allowed to make the choice as to 
whether to continue or terminate her pregnancy."292 The state ob­
jected that the controversy was not justiciable and, if justiciable, that 
the rights of the human fetus trumped those of the mother.293 After re­
argument, the Supreme Court achieved a surprising consensus. Justice 
Blackmun's opinion for a seven-Justice Court ruled in Roe v. Wade294 
that the Texas law unconstitutionally burdened a woman's due process 
liberty to control her body and choose an abortion in the first trimes­
ter. In Doe v. Bolton,295 Justice Blackmun's opinion focused on the de­
cision of the mother made in consultation with her doctor and struck 
down most of the other procedural and substantive obstacles 
Georgia's recent law imposed on the mother. The Court's decisions in 
the abortion cases were an international sensation, but for my pur­
poses they are the near-apotheosis of women's politics of protection as 
it concerned pregnancy: after 1973, the constitutional baseline was that 
a woman is, as a matter of constitutional law, the primary decision­
maker as to issues of conceiving and bearing a child. 
2. Feminists ' Politics of Recognition, 1961-76 
Like people of color, but more successfully, women engaged in a 
vigorous politics of recognition during the late nineteenth century.296 
Unlike people of color's, their politics won some notable victories 
early in the twentieth. The Nineteenth Amendment was adopted 
against traditionalist arguments that women's role should be limited to 
the domestic sphere, and it advanced the norm that women's abilities 
were on a par with men's.297 The early birth control movement was 
part of such a politics. Emma Goldman maintained that 
292. Oral Argument, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 1 1 3  (1973), in 75 LANDMARK BRIEFS, su­
pra note 199, at 787; see Brief for Appellants at 99-115, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 1 13 (1973) 
(No. 70-18); see also id. at 94-99 (relying on a right to receive medical care for the protection 
of the mother's health as well). 
293. Brief for Appellee at 9-20, Roe (No. 70-18) (arguing that the issue is nonjusticia­
ble); id. at 26-54 (arguing that the rights of the fetus trump those of the mother). 
294. 410 U.S. 1 13 (1973); see also Sections 11.A.3 & 11.B (discussing the Court's delibera­
tions in Roe). See generally GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 255, at 389-599 
(providing a detailed account of the Roe litigation and the Court's internal deliberations). 
295. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
296. See Ellen Carol Du Bois, Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathers: Equal Rights, 
Woman Suffrage, and the United States Constitution, 1820-1878, 74 J .  AM. HIST. 836 (1987). 
297. See Siegel, She the People, supra note 237. 
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[a woman's] development, her freedom, her independence, must come 
from and through herself. First, by asserting herself as a personality, and 
not as a sex commodity. Second, by refusing to bear children, unless she 
wants them, by refusing to be a servant to God, the State, society, the 
husband, the family etc., by making her life simpler, but deeper and 
richer.298 
Potentially important for women's politics of recognition was the 
proposed Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA"), first introduced in 
Congress in 1923. Yet many feminists were appalled by Goldman's call 
for sexual liberation and opposed the ERA on the grounds that it 
would preempt labor-protective legislation299 or wrongfully denied 
women's genuine difference from men.300 These were among the rea­
sons the feminist politics of recognition stalled or slowed down after 
the Nineteenth Amendment.301 It did not disappear, however. The 
ERA continued to be debated among feminists and within Congress in 
the 1940s and 1950s.302 Most states eased their exclusions of women 
from juries, either placing their service on a par with men's or allowing 
them to serve unless they opted out. Although masked for the most 
part during the 1930s, the birth control movement continued to be 
animated, in part, by an insistence that women have the freedom that 
Goldman had asserted. 
Women's politics of recognition picked up speed after World War 
II, and the renewed interest showed up immediately in constitutional 
cases such as Goesaert.303 Women who had proved themselves fully 
equal to men during the war were often unwilling to re-assume their 
subordinate status after the war. In constitutional law, this attitude 
was displayed most clearly in the cases challenging women's exclusion 
or exemption from jury service. Women generally did not serve on ju-
298. Emma Goldman, Woman Sufferage, WOMAN REBEL, June 1914, at 4; see also 
CANDACE FALK, LOVE, ANARCHY, AND EMMA GOLDMAN (1985); EMMA GOLDMAN, The 
Tragedy of Woman's Emancipation, in ANARCHISM AND OTHER ESSAYS 219, 237 (1910). 
299. The League of Women's Voters and the Women's Bureau opposed the ERA for 
this reason. GLADYS HARRISON, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, AGAINST 
"EQUAL RIGHTS" BY CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 1 1-12 (1928); see RUTH ROSEN, THE 
WORLD SPLIT OPEN: How THE MODERN WOMEN'S MOVEMENT CHANGED AMERICA 27, 
66 (2000) [hereinafter ROSEN, THE WORLD SPLIT OPEN]. 
300. See JOSEPHINE DONOVAN, FEMINIST THEORY: THE INTELLECTUAL TRADITIONS 
OF AMERICAN FEMINISM 75-76 (2001); Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex 
Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex From Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 ,  16  
(1995). 
301. See generally Verta Taylor, Social Movement Continuity: The Women's Movement 
in Abeyance, 54 AM. Soc. REV. 761 (1989). 
302. See CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S 
ISSUES, 1 945-1968, at 3-38 (1988) [hereinafter HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX]. 
303. Anne Davidow's brief in that case argued that the barmaid law was an "unfair dis­
crimination against women owners of bars" and "women bartenders." Brief of Appellants at 
6, Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (1947 Term, No. 49). 
2126 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 100:2062 
ries before World War I. Once women gained the right to vote, some 
state courts construed their state jury service laws to include women 
because the laws tied jury venires to voting lists. Nonetheless, as the 
nation entered World War II, only thirteen states required the same 
jury service of women that they required of men; fifteen states allowed 
women to opt out of compulsory jury service; twenty states disquali­
fied women as a class.304 
After the war, the situation shifted rapidly, and the Supreme Court 
gave it a push in 1946. Relying on a federal statute; the Court over­
turned the conviction of Edna and Donald Ballard for promotion of a 
fraudulent religious program, because the federal judge excluded 
women from the jury venire in Ballard v. United States.305 In response 
to the government's argument that the admittedly erroneous discrimi­
nation was not prejudicial to defendants' jury trial rights, Justice 
Douglas responded that women and men are "not fungible; a commu­
nity made up exclusively of one is different from a community com­
posed of both." He then posed the question: " [I]f the shoe were on the 
other foot, who would claim that a jury was truly representative of the 
community if all men were intentionally and systematically excluded 
from the panel?"306 A Court majority declined to constitutionalize that 
principle in Fay v. New York,307 but four dissenters in that case main­
tained that a "blue ribbon" jury substantially excluding women and 
working class people violated the Equal Protection Clause.308 
After Ballard and Fay, the complete exclusion of women dropped 
away. By 1961, only three states retained complete exclusions. Of the 
forty-seven states where women were eligible, twenty-one states had 
no special gender-based rules, eight states allowed women to be ex­
cused if their service would create hardships for their families, fifteen 
states and the District of Columbia allowed women to opt out for any 
reason, and three states permitted women to serve only if they opted 
in.309 Gwendolyn Hoyt killed her husband in Florida, one of the states 
in the last group. A jury of twelve men found her guilty of murder, and 
304. REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON SELECTION OF 
JURORS 23 (1942), noted in Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 289 & n.31 (1947). 
305. 329 U.S. 187 (1946). 
306. Id. at 193. The federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 411 ,  required that jurors in federal court 
should have the same qualifications as those of the state in which the court was sitting (Cali­
fornia, which did allow women to serve on juries). The Court had construed the statute as 
reflecting a design to make the jury "a cross-section of the community" and representative of 
it. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942). 
307. 332 U.S. 261 (1947). 
308. Id. at 296-300 (Murphy, J., joined by Black, Douglas & Rutledge, JJ., dissenting). 
309. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62-63 (1961). For more background, see LINDA K. 
KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES (1998). 
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she appealed on the ground that the Equal Protection Clause prohib­
ited the exclusion of women from the jury that convicted her. Her 
counsel on appeal argued that Ballard's federal statutory rule should 
be extended to the states as a matter of equal protection; the state's 
reason for continuing to excuse women - their families' need for 
them - was wholly inapplicable to the one-third of Florida women 
who worked outside the home.310 
Dorothy Kenyon persuaded the ACLU to befriend Hoyt on the 
appeal, the Union's first major feminist Supreme Court filing.311 Her 
remarkable amicus brief argued that representation on juries is an im­
portant civil right, as illustrated by the experience of blacks, who did 
not achieve genuine citizenship until the Court required that they be 
invited to its burdens such as jury service.312 The same was true of 
women. They continued to be excluded, either by law or in practice, 
because "the thinking of older times, when women were no part of the 
body politic," suggested that jury service would detract from women's 
"primary duties" of housekeeping and childrearing. This rationale was 
decidedly anachronistic, as "a revolution has taken place in the lives 
and status of women."313 Not only was the discrimination against all 
women therefore unreasonable, but it was a discrimination that the 
"fully emancipated, fully enfranchised woman citizen" would no 
longer tolerate: 
It is a belittlement of her accomplishment in overcoming that long time 
sex defect of hers to suggest, even by implication, that even in this day 
and age she is perhaps still not qualified or capable of performing this 
simple act of good citizenship on the same terms as men. It is a genuine 
humiliation and degradation of her spirit.314 
Kenyon's brief epitomizes what I am calling women's politics of rec­
ognition: in demanding equal respect, women were demanding the 
same duties as well as benefits that men had and insisted on complete 
rather than token integration into the public as well as private institu­
tions of the nation. 
The Warren Court did not see matters this way. At conference, the 
Chief Justice presented a diluted version of Kenyon's arguments and 
310. Brief for Appellant at 10-19, Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (1961 Term, No. 
31). 
311. See SUSAN M. HARTMANN, THE OTHER FEMINISTS: ACTIVISTS IN THE LIBERAL 
ESTABLISHMENT 53-71 (1998) (noting that Kenyon, an ACLU board member for forty 
years, was the only voice of feminism in the organization from 1930 until she was joined by 
Harriet Pilpel in 1962 and Pauli Murray in 1965). 
312. Brief of Amici Curiae Florida Civil Liberties Union and American Civil Liberties 
Union at 8-12, Hoyt (1961 Term, No. 31). 
313. Id. at 20. 
314. Id. at 26. 
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urged reversal on the ground that Florida's opt-in system generated 
juries that were ridiculously unbalanced under the Ballard criteria.315 
Justices Black and Douglas immediately agreed, but the remainder of 
the Court went with Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker, who main­
tained that there was "no systematic exclusion" of women similar to 
that found in Ballard or the Norris line of cases.316 Frankfurter smartly 
assigned the case to Justice Harlan, the finest lawyer on the Court. His 
opinion in Hoyt v. Florida317 was a masterly treatment of the largely 
uncharted issue of how to handle sex-based classifications and of the 
much-litigated issue (in the race cases) of discriminatory application of 
a statutory standard. Even the dissenters in conference felt impelled to 
join part of Harlan's opinion.318 In this fashion, the Warren Court was 
unanimous in denying women's incipient politics of recognition in 
what turned out to be that Court's only important sex discrimination 
case. 
Hoyt cast into bold relief the fact that the Supreme Court had 
never struck down a sex discrimination as unconstitutional.319 Ironi­
cally, the decision came just as the women's movement was taking 
flight again. Responding to mounting feminist demands, President 
Kennedy in 1961 established the President's Commission on the Status 
of Women, which served as a consciousness-raising and idea-sharing 
forum for feminist lawyers and thinkers from all around the country.320 
Pauli Murray, a civil rights lawyer working toward her J.S.D. at Yale 
Law School, drafted a remarkable memorandum for the Commission. 
The memorandum argued that the Equal Protection Clause could be 
interpreted to question sex-based discrimination for the same reasons 
the Court had deployed it against race-based discrimination: sex dis­
crimination (like race discrimination) rested upon a natural law under­
standing of "inherent differences" that had been deployed to support 
disadvantages and social inferiority of women; the naturalized view of 
sex differences rested upon unproven stereotypes or myths about 
315. See Douglas Conference Notes for Hoyt v. Florida (Oct. 20, 1961), in Douglas 
Papers, supra note 192, Container 1269. 
316. See id. Justice Brennan was a "tentative" vote for affirmance along those grounds. 
3 17. 368 U.S. 57 (1961). 
318. See id. at 69 (Warren, CJ., and Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring in part). 
319. Contrast Ballard, 329 U.S. 187 (1946), where the Court struck down a total exclu­
sion of women in a federal proceeding because it violated a federal statutory mandate, with 
Fay, 332 U.S. 261 (1947) (later in the 1946 Term), where the Court upheld against equal 
protection attack a substantial exclusion of women in a state proceeding, and Hoyt, 368 U.S. 
57 (1961), where the Court continued to follow Fay even after most states had adopted in­
clusionary policies. But cf. White v. Crook, 251 F.Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (three-judge 
court) (striking down Alabama's exclusion of all women from juries; distinguishing Hoyt as 
involving unproven charges of de facto discrimination). 
320. See HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX, supra note 302, at 109-37. 
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women that were usually an irrational basis for subordinating them; 
like blacks, women needed to mobilize against pervasive state dis­
crimination through the formation of an organization like the 
NAACP.321 
Murray's arguments not only persuaded the President's 
Commission that " [e]quality of rights under the law for all persons, 
male or female, is so basic to democracy and its commitment to the ul­
timate value of the individual that it must be reflected in the funda­
mental law of the land,"322 but also helped persuade the ACLU to add 
sex equality to its civil rights agenda.323 Moreover, Murray's memo­
randum served to bridge the concerns of various civil rights activists: 
her Fourteenth Amendment strategy sought equality for women (de­
sired by liberal ERA feminists), but without sacrificing laws genuinely 
remedying women's disadvantages in the workplace (desired by labor 
feminists and ERA opponents). For good measure, Murray, an 
African American who had been active in the civil rights movement, 
sought to unite blacks and women in a common campaign against 
prejudice and discrimination.324 
Murray's arguments found their way into the congressional de­
bates over the addition of "sex discrimination" to the jobs title of the 
Kennedy Administration's civil rights bill. Although the addition was 
propounded by anti-civil rights (but pro-ERA) Representative 
Howard Smith of Virginia, Murray and other feminists supported it 
and ensured that it was preserved in the final statute.325 The EEOC, 
321 . Pauli Murray, A Proposal to Reexamine the Applicability of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to State Laws and Practices Which Discriminate on the Basis of Sex Per Se (Dec. 
1962), in President's Commission on the Status of Women Papers, Schlesinger Library [Rad­
cliffe Inst.], Box 8, Folder 62, discussed in HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX, supra note 302, 
at 126-34; Mary Becker, The Sixties Shift to Formal Equality and the Courts: An Argument 
for Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 209, 222-31 (1998). 
322. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, AMERICAN WOMEN 44-45 
(1963). 
323. Dorothy Kenyon in 1963 presented Murray's memo (whose arguments paralleled 
those she had pressed in Hoyt) to the ACLU board, which was supportive. HARTMANN, su­
pra note 311,  at 62-63. Murray joined the board in 1965, id. at 54, and she and Kenyon in 
1966 urged the ACLU to go on record against legislation classifying on the basis of sex as 
"inherently discriminatory and unconstitutional." Id. at 72. Although they attracted allies 
within the ACLU (Norman Dorsen and Mel Wulf), they were not able to persuade the 
board to support constitutional equality for women until 1970, from which followed the es­
tablishment of the Women's Rights Project. Id. at 80-83; see also Nadine Strossen, The 
American Civil Liberties Union and Women's Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 1950-55 
(1991) (describing the origins of the ACLU's role in women's rights litigation). 
324. See Pauli Murray & Mary 0. Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimina­
tion and Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232 (1965); Serena Mayeri, Note, "A Common 
Fate of Discrimination": Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective, 110 
YALE L.J. 1045 (2001 ) . 
325. See HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX, supra note 302, at 176-82; PAULI MURRAY, 
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A BLACK ACTIVIST, FEMINIST, LAWYER, PRIEST, AND POET 
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however, refused to make sex discrimination a priority in its enforce­
ment of the new law, a stance that drew strong protests. When officials 
ignored their complaints at a 1966 conference on women's status, 
Murray, Betty Friedan, and other feminists stormed out in protest and 
founded the National Organization for Women ("NOW"). As Friedan 
later recalled, "it only took a few of us to get together to ignite the 
spark" that grassroots feminist consciousness raising had already cre­
ated, "and it spread like a nuclear chain reaction."326 In its statement 
of purpose, NOW went beyond the ambivalent agenda of the 
President's Commission and demanded not just formal equality for 
women, but also a dismantling of the separate sphe'res ideology. 
Women should not only have all the (public) economic and social op­
portunities as men, but men should also share in the (private) respon­
sibilities of home and childrearing.327 In 1967, NOW set out an ambi­
tious national agenda, including serious enforcement of the Equal Pay 
Act and Title VII by the EEOC and the courts; adoption of the ERA; 
and repeal of abortion laws.328 As Cynthia Harrison has argued, 
NOW's agenda reflected the first coherent feminist philosophy of the 
century, one that combined an updated politics of protection with a 
new politics of recognition: childbearing should be separated from 
both sexual intimacy and from childrearing; both mothers and fathers 
are responsible for family as well as work.329 
Like the NAACP, NOW established a Legal Defense and 
Education Fund to litigate issues of women's equality. In 1971, the 
ACLU established its Women's Rights Project, headed by Professor 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Representing a new generation of litigators, 
Ginsburg followed Kenyon and Murray in pressing the Court to rule 
that women have all the same legal rights and duties as men.330 These 
354-58 (1987); Jo Freeman, How "Sex" Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a 
Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQUALITY 163, 163-84 (1991). 
326. JUDITH HOLE & ELLEN LEVINE, REBIRTH OF FEMINISM 81 (1971) (quoting Betty 
Friedan, N.0. W. - How It Began, WOMEN SPEAKING, Apr. 1967, at 4). See generally 
CAROLINE BIRD, BORN FEMALE: THE HIGH COST OF KEEPING WOMEN DOWN 209 (rev. 
ed. 1970); Jo Ann Freeman, The Origins of the Women's Liberation Movement, 78 AM. J. 
soc. 792 (1973). 
327. NOW, Statement of Purpose, reprinted in UP FROM THE PEDESTAL: SELECTED 
WRITINGS IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FEMINISM 363-69 (Aileen s. Kraditor ed., 1968). 
328. HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX, supra note 302, at 201-05. At the same time 
NOW was pressing this national agenda, it was encouraging local "consciousness raising" 
groups among women and activism at the local level. See SARA EVANS, PERSONAL 
POLITICS: THE ROOTS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND 
THE NEW LEFT (1979). 
329. HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX, supra note 302, at 217. 
330. That their voice became the voice of women before the Court does not mean that 
all women agreed with their philosophy; both traditionalist and radical female perspectives 
were generally not heard by the Court until the 1980s. Compare F. CAROLYN GRAGLIA, 
THE HOUSEWIFE AS PARIAH: CONTEMPORARY FEMINISM'S WAR ON THE FAMILY (1997) 
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lawyers filed constitutional challenges to statutory sex discriminations, 
and state and federal judges found many of the challenged policies un­
constitutional - notwithstanding Hoyt. The leading case was White v. 
Crook, where Dorothy Kenyon and Pauli Murray's ACLU brief 
helped persuade a three-judge federal court to hold invalid Alabama's 
exclusion of both people of color and women from criminal juries.331 
For examples at the state level, the New Jersey and California 
Supreme Courts struck down state exclusions of women from bar­
tending, essentially refusing to follow Goesaert.332 Several state courts 
overruled the common law presumption that only husbands could 
bring loss of consortium claims in tort, on the ground that this was a 
blatant sex discrimination.333 Federal judges struck down state laws ex­
cluding women from state universities,334 from living off campus at 
state colleges,335 and from juries,336 as well as state laws treating women 
differently from men for purposes of sentencing after conviction of a 
crime.337 
The first case to reach the U.S. Supreme Court was an ACLU 
challenge to an Idaho statute which preferred male relatives over fe­
male ones for purposes of appointment to administer estates of intes­
tate decedents. Sally Reed's counsel on appeal - Kenyon, Murray, 
Wulf, and Ginsburg - urged the Court to renounce the constitutional 
philosophy of Muller, Goesaert, and Hoyt.338 " [A] new appreciation of 
women's place has been generated in the United States." Feminists 
"of both sexes" had pressed for women's "full membership" in the 
benefits and duties of constitutional citizenship. "But the distance to 
equal opportunity for women - in the face of the pervasive social, 
(discussing exclusion of traditionalist women from feminist thinking), with IMELDA 
WHELEHAN, MODERN FEMINIST THOUGHT 69-79 (1995) (discussing exclusion of radical 
feminists from legal reformist efforts). 
331. 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (three-judge court) (not appealed). 
332. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1971); Paterson Tavern & Grill Owners 
Ass'n v. Borough of Hawthorne, 270 A.2d 628 (N.J. 1970); Gallagher v. City of Bayonne, 245 
A.2d 373 (N.J. 1968); see also Seiden berg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, 317 F. Supp. 593 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (exclusion of female patrons unconstitutional). 
333. Deems v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 231 A.2d 514 (Md. 1967); Montgomery v. Stephen, 
101 N.W.2d 227 (Mich. 1960); Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 239 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 
1968); Durham v. Gabriel, 241 N.E.2d 401 (Ohio 1968); Clem v. Brown, 207 N.E.2d 398 
(Ohio 1965). 
334. Kirstein v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970) 
(three-judge court). 
335. Mollere v. Southeastern La. College, 304 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. La. 1969) . 
336. Abbott v. Mines, 411 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1969); White v. Crook, 251 F.Supp. 401 
(M.D. Ala. 1966) (three-judge court). 
337. United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968); accord Lib­
erti v. York, 246 A.2d 106 (Conn. 1968); Commonwealth v. Daniel, 243 A.2d 400 (Pa. 1969). 
338. Brief for Appellant at 41-53, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4). 
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cultural, and legal roots of sex-based discrimination - remains con­
siderable. In the absence of a firm constitutional foundation for equal 
treatment of men and women by the law, women seeking to be judged 
on their individual merits will continue to encounter law-sanctioned 
obstacles."339 Accordingly, the ACLU lawyers maintained that sex was 
a suspect classification for the same reasons race was: both were natu­
ral traits that the dominant culture has treated as a badge of inferiority 
and stigmatized legally, based upon inaccurate stereotypes about the 
group defined by the trait.340 
At the urging of Professor Herma Hill Kay, the California 
Supreme Court had just accepted such an argument in Sail' er Inn, Inc. 
v. Kirby.341 But the U.S. Supreme Court was not prepared to go that 
far in 1971, nor did the case require it to do so. As Chief Justice 
Burger said in opening the short conference discussion, the statute was 
a "carry over from [an] ancient English statute" and "can't stand" be­
cause it was an unreasonable discrimination, as the ACLU had also 
argued.342 Burger's opinion for a unanimous Court in Reed v. Reed343 
rested upon the statute's arbitrariness and therefore left the ACLU's 
other arguments unaddressed. In Forbush v. Wallace,344 the Court sug­
gested it was still applying ordinary review to sex-based classifications, 
as it summarily affirmed a lower court decision upholding state rules 
requiring women to adopt their husbands' surnames when they mar­
ried. 
Soon after Reed and Forbush, Congress voted for the proposed 
ERA and sent it to the states for ratification. This was an important 
normative moment, for not only did feminists unite behind the pro­
posal, but huge bipartisan majorities in Congress agreed that "Equal­
ity of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or any State because of sex."345 Meanwhile, Fourteenth 
339. Id. at 10. 
340. Id. at 14-41; accord, Joint Brief of Amici Curiae American Veterans Comm., Inc., 
NOW Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. at 10-12, Reed (No. 70-4); Brief of the City of 
New York at 8-17, Reed (No. 70-4). 
341. 485 P.2d 529, 538-43 (Cal. 1971) (striking down statute barring women from being 
bartenders in licensed establishments, inconsistent with Equal Protection Clause (as well as 
title VII and state constitution)). 
342. Douglas Conference Notes for Reed (Oct. 22, 1971), in Douglas Papers, supra note 
192, Container 1525. 
343. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
344. 405 U.S. 970 (1971), affg mern;, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (three-judge 
court). 
345. See generally MARY FRANCES BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED: POLITICS, WOMEN'S 
RIGHTS AND THE AMENDING PROCESS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1986); JANE J. 
MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986); RIGHTS OF PASSAGE: THE PAST AND 
FUTURE OF THE ERA (Joan Hoff Wilson ed., 1986). 
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Amendment litigation for sex equality continued apace. In 1973, the 
Supreme Court heard an appeal brought by the Southern Poverty Law 
Center in Fronteiro v.Richardson.346 The issue was whether the armed 
forces could deny female service personnel fringe benefits for their 
spouses absent a showing that the spouses were in fact "dependent" 
on them, a showing male service personnel did not have to make. 
Joseph Levin and Morris Dees' brief on appeal argued that the Court 
should apply strict scrutiny to the statutory sex discrimination; 
Ginsburg and Wulf filed an amicus brief making the same arguments 
for strict scrutiny they had made in Reed.347 Although Chief Justice 
Burger made an impassioned effort to dismiss this challenge as a 
"tempest in a teapot," the Brethren voted to reverse on the authority 
of Reed.348 
Justice Brennan's initial draft opinion followed Reed but invited 
his colleagues to consider the question whether sex is a suspect classi­
fication, as the Frontieros and the ACLU were urging.349 Justices 
Douglas, White, and Marshall immediately urged him to do so,350 
while the other Justices held off. Brennan circulated a new opinion 
which accepted the suspect classification argument along the lines sug­
gested by the ACLU. The opinion argued that, given the nation's 
"long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination," the immutability 
of sex as a trait, and the wide normative agreement that sex is usually 
irrelevant to proper public policy, sex is enough like race to justify its 
being treated as a "suspect classification" triggering "strict judicial 
scrutiny."351 Brennan's opinion only attracted the votes of four 
Justices, however. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Stewart, 
and Blackmun were reluctant to adopt the suspect classification ap­
proach so long as the ERA was pending, and they ended up concur­
ring in the judgment, depriving Brennan of his needed fifth vote to 
make a Court.352 
346. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
347. Brief for the Appellants at 28-37, Frontiero (No. 71-1694); Brief of American Civil 
Liberties Union Amicus Curiae at 24-44, Frontiero (No. 71-1694). By 1971, it was well­
established that equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment were "reverse­
incorporated" into the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 
348. Douglas Conference Notes for Frontiero, in Douglas Papers, supra note 192, 
Container 1577. Only the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist favored upholding the policy. 
349. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Memorandum to the Conference, re No. 71-1694 -
Frontiero v. Laird (Feb. 14, 1973), in Brennan Papers, supra note 129, Box I: 299, Folder 1 1  
(also including a draft of the opinion). 
350. See id. (emended with a handwritten note from Justice Douglas saying that he pre­
ferred the new approach); Memorandum from Byron R. White to William J. Brennan, Jr. 
(Feb. 15, 1973), in Brennan Papers, supra note J.29, Box I: 299, Folder 11 .  
351 .  Frontiero, 411  U.S. at 682-88. 
352. See id. at 697 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, CJ., and Blackmun, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (explicitly reserving the suspect classification question in light of the pending 
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Nonetheless, Frontiero sent a powerful signal. Soon after losing the 
case, Solicitor General Erwin Griswold announced that the Equal 
Protection Clause "does not tolerate discrimination on the basis of 
sex."353 As Professor Ginsburg read the case, "persons similarly situ­
ated, whether male or female, must be accorded even-handed treat­
ment by the law." Legislative classifications, she concluded, "may not 
be premised on sex-role stereotypes or unalterable sex characteristics 
that bear no necessary relationship to an individual's need, ability or 
life situation. "354 Ginsburg's campaign, essentially, was to interpret the 
Equal Protection Clause to entrench a feminist understanding of the 
ERA, which was in the midst of fierce ratification battles in state leg­
islatures that savvy observers felt was being lost. To accomplish this, 
she continued to bring cases to, or support cases before, the Supreme 
Court challenging sex discriminations that reflected archaic stereo­
types. 355 
The Burger Court did not always agree with the ACLU. For ex­
ample, the Justices upheld sex-based classifications when they ap­
peared remedial, such as the Florida law allowing widows but not wid­
owers a small property tax exemption, upheld in Kahn v. Shevin.356 
(Recall that many feminists themselves, such as Kenyon and Murray, 
believed that genuinely remedial legislation ought to pass equal pro­
tection scrutiny.) As the ACLU advocated, the Court struck down 
classifications that appeared to hold women back because of archaic 
stereotypes, such as the law allowing a spouse to stop paying child 
support for daughters at an earlier age than for sons, invalidated in 
Stanton v. Stanton.357 In Taylor v. Lousiana,358 the Court overruled 
ERA); id. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment, without a statement of reasons). 
Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 691. 
353. Memorandum of Amicus Curiae United States at 8, Cohen v. Chesterfield County 
Sch. Bd., 411 U.S. 947 (1973) (No. 72-1129) and Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 
632 (1974) (No. 72-777). 
354. Brief for Appellants at 11 ,  Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (No. 73-78) (Gins­
burg et al. representing the appellant). 
355. Interestingly, the plaintiffs she represented or befriended were Joseph as well as 
Sharron Frontiero, Mel Kahn, Stephen Charles Wiesenfeld, Will Webster, and William Her­
bert Orr - men harmed by sex discriminations. The strategy, controversial among feminists, 
was to show male judges that everybody - including people like them - was harmed by sex 
discrimination. 
356. 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (Douglas, J.) (women are more likely to need the tax break); 
see also Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding gendered social security provi­
sion, which the Court read as advantaging female wage earners and their families, as a way 
of redressing society's longstanding disparate treatment of women); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 
419 U.S. 498 (1975) (upholding a longer period for female officers to attain promotion for an 
"up or out" policy in the armed forces, because of greater difficulties women faced in com­
piling a record for promotion). In all three cases, the Court rejected the ACLU's arguments. 
357. 421 U.S. 7 (1975); see also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (Bren­
nan, J.) (invalidating ·gendered social security provision, which the Court read as discrimi-
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Hoyt, on the ground that an opt-in system for women to serve on ju­
ries violates the Sixth Amendment and due process requirement that 
juries be cross-sections of the community. 
The Women's Rights Project called on the Court to overrule 
Goesaert in Craig v. Boren.359 That case involved a state law barring 
the sale of two percent beer to eighteen-year-old males and 
twenty-one-year-old females, assertedly on the ground that the former 
were more likely to become inebriated and therefore a safety hazard 
than the latter. No longer making its pitch for strict scrutiny, the 
ACLU's amicus brief read the Supreme Court precedents for the still­
strong proposition that the judiciary should strike down statutes re­
flecting "traditional attitudes and prejudices about the expected be­
havior and roles of the two sexes in our society," for these are "part of 
the myriad signals and messages that daily underscore the notion of 
men as society's active members, women as men's quiescent compan­
ions, members of the 'other' second sex."360 The Court was open to 
this statement of women's politics of recognition. Justice Brennan 
garnered six Justices to require that sex-based classifications "must 
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially 
related to achievement of those objectives."361 Specifically, neither 
"administrative . . .  convenience" nor "overbroad and archaic gener­
alizations" regarding men and women's different capacities or roles 
could justify sex-based classifications.362 
Handed down in 1976, when it was likely the ERA would not be 
adopted, Craig seemed to satisfy liberal feminists' version of women's 
politics of recognition; the dissenting Justices certainly thought so.363 
Notwithstanding the ambiguous level of scrutiny, the Craig formula-
nating against female wage earners), followed in Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); 
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977). 
358. 419 U.S. 522 (1975), discussed in Section II .A.Le. 
359. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
360. [ACLU) Brief Arnicus Curiae at 22, Craig (No. 75-628) (citing SIMONE DE 
BEAUVOIR, SECOND SEX (1949)). 
361. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (Brennan, J., for the Court, including Justices White, Mar­
shall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens). Justice Stewart concurred only in the judgment, id. at 
214; Chief Justice Burger, id. at 215, and Justice Rehnquist dissented, id. at 217. 
362. Id. at 198 (opinion of the Court) (quotation omitted). 
363. See id. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Memorandum from Warren E. Burger 
(who also dissented) to William J. Brennan, Jr. (Nov. 15, 1976), in Brennan Papers, supra 
note 129, Box I: 411, Folder 2 (testily admonishing Brennan that he might have joined a 
Reed-like opinion, but that "you read into Reed v. Reed what is not there. Every gender dis­
tinction does not need the strict scrutiny test applicable to a criminal case."). Commentators 
agreed with the dissenters' assessment that "even if the ERA should fail to be ratified, be­
fore long the Court seems certain to reach the same conclusion under the equal protection 
clause." Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term - Foreword: Equal Citizenship 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 ,  54 (1977). 
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tion - and its application in that case, where there was both a plausi­
ble safety justification and an arguable Twenty-First Amendment 
boost for state alcohol regulation - had teeth enough to clear out 
most sex discriminations from state codes. Even armed with Frontiero 
and Craig, however, liberal feminism's constitutionalized politics of 
recognition ran into a formidable doctrinal roadblock: the reluctance 
of the Justices to scrutinize classifications that strongly affected 
women but were not openly gendered. At the very same time that the 
Burger Court was subjecting sex-based classifications to heightened 
scrutiny, it was subjecting laws having disparate impact on race-based 
classes to ordinary scrutiny in Hackney, Rodriguez, and Washington v. 
Davis. There was no reason to expect the Justices to follow a different 
approach with regard to sex-based classes, with or without the ERA. 
The most important issue for feminists was whether the state could 
discriminate on the basis of pregnancy. Representing women whose 
pregnancies were excluded from a state disability program in Geduldig 
v. Aiello,364 Wendy Webster Williams maintained that "the individual 
who receives a benefit or suffers a detriment because of a physical 
characteristic unique to one sex benefits or suffers because he or she 
belongs to one or the other sex" - which surely is sex discrimination, 
because men are treated differently.365 Moreover, men were treated 
more favorably than women, and for exactly the reasons rejected in 
Reed and Frontiero (and later in Craig): men were privileged and 
women were denigrated in the public and workplace sphere because 
of women's unique ability to bear children and the concomitant spe­
cial responsibility for rearing them in the domestic sphere.366 Indeed, 
" [t]his last prejudice - that women are not serious and permanent 
members of the workforce and that lurking somewhere in each 
woman's life is a man fully able to support her - underlies and rein­
forces discrimination against women in all realms of their lives. "367 
Williams' powerful presentation was supported by amicus briefs from 
the ACLU and the EEOC. 
But the nine men on the Court were not persuaded. The discussion 
in conference revealed little comprehension of Williams' arguments. 
Most of the Justices agreed with their Chief's complaint that the preg-
364. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
365. Brief for Appellees at 31, Geduldig (No. 73-640). 
366. "Those who would make these unique physical differences a touchstone for unscru­
tinized differential treatment offer nothing other than the modern version of the historical 
rationales which were for so long the source of women's second class citizenship under the 
law." Id. at 36. 
367. Id. at 39-40 (footnote numbers omitted); see id. at 42-45 (relying on the similar in­
terpretation of the ERA forwarded by Professor Thomas Emerson and his Yale law students 
in Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal 
Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 930 (1971)). 
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nancy exclusion involves "a different kind of risk than illness covered 
by [the] Act. [P]rostate problem is covered - as is hysterectomy -
different from pregnancy."368 Based upon this reasoning, the Court 
ruled that the pregnancy exclusion was not a sex-based classification369 
and upheld the statutory scheme. During the same Term, the Court 
invalidated school board rules barring pregnant women from con­
tinuing their jobs as teachers, but the opinion by Justice Stewart (also 
the author of Geduldig) reasoned that the per se rule arbitrarily bur­
dened the women's parenthood and family rights and so was unconsti­
tutional under the Due Process Clause.370 In 1976, the Supreme Court 
followed Geduldig to interpret the sex discrimination bar in Title VII 
to be inapplicable to pregnancy-based discrimination.371 Wendy 
Williams again argued for the losing side - but it was her vision of sex 
discrimination that triumphed when she and Susan Deller Ross per­
suaded Congress to override the Court with the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978 ("PDA").372 " [R]eaffirm[ing] that sex dis­
crimination includes discrimination based on pregnancy, and specifi­
cally defin[ing] standards which require that pregnant workers be 
treated the same as other employees on the basis of their ability or in­
ability to work,"373 the PDA provided a legal (even if not a constitu­
tional) basis for liberal feminists' ongoing campaign to assure women 
conditions of employment that would allow them to have productive 
careers.374 
368. Douglas Conference Notes for Geduldig (Mar. 29, 1974), in Douglas Papers, supra 
note 192, Container 1630 (0.T. 1973, Argued Cases, 73-640); see Brennan Conference Notes 
for Gedu/dig, in Brennan Papers, supra note 129, Box I: 311 ,  Folder 4 (Burger argued that 
the "exclusion is not sex based but upon distinction between pregnancy and other ail­
ments"). 
369. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20. 
370. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). The LaFleur conference 
presaged the Geduldig one, for Burger, Stewart, and Blackmun all went out of their way to 
emphasize that the "differentiation is not sex related," because it related only to pregnancy. 
Brennan Conference Notes for LaFleur, in Brennan Papers, supra note 129, Box I: 310 (No. 
72-777) (quote is from Blackmun). Powell viewed the case in equal protection terms, but 
only required the board to show a rational basis. Id. 
371 .  Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
372. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000) (defining "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" in 
Title VII to include pregnancy). 
373. H. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3 (1978); see also SUZANNE UTTARO SAMUELS, FETAL 
RIGHTS, WOMEN'S RIGHTS: GENDER EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE (1995). 
374. Chastened by Congress's immediate and angry override of Geduldig and Gilbert, 
the Supreme Court not only applied the PDA expansively to protect women's workplace 
rights, e.g., United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991) (reject­
ing employer policy protecting potentially pregnant women against jobs posing hazards to 
fetuses), but also applied its preemptive force conservatively when confronted with state 
rules expanding women's workplace opportunities. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 292 (1987) (holding that the PDA does not preempt a state law re­
quiring employers to grant leaves for pregnant women). 
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As the pregnancy cases reflect, feminists' politics of recognition in­
sisted on heightened scrutiny of rules that had an inevitable impact on 
women. And, generally, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected their stance, 
just as it had rejected similar arguments made by people of color. The 
leading case was Personnel Administrator v. Feeney.375 Helen Feeney 
found it virtually impossible to advance in the civil service because of 
the operation of the state's strong preference for veterans. She chal­
lenged the preference for its significant adverse impact upon women's 
opportunities in a state where 98% of the veterans were men. Phyllis 
Segal's NOW amicus brief supporting her claim argued that the pref­
erence "inevitably discriminates deeply and pervasively against 
women as a result of a congeries of laws, regulations and practices 
which define as overwhelmingly male the class of individuals who 
qualify as veterans."376 Invoking Washington v. Davis, the state re­
sponded that the classification itself (veterans) was benign and there 
was no evidence whatsoever of any intent to discriminate against 
women.377 With little internal dissent, the Supreme Court agreed. 
Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court was an important clarification 
of the burden of proving intent under Washington v. Davis: challeng­
ers to a state employment policy must show that the challenged policy 
was not only adopted in spite of its disparate impact on women (or ra­
cial minorities), but because of that impact.378 
3. The Politics of Remediation and the New Politics of Preservation, 
1976-Present 
Traditionally, most opposition to equality for women was driven 
by open commitments to a natural law view in which sex and gender 
differences were viewed as profound and women's proper role was to 
bear and rear children and govern the domestic sphere.379 As women 
375. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
376. Brief of Amici Curiae National Organization for Women, NOW Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, Inc. et al. at 12-13, Feeney (No. 78-233). 
377. Brief for Appellants at 30-57, Feeney (No. 78-233); accord 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-11 
(veterans' preferences exempted from Title VII); Brief of Amicus Curiae United States, 
Feeney (No. 78-233) (agreeing with the state). 
378. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 278-80. For an excellent analysis of Feeney as a different "in­
tent" standard than that in Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights, see Sheila Foster, 
Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065 (1998). 
379. Examples of such natural law discourse include Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 
(1948) (allowing women to tend bar only if employed by their fathers or husbands); Muller 
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding maximum hours law to protect only women); 
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring in the judgment) (excluding 
women from the practice of law); PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY, THE POWER OF THE POSITIVE 
WOMAN 54, 159-63 (1977) (normative book by the leading opponent of the ERA); Siegel, 
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increasingly objected to their subordinate status and moved public 
opinion toward the idea that sex is a tolerable variation as far as most 
public policies were concerned, pragmatic arguments came to the fore. 
Although natural law continued to be the basis for supporting tradi­
tional gender roles and separate spheres, preservationist rhetoric 
gradually shifted to include or emphasize the bad consequences of 
"radical" change, including harms to the privacy of the marital rela­
tionship and the harmony of the family, the psychic costs to women as 
well as men if traditional mores were upset, and the possibilities of 
violence and disorder.380 As in the race cases, the shift in rhetoric was 
accelerated by the Supreme Court's sex discrimination jurisprudence. 
Because traditionalist arguments for the status quo came perilously 
close to the kinds of "archaic" notions about sex differences that were 
automatically lethal in cases like Craig and Frontiero, these precedents 
pressed preservationists strongly toward pragmatic rather than natural 
law arguments, at least in public. Like the politics of racial preserva­
tion, the politics of sex and gender role preservation in the 1970s and 
1980s was dominated by this kind of cost-benefit moderation, with at 
least one important exception. Pragmatists as well as traditionalists 
paid attention to women's "real differences" from men, particularly 
those related to pregnancy and women's responsibilities to the unborn 
as well as the children they (still) reared.381 Indeed, feminists them­
selves split on the issue. A new generation of difference feminists 
urged the necessity of state rules empowering and compensating 
women for their traditionally undervalued caretaking roles.382 
Like the liberal feminists they were opposing, both pragmatic and 
natural law preservationists invoked the Constitution. They main­
tained that sex-neutral and abortion-protective rules imposed by 
judges in Washington, D.C. were at war with (1) the values of local-
She the People, supra note 237 (discussing arguments against female suffrage and ratification 
of the Nineteenth Amendment). 
380. See generally Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicat­
ing Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127 (1994); Reva B. Siegel, "The 
Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119-20 (1996) 
(arguing in two different contexts that when traditional male privileges came under fire, 
their justifications were "modernized" and thereby strengthened). 
381. Thus, women (the supposed beneficiaries of the politics of recognition) have been 
well-represented in the pro-life and anti-ERA politics of preservation. Women opposing the 
liberal feminist agenda hold different views than the liberals regarding gender roles, sexual­
ity, and parenting. Generally, they view women's greatest fulfillment in their roles as wives 
and mothers. See LUKER, supra note 290, at 158-91 (pro-life women); MANSBRIDGE, supra 
note 345, at 98-117 (1986) (anti-ERA women). 
382. Although difference feminism is typically set "against" liberal feminism, that is 
simplistic. Both liberals like Wendy Williams and Ruth Ginsburg and difference feminists 
like Chris Littleton agreed with Pauli Murray and Celia Kenyon that neither the ERA nor 
the equal protection clause should be construed to invalidate legislation genuinely remedial 
to women's traditional disadvantages, especially in the workplace. 
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ism, where the family and the state were the primary situs for rules 
relating to gender-normative roles in bearing and raising children, 
without interference from the national government; (2) the constitu­
tional separation of powers, whereby the popularly elected legislature 
is both the most legitimate and the most institutionally competent 
state organ to handle complex, delicate moral and family issues; and 
(3) fundamental liberties, particularly the rights of fetuses and parents. 
These arguments were prominent in the campaign to defeat the ERA. 
Phyllis Schlafly and other opponents argued that the ERA was a bad 
idea because it would undermine the family and deprive states of their 
ability to legislate morality (including sexual abstinence and compul­
sory heterosexuality), would empower unaccountable federal judges 
to impose their own elite views on an unconsenting populace, and 
would deprive wives and parents of fundamental rights needed for the 
preservation of families.383 
The arguments that sunk the ERA also instructed the Supreme 
Court regarding the extent to which it should apply the Equal 
Protection Clause to liberate women from archaic stereotypes.384 
Among Mrs. Schlafly's most popular charges against the ERA were 
that it would empower the Supreme Court to subject women to the 
draft and military service, to invalidate gendered laws protecting 
women, and to require states to recognize same-sex marriages and 
other "homosexual rights."385 Americans supported sex segregation in 
military service, many special protections for women, and marriage 
limited to different-sex couples. While the ERA lingered, the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed all of the foregoing sex discriminations, substantially 
following the constitutional logic of Mrs. Schlafly and her allies. Be­
tween 1972 and 1975, the Court brushed aside sex discrimination (and 
other) arguments for same-sex marriage and sodomy law nullification 
without even asking for briefs on the merits.386 The Court addressed 
383. See MANSBRIDGE, supra note 345; DONALD G. MATHEWS & JANE SHERRON DE 
HART, SEX, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE ERA: A STATE AND THE NATION (1990) 
(case study of the ERA's defeat in North Carolina); id. at 35-53 (arguments against ERA by 
Senator Ervin [D-N.C.] during its debate in Senate, 1971-72). 
384. Recall that four concurring Justices declined to join Justice Brennan's opinion in 
Frontiero because these arguments were being seriously debated in connection with the 
ERA. See supra note 352. 
385. See Phylis Schlafly, What's Wrong with "Equal Rights" for Women?, 5 PHYLLIS 
SCHLAFLY REP. NO. 7, Feb. 1972, reprinted in WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 291 (Winston E. Langley & Vivian c. Fox eds., 1994) (women 
would be subject to the draft and would lose custody of their children); Phyllis Schlafly, 
Memo on the Equal Rights Amendment 2000, at http://www.eagleforum.org/ 
era/ERA99.shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2002) (federally funded abortions and rights for 
"homosexuals," including marriage). 
386. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (summa­
rily affirming state consensual sodomy law); Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (dismissing 
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the other two issues in 1981, just before the period for ERA ratifica­
tion expired for good (1982). 
As Feeney and Frontiero illustrated, the United States armed 
forces operated under a cornucopia of sex-discriminatory rules, the 
centerpiece of which was the exclusion of women from combat roles. 
Women's marginal role in the military was, from the perspective of 
most feminists, a textbook example of the way in which sexist public 
law reinforced women's status as second-class citizens.387 Traditional­
ists viewed women's exclusion as necessary, lest the military be femi­
nized and weakened.388 Such a justification was insufficient under 
Craig or even Reed. The modernized (pragmatic) justification for ex­
clusions was that unit cohesion would break down if women joined in 
combat.389 For this and other reasons, the 1980 reactivation of the draft 
required only men to register. A three-judge court ruled that the sex 
discrimination violated the Craig standard. Although the ACLU was 
joined on appeal by NOW, the League of Women Voters, and a num­
ber of other feminist organizations, and a generation of the nation's 
finest constitutional lawyers (like Wendy Williams and Larry Tribe) 
defended the lower court judgment, their arguments fell on deaf (or 
deferential) judicial ears. Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Rostker v. 
Goldberg390 emphasized that the Constitution commits military policy 
to the political branches, that the judiciary has very little competence 
to evaluate their policy choices, and that Congress had in this case en­
gaged in careful factfinding and deliberation to which the Court must 
defer. Moreover, "the decision to exempt women from registration 
was not the ' "accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking 
about females. " ' "391 Instead, the decision was a corollary of the 
proposition that women were barred from combat roles, a bar not 
challenged by the plaintiffs.392 Writing for three dissenters, Justice 
appeal of rejected challenge to state bar to same-sex marriages); see also supra Section I.C.2 
(discussing Baker and Doe). 
387. Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed 
Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499 (1991); see also Lori Kornblum, Women Warriors in a Men 's 
World: The Combat Exclusion, 2 L. & INEQUALITY 351 (1984); Wendy Webster Williams, 
The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RIGHTS 
L. REP. 175, 182-85 (1982). 
388. See BRIAN MITCHELL, WEAK LINK: THE FEMINIZATION OF THE AMERICAN 
MILITARY (1989). 
389. See generally FEMALE SOLDIERS - COMBATANTS OR NONCOMBATANTS? 
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES (Nancy Loring Goldman ed., 1 982) 
(hereinafter FEMALE SOLDIERS]. Note especially Mady Weschler Segal, The Argument for 
Female Combatants, in FEMALE SOLDIERS, supra. 
390. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-74 (1981). 
391. Id. at 74 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977), in turn quoting 
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977)). 
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Marshall found more at stake in the challenge because women were 
being excluded from "a fundamental civic obligation. "393 
The Court was also tolerant of sex-based classifications protecting 
women against male predation. Although states in the 1970s redrafted 
their penal codes to be largely sex-neutral, California continued to 
make it a felony for a male (of any age) to have sexual intercourse 
with a female under the age of eighteen. In Michael M. v. Superior 
Court,394 plaintiffs and their amici challenged the statute as a classic 
sex discrimination based upon traditional gender stereotypes, where 
the vulnerable girl needs to be protected against predatory boys and 
men, but boys can take care of themselves.395 California and the 
United States, which entered the case as an amicus, defended the stat­
ute as appropriately focusing regulatory attention on the main prob­
lem, the need to protect girls against predation and unwanted preg­
nancies.396 The statutory rape law was a prophylactic measure to 
protect minor women who were in fact vulnerable to sexual assault. Its 
sex discrimination was permissible, because women rarely assaulted 
boys; it was necessary to the operation of this policy, because girls 
would be reluctant to report violations if they themselves could be 
prosecuted. Five Justices accepted this justification.397 Dissenting 
Justices and feminist critics of the decision disputed both elements of 
the Court's logic: the historical policy of the gendered statute was 
rooted in archaic stereotypes of vulnerable girls and predatory boys, 
and a humane anti-predation policy that recognizes girls' as well as 
boys' sexual agency can criminalize sex between adults and underage 
persons of either sex.398 
Although the Supreme Court proved receptive to preservationist 
arguments in the areas of greatest social anxiety about sex equality -
392. Because the goal of registration was to prepare for combat mobilization, it was a 
reasonable decision to register only those who could engage in combat, men. Id. at 76-83. 
393. Id. at 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall demonstrated that the Court attributed 
a more rational policy to Congress than could be supported from the record and that the ex­
perts to whom greatest deference was owed (the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President) had 
supported the registration of women. Id. at 88-113. 
394. 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 
395. See Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU and the ACLU of Northern California, Michael 
M. (No. 79-1344). 
396. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 13-24, Michael M. (No. 79-1344). 
397. See Michael M. , 450 U.S. at 470-76 (Rehnquist, J., for a plurality); id. at 478-80 
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 481-87 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). 
398. See id. at 493-95 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Kristin Bumiller, Rape as a Legal Sym­
bol: An Essay on Sexual Violence and Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 75 (1987); Frances Ol­
sen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 387 (1987); 
Williams, supra note 387, at 181-82; see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex 
Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1305 (1991) (criticizing both majority and dissent­
ing Justices). 
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same-sex marriage, women in combat, and statutory rape - it did not 
retreat from Craig's baseline, even after the Court shifted toward the 
right after President Reagan's election in 1980. Indeed, Reagan's first 
Supreme Court appointee was Sandra Day O'Connor, the first woman 
to serve on the Court.399 In one of her earliest major opinions for the 
Court, Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,400 Justice 
O'Connor struck down a state law allowing only women to enroll at 
the state nursing college. When a law adopts a sex-based classification, 
the state has a "burden of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justifi­
cation' for the classification," a burden that cannot be met by post-hoc 
rationalizations by counsel or policies that ultimately rest upon gender 
stereotypes.401 With Craig, Hogan remains the leading statement of the 
Court's approach to statutory sex discriminations, and the Rehnquist 
Court - often over the objection of its Chief - has been just as vig­
orous as the Burger Court was in carrying out the liberal feminist poli­
tics of recognition under cover of the Equal Protection Clause. No 
longer can women be peremptorily struck from juries without explana­
tion402or excluded from state paramilitary colleges,403 for prominent 
examples. In both cases, Justice O'Connor was in the majority, and the 
opinion for the Court quoted and applied Hogan.404 
The foregoing sex discrimination cases reflect the Court's stance as 
the twentieth century came to a close: consistent with the feminist 
politics of recognition (and public opinion), most of the Justices have 
insisted on formal equality and respect for women's co-equal role in 
public as well as private life.405 On the other hand, and probably con­
sistent with public opinion, the Justices backed away when women's 
equality was strongly inconsistent with third-party rights, the legiti­
macy and comparative competence of the judiciary (vis a vis the politi­
cal branches), and the Constitution's preference for local decision­
making as to matters of family life and public safety. 
399. Although a reliable conservative on issues of federalism, separation of powers, and 
the individual rights of racial and sexual minorities, Justice O'Connor also proved attentive, 
in a way her Reagan Brethren were not, to feminist voices. E.g. , Judith Olans Brown et al., 
The Rugged Feminism of Sandra Day O'Connor, 32 IND. L. REV. 1219 (1999); Sandra Day 
O'Connor, Portia's Progress, 66 NYU L. REV. 1546, 1553 (1991). 
400. 458 U.S. 718 (1982), also discussed in Section 11.C.3 infra. Because the decision was 
5-4, the replacement of Justice Stewart (a conservative in sex discrimination cases) with Jus­
tice O'Connor very probably changed the outcome of the case. 
401. Id. at 724. 
402. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
403. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
404. Id. at 523-24; J.E.B. ,  511  U.S. at 136. 
405. See ROSEN, THE WORLD SPLIT OPEN, supra note 299, at 338 (opinion polls have 
found large majorities of Americans supportive of a "strong women's movement to push for 
changes that benefit women"). 
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Although the foregoing constitutional clashes between women's 
politics of recognition and traditionalists' politics of preservation were 
important and meaningful, the most intense post-1976 clashes involved 
the unique issue of abortion and issues of remediation. Abortion has 
been an intense question because it is so important for each group and 
their points of view are incommensurable: feminists understand choice 
as essential to their equal citizenship, while traditionalists understand 
life to be at stake. As with the civil rights movement, the other conten­
tious issues relate to women's politics of remediation. The women's 
movement has sought and obtained statutes and administrative rules 
protecting against private workplace discrimination and sexual har­
assment; requiring integration of public accommodations; insisting 
that schools not only protect girls against sexual harassment, but also 
devote equal resources to girls' athletic as well as educational pro­
grams; modernizing rape laws and criminalizing hate speech; and pro­
viding tort causes of action for gender-based violence. Remedial 
measures such as these are costly and may cross fuzzy constitutional 
lines relating to federalism, separation of powers, and individual rights 
of free speech and association. Even as they were being routed as to 
matters of women's equal rights to serve on juries and attend paramili­
tary colleges, preservationists have made successful court challenges to 
feminist remedial measures suppressing misogynistic pornography, 
regulating pro-life protests and persuasive activities outside abortion 
clinics, and (most controversially) creating a federal cause of action for 
gender-based violence. 
a. The Post-Roe Abortion Cases. Pro-life traditionalists mobilized 
as a normative social movement seeking to preserve not only human 
life, but also a traditionalist ethic of family values and women's do­
mestic role.406 They maintained that Roe v. Wade was worse than the 
ERA because it took the most moral of issues away from family and 
state decisionmaking, represented the most arrogant example of judi­
cial legislation, and blatantly ignored the fundamental right to life of 
the most vulnerable party to the matter, the unborn human child.407 
Through organs such as the National Right to Life Committee (1973), 
the movement sought to amend the Constitution to overrule Roe and, 
failing that, to adopt new state laws regulating abortion in a variety of 
ways. These laws, in turn, were challenged by pro-choice groups and 
defended by state attorneys general and their pro-life amici. Three 
kinds of abortion-regulatory laws illustrate how this ongoing culture 
406. See DALLAS A. BLANCHARD, THE ANTI-ABORTION MOVEMENT AND THE RISE 
OF THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT: FROM POLITE TO FIREY PROTEST 22-36 (1994) (providing an 
institutional history of the pro-life movement); id. at 44-46 (providing essential ideology of 
pro-lifers). 
407. See id. at 37-50; Luker, supra note 290. 
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clash played itself out in constitutional law: parental and spousal noti­
fication and consent requirements, bars to public funding or assistance 
for abortions, and informed consent rules seeking to persuade women 
to think twice before they chose abortions. 
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,408 the first major post-Roe 
case, Missouri Attorney General John Danforth pressed a pro-life 
constitutional understanding in support of Missouri's law which re­
quired a minor to obtain her parents' consent and a wife to obtain her 
husband's consent before an abortion could be performed. He was 
supported by an amicus brief from the United States Catholic 
Conference.409 Both argued that "the [constitutional] rights of parents 
to the exercise of their authority is considered fundamental and only a 
compelling interest by the state can overcome it."410 Similarly, both in­
voked the right to marry cases, including Griswold, for the proposition 
that family decisions, including those relating to pregnancy, are joint 
decisions in which the husband has a legally protected interest, just as 
his wife does.411 These arguments had an audience on the Court: 
Justices White, Rehnquist, and Stevens were persuaded by the argu­
ments for parental consent; White and Rehnquist went with spousal 
consent as well.412 But a majority of the Court insisted on the individu­
alistic framework suggested by Roe and supported by Planned Parent­
hood's detailed argument that, in practice, the state's consent rules 
would give parents and husbands vetoes over a decision that was ulti­
mately personal to the mother.413 
The foregoing pro-life constitutional arguments were pressed more 
ardently in Bellotti v. Baird,414 which evaluated a Massachusetts law 
requiring minors to notify their parents and obtain their consent be­
fore they could obtain abortions, with a judicial proceeding available if 
408. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
409. The National Catholic Bishops' Conference had in 1967 established a Committee 
on Family Life, which was the main speaker for the pro-life viewpoint before Roe. The 
Committee was the precursor to the National Right to Life Committee, formed in 1973. 
Blanchard, supra note 406, at 50-53. 
410. Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States Catholic Conference at 24, Planned Par­
enthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (No. 74-1151); see Brief for Appellees at 42-44, 
Danforth (No. 74-1151). 
411. Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States Catholic Conference at 32-39, Danforth 
(No. 74-1151); Brief for Appellees at 38, Danforth (No. 74-1151). 
412. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 94 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Brennan Conference Notes 
for Danforth (Nos. 74-1151, 74-1419), in Brennan Papers, supra note 129, Box I: 368, Folder 
6. 
413. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 68-72 (parental consent), id. at 72-75 (spousal consent); Brief 
for Appellants and Cross-Appellees Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri, et al., at 72-90, 
Danforth (Nos. 74-1151, 74-1419) (spousal consent), id. at 90-105 (parental consent). 
414. 443 U.S. 627 (1979). 
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either parent refused and the minor felt it was in her best interests. 
Several amici argued that the constitutional protection for family in­
tegrity not only justified the parental consent requirement, but also 
barred the state from overriding the parents' decision with the judicial 
bypass.415 Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice Powell accepted 
the traditionalists' point that the state has much more leeway in regu­
lating the sexual choices of minors because of "the peculiar vulner­
ability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an in­
formed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in 
child rearing."416 Powell also adopted the amici's localist stance that 
moral instruction and choice for minors lay first within the family, and 
"beyond the competence of impersonal political institutions. "417 On 
the other hand, he agreed with the challengers' claim that the statute 
was overbroad: it required notification even when there was no chance 
of productive dialogue and therefore was an "undue burden" on the 
minor's right to choose an abortion.418 In dictum, Justice Powell 
suggested that states could require both parents to consent to the 
procedure, so long as there was a judicial bypass available to the 
minor in lieu of parental dialogue.419 Because Powell spoke for 
four Justices and a fifth (White) believed the Massachusetts law 
was valid, Bellotti indicated that there was a Court that would uphold 
subsequent parental consent and notification laws - as indeed there 
was in subsequent cases, notwithstanding mounting evidence that even 
notification-with-bypass requirements imposed traumatic burdens on 
minor women.420 
415. See Brief of Amici Curiae Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights, et. al at 
6-32, Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 627 (1979) (No. 78-329). 
416. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634 (Powell, J., for a plurality joined by Burger, C.J., and 
Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.); id. at 637-39 (discussion relying on Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510, 535 (1925) and other cases emphasized by the state and its amici). 
417. Id. at 638. "Thus, 'it is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the 
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include prep for obliga­
tions the state can neither supply nor hinder." Id. (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 
158, 166 (1944)). 
418. Id. at 646-50. 
419. Id. at 649. 
420. To trace the development of the doctrine, see H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 
(1981) (upholding parental notification-whenever-possible requirement); Planned Parent­
hood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (upholding parental-consent law, with judicial 
bypass as suggested in Bellotti); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (upholding a 
two-parent notification, with bypass, law against strong social science evidence and lower 
court findings of fact that notification did not contribute to healthy dialogue about the im­
portant moral choice and instead contributed to trauma for the minors); Planned Parent­
hood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (joint opinion, delivering the judgment of the Court) 
(upholding one-parent consent requirement, with judicial bypass, but striking down spousal 
notification requirement). For an analysis of the social science evidence that the parental­
consent and notification requirements burden women and do not contribute to family com-
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The Supreme Court was also responsive to the arguments of prag­
matic preservationists that even if choosing an abortion was a tolerable 
moral choice, such that the state could ordinarily not make it a crime, 
abortion was not a benign or good moral choice, such that the state 
must support or "promote" it. In Maher v. Roe,421 the Court ruled that 
it is not unconstitutional for state medicaid programs to exclude abor­
tions even if they fund childbirths. Justice Powell's opinion for the 
Court interpreted Roe-Danforth-Bellotti as protecting women against 
"unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether 
to terminate her pregnancy" - a freedom from state "compulsion" 
that did not entitle women to have their abortions paid for by the 
state.422 "There is a basic difference between direct state interference 
with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative ac­
tivity consonant with legislative policy."423 The state has wide latitude 
not to "promote abortion" by funding it, and Powell's opinion con­
cluded with a statement that this is precisely the sort of policy issue 
best left to the democratically elected legislators.424 
Maher encouraged pro-life activists to press for laws not only re­
quiring that abortions be performed only after doctors obtain the writ­
ten consent of their patients (a requirement upheld in Danforth),425 
but also that the consent be "informed" by pro-life information the 
doctors were required to provide. Akron, Ohio, for example, required 
doctors to inform their patients about "the anatomical and physiologi­
cal characteristics of the particular unborn child," many possible com­
plications of abortion, and the "fact" that "the unborn child is a hu­
man life from the moment of conception." This was a powerful bit of 
lobbying by the state, and an intrusion into the doctor-patient rela­
tionship, but one that was defended by the Reagan Administration, 
which argued that Roe was not strongly implicated in regulations that 
did not "unduly burden" the woman's ability to obtain an abortion 
munication, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, 
AND THE LAW 190-202 (1997) (hereinafter ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, SEXUALITY]. 
421 .  432 U.S. 464 (1977). See also Maher's companion cases, Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 
(1977) (interpreting Social Security Act to allow states to participate in medicaid program 
without funding abortions), and Poetker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (per curiam) (municipal 
hospital providing childbirth services was not constitutionally required to provide abortion 
services). The Court followed and applied Maher to uphold a federal bar to spending federal 
monies on abortions in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
422. Maher, 432 U.S. at 473-74 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)). 
423. Id. at 475. Powell contrasted a law barring schools from teaching German, invali­
dated in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), with a policy of teaching Latin as the only 
foreign language in the public schools, which the Court would uphold. Maher, 432 U.S. at 
476-77. 
424. Id. at 479-80; see id. at 481-82 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (same). 
425. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67, 85 (1976). 
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and that the Court should "accord heavy deference to the legislative 
judgment" in determining whether this and other requirements consti­
tuted an "undue burden" on the pregnant patient.426 The Inc. Fund, in 
an amicus brief, reminded the Court that deference to legislative 
judgments had been the last line of segregationist constitutionalism -
and that Brown and other race cases had decisively rejected this kind 
of argument.427 In any event, the required disclosures loaded up the in­
formed consent process too much for Justice Powell, who wrote for 
the Court in striking down this ordinance in Akron v. Akron Center 
for Reproductive Health.428 "By insisting upon recitation of a lengthy 
and inflexible list of information, Akron unreasonably has placed 'ob­
stacles in the path of the doctor upon whom [the woman is] entitled to 
rely for advice in connection with her decision.' "429 
The Court followed Akron in Thornburgh v. American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists,430 which struck down a similarly 
loaded informed consent statute. Justice Blackmun's opinion for the 
Court was more forceful than that in Akron, however. "The States are 
not free, under the guise of protecting maternal health or potential 
life," state interests recognized as valid in Roe, "to intimidate women 
into continuing pregnancies" or "to deter a woman from making a de­
cision that, with her physician, is hers to make."431 Thornburgh is sig­
nificant, for it represented an advance for the politics of preservation's 
campaign to overrule Roe. Solicitor General Charles Fried filed an 
amicus brief urging the Court to abandon Roe's "rigid" trimester 
framework and to apply Maher's "undue burden" approach to evalu­
ate the informed consent provisions432 - and his brief drew general 
426. Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States at 6-7, Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Repro­
ductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (No. 81-746) (undue burden as the constitutional stan­
dard); id. at 8-10 (deference to legislators); cf. id. at 5 n.1 (reserving the question whether the 
government believed Roe was correctly decided). 
427. Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. at 5-12, 
Akron (No. 81-746). 
428. 462 U.S. 416, 442-49 (1983). 
429. Id. at 445 (quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at 604 n.33). Powell rejected the argument, 
pressed in dissent by Justice O'Connor, that the unconstitutional advice could be severed 
from other information that Akron properly required doctors to make available. Id. at 445-
46 n.37. 
430. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
431. Id. at 759. 
432. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States at 17-18, Thornburgh v. American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (No. 84-495) (urging the 
Court to abandon the Roe framework for analysis). 
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support from four Justices, including Chief Justice Burger (who had 
joined Roe and subsequent majority opinions) .433 
After President Reagan appointed Antonin Scalia and Anthony 
Kennedy to the Court, only three of the seven Roe Justices remained 
on the Court, and there was every reason to believe that Roe would be 
narrowed or overruled.434 The life/choice culture clash broke open in 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.435 Missouri required doctors 
to perform viability tests near the end of the second trimester, a re­
quirement foreclosed by Roe as applied in Akron.436 The state asked 
the Court to reconsider and overrule Roe v. Wade - a petition joined 
by dozens of right-to-life amici and the Reagan Administration.437 The 
Solicitor General argued that Roe created a fundamental right that 
was not supported by constitutional text, intent, or tradition; deni­
grated the state's interest in potential human life without any legal or 
moral basis; created an arbitrary trimester framework for implement­
ing its flawed premises; and, most important, engaged in this activism 
in the teeth of popular demands for regulation.438 "At the heart of the 
abortion controversy lies a divisive conflict between a woman's inter­
est in procreative choice and the State's interest in protecting the life 
of an unborn child and promoting respect for life generally. This is not 
the kind of conflict that is amenable to judicial resolution."439 Indeed, 
judicial activism tangibly interfered with the proper operation of the 
democratic process; by constitutionalizing the key issues, Roe deprived 
legislators of the room to bargain and moderate the views of the vari­
ous groups.440 
433. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 782-85 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 785-814 (White, J., 
joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 814 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., dis­
senting). 
434. See Walter Dellinger & Gene Sperling, Abortion and the Supreme Court: The Re-
treat from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 83 (1989). 
435. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
436. Akron, 462 U.S. at 434-38. 
437. Among the religious groups filing briefs to overrule Roe were the United States 
Catholic Conference; the Southern Baptist Convention; the National Association of Evan­
gelicals; the Missouri Synod of the Lutheran Church; the Holy Orthodox Church. Other 
amici represented Feminists for Life of America; the National Association of Pro-Life 
Nurses; Women Exploited by Abortion; the Family Research Council; Right to Life Advo­
cates. 
438. Brief for Amicus Curiae the United States at 11-20, Webster v. Reprod. Health 
Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605) .  
439. Id. at 20. 
440. Id. at 20-24; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN 
WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES (1987) (most western 
countries have resolved these issues through legislation), discussed in Brief of Amicus Cu­
riae the United States at 23-24, Webster (No. 88-605). 
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We do not know exactly liow the Justices received these arguments 
in conference, but ultimately the Court met the Reagan 
Administration more than halfway. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion 
for three Justices did not question Roe's holding that a woman's 
choice is a "liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause" but 
seemed open to the Solicitor General's view that the liberty interest 
did not require strict scrutiny; following the administration, his opin­
ion abandoned Roe's trimester framework, as it had been applied as 
recently as Thornburgh.441 Declining to follow the administration's 
lead so completely, Justice O'Connor concurred only in the result, ap­
plying Maher's "undue burden" analysis.442 Justice Scalia also con­
curred only in the result. In his own distinctive language, he advanced 
the Solicitor General's position: Roe should be completely over­
ruled.443 
Roe seemed doomed after two more of its majority (Brennan and 
Marshall) left the Court and were replaced by Justices Souter and 
Thomas. Both the Solicitor General and the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, joined by dozens of amici, again urged the Court to 
overrule Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.444 Planned Parenthood 
suggested that the state law could not be sustained without overruling 
Roe but urged that the Court not do so.445 A large majority of 
Americans believed that women do have liberty interests in their deci­
sions whether to choose to abort an unplanned pregnancy,446 and a 
great deal of American law and family practice had evolved in reliance · 
on the rights recognized for a generation under Roe. The conservative 
Court faced a dilemma, which its centrists - Justices O'Connor, 
Kennedy, and Souter - resolved in a Salamonie way. Their joint 
opinion, which also delivered the judgment of a fractured Court, 
reaffirmed Roe's holding that the Due Process Clause guarantees a 
"woman's [fundamental] right to terminate her pregnancy before 
441. Webster, 492 U.S. at 517 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White & Kennedy, JJ.). 
442. Id. at 530 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Contra Brief of Amicus Cu­
riae the United States at 22, Webster (No. 88-605) (rejecting the "undue burden" approach 
as unmoored in the Constitution and therefore arbitrary); id. at 22 n.16 (if the Court adopts 
an undue burden approach, the focus should be the "burden on procreational choice" and 
not the "burden on abortion"). 
443. Webster, 492 U.S. at 537 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
444. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). For demands that the Court overrule Roe, see, for example, 
Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States Supporting Respondents at 8-9, Casey (No. 91-
744); Brief for Respondents at 104-17, Casey (No. 91-744). 
445. See Brief for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents at 17-34, Casey (No. 91-744). 
446. See, e.g. , ELIZABETH ADELL COOK ET AL., BETWEEN Two ABSOLUTES: PUBLIC 
OPINION AND THE POLITICS OF ABORTION (1992); Noemie Emery, The Women Who Really 
Want This President, THE SPECTATOR, Jan. 31, 1998, at 12 (61 % of Americans support some 
right to abortion). 
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viability," while at the same time jettisoning the trimester framework, 
"which we do not consider to be part of the essential holding of 
Roe."441 
In place of the prior framework, the three controlling Justices 
ruled that the appropriate test should be whether a state regulation 
imposes an "undue burden" on the woman, namely, that it "has the 
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman seeking abortion of a nonviable fetus."448 The joint opinion 
applied this test to allow the state requirements of parental consent 
(with the Bellotti bypass) and the woman's written consent after she 
had been given state-required information about the fetus and the 
consequences of the abortion.449 Although the latter holding essen­
tially overruled Akron and Thornburgh, the joint opinion justified it in 
feminist terms that tied women's politics of recognition to the state's 
right to promote its own conception of the good.450 Reaffirming 
Danforth, the joint opinion rejected the spousal notification require­
ment in terms of women's politics of recognition. No longer could the 
Court presume, as it wrongly did in Hoyt and Bradwell, that a 
woman's place is in the home, under the thumb of her husband and 
consigned to bearing and raising children. The spousal notification 
provision "embodies a view of marriage consonant with the common­
law status of married women but repugnant to our present under­
standing of marriage and of the nature of the rights secured by the 
Constitution. Women do not lose their constitutionally protected lib­
erty when they marry."451 
As Justices Blackmun and Stevens argued in partial dissent, the 
joint opinion was a conservative understanding of feminist politics, be­
cause it permitted a great deal of state regulation of women's choices 
that do not burden men's choices.452 But the joint opinion was also a 
far cry from the strict pro-life ideology, which received its classic judi­
cial articulation in Justice Scalia's seething dissent, joined by four 
Justices. Echoing the view of the pro-life amici, Scalia denounced the 
Court for finding a "liberty" to destroy "a human life," without any 
447. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846, 873 Qoint opinion). 
448. Id. at 877. This was the test followed by Justice Powell in Maher, 432 U.S. at 473-74. 
449. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882-83 (written consent and information requirements); id. at 
899-900 (parental consent). 
450. "Regulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the 
State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the 
unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman's exercise of the 
right to choose." Id. at 877. 
451. Id. at 898. 
452. Id. at 927-29 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part); id. at 934-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting 
in part). 
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principled legal basis for justifying that move.453 He insisted that this 
profoundly moral matter is the classic example of an issue best left to 
the democratically legitimate state legislative process, and that the 
elitist usurpation of decisionmaking by the Court was illegitimate.454 
Although most observers thought that Casey resolved the legal 
status of Roe v. Wade, the pro-life/pro-choice constitutional debate has 
continued and possibly escalated. The next wave of statutes reflecting 
traditionalist objections to Roe focused on certain mechanisms for 
late-term abortions, and these laws have produced emotional clashes 
in all levels of government.455 The Supreme Court ruled in Stenberg v. 
Carhart,456 that states could not ban all such mechanisms and could not 
ban any that did not have a broad exception giving physicians discre­
tion to protect the health of the mother. Joined by four members of 
the Court, Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion described procedures 
allowed by the Court's decision in gruesome detail, analogizing them 
to "infanticide."457 Justice Scalia went further, describing the Court's 
authorization for "killing a human child" as a decision whose infamy 
would be equivalent to that of Dred Scott and Korematsu.458 Although 
Justice O'Connor provided a roadmap for states to enact partial birth 
abortion laws that would satisfy her (the critical fifth vote for the ma­
jority),459 there is little doubt that this new manifestation of the consti­
tutional politics of abortion will occupy the country and the courts for 
some time to come. 
b. The First Amendment Cases. The libertarian First Amendment, 
protective of women's interests in the family planning context, was a 
fulcrum for critique once feminists obtained state and federal legisla­
tion protecting their interests. Where feminists were most united and 
public opinion agreed with their agenda, the Court has applied the 
First Amendment cautiously. For example, many states and munici­
palities have barred "public accommodations" from discriminating on 
the basis of sex, and some have applied these laws to private clubs 
453. Id. at 982 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). 
454. Id. at 996. 
455. See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 881 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) 
(analyzing cynically the politics of partial birth abortion measures). 
456. 530 U.S. 914 (2000), discussed in Section 111.B. 
457. Id. at 983-87 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., dis­
senting) (noting that the procedure "so closely borders on infanticide that 30 States have 
attempted to ban it," a characterization repeated at 1020); id. at 983-87 (describing in detail 
the procedure, with the suggestion that this is surgical murder). 
458. Id. at 953 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In a characteristically antic move, Scalia presented 
himself as a modern Cato, as he ended two consecutive paragraphs, and his dissenting opin­
ion, with the refrain, "Casey must be overruled" (translatable as "Casey delenda est"). Id. at 
955-56. 
459. Id. at 947-51 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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such as the Jaycees and the Rotary Club, which were all-male by na­
tional rule.460 In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,461 the Court recog­
nized that the First Amendment protects the right of men to form 
"expressive" associations but failed to see how admitting women 
would undermine the expressive and associational interests of the 
Jaycees.462 Moreover, the Court ruled that whatever injury the law im­
posed on men's rights of association was justified by the important 
state antidiscrimination interest.463 
In other areas, where feminists were themselves divided and the 
public less supportive, the Court has applied the First Amendment ag­
gressively. The Court, for example, summarily affirmed Judge Frank 
Easterbrook's decision invalidating an Indianapolis law creating a tort 
cause of action for women injured by sexually explicit pornography 
that objectifies or degrades women.464 As Easterbrook's opinion em­
phasized, the ordinance regulated published materials that were not 
obscene (as the Court had defined the term) based on their content, 
the kind of regulation the First Amendment has traditionally rejected. 
Professor Catharine MacKinnon and other feminists had supported 
the ordinance as a measure needed for the protection of women 
against violence, and Indianapolis pressed their views on appeal. The 
ordinance regulated "speech" that is of the lowest value and results in 
great harm to women; under the Court's child pornography and inde­
cent speech precedents, these demonstrated harms should have been 
sufficient to justify the ordinance, they maintained.465 Even under strict 
scrutiny, the ordinance could be defended as needed to advance the 
compelling state interest in "eradicating sex discrimination," as in 
Roberts.466 The most powerful critics of these arguments have been 
460. See, e.g. , David E. Bernstein, Sex Discrimination Laws Versus Civil Liberties, 1999 
U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 133. 
461.  468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
462. Id. at 627; accord Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'! v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) 
(following Roberts). The Jaycees' brief probably did not help their cause much, as it was 
largely circular: the Jaycees defined themselves as a "young men's" association, and so their 
goals would axiomatically be impaired if "young women" were imposed upon them. See 
Brief of Appellee at 11-16, Roberts (No. 83-724). Their expressive association claim would 
have been stronger - but also probably less acceptable to their membership - if it had 
been that "our association stands for the idea that 'business is for guys. '  " Cf Brennan Con­
ference Notes for Roberts, in Brennan Papers, supra note 129, Box I: 628, Folder 4 (Stevens: 
"Male chauvinists can't have protections unless they admit they are.''). 
463. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. 
464. Hudnut v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986), summarily affg 771 
F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985). 
465. Jurisdictional Statement at 11-15, Hudnut (No. 85-1090) (relying on New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography)); Young v. Am. Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 
(1976) (plurality opinion) (sexually explicit speech is low-value) as well as Catharine MacK­
innon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985)). 
466. Jurisdictional Statement at 15-20, Hudnut (No. 85-1090). 
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feminists, however.467 In the Indianapolis case, their only fans on the 
Supreme Court were its most traditionalist Justices.468 
Hate speech codes have been even more controversial, because 
traditionalists as well as liberal feminists are skeptical of them. De­
fenders such as Professor Mari Matsuda maintain that such codes are 
constitutional because of their effect on third parties, especially people 
of color, women, and lesbigay people: hate speech literally disables 
them from participating in the political, social, and intellectual life of 
the community.469 Notwithstanding these powerful arguments, such 
codes are of dubious constitutionality after the Court's decision in 
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul.470 The Court ruled that a hate crime law was 
overbroad because it penalized a lot of protected speech because of its 
expressive content, and indeed because of its viewpoint (denigration 
of racial or sexual minorities or women). Most judges - and many 
feminists - have understood this decision to be fatal to broadly writ­
ten state hate speech laws. 
Contrast the EEOC's Title VII guidelines regulating sexual har­
assment in the workplace.471 Like the anti-porn ordinance, these 
guidelines are drawn from the work of Professor MacKinnon and 
other early feminists.472 And their requirement that the employer not 
tolerate a "hostile work environment" has been interpreted to restrict 
speech as well as conduct that creates an environment hostile to 
women. Although libertarians have been consistently critical of these 
speech-restrictive rules, feminists and ordinary judges have disputed 
their tension with First Amendment values.473 Even Justice Scalia's 
opinion in R.A. V. was forced (by his colleagues no doubt) to concede 
that "sexually derogatory 'fighting words,' among other words, may 
produce a violation of Title VII's prohibition of sexual discrimination 
467. See Lisa Duggan et al., False Promises: Feminist Anti-Pornography Legislation, 38 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133 (1993); Nicholas Wolfson, Eroticism, Obscenity, Pornography, and 
Free Speech, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1037 (1994). 
468. Within the Court, Burger, Rehnquist, and O'Connor - the most traditionalist Jus­
tices in 1986 - would have noted probable jurisdiction and heard arguments in the case. The 
other six Justices voted to affirm Easterbrook's opinion without briefing and argument. See 
Hudnut, 475 U.S. 1001. 
469. Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim 's Story, 
87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989). 
470. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
471. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. 1604.ll(a); see 
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (upholding these regulations). 
472. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A 
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979). 
473. Compare JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE (2001); Eugene Volokh, Free­
dom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992), with Miranda 
Oshige McGowan, Certain Illusions About Speech: Why the Free Speech Critique of Hostile 
Work Environment Harassment Is Wrong, CONST. COMM. (forthcoming 2002). 
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in employment practices."474 This consensus has eroded: some femi­
nists and judges are concerned that the breadth of the EEOC's guide­
lines or their too-aggressive implementation by employers are chilling 
sexual expression in the workplace.475 
The most hotly contested area has involved pro-life activities. Frus­
trated by their mixed results from the legal system and the political 
process, pro-life activists formed more aggressive groups, the Pro-Life 
Action League (1980) and Operation Rescue (1986). These groups 
have engaged in an escalating campaign to picket abortion -clinics and 
the homes of abortion doctors, to approach women entering clinics 
and persuade them not to proceed with abortions, and (in some in­
stances) to assault abortion providers and damage the clinics.476 Pro­
choice activists objected that these activities intimidated both women 
seeking abortions and providers.477 In 1986, NOW sued the Pro-Life 
Action League for conspiring to interfere with its members' constitu­
tional rights; Operation Rescue was added as a defendant in 1989. 
Abortion providers and their allies obtained injunctions all over the 
country; the orders typically enjoined protesters from blocking access 
to clinics, harassing women as they approached the clinics, and creat­
ing loud disturbances outside the clinics.478 
Pro-life protesters objected that these injunctions violated their 
First Amendment rights. In Madsen v. Women's Health Center,419 
474. R.A. V. , 505 U.S. at 389 (emphasis added). Note Scalia's slip of the pen: "sexual" 
rather than "sex" discrimination. Id. 
475. See, e.g., Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001) (trim­
ming back application of school district's sexual harassment guidelines in light of First 
Amendment values); Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 
2002). 
476. See RANDALL A. TERRY, OPERATION RESCUE (1988) (describing the philosophy 
of the organization's founder); Blanchard, supra note 406, at 51-60; Faye Ginsburg, Rescuing 
the Nation: Operation Rescue and the Rise of Anti-Abortion Militance, in ABORTION WARS: 
A HALF CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, 1950-2000, at 227-50 (Rickie Solinger ed., 1998); Victoria 
Johnson, The Strategic Determinants of a Countermovement: The Emergence and Impact of 
Operation Rescue Blockades, in WA YES OF PROTEST: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS SINCE THE 
SIXTIES 241, 245-65 (Jo Freeman & Victoria Johnson eds., 1999). 
477. See generally Abortion Clinic Violence: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Civil & Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. (1985-86); 
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on 
Labor and Human Resources, 103d Cong. (1993). 
478. See Brief of Amici Curiae NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al., Madsen 
v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (No. 93-880) (listing reported federal and state 
cases issuing or upholding such injunctions). 
479. 512 U.S. 753 (1994), followed and applied in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of 
Western N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997). An earlier case, Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), 
upheld an ordinance regulating residential picketing that had been aimed at pro-life protest­
ers. Accord Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993) (holding that 
women have no § 1985 claim for relief against pro-life protesters conspiring to deny them 
access to abortion). 
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Operation Rescue and ·counsel Jay Sekulow argued that the injunc­
tions were prior restraints per se invalid under the First Amendment 
and, if not prior restraints, were substantive (and not time, place, or 
manner) restrictions on speech that were subject to strict scrutiny.480 
Other amici associated Operation Rescue's protest activities with 
those of Susan B. Anthony, Martin Luther King, Jr., and early gay 
rights activists - a tradition of "civil disobedience" justifying judicial 
protection.481 Feminists and the clinic responded that the injunctions 
regulated conduct and likely violations of the law, not ideas, and 
therefore constituted ordinary time, place, and manner restrictions, 
traditionally subjected to rational basis inquiry.482 
As it had in Casey, the Supreme Court chose a middle path to re­
solve the clash of norms. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the 
Court in Madsen ruled, with the clinic, that the injunction was neither 
a prior restraint nor a content-based regulation of the protesters but 
followed Operation Rescue in declining to characterize it as nothing 
more than a time, place, or manner restriction. Because injunctions 
"carry greater risks of censorship and discriminatory application" than 
statutes do, Rehnquist ruled that they require more exacting scrutiny 
than statutory time, place, and manner restrictions. "We must ask 
instead whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden 
no more speech than is necessary to serve a significant government 
interest."483 Applying the standard, the Chief Justice upheld the 
thirty-six-foot buffer zone in front of the clinic but invalidated other 
features of the injunction that were too broad.484 
c. The National Campaign Against Sexual Harassment and Assault. 
Like civil rights activists, feminists have had strong incentives to na­
tionalize their rights campaign: national laws and precedents offer the 
impressive enforcement resources of the federal government, can 
trump sexist policies still followed in the most traditionalist states (es­
pecially in the South), and present better possibilities for policies that 
actually redistribute power toward women.485 Nowhere has this been 
480. See Brief of Amici Curiae Operation Rescue et al. at 4-15, Madsen (No. 93-880). 
481. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Family Association at 4-11, Madsen (No. 93-
880). 
482. Brief for Respondents at 21-28, Madsen (No. 93-880). 
483. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764-65. 
484. The Court followed and elaborated Madsen in Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 
(2000) (discussed in Section III.B) and Scheck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997). 
485. As to the last item, political scientists recognize that local governments are less 
likely to redistribute resources or rights, because they fear flight from traditionally empow­
ered groups (especially rich people and corporations). At least in the 1960s, the flight prob­
lem was not so serious when regulation was national, and so redistributive legislation in the 
twentieth century tended to flourish at the national rather than local level. See PAUL 
PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM ( 1995). 
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more important than in women's mobilization against gender-based 
violence. Recall the previous discussion of the EEOC's rules against 
sexual harassment in the workplace. Because of the civil rights move­
ment's complete victory in legitimating Title VII as a proper exercise 
of congressional authority, this feminist effort did not encounter 
strong objection that it was an intrusion into areas best regulated by 
state and local governments. In contrast, feminist arguments that sex­
ual harassment is illegal in educational institutions covered by Title 
IX, accepted by the Department of Education in 1998, have met with 
strong federalism-based resistance. Federalist critics concede that the 
federal government has broad discretion to set conditions on the funds 
it distributes to state educational institutions but argue that Title IX 
does not provide the states with adequate notice that their receipt of 
federal money carries with it potentially costly liability for sexual har­
assment lawsuits.486 As the new millennium opened, Title IX has been 
the subject of intense policy debates. 
In contrast to sexual violence in the workplace, where national 
regulation is well-established, and in schools, where national regula­
tion is justified by the receipt of federal funds, sexual violence in the 
bedroom has traditionally been the province of state and local gov­
ernments. As scholars have shown, those governments have per­
formed their functions poorly (and by some accounts scandalously). 
Even after states liberalized rape laws, women too often remain un­
protected against sexual assault, either by strangers or (especially) 
boyfriends and spouses.487 Between 1990 and 1994, feminists and their 
allies developed a detailed record in a series of congressional hearings 
and reports, showing that women are pervasively subjected to violence 
because of their sex, that this pervasive violence not only affects 
women but also imposes enormous costs on the community and the 
economy, and that state law enforcement has been and remains inade­
quate to handle this level of gender-based violence.488 Based on this 
record, Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 
486. Compare Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654 (1999) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (making this argument as a basis for not rendering schools liable 
for hostile environment harassment), with id. at 632 (O'Connor, J. , for the Court) (allowing 
a claim for relief, but defining it narrowly because of these federalism concerns). 
487. There is an enormous literature on the prevalence of unremedied sexual assaults 
against women in America, including DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION: 
RAPE, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, AND WORKPLACE HARASSMENT (1984); Mary Koss et al., 
The Scope of Rape: Incidence and Prevalence of Sexual Aggression and Victimization in a 
National Sample of Higher Education Students, 55 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 
162 (1987). For a popular critique of these studies, see KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING 
AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS (1993). 
488. The congressional evidence is assembled, with references, in United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628-36 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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("VA WA"), which, inter alia, created a private claim for relief for 
"crimes of violence motivated by gender."489 
Although Congress justified its authority to enact VA WA upon 
the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment precedents that 
had sustained the Civil Rights Act ("CRA") and the Voting Rights 
Act ("VRA"),490 VA WA was different from the earlier laws. Unlike 
the VRA, which applied only to state and local governments, VA WA 
created a claim for relief against private violators; unlike the CRA, 
which applied to employers and public accommodations engaged in 
economic activities, VA WA reached defendants engaged in private 
noneconomic activity (sexual violence, usually in private places). To 
the extent the Court viewed the Commerce Clause as justifying fed­
eral regulation only of economic activity and the Fourteenth 
Amendment as justifying federal regulation only of state activity, 
VA WA was in constitutional trouble - and, not surprisingly, it 
reached the U.S. Supreme Court pretty quickly, as United States v. 
Morrison.491 
In my view, the mountains of briefs in the case mechanically 
worked the precedents, which could have justified either result.492 In 
lawyerly fashion, VA WA defenders emphasized the desperate need 
for national enforcement of widely accepted norms against sexual as­
sault,493 while critics argued that any theory supporting VA WA could 
be used to justify any exercise of congressional power, thereby elimi­
nating federalism as a limit on Congress.494 An issue that received re­
markably short shrift was the longstanding feminist charge that the 
ideas of traditional state sovereignty over domestic relations (relevant 
to the Commerce Clause power) and the state action doctrine (rele-
489. Violence Against Women Act, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1941-42, codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 13981 (2002). 
490. The precedents are discussed in Section II.E.2. 
491. 529 U.S. 598 (2000), discussed in Section 11.E.2. 
492. That is, briefs supporting VA WA argued that the civil rights precedents supported 
federal lawmaking over any activity affecting commerce, Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 
294 (1965), or undermining equal access to state justice, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 
(1966). Briefs attacking VA WA argued that newer federalism precedents did not allow 
Congress to regulate noneconomic activity under the Commerce Clause, United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995), or to regulate purely private activity under the Four­
teenth Amendment, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (reaffirming The Civil 
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)). 
493. See Brief of Petitioner at 6-18, 26-32, 42-45, Morrison v. United States, 529 U.S. 598 
(2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29); Brief of Amici Curiae States of Arizona [and 35 other states and 
Puerto Rico) in Support of Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 5-9, 15-21, Morrison (Nos. 99-
5, 99-29); Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at 7-12, 18-23, 
Morrison (Nos. 99-5, 99-29). 
494. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund in 
Support of Respondents, Morrison (Nos. 99-5, 99-29). 
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vant to the Fourteenth Amendment power) mimicked the separate 
spheres construct that has long retarded women's equality. That is, the 
traditional relegation of women to the domestic sphere finds parallels 
in the presumption against national regulation of domestic relations or 
of private discriminations and violence. The spaces where women are 
most centrally located and most vulnerable are those least constitu­
tionally susceptible to national regulation that is much more effica­
cious. In contrast, the public spheres of commerce and state action -
where men have been and remain dominant - are spaces where the 
Court has authorized Congress to act, partly in response to cases 
brought by the male-dominated civil rights movement. 
Although one may doubt the Justices would have been receptive to 
this kind of theoretical argument, it does help us understand the con­
sequences of the Court's 5-4 ruling striking down the law. Rejecting 
the feminist position taken by thirty-six states, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's opinion for the Morrison Court strictly followed the ar­
guments laid out in the briefs for the defendants and the amicus brief 
for Phyllis Schlafly's Eagle Forum. This was an important defeat for 
women's politics of recognition as well as remediation: not only will 
sexual assault laws continue to be greatly underenforced, but the sepa­
rate spheres idea got an unexpected boost from the Court, which spe­
cifically targeted "family law" as an arena limited to state regulation.495 
Conversely, Morrison is an important victory for the politics of preser­
vation's effort to localize antidiscrimination law. A consequence is 
that feminist efforts to redistribute resources to protect women will 
continue to be thwarted by obstacles inherent to local governance. 
C. Gay Rights Movement 
Unlike the civil rights and women's rights movements, which had 
rich conceptual and political antecedents in the nineteenth century, 
the gay rights movement was entirely a creature of the twentieth cen­
tury. Although states criminalized sodomy and municipalities made 
cross-dressing a minor crime before 1900, "homosexual sodomy" and 
"homosexuality" were not objects of state regulation until the early 
twentieth century.496 But once the state focused on "homosexuals and 
495. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16 (noting that a danger of accepting Congress's under­
standing of the Commerce Clause is that it could "be applied equally as well to family law 
and other areas of traditional state regulation"). 
496. For this regulatory shift, see ESKRIDGE, GA YLAW, supra note 14, at 17-56; LILLIAN 
FADERMAN, ODD GIRLS AND TWILIGHT LOVERS: A HISTORY OF LESBIAN LIFE IN 
TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA (1991); ANGUS MCLAREN, THE TRIALS OF 
MASCULINITY: POLICING SEXUAL BOUNDARIES, 1870-1930 (1997); and Estelle Freedman, 
"Uncontrolled Desires": The Response to the Sexual Psychopath, 1920-1960, 74 J. AM. HIST. 
83 (1987). 
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sex perverts," it did so with a vengeance. At the height of America's 
anti-homosexual terror, the half-generation after World War II, the 
state not only hunted and jailed "homosexuals" for cross-dressing and 
having sex with one another, but kicked them out of the civil service, 
closed their bars and hangouts, seized novels and journals about their 
"perversion," censored movies that mentioned the crime that dared 
not speak its name, deported them, and locked them in hospitals 
where they were electroshocked, castrated, and otherwise tortured.497 
Before the anti-homosexual Kulturkampf, there was little homo­
phile politics of any sort - there were frightened individuals seeking 
to avoid disclosure, tiny subcultural communities concentrated in the 
larger cities, and isolated institutions such as bars and publishers who 
catered to a lesbigay clientele. State persecution stimulated a nascent 
politics of protection after 1945, as "homosexuals" and their subcul­
tural institutions not only started to resist their persecution, but did so 
through organizations and lawyers that asserted their rights in court. 
Both the persecution and the resistance encouraged a larger number 
of gay people to "come out of the closet" in the 1960s, a process that 
spawned a tiny but influential politics of recognition, modeled on the 
civil rights experience and claiming that homosexuality is a benign 
variation, rather than the malignant one portrayed by the law. Be­
cause openly lesbigay people have been a minuscule (and later small) 
minority of the American population, and an intensely hated minority 
to this day, they have relied on lawyers to assert their interests more 
than women and perhaps even people of color have in the last genera­
tion. Unlike the civil rights and women's movements, moreover, the 
gay rights movement has been far from successful in its politics of rec­
ognition: not only do many state and even national laws and policies 
disadvantage lesbigays as a practical matter, many openly disrespect 
Americans because of their minority sexual orientation.498 On the 
other hand, in municipalities and an increasing number of gay-friendly 
states, a lesbigay politics of remediation has been successful in ob­
taining state protection for sexual and gender minorities. 
The slow and to this day uncertain progress of a progay politics of 
recognition and remediation owes much to the average person's asso­
ciation of lesbigay people with sodomy and other sexual activities. Ac-
497. On the postwar anti-homosexual persecution, see ALLAN BERUBE, COMING OUT 
UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GA y MEN AND WOMEN IN WORLD w AR Two (1990); 
JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A 
HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970 (1983); ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, 
supra note 14, at 57-80; JONATHAN NED KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY (1976) (repro­
ducing many primary documents); and George Chauncey, Jr., The Postwar Sex Crime Panic, 
in TRUE STORIES FROM THE AMERICAN PAST 160 (William Graebner ed., 1993). 
498. Antigay laws and policies as of 1998 are collected (with references) in ESKRIDGE, 
GAYLAW, supra note 14, at 139-41, 362-71 (app. B3). 
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cordingly, lesbigay people's political and constitutional struggles have 
tended to be more like the politics of abortion than the politics of 
equal rights for women and people of color. Like the (intimately re­
lated) pro-life countermovement, the traditional family values 
("TFV") countermovement focuses on the asserted immorality of spe­
cific conduct (consensual sodomy) to deny individuals rights and, 
when this argument runs out, falls back on "no promotion" arguments: 
even if the state cannot criminalize consensual same-sex intimacy, it 
can adopt numerous measures to discourage or signal its disapproval 
of such controversial activities. Ongoing clashes between gay rights 
and family values form one of the cutting edges of American constitu­
tional law at the dawn of the new millennium. 
1. The Politics of Protection, 1946-69 
"Homosexuals" and cross-dressers were legally defenseless but 
were mostly left alone by the law before World War II. The two phe­
nomena were interrelated: so long as they were left alone, these 
Americans were not even an identity-based "minority group." This 
changed with the postwar anti-homosexual terror, for it landed many 
lesbigay people in prison, outed them and others, and triggered a 
moderate "homophile" politics seeking constitutional protection of 
private gay spaces.499 That politics relied on the libertarian features of 
the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment, at the very point 
when the civil rights and free press movements were giving these con­
stitutional provisions real bite. For a dramatic example, the earliest 
public triumph of the Mattachine Society of Los Angeles, the first sub­
stantial homophile group, was a campaign against police entrapment 
of one of their members through aggressive sting operations.500 In this 
and other campaigns, the Mattachine Society, and its sister the 
Daughters of Bilitis, conceded gay people's condition as tragic but 
claimed basic civil liberties. 
Unlike the early civil rights and women's movements, the homo­
phile movement relied most successfully on the First Amendment. 
State censorship of "degenerate" or "perverted" books, plays, and 
movies was particularly common, because traditionalists were 
squeamish about any favorable or even neutral public discussion of 
"sexual deviation," while lesbigay people were thirsty for information 
about sexual variation and saw their despised status as one based on 
499. On the early homophile politics, see D'EMILIO, supra note 497; STUART TIMMONS, 
THE TROUBLE WITH HARRY HAY (1990). See also ERIC MARCUS, MAKING HISTORY: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR GAY AND LESBIAN EQUAL RIGHTS 32-36, 40-41, 50-53, 62-63, 1 1 1-13 (1992) 
(providing various first-person accounts by early homophile leaders). 
500. See Dale Jennings, To Be Accused Is to Be Guilty, ONE, INC., Jan. 1953, at 1 1-12 
(providing first-hand account). 
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society's misinformation.501 State and lower federal courts had some­
times ruled against censorship of gay-friendly or gay-neutral materials 
before World War II. For example, New York's state courts over­
turned local censorship of Sholom Asch's lesbian-themed God of 
Vengeance, gay writer Andre Gide's autobiography, and Radclyffe 
Hall's lesbian classic, Well of Loneliness.502 In retrospect, these few 
protected works were pretty tame discussions of sexual variation; the 
authorities wished to censor them because they spoke of homosexual­
ity as a natural rather than sinful phenomenon, a benign or at worst 
tolerable sexual variation. After the war, more provocative literary 
depictions of sexual variants tested the limits of the First Amendment. 
Most lesbigay-depicting novels either passed unnoticed by the censors 
or were suppressed without much fuss, but in the 1950s aggressive cen­
sors confronted more in-your-face gay works such as Allen Ginsburg's 
homoerotic poem "Howl" and Herman Womack's male physique 
magazines, both of which were suppressed by state authorities and 
then liberated by the courts.503 
These legal questions first reached the Supreme Court in the most 
innocuous setting imaginable. The U.S. Post Office seized the October 
1954 issue of One, Inc. , the earliest homophile informational maga­
zine.504 The Post Office claimed that the magazine's brief, generalized 
depiction of a potential lesbian romance ("Sappho Remembered"), a 
dirty poem, and an advertisement for a German magazine were ob­
scene; the Ninth Circuit agreed, on the ground that vulnerable minds 
could be corrupted by these materials.505 One appealed to the Supreme 
501. For accounts of the battle by gay people to express themselves and society to shut 
them up in various fora, see ROGER AUSTEN, PLAYING THE GAME: THE HOMOSEXUAL 
NOVEL IN AMERICA (1977); KAIER CURTIN, "WE CAN ALWAYS CALL THEM 
BULGARIANS": THE EMERGENCE OF LESBIAN AND GAY MEN ON THE AMERICAN STAGE 
(1987); and RODGER STREITMATTER, UNSPEAKABLE: THE RISE OF A GAY AND LESBIAN 
PRESS IN AMERICA (1995). On the legal struggle, see ESKRIDGE, GA YLAW, supra note 14, at 
32-34, 46-49, 76-78, 95-96, 1 16-23. See also id. at 80-82 (suggesting chilling parallels between 
Nazi suppression of homosexual expression and similar suppressive measures in America 
after the war against the Nazis). 
502. For the stories of these works' censorship and state court action, see ESKRIDGE, 
GAYLAW, supra note 14, at 33, 47-48; Nancy J. Knauer, Homosexuality as Contagion: From 
The Well of Loneliness to the Boy Scouts, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 401, 430-54 (2000) (offering 
detailed analytical account of We/l's obscenity trials in both the U.S. and U.K.). Most gay­
themed works either passed without censorial notice or, if discovered, were successfully cen­
sored before World War II, however. See ESKRIDGE, GAYLA W, supra note 14, at 46-49 
(providing examples). 
503. Womack's work is treated below; Ginsburg's in Section 11.F.2. 
504. For two slightly different accounts of this episode, compare STREITMATTER, supra 
note 501, at 32, with MARCUS, supra note 499, at 52-53 (providing first-person account years 
after the events). 
505. One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per 
curiam). 
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Court, on the ground that " [w]orks which attempt to elucidate, explain 
or grapple with thorny and fundamental human problems should be 
extended great latitude of expression, since they often, in the last 
analysis, serve humanity's ends." Apologetically, Eric Julber's brief 
submitted that the magazine never included lewd sexual references 
nor even any "advocacy of homosexuality as a way of life"; it just prof­
fered discussion of the issues associated with "that particular neurosis, 
or complexion. "506 
Right after Julber filed his brief, the Court decided Roth v. United 
States,507 which held that the state could not censor a publication as 
"obscene" unless, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to 
the audience's prurient interest and its presentation exceeds custom­
ary limits. Was a lesbian romance inherently prurient in ways that 
straight ones were not? As one law clerk put it, 
The [appeals] court seems to feel that homosexuality is disgusting and 
therefore allusions to homosexual practices are disgusting and ob­
scene. . . . I think One is no more descriptive of sexual practices than 
dozens of magazines. The fact that the practices differ from those of the 
"normal" person should not make the magazine obscene.508 
We do not know exactly how the Justices viewed the case, but they 
voted with no recorded dissent to reverse the Ninth Circuit's decision 
and to direct that judgment be awarded to the homophile publication 
on the basis of Roth.509 
The Post Office's campaign also included male physique maga­
zines, which government psychiatrists believed had a prurient appeal 
to male homosexuals. In Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day,510 Herman 
Womack challenged the government's targeting several of his maga­
zines (MANual, Grecian Guild Pictorial) under Roth. Stanley Dietz's 
506. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (1957 
Term, No. 290). 
507. 354 U.S. 476 (1957), discussed in Section 11.F.2. 
508. Law Clerks' Memoranda for One, Inc. (1957 Term), in Burton Papers, supra note 
249, Container 298 (No. 290). Another law clerk professed himself "torn between the desire 
to cut down on this sort of administrative censorship and the revulsion the magazine gives 
me." However, he opined that "in the long run it is better to let the American people make 
the choice than a postmaster." Office Memos for One, Inc. (Aug. 26, 1957), in Douglas Pa­
pers, supra note 192, Container 1 187. 
509. One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per curiam) (reversing on the basis of 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)). According to Justice Douglas' docket book, six 
Justices voted to take the case on January 3, 1958, with four Justices (Frankfurter, Douglas, 
Harlan, and Whittaker) reversing summarily, rather than remanding for the lower court to 
reconsider in light of Roth. (There is no notation for how three Justices voted.) A week later, 
Justice Clark, who voted against certiorari the week before, voted with the Frankfurter 
group to reverse outright. See Docket Book for One, Inc. (Jan. 13, 1958), in Douglas Papers, 
supra note 192, Container 1 184. 
510. 370 U.S. 478 (1962), described and analyzed by JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, 
COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT 65-88 (2001). 
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brief for Womack charged the Post Office with "nothing more than an 
attempt to enforce the prejudices of the predominant social and eco­
nomic majority over a minority group." If the state could censor im­
ages based on their prurient appeal alone, then the Post Office could 
seize suggestive pin-up photographs of Marilyn Monroe, Dietz ar­
gued.51 1 Solicitor General Archibald Cox's brief responded that the 
state could censor any kind of scantily-clad pin-ups and, in any event, 
that homophile pin-ups are more dangerous to society because "ho­
mosexuals are more easily stimulated to overt sexual activities than 
are normal persons with heterosexual outlooks. Finally, it seems 
scarcely open to question that society has a legitimate interest," ex­
pressed in state sodomy laws, "in preventing overt homosexual activi­
ties while refusing to condemn comparable activities when indulged in 
on a heterosexual basis."512 Dietz's oral argument in Manual 
Enterprises was the Justices' first face-to-face encounter with constitu­
tional issues raised by sexual minorities. There is no evidence that 
anyone on the Court learned anything from the encounter. Justice 
Harlan's plurality opinion reversed the censorship because the pic­
tures were not inherently "prurient" according to contemporary stan­
dards of decency513 but gratuitously described the magazines as "dis­
mally unpleasant, uncouth, and tawdry" and their readers as 
"unfortunate persons."514 Justice Clark's dissenting opinion lamented 
that the Post Office was now required to be "the world's largest dis­
seminator of smut."515 The Supreme Court in the 1960s and 1970s re­
peatedly addressed state and local censorship of publications depicting 
homosexual intimacy more directly. The Court sometimes protected 
gay erotica against censorship, but often treated gay erotica more 
harshly than straight.516 
Lesbigay people could invoke the speech and press protections of 
the First Amendment to protect discussion about homosexuality, in-
511.  Brief for Appellant at 23 (quotation in text), 27-28, Manual Enterprises (1961 
Term, No. 123). 
512. Brief for the Respondent at 44-45, Manual Enterprises (1961 Term, No. 123); see id. 
at 27 (making similar argument that "pornographic material directed to sexual deviates is 
more likely to induce overt sexual activity than such material directed to the normal sexual 
impulses"). 
513. Manual Enterprises, 370 U.S. 478 (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J.). Four Justices 
concurred in the result. Id. at 495 (Black, J., concurring in the result); id. at 495-519 
(Brennan, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment) (rejecting 
the Post Office's authority to censor). 
514. Id. at 490 (opinion by Harlan, J.). 
5 15. Id. at 519 (Clark, J., dissenting). "The magazines have no social, educational, or 
entertainment qualities but are designed solely as sex stimulants for homosexuals." Id. at 
526. 
516. See infra Section 11.F.2. 
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eluding autobiographical discussion.517 They could also invoke the as­
sembly provision to protect their ability to gather together. Indeed, 
the NAACP's right of association cases made it unlikely that the state 
would directly prosecute homophile organizations. Most of the litiga­
tion arose in the context of state efforts to revoke liquor licenses from 
bars catering to lesbian or gay clientele. Unlike individual gay people, 
the bars had resources to resist such efforts, and sometimes state 
courts would intervene. The California Supreme Court in Stoumen v. 
Reilly518 ruled that regulators could not deny licenses to bars simply 
because of "patronage . . .  by homosexuals . . .  without proof of the 
commission of illegal or immoral acts on the premises."519 Because the 
constitutional basis for this ruling was unclear, the legislature adopted 
a law barring licenses to establishments that were reputed to be resorts 
for "sexual perverts."520 In Vallerga v. Department of Alcoholic 
Beverage Control,521 the California Supreme Court invalidated this law 
as a violation of gay people's constitutional right to association, just as 
Mitchell and Juliet Lowenthal had argued in their amicus brief filed on 
behalf of the ACLU. As Vallerga suggests, ACLU-affiliated attorneys 
sometimes represented lesbigay defendants in the 1950s and early 
1960s, even though the national ACLU was on record in favor of sod­
omy laws. 
The Due Process Clause had a lot less bite for the homophile poli­
tics of protection than it had for people of color, because almost all the 
"homosexuals" arrested by police dragnets and stings were either re­
leased immediately or plea bargained to a mild punishment without a 
constitutional peep.522 The biggest value of due process was prophylac­
tic: homophile groups made gay people aware of their procedural 
rights, especially their right to remain silent and to retain counsel 
(later provided free by the state ).523 Once an accused "homosexual" 
517. See, e.g. , People ex rel. Savery v. Gotham Book Mart, Inc., 285 N.Y.S 563 (NYC 
Magis. Ct. 1936) (protecting Andre Gide's autobiography against censorship). 
518. 234 P.2d 969 (Cal. 1951). 
519. Id. at 971; see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Privacy Jurisprudence and the Apartheid of 
the Closet, 1946-1961, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 703, 752-53 (1997) (discussing the California 
gay bar cases). 
520. Law of 1955, CAL. Bus. & PROF'L CODE ANN., § 24200(e) (repealed 1963) (West 
1997). 
521. 347 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1959). 
522. See, e.g. , Charles K. Robinson, The Raid, ONE, INC., July 1960, at 26 (state judge 
complaining that homosexual defendants pleaded guilty to charges even the prosecution was 
willing to drop). It must be noted that most of the lesbigay defendants rounded up by the 
police faced relatively mild punishments (a short time in jail), in contrast to the death sen­
tences often meted out to men of color. 
523. See Your Rights in Case of Arrest, ONE, INC., Jan. 1954, at 14 (publishing handy list 
of constitutional rights of criminal defendants, and advice to lesbigays harassed or arrested 
by the police). 
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lawyered up, he or she could usually escape jail time and even any 
kind of conviction. When defendants were brave enough to contest 
charges of consensual sodomy or solicitation in court, there were often 
winning due process defenses: the police entrapped the defendant or 
obtained evidence illegally; there was not sufficient evidence to sustain 
a conviction; or the substantive statute was too vague to provide ade­
quate notice to defendants that their conduct was criminal.524 The 
vagueness argument, of course, could inure to the benefit of all gay 
people, and not just the defendant in the particular case. State courts 
were particularly hard on cross-dressing and, to a lesser extent, va­
grancy and solicitation laws.525 Several courts invalidated or narrowly 
construed their crime against nature laws.526 
Unlike the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause offered no 
protection for gay people in the U.S. Supreme Court, however. The 
Court's first struggle with such issues involved the immigration law's 
exclusion of aliens "afflicted with psychopathic personality." The ad­
ministering agencies interpreted that language to exclude all "homo­
sexuals and sex perverts," and sought to deport George Fleuti, a 
sodomite. His counsel introduced psychiatric evidence that sexual 
variation was not sufficient to justify a diagnosis of "psychopathy." 
Demonstrating that the term did not even have an accepted meaning 
among psychiatrists, the Ninth Circuit in Fleuti v. Rosenberg527 ruled 
that the statutory language was too imprecise to justify exclusion or 
deportation of gay people as a group. On appeal, the Supreme Court 
was deeply split, with four Justices finding the statute unconstitution­
ally vague, but five unpersuaded. The decisive vote in conference 
came from newly appointed Justice Arthur Goldberg, who believed 
that Fleuti's arrests for sex in public places rendered him "a psycho­
path in the conventional sense."528 Goldberg was assigned the opinion 
for the Court, but on further deliberation changed his mind. He pro­
posed that the Ninth Circuit's refusal of deportation be affirmed on a 
narrow statutory ground; the four Justices formerly in the minority 
joined his opinion, with one important change of language.529 So Fleuti 
524. See ESKRIDGE, GA YLAW supra note 14, at 84-90 (discussing these challenges). 
525. See id. at 1 09-11 (surveying state court opinions striking down these laws). 
526. See Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1969); Franklin v. State, 257 So.2d 21 (Fla. 
1971); Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478 (Mass. 1974). 
527. 302 F.2d 652, 657-58 (9th Cir. 1962), affd on other grounds, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), 
also discussed in Section 11.A.3. See generally MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 510, at 85-101 
(giving more background on Fleuti). 
528. Conference Notes for Fleuti v. Rosenberg (Apr. 17, 1962), in Douglas Papers, supra 
note 192, Container 1281. 
529. Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 374 U.S. 449 (1963). At the urging of Justice Brennan, Justice 
Goldberg changed this sentence, "Congress unquestionably has the power to exclude homo­
sexuals and other undesirables from this country," to omit "homosexuals and other." See 
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was able to stay in the United States, but the immigration authorities 
continued their campaign against others. 
Responding to the Ninth Circuit opinion, Congress amended the 
law to exclude people "afflicted with . . .  sexual deviation" as well. 
When the "psychopathic personality" issue returned to the Supreme 
Court in Boutilier v. INS,530 the Justices were less divided: even though 
the bisexual Canadian was deported under the old psychopathic per­
sonality exclusion (before the new amendment took effect), at least 
two of the Justices gave up on their vagueness objection in light of 
Congress's subsequent clarification.531 The majority opinion, by Justice 
Clark (the solo dissenter in Manual), lumped all homosexuals and the 
apparently bisexual Boutilier into the statutory category of "psycho­
paths." The most sympathy lesbigay people could find from the Court 
was Justice Douglas's lament, in his draft dissent, that "homosexuals" 
are "just as much the victims of their constitutions as we are of ours, 
and we can only step in when their conduct becomes subversive of so­
ciety, or when they request help so as to enable them to reach a more 
mature level."532 
The Court was also unreceptive to vagueness challenges to laws 
criminalizing "lewd conduct"533 or the "crime against nature." Al­
though the crime against nature might mean almost anything (or 
nothing), the Court ultimately ruled, in a perfunctory per curiam 
opinion, that the term had acquired sufficient clarity through long­
standing judicial construction and popular understanding to pass the 
vagueness test.534 A potentially stronger challenge to such laws lay in 
the right of privacy recognized in Griswold and Roe. The American 
Law Institute ("ALI") in 1955 had taken the position that sodomy be-
Letter from William J. Brennan, Jr., to Justice Goldberg re: Fleuti (June 6, 1963), in Brennan 
Papers, supra note 129, Box I: 91, Folder 5. Said Brennan: "[I] think it may be, at least medi­
cally, a matter of doubt whether homosexuals also necessarily fall into the category of unde­
sirable aliens." Id. 
530. 387 U.S. 118 (1967); see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1990) (putting forth a detailed examination of the statutory inter­
pretation arguments in Boutilier). 
531 . According to Justice Douglas' notes, Justice Black, who had found the psycho­
pathic personality term too vague in Fleltli, found it clear enough the next time around to say 
that "psychopathic personality means sexual deviate," the term added in 1965. Douglas Con­
ference Notes for Boutilier (Mar. 17, 1967), in Douglas Papers, supra note 192, Container 
1391. Chief Justice Warren continued to believe that "a homo immigrant might not be psy­
chotic," id. , but he ultimately joined the majority opinion upholding Boutilier's deportation. 
532. Draft Dissenting Opinion for Boutilier at 2 (Mar. 17, 1967), in Douglas Papers, su­
pra note 192, Container 1391 . The language quoted in text was deleted in the published dis­
sent. 
533. See Talley v. California, 390 U.S. 1031 (1968) (denying certiorari to gay couples' 
challenge to a "lewd conduct" arrest for kissing one another in the Black Cat Bar). 
534. Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973) (per curiam), followed in Rose v. Locke, 
423 U.S. 48 (1975). 
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tween consenting adults should be decriminalized as a matter of pri­
vate liberty rather than public concern.535 After Griswold, the ACLU 
took the position that the right of privacy required states to follow the 
ALI. After Roe, the ACLU brought a class action challenging 
Virginia's sodomy law as a violation of the right of privacy and the 
First Amendment rights of association, thought, and expression.536 The 
Supreme Court in 1976 summarily (without full briefing and oral ar­
gument) affirmed the lower court decision upholding the law.537 
Not only could the state constitutionally imprison someone for en­
gaging in oral or anal sex with a consenting adult, but for the most part 
the courts allowed the state to exclude lesbigay people from civil 
service employment. For a dramatic example, the Civil Service 
Commission ("CSC") dismissed Dr. Franklin Kameny, a Harvard­
trained astronomer, for failing to report that he had been arrested in 
1956 for allegedly soliciting sex from an undercover police officer.538 
That Kameny lost his job over a minor incident suggesting his homo­
sexuality was nothing new in the period after World War Il.539 What 
was unusual was Kameny's response: he sued the federal government 
to get his job back. His attorney, Byron Scott, maintained that the 
government's action was arbitrary and therefore a violation of the 
Due Process Clause. The federal courts summarily dismissed this 
complaint. Kameny filed a pro se petition for writ of certiorari with 
the U.S. Supreme Court on January 27, 1961. Like his attorney in the 
courts below, Kameny made standard due process arguments: the 
government's decision to fire him and bar him from further employ­
ment was not sufficiently supported by the facts of his case, did not 
follow the proper procedures, and operated under a substantively un­
supportable rule barring federal employment of people who commit 
"immoral conduct."540 Not only was the "immoral conduct" bar vague, 
535. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5 comments (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). 
536. See Jurisdictional Statement at 7-11, Brief of American Civil Liberties Union, Doe 
v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (No. 75-896) (asserting Supreme Court's 
jurisdiction to review three-judge court's refusal to invalidate sodomy law). 
537. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (per curiam), affg mem., 
403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge court); see Consolidated Petition for Re­
hearing, Doe (No. 75-896) and Ens/in v. North Carolina, 425 U.S. 985 (1976) (No. 75-897). 
538. In return for a guilty plea to a charge of lewd conduct, the court sentenced Kameny 
to probation. After he completed the probation, the court granted his motion to withdraw 
the guilty plea and substitute a note of dismissal. Kameny therefore felt justified in not dis­
closing the expunged arrest. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6-9, Kameny v. Brucker, 
365 U.S. 843 (1 961) (1960 Term, No. 676); Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 3-4 & 
n.4, Kameny (1960 Term, No. 676). 
539. See Note, Government-Created Employment Disabilities of the Homosexual, 82 
HARV. L. REV. 1738 (1969). 
540. See Brief for Pe ti ti toner at 24-26, Kameny (1960 Term, No. 676) (quoting 5 C.F.R. § 
2.106(a)(3) (CSC regulation)). 
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but it imposed an "odious conformity" upon federal employees, incon­
sistent with the First Amendment.541 This petition was the first time 
the Supreme Court had seen a challenge to state exclusions of gay 
people from the civil service. The Court denied the petition, without 
either internal or written dissent.542 
2. The Birth of a Politics of Recognition, 1961-81 
Futile as it was, Kameny's petition to the Supreme Court was a 
landmark in the politics as well as constitutional discourse of gay peo­
ple. Kameny also argued that the federal government's broad exclu­
sion from employment "makes of the homosexual a second-rate citi­
zen, by discriminating against him without reasonable cause. "543 There 
was, for example, no scientific basis for the belief that "homosexuals" 
were psychopathic. "The average homosexual is as well-adjusted in 
personality as the average heterosexual."544 Because such persons are 
capable of excellent government service, excluding them is presump­
tively irrational. The federal government should be doing precisely the 
opposite: " 'One role of government is to stimulate changes in atti­
tude. '  In fields of anti-Negro, Anti-Semitic, anti-Catholic, and other 
prejudice, the government has indeed recognized, and is playing fully 
and admirably its role as a leader of changes in attitude."545 The CSC's 
exclusion, Kameny argued, "constitute[s] a discrimination no less ille­
gal and no less odious than discrimination based upon religious or ra­
cial grounds . . . .  "546 
The ideas in Kameny's brief were revolutionary and important. 
The brief was an announcement that the objects of the postwar anti­
homosexual Kulturkampf were insisting on equal citizenship and not 
just an easing of persecution. It was the beginning of a serious politics 
of recognition and even remediation for lesbigay people, and this 
rapidly eclipsed the apologetic homophile politics of protection of the 
541. Id. at 27; see id. at 28-29. For an updated version of Kameny's argument, see David 
Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr. , From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protec­
tion of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 319 (1994). 
542. Kameny, 365 U.S. 843. The docket sheet kept by Justice Brennan revealed no Jus­
tice willing to hear Kameny's case. 
543. Brief for Petitioner at 32, Kameny (1960 Term, No. 676). For the historical context 
of Kameny's revolutionary brief, see David K. Johnson, "Homosexual Citizens": Washing­
ton's Gay Community Confronts the Civil Service, WASH. HIST., Fall-Winter 1994-1995, at 
52. An important normative precursor to the egalitarian arguments was DONALD WEBSTER 
CORY, THE HOMOSEXUAL IN AMERICA: A SUBJECTIVE APPROACH (1951 ). 
544. Brief for Petitioner at 37, Kameny (1960 Term, No. 676). 
545. Id. at 49-50. 
546. Id. at 56; see id. at 59 (calling exclusionary policy "a stench in the nostrils of decent 
people, an offense against morality"). 
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1950s. After filing his petition, Kameny founded the Mattachine Soci­
ety of Washington, D.C. ("MSW"), which expressed this philosophy in 
a letter to Attorney General Robert Kennedy: 
We feel that, for the 15,000,000 American homosexuals, we are in much 
the same position as the NAACP is in for the Negro, except for the mi­
nor difference that the Negro is fighting official prejudice and discrimina­
tion at the state and local level, whereas we are fighting official prejudice 
and discriminatory policy and practice, as ill-founded, as unreasonable, 
as unrealistic, and as harmful to society and to the nation, at the Federal 
level. Both are fighting personal prejudice at all levels. For these reasons, 
and because we are trying to improve the position of a large group of 
citizens presently relegated to second-class citizenship in many respects, 
we should have, if anything, the assistance of the Federal government, 
and not its opposition.547 
Other groups, such as San Francisco's Society for Individual Rights 
and New York's Mattachine Society, took similar positions. In 
February 1966, the First National Planning Conference of Homophile 
Organizations resolved: "Homosexual American citizens should have 
precise equality with all other citizens before the law and are entitled 
to social and economic equality of opportunity."548 By the late 1960s, 
Kameny's slogan "Gay is Good" had become the rallying cry for gay 
activists. 
Kameny's pro se brief was the first time a litigant before the Court 
had challenged the compulsory heterosexuality requirement for fed­
eral employment or other benefits. It was the first brief before the 
Supreme Court to argue that homosexuality was a benign variation, 
that "homosexuals" were a minority group like Jews and African 
Americans, that anti-homosexual discrimination was fundamentally 
based on prejudice rather than a neutral policy, and that the equal 
protection component of the Fifth Amendment barred discrimination 
on the basis of sexual variation. Lawyers representing lesbigays picked 
up on some of Kameny's ideas. For example, in Manual Enterprises, 
Stanley Dietz challenged the Kennedy Administration's view that gay 
erotica should be treated differently from straight: "Our Constitution 
does not state that only heterosexuals may receive and read the litera­
ture of their choice and homosexuals must read the same literature or 
547. Letter from Franklin E. Kameny, President, The Mattachine Society of 
Washington, D.C., to Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General 1 (June 28, 1962) (on file with 
the FBI, FOIA File HQ 100-403320 (Mattachine Society) § 6, Serial No. 88); see also News 
Release, Mattachine Society of Washington, D.C. (Aug. 28, 1962) (on file with the FBI, 
FOIA File HQ 100-403320 (Mattachine Society) § 6, Serial No. 90X) (insisting on the same 
constitutional rights for "the homosexual minority - a minority in no way different, as such, 
from other of our national minority groups . . . .  "). 
548. U.S. Homophile Movement Gains National Strength, THE LADDER, Apr. 1966, at 4 
(quoting the conference's resolutions). 
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be denied the right to view a magazine which interests them. To inter­
pret our Constitution . . . in the manner that the Post Office 
Department has done, reduces a large segment of our society to sec­
ond class citizenship."549 To the Solicitor General's suggestion that les­
bigay people are sick, Dietz responded that, according to modem sci­
ence, homosexuality is neither a disease nor a mental defect, "nor is 
homosexuality as such intrinsically evil. "550 The same kind of argu­
ments were made by the attorneys for George Fleuti and Clive 
Michael Boutilier, gay and bisexual men whom the Kennedy-Johnson 
Administration sought to deport as statutory psychopaths. Based on 
newer and more reliable medical research, counsel maintained that 
lesbigay people generally were no more mentally defective than 
straight people. The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Fleuti was the rare de­
cision that recognized some part of this new rhetoric of recognition. 
Kameny and Boutilier lost their cases, and Manual Enterprises and 
Fleuti won theirs only on legal technicalities. 
Likewise, MSW sponsored challenges to the federal civil service 
exclusion through the 1960s, and sometimes its attorneys were success­
ful - but always under cover of the procedural and nonarbitrariness 
features of the Due Process Clause.551 Chief Judge David Bazelon of 
the D.C. Circuit ruled in Norton v. Macy552 that it was a violation of 
due process guarantees for the CSC to bar gay people from employ­
ment without a demonstrated "nexus" between their sexual orienta­
tion or activities and the legitimate requirements of their jobs. 
Authored by a judge with deep understanding of the medical litera­
ture debunking anti-homosexual stereotypes, Norton was a break­
through precedent, in part because it was handed down simultane­
ously with the Stonewall riots, after which thousands of lesbigay 
people streamed out of their closets and protested their various state 
exclusions. 553 
549. Brief of Appellant at 23, Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962) (1961 Term, 
No. 123). 
550. Id. 
551 .  For the few successful challenges, see Dew v. Halaby, 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 
1963), cert. granted, 376 U.S. 904 (1964) (after certoriari granted, government agreed to rein­
state married civil servant who had committed "homosexual acts" in his youth); and Scott v. 
Macy, 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965), 402 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (overturning CSC's dis­
charge of gay man). Outside of the D.C. Circuit, such challenges generally failed in the late 
1960s. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Macy, 398 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1969); Taylor v. United States 
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 374 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1967). 
552. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: 
The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979) 
[hereinafter Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges] (discussing Norton and its aftermath). 
553. The Stonewall riots were June 26-28, 1969; Norton was handed down July 1, 1969. 
Until a month before he issued Norton, Bazelon served on a task force studying homosexu-
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Within a year of Stonewall, the ACLU's Norman Dorsen and 
Cqarles Lister revived Kameny's equal protection arguments in a peti­
tion for the Supreme Court to review the civil service exclusion. They 
maintained that gay people are good citizens, homosexuality is an ac­
ceptable variation from the norm, and antigay employment discrimi­
nation is "odious," unjust and, for all of these reasons, contrary to the 
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.554 Although the 
Supreme Court continued to ignore these arguments, they were start­
ing to have bite with more lower courts. Decisions by federal judges in 
the District of Columbia and California, where lesbigays were politi­
cally mobilized, ruled civil service discriminations unconstitutional, 
and the CSC formally abandoned its policy in 1973-74.555 The Supreme 
Court even granted certiorari for a petition by a cross-dressing gay 
man who had (before the CSC policy shift) been discharged by the 
EEOC for "flaunting" his sexual orientation.556 
Many municipalities and states followed the CSC's lead, but other 
government employers, including the federal armed forces, continued 
to exclude and discharge gay people because of their sexual orienta­
tion. Gone were the days when outed "homosexuals" passively ac­
cepted their fates, however; a substantial number of those discharged 
brought lawsuits as openly lesbigay persons. Most of the lawsuits were 
unsuccessful in the 1970s,557 but some judges were willing to overturn' 
discharges because they were not accompanied by any statement of 
reasons558 or .because there was no nexus between the agreed-upon 
ality for the National Institute of Mental Health. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges, supra 
note 552, at 1036 n.107. 
554. Brief for Petitioners at 6-9, Schlegel v. United States, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970) (1969 
Term, No. 1257), denying cert. to 416 F.2d 1372 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Brief for Petitioner at 5, 
Adams v. Laird, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970), denying cert. to 420 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1969), (1969 
Term, No. 1258). 
555. For an account of the cases and of the decline and fall of CSC's exclusion, see 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing Conditions for 
Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship, 1961-1981, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 
911 -18 (1997) [hereinafter Eskridge, Establishing Conditions]. Executive Order No. 13,087, 
63 Fed. Reg. 30,097 (May 28, 1998), prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation by the federal government outside the armed forces. 
556. Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977), granting cert. to 
530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976); see Rhonda R. Rivera, QueerLaw: Sexual Orientation Law in 
the Mid-Eighties (Pt. 1), 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 459, 485 (1985) (federal government rein­
stated Singer after certiorari was granted, and so the case was never heard by the Court). 
557. See, e.g., McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), rev'g 316 F. Supp. 
809 (D. Minn. 1970); see Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges, supra note 552, at 1043-47 (sur­
veying the state employment cases), id. at 1078-92 (surveying cases where public school 
teachers were discharged on grounds of homosexuality). 
558. See, e.g., Matlovich v. Sec'y of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see 
MIKE H IPPLER, MATLOVICH: THE GOOD SOLDIER (1989). 
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reasons for discharge and legitimate job requirements.559 By the late 
1970s, counsel for those discharged were no longer willing to rest their 
cases on due process arguments alone, however. Like Kameny, they 
maintained that it was a violation of equal protection for gay people to 
be treated any differently from straight people. Their arguments met 
with a variety of thoughtful responses, especially in the military exclu­
sion cases. In the leading case, Beller v. Middendorf,560 Judge Anthony 
Kennedy upheld the armed forces bar largely because of the judici­
ary's long tradition of near-absolute deference to military judgments; 
because the Navy's reasons were defensibly pragmatic concerns with 
unit cohesion, the chain of command, and recruitment, its exclusionary 
policy was constitutionally permissible.561 The opinion, however, ex­
plicitly recognized that discriminatory treatment of gay people in 
other institutional contexts could represent valid privacy and equal 
protection claims.562 
In a civil employment case, the California Supreme Court gave a 
stronger endorsement to gay people's politics of recognition, but un­
der free speech auspices. In Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific 
Telephone & Telegraph Co. ,563 the court ruled that harassment or dis­
charge of openly gay employees violated a statutory bar to discrimina­
tion on the basis of "political activities or affiliations." Because "the 
struggle of the homosexual community for equal rights, particularly in 
the field of employment, must be recognized as a political activity,'' 
and because "com[ing] out of the closet" and "acknowledg[ing] their 
sexual preferences" were essential to that politics as understood by 
gay people, efforts to discourage or penalize such employees and press 
them back into their closets was within the bar to political activity dis­
crimination.564 
I start with the employment cases because they dramatically illus­
trate the new kinds of constitutional arguments, but lesbigay people's 
new politics of recognition also triggered important public discourses 
in connection with lesbian and gay associations, criminal law and en­
forcement, and family law. If lesbigay groups and organizations could 
be counted on a few hands in 1961,  they numbered in the hundreds 
within a few years of Stonewall. The NAACP cases insulated these as­
sociations from direct state persecution or harassment, but state insti-
559. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Jack M., 566 P.2d 602 (Cal. 1977); Morrison v. State Bd. of 
Educ., 461 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1969). 
560. 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980) (reversing Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. 
Cal. 1977) and abrogating Martinez v. Brown, 449 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Cal. 1978)). 
561. See id. at 810-12. 
562. See id. at 809-10 (right of privacy in some contexts); id. at 812 (equal protection). 
563. 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979). 
564. Id. at 610. 
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tutions were reluctant to provide any kind of sanction to them.565 After 
the 1960s, this was no longer tolerable in jurisdictions where lesbigay 
people were politically mobilized. For example, the Lambda Legal 
Defense and Education Fund, Inc. was formed "to promote the avail­
ability of legal services to homosexuals by encouraging and attracting 
homosexuals into the legal profession; to disseminate to homosexuals 
general information concerning their rights and obligations; and to 
render technical assistance to any legal services corporation or agency 
in regard to legal issues affecting homosexuals." New York's 
Appellate Division balked at approving Lambda as an authorized le­
gal group, and Lambda's first legal victory came when the Court of 
Appeals vacated the original decision and the Division grudgingly ap­
proved its application.566 Other lesbian and gay groups also sued, usu­
ally with success, to require state officials to register them on equal 
terms with other associations.567 After several years of resistance, the 
Internal Revenue Service in 1977 agreed to recognize tax exemptions 
for gay groups formed for educational or charitable purposes.568 
Many right of association cases arising from the new politics of 
recognition involved public universities. The leading case was Gay 
Students Organization v. Bonner.569 The University of New Hampshire 
recognized the Gay Students Organization ("GSO") but sought to 
limit GSO's social and political activism that stirred enormous public­
ity and political trouble for the administration. Judge Coffin's opinion 
ruled that the university as a public forum could not discriminate 
against gay people's politics of recognition, which included social 
events and plays as well as more conventional educational activities.570 
565. E.g. , Eskridge, Establishing Conditions, supra note 555, at 876-77 (congressional 
investigation into D.C. registration of MSW as a "charitable organization). The NAACP 
cases are discussed in Sections I.A.3 and 11.F.1. 
566. See In re Thom, 301 N.E.2d 542, 543 (N.Y. 1973), on remand 350 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. 
Div. 1973). The Court of Appeals' opinion quoted Lambda's statement of purpose. 301 N.E. 
2d at 543. The court chose to strike part of the statement of purpose on remand, deeming it 
to fall outside the scope of the law authorizing legal assistance corporations. 350 N.Y.S.2d 2. 
567. Compare GAA v. Lomenzo, 293 N.E.2d 255 (N.Y. 1973) (requiring state officials to 
register gay rights group), with Grant v. Brown, 313 N.E.2d 847 (Ohio 1974) (allowing state 
officials to refuse registration, on "no promo homo" grounds). 
568. IRS Reverses Policy on Tax Exemptions, ADVOCATE, Oct. 5, 1977, at 11 (IRS an­
nouncement); Rev. Rul. 78-305, 1978-2 C.B. 172 (formal rule). 
569. 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974); cf Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges, supra note 552, 
at 1144 (describing an unreported 1971 California Superior Court decision, Associated Stu­
dents of Sacramento State College v. Butz, Civ. No. 200795, which required a state college to 
recognize a gay student group on the ground that the First Amendment bars public forums 
from discriminating on the basis of the content of the speech or association of petitioners). 
570. On the other hand, the judge conceded the university ample room for regulation of 
"overt sexual behavior, short of criminal activity, which may offend the community's sense 
of propriety." Bonner, 509 F.2d at 663. 
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Judges all over the country followed Bonner to require fair access by 
gay student groups to state collegiate public forums.571 
After a substantial number of lesbigay people came out of their 
closets, the operation of the criminal justice system in big cities 
changed, almost overnight, with regard to gay and bisexual men in 
particular. Most changes were effectuated through the political proc­
ess, as police departments were pressured into reducing resources de­
voted to victimless crime enforcement and as legislatures were per­
suaded to repeal their consensual sodomy laws.572 But constitutional 
law also played an important role, and a different role than it played 
before the 1960s. During the earlier period of the politics of protec­
tion, gay people relied on after-the-fact retail arguments (if they dared 
resist at all): this particular arrest was tainted with entrapment, denial 
of counsel, a coerced confession, and so forth. Once gay people mobi­
lized, and gained institutional allies such as the ACLU (in the 1960s) 
and Lambda (1970s) , they made sweeping wholesale arguments: the 
jurisdiction's cross-dressing, sexual solicitation, lewd conduct, or sod­
omy law cannot be applied to any such defendants because it is uncon­
stitutional. The reasons these statutes were said to be unconstitutional 
included not just the traditional due process problem of vagueness and 
lack of notice, but also newer problems raised by the right to privacy 
(Griswold) , the First Amendment (Stanley) , and even the Equal 
Protection Clause (Kameny) . . 
For one important example, when North Carolina entrapped 
Eugene Enslin into a violation of its consensual sodomy law, the 
ACLU took up his defense. As foundation for its argument at trial 
that the statute was unconstitutional, ACLU attorney Marilyn Haft 
presented evidence that the conduct criminalized (oral and anal sex) is 
performed by and gives great pleasure to a majority of Americans, 
without any harm to them or to third parties, and that the people most 
stigmatized by the statute, gay people, are psychologically normal, 
non-predatory citizens.573 The ACLU appealed Enslin's conviction all 
the way to the Supreme Court, where it was joined by Lambda and the 
National Gay Task Force. No one argued that the law was unclear, nor 
571. See, e.g., Gay Lib v. Univ. of Missouri, 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977); Gay Alliance of 
Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976). For a recent example, see Gay Lesbian 
Bisexual Alliance v. Pryor, 110 F.3d 1543 (11th Cir. 1997). 
572. See Eskridge, Establishing Conditions, supra note 555, at 836-42 (gay political pres­
sure leading to milder police practices in various cities); id. at 842-63 (gay political pressure 
and litigation leading to repeal, invalidation, or narrow construction of sodomy, lewdness, 
and cross-dressing laws); Steven A. Rosen, Police Harassment of Homosexual Women and 
Men in New York City 1960-1980, 12 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 159 (1980-81) (providing a 
detailed account of milder application of criminal laws against gay people in New York 
City). 
573. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6-9, Enslin v. North Carolina, 425 U.S. 903 
(1976) (No. 75-897) (describing defendant's case at trial). 
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did the petitions merely plead for the state to leave gay people alone. 
Instead, the petitioners maintained that sodomy laws were the legal 
authorization for an array of public and private practices punishing 
lesbigay people unfairly - employment discrimination, police har­
assment, exclusion from the armed services, loss of children, and the 
closet itself.574 As Lambda put it, "just as the elimination of legal seg­
regation and miscegenation laws [was] a necessary first step to the 
elimination of race prejudice, so the elimination of the sodomy laws is 
the essential first step to the elimination of unwarranted prejudice 
against gay people."575 Although the Justices declined to address 
Haft's arguments, they had receptive audiences in other judiciaries. 
New York's Court of Appeals invalidated that state's consensual sod­
omy law for these kinds of reasons in People v. Onofre.516 Indeed, the 
state judiciaries of New York, California, New Jersey, Ohio, and 
Massachusetts narrowly construed or invalidated laws in those juris­
dictions that had been deployed by the police to terrorize lesbigay and 
transgendered people.577 
The most radical manifestation of lesbigay people's politics of rec­
ognition was in the arena of family law. Not only were lesbians and 
gay men insisting on their rights to come out of their closets in the 
workplace and in public culture, but they asserted their moral and 
constitutional rights to have the state recognize and protect their 
families. The most sensational cases were the same-sex marriage ones, 
and the first of those was Baker v. Nelson.578 After the Minnesota 
Attorney General and Supreme Court denied a male couple's right to 
a marriage license, Michael Wetherbee of the local ACLU chapter 
filed an appeal with the U.S. Supreme Court. "At first, the question 
and the proposed relationship may well appear bizarre - especially to 
heterosexuals," but that first impulse "provides us with some measure 
574. Id. at 11 -17; Brief of Amicus Curiae Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
Inc. at 7-12, Ens/in (No. 75-897). The ACLU and Lambda made similar arguments in their 
briefs seeking rehearing of the Court's refusal to grant review, and there they were joined by 
the Brief of Amicus Curiae National Gay Task Force in Support of Petition for Rehearing, 
Ens/in (No. 75-897). 
575. Brief of Amicus Curiae Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. at 1 1 -12, 
Ens/in (No. 75-897). 
576. 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). 
577. See, e.g., Pryor v. Mun. Court, 599 P.2d 636 (Cal. 1979) (narrowly construing "vag­
lewd" law used to entrap gay men) (discussed in greater detail in Section 11.A.3); People v. 
Uplinger, 447 N.E.2d 62 (N.Y. 1983) (invalidating on privacy grounds the state law barring 
loitering for the purpose of solicitation of "deviate sexual intercourse"); City of Columbus v. 
Rogers, 324 N.E.2d 563 (Ohio 1975) (invalidating on vagueness grounds a municipal cross­
dressing ordinance). For a detailed discussion of cases from a variety of jurisdictions, see 
Eskridge, Establishing Conditions, supra note 555, at 842-52 (privacy challenges) and 852-63 
(vagueness challenges). 
578. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
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of the continuing impact on our society of prejudice against non­
heterosexuals." Indeed, Wetherbee maintained, "the relationship con­
templated is neither grotesque nor uncommon."579 He set forth a brief 
case for the descriptive proposition that sexual variation is benign and 
homosexuality normal. Prescriptively, he argued that marriage bars 
should be subjected to heightened scrutiny for any of three reasons. 
First, such bars deny lesbian and gay couples their fundamental right 
to marry that had been recognized in Griswold (for straight couples) 
and Loving (different-race couples).580 Second, the marriage bar also 
denies such couples the important property and economic rights that 
accompany spousehood as a matter of law.581 Third, the state's dis­
crimination was one "based on gender. "582 Whatever the basis for 
heightened scrutiny, the state marriage bar could not be sufficiently 
justified. The state's argument that marriage had always been 
different-sex (the reason accepted by the courts below) begged the 
normative question, and the state's association of marriage with chil­
dren did not justify treating childless gay couples differently from 
childless straight ones, as the statute did. By a unanimous vote, the 
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in Baker, but all the key argu­
ments for invalidating same-sex marriage bars were suggested in that 
case.583 
At the same time same-sex couples were going to court seeking 
marriage licenses from the state, lesbigays formerly married to persons 
of the opposite sex were being dragged into court by their former 
spouses seeking to deprive them of all cop.tact with their children. 
Lesbian and gay parents who chose to fight for their children, as many 
did, turned to studies showing that their orientation had no bearing on 
their ability to be good parents. Lesbigay parents and their lawyers ul­
timately revolutionized custody law, as most states abandoned per se 
rules against lesbigay custody of their own children and adopted the 
579. Jurisdictional Statement at 8-9, Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (No. 71-1027). 
580. See id. at 11 .  
581. See id. at  11-12. 
582. See id. at 16-18. The brief did not flesh out this argument, as the Court had just 
handed down its first sex discrimination decision, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 ( 1971) ,  but it 
appears that the argument was inspired by the miscegenation analogy: just as the bar to dif­
ferent-race marriage was treated as race discrimination in Loving, so the bar to same-sex 
marriage should be treated as sex discrimination. This precise argument was made and re­
jected in Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1 187 (Wash. App.), reh'g denied, 84 Wash.2d 1008 (1974) 
(interpreting the state ERA as not requiring state recognition of same-sex marriages). 
583. 409 U.S. 810 (1972); see Docket Sheet for Baker, in Brennan Papers, supra note 
129, Box 1:281, Folder 1 (revealing that all nine Justices voted to dismiss the appeal). For 
discussion of the other same-sex marriage cases of the 1970s and 1980s, see WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR. ,  THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 52-57 (1996); cf. id. at 232-33 nn.23-
24, 248-49 n.18 (listing the attorney general and judicial decisions). 
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best interests of the child standard.584 Nonetheless, most openly gay or 
lesbian parents lost their legal battles in the 1970s. Even when they 
were successful in retaining custody or visitation rights, courts often 
imposed burdens and conditions on them that would never have been 
contemplated for straight parents.585 
A striking feature of the foregoing discussion of gay people's poli­
tics of recognition in this formative period is that the Burger Court as 
a group were unwilling to listen or respond to any of it. In every case 
presented for its review between 1969 and 1986, the Court either de­
nied certiorari (as in Ens/in), granted review without reaching the 
merits,586 or affirmed an antigay decision without briefing or argument 
(as in Baker). Sometimes these avoidances provoked dissents. In Doe 
v. Commonwealth 's Attorney,587 the Court summarily affirmed a lower 
court decision upholding Virginia's consensual sodomy law against 
privacy, equal protection, and First Amendment attack. Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented on the ground that the im­
portant privacy issues should have been briefed and argued.588 The 
Court denied certiorari in Ratchford v. Gay Lib,589 thereby leaving in 
effect a lower court decision requiring a state university to recognize 
and fund a gay rights group. Justice Rehnquist wrote a passionate dis­
sent, arguing that the lower court was requiring the state to tolerate 
moral contagion. He rejected the claim that the students were merely 
engaged in political and educational activities and insisted that "the 
question is more akin to whether those suffering from measles [i.e. ,  
homosexuality] have a constitutional right, in violation of quarantine 
regulations [i.e., the state sodomy law], to associate together and with 
others [i.e. ,  vulnerable youth] who do not presently have measles."590 
Finally, the Court denied review to Rowland v. Mad River Local 
School District,591 which had upheld the discharge of a bisexual high 
584. Excellent reviews of this litigation are found in Nan D. Hunter & Nancy Polikoff, 
Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25 BUFF. L. REV. 
691 (1976); and Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges, supra note 552, at 1102-23. 
585. See, e.g. , Schuster v. Schuster, 585 P.2d 130 (Wash. 1978) (en bane). 
586. People v. Uplinger, 447 N.E.2d 62 (N.Y. 1983), cert. dismissed as improvidently 
granted, 467 U.S. 246 (1984). The decision followed and applied the Court of Appeals' prior 
decision in Onofre. 
587. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), summarily affg 403 F.Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge 
court). The Court's order in Doe was issued the same day the Court denied certiorari in En­
s/in. 
588. Id. (Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ. would have noted probable jurisdiction). 
589. 434 U.S. 1080 (1978) denying cert. to Gay Lib v. University of Missouri, 558 F.2d 
848 (8th Cir. 1977). 
590. Id. at 1084 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Blackmun, J., dissenting from the denial of cer­
toriari). 
591. 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985). 
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school guidance counselor against First Amendment and equal protec­
tion attack. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, vigorously 
dissented and laid out substantive reasons for reversing the lower 
court. The dissenters maintained that sexual orientation - like sex, 
illegitimacy, and race - ought to be a suspect classification, because 
the group stigmatized by the classification has been the object of hos­
tile state action reflecting prejudice rather than rationality and be­
cause that group has been relatively powerless in the political proc­
ess.592 Brennan's statement was the most complete analysis, at the 
Supreme Court level, of the level of scrutiny owed to sexual orienta­
tion classifications. (Note some parallels to Brennan's plurality opin­
ion in Frontiero.) Even if sexual orientation were not a suspect classi­
fication per se, Brennan argued that the state bore a high burden of 
justification when it denies a minority group public rights, including 
employment opportunities, because of either their private choices and 
conduct or their "nondisruptive expression of homosexual prefer­
ence. "593 
3. The Ongoing Politics of Recognition and Remediation and the 
Politics of Preservation, 1981-Present 
Even the limited success of gay people's politics of recognition in 
the late 1970s alarmed traditionalists and called forth a politics of 
preservation. What I call the "traditional family values" ("TFV") 
movement emerged as a well-organized countermovement between 
1976 and 1981.594 It has flourished since then, even as more Americans 
have come out as lesbian or gay or bisexual and as litigating organiza­
tions have pursued gay rights systematically.595 Like the anti-civil rights 
592. Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1014 (Brennan, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); 
see also MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 510, at 241-51 (giving a moving account of Bren­
nan's gay rights dissent). 
593. Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1015-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). 
594. Key moments in the emergence of the TFV countermovement were the debate 
over sodomy reform and same-sex marriage in California in 1976-77; Anita Bryant's "Save 
the Children" campaign to override Dade County's antidiscrimination law in 1977, and sub­
sequent successful initiatives revoking progay laws in St. Paul, Witchita, and other cities in 
1978 and 1979; California's unsuccessful Briggs Initiative in 1978, whose proponents sought 
to bar from public schoolteaching any person who "advocated" homosexuality in any way; 
and the Moral Majority's successful campaign to persuade Congress to override the District 
of Columbia's attempted sodomy law repeal in 1981. See generally CHRISTOPHER BULL & 
JOHN GALLAGHER, PERFECT ENEMIES: THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT, THE GAY MOVEMENT, 
AND THE POLITICS OF THE 1990S (1996); DIDI HERMAN, THE ANTIGA Y AGENDA: 
ORTHODOX VISION AND THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT (1997). 
595. Lambda and the ACLU (which formally established a Lesbian & Gay Rights Proj­
ect headed by Nan Hunter) remained the leading litigation groups. They have been joined 
by Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders in Boston and other regional litigation 
groups. 
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and pro-life countermovements with which it was linked, the TFV 
countermovement has had natural law and pragmatic faces. Natural 
law traditionalists maintain that sexual variation is malignant, for re­
ligious ("abomination") or medical (AIDS) or mental heath (psycho­
pathic) reasons.596 Therefore, it would be a catastrophe for the state to 
provide any "special rights" to gay people or not to criminalize sod­
omy. Pragmatic traditionalists, in contrast, concede that there is some 
tolerable variation in sexuality. They are willing to abandon sodomy 
laws, for practical reasons, and focus on positive projects that would 
be threatened by too many "special rights" for gay people.597 Thus, the 
state should tolerate gay people but should not promote homosexual­
ity. The "no promo homo" arguments of the last several decades are 
the rhetorical means by which TFV extremists and moderates can 
work together and even attract ordinary Americans to their point of 
view.598 Again like prior countermovements, TFV people from both 
horizons espouse a shared constitutional philosophy of states' rights, 
institutional deference, and individual liberties. 
American law in the 1980s and 1990s was a battleground between 
an increasingly vigorous lesbigay people's politics of recogni­
tion/remediation and an equally vigorous politics of preservation. The 
consequent legal equilibrium varied significantly by state or region: in 
gay-friendly states like California, New York, ·and Vermont, lesbigay 
people now enjoy normal personal and economic liberties and in­
creasing state protection against private violence and discrimination; 
in noncommittal states like New Mexico and Pennsylvania, lesbigay 
people are not much harassed or arrested, but neither are they af­
forded normal protections by the state against private violence and 
discrimination; and in states in the South, lesbigay people are still 
treated like presumptive criminals.599 The TFV strategy within states 
has been to localize progay measures to the urban areas where lesbi­
gay people are concentrated; in the country at large, the strategy has 
been to protect states like Mississippi and Texas from the constitu­
tionalization of policies followed in New York and California. TFV 
596. See, e.g. , ANITA BRYANT, THE ANITA BRYANT STORY: THE SURVIVAL OF OUR 
NATION'S FAMILIES AND THE THREAT OF MILITANT HOMOSEXUALITY (1977) (religious 
and moral); JOSEPH NICOLOSI, REPARATIVE THERAPY OF MALE HOMOSEXUALITY: A 
NEW CLINICAL APPROACH ( 1991 )  (mental health). 
597. See e.g., STEPHEN BRANSFORD, GAY POLITICS VS. COLORADO AND AMERICA: 
THE INSIDE STORY OF AMENDMENT 2, 36-40 (1994) (supporters of Amendment 2 chose a 
pragmatic over a natural law approach to that antigay initiative). 
598. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Dis­
course and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1338-46 (2000) 
[hereinafter Eskridge, No Promo Homo]. 
599. For antigay laws, state-by-state, see ESKRIDGE, GA YLAW, supra note 1 4, app. B3 at 
362-71 .  
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people have also had confidence that their position is one that ordi­
nary folks would prefer to that of elitist judges - so they prefer that 
decisions be made by legislation and popular referenda rather than 
through judicial review and constitutional discourse.600 
Since 1981, therefore, American politics of sexuality has been 
caught up in this pas de deux between gay people's politics of recogni­
tion and TFV people's politics of preservation. Because both sides 
have constitutionalized their discourse, the courts have been drawn 
into the culture clash - including the once comically squeamish U.S. 
Supreme Court. To the extent there has been a national consensus 
about issues of sexuality it has been the edgy ambivalent tolerance of 
"no promo homo": states are not allowed to hurt lesbigay people and 
are required to provide them minimal protections of law, but are not 
required to "promote" homosexuality in affirmative ways and indeed 
are debarred from forcing private groups to accept lesbigay people if 
they feel that acceptance is tantamount to "endorsing" homosexuality. 
a. Sodomy Laws and the Military Exclusion. No issue has set the 
gay rights movement apart from the civil rights and women's rights 
movements more than the association of homosexual status with ho­
mosexual conduct. That many Americans claim to be disgusted by the 
latter makes it harder for gay people to claim protection because of 
the former.601 It is for this reason that lesbigay legal groups have since 
the 1960s made sodomy law repeal or invalidation their central goal. 
By 1986, when the Burger Court finally addressed the privacy argu­
ment against consensual sodomy laws in Bowers v. Hardwick,602 half 
the states had repealed their laws, either judicially or (for most states) 
legislatively. As Professor Larry Tribe realized, there was no Court 
majority for a "gay rights" argument, and so his brief for the chal­
lenger pushed homosexuality into a legal closet and emphasized the 
abuse of state power represented by the gendarmerie's charge into 
Michael Hardwick's bedroom. No one else saw the case his way, 
though. Homosexuality was front and center in the remainder of the 
briefs. The American Psychological Association's brief presented the 
benign sexual variation notion that the conduct criminalized in 
600. For the most part, they have been right about that, as antigay initiatives have 
shown an astounding success rate. See Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular 
Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 251, 258 (1997). By my informal count, however, more than 
half of the antigay referenda after 1997 have failed. See infra note 1535. 
601. For insightful discussions of this phenomenon, see Anne B. Goldstein, Comment, 
History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988) [hereinafter Goldstein, History, Homosexu­
ality]; Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and after Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 737, 777-800 (1989); and Michael Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: 
Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521 (1989). 
602. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (discussed also in Section Il.B). 
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Georgia is in no way pathological and, indeed, is important to the psy­
chological health of individuals and to their intimate relationships, 
whether homosexual or heterosexual.603 The state responded that the 
statute reflected the moral judgments of the people of Georgia, and 
the Court could not legitimately interfere with those judgments unless 
required by constitutional text or well-established precedent. 
Justice White's perfunctory opinion for the Court agreed with the 
state, concluding that it was illegitimate for the unelected Justices to 
overturn the state legislature's moral judgment that sodomy is wrong, 
without a firmer basis in constitutional text or tradition.604 Even within 
that framework, however, White's obsessive focus on "homosexual 
sodomy," notwithstanding the statute's inclusion of sodomy of all 
kinds, exposed the Court to criticism that it was not treating gay peo­
ple impartially.605 Four dissenting Justices not only questioned the 
Court's analysis, but recognized the link between lesbigay people's 
equal citizenship and a constitutional recognition of benign sexual 
variation:606 
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual inti­
macy is "a sensitive key relationship of human existence, central to fam­
ily life, community welfare, and the development of human personality." 
The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way through 
their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as di­
verse as ours, that there may be many "right" ways of conducting those 
relationships, and that much of the richness of a relationship will come 
from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of 
these intensely personal bonds. 
The dissenters also contrasted the Court's passivity in Hardwick with 
its productive activism in Brown, Loving, and Roe, all of which have 
603. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association and American Pub­
lic Health Association in Support of Respondents, passim, Hardwick (No. 85-140); see also 
Brief of Amicus Curiae for Lesbian Rights Project [and other feminist groups), passim, 
Hardwick (No. 85-140) (similar argument, plus sodomy laws contribute to rampant discrimi­
nation against lesbigay people in particular). These kinds of briefs, routinely filed in gay 
rights cases, are called "Homo 101 briefs" because they lay out the established scientific facts 
of (gay) life to presumptively ignorant judges. 
604. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194-95; see id. at 1 91-94 (asserting that the argument that 
"homosexual sodomy" is protected by the nation's libertarian tradition is, "at best, face­
tious") .  
605. Compare id. at 1 90, 19 1 ,  192, 196 (limiting case to "homosexual sodomy"), and id. 
at 1 96-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (similar), with id. at 1 99-200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that it is morally arbitrary for the Court to insist that only "homosexual sodomy" is 
at stake, when the statute covers all kinds of sodomy), and id. at 215- 16 (Stevens, J., dissent­
ing) (noting that state legislature deliberately expanded its sodomy law to include all differ­
ent-sex sodomy). 
606. Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting) 
(quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 ( 1973) and citing Kenneth Karst, 
The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 637 ( 1980)). 
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been cogently criticized for expanding constitutional freedoms beyond 
the boundaries suggested by constitutional text and original intent.607 
The Court's 5-4 decision upholding Georgia's law brought upon 
the Court the greatest criticism I have seen for a decision upholding 
rather than striking down a law.608 Legal junkies continue to be fasci­
nated by new revelations about the many corrupt features of the case, 
such as Attorney General Bowers' longtime adulterous (and allegedly 
sodomitic) affair during the case.609 In a twisted way, Hardwick was (in 
part) a boon to lesbigay rights as a social movement, for the Court's 
openly antigay opinion not only reinforced lesbigays as a "marked" 
minority group, but also rallied lesbigay attorneys out of their closets 
in record numbers and attracted moderate allies. Movement lawyers 
brought fresh challenges under state constitutions and have prevailed 
in most of the cases.610 Social norms have decisively moved away from 
the Supreme Court's assumptions: conservatives and traditionalists as 
well as liberals and civil rights advocates have joined in a public con­
sensus that the state should not make consensual sodomy a crime. On 
the other hand, there is no consensus for the proposition that sodomy 
is unproblematic - and in one area of law, sodomy remains the key to 
a strong antigay policy, the military exclusion. 
Surprisingly, the stream of cases appealing the exclusion of lesbi­
gay people from the armed forces continued after Hardwick. Indeed, 
the Ninth Circuit fiercely debated the issue in Watkins v. United States 
Army.61 1  Judge William Norris' panel opinion ruled that the army's ex­
clusion of "homosexuals" (defined as people who "desire[] bodily con­
tact between persons of the same sex") was a status-based discrimina-
607. Id. at 210-11 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
608. Critiques from different points of view include ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 
14, ch. 4 (precedent and gaylegal history); CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW - ARGUING 
THE REAGAN REVOLUTION 81-84 (1991) (precedent); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND 
REASON 341-50 (1991) (libertarian philosophy); Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, supra 
note 601 (history); Sylvia Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wrs. 
L. REV. 187 (feminist premises and history); and Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 
YALE L.J. 1493 (1987) (republican philosophy). There is no major law review article or legal 
book defending Hardwick, a notable contrast to other controversial Supreme Court opin­
ions, such as Roe v. Wade or even Brown. 
609. See MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 510, at 493-94. 
610. For decisions striking down consensual sodomy laws under state constitutions, see 
Powell v. State, 5 10 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998) (the Hardwick law); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 
842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); State v. Cogshell, 997 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. App. 1999); Gryczan v. 
Montana, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997); and Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. 
App. 1996) (appeal denied). For opinions upholding a law against state constitutional chal­
lenge, see State v. Smith, 766 So.2d 501 (La. 2000), and Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 
(Tex. 2001) (petition for certiorari pending). 
611 .  847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated en bane, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (dis­
cussed in Section II.C.1 .f). 
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tion subject to strict scrutiny.612 In dissent, Judge Stephen Reinhardt 
read Hardwick to condone "anti-homosexual animus in the actions of 
the government,'' and to allow the state to discriminate against that 
class of people who are predisposed to commit criminalizable sod­
omy.613 There were analytical problems with both stances: as Norris 
argued, Hardwick was concerned only with homosexual conduct and, 
even in that sphere, did not reach equal protection issues - but be­
cause homosexual status is defined by the desire and the proclivity to 
engage in proscribable conduct, Hardwick was not irrelevant to the 
equal protection issue, Reinhardt's point.614 Ultimately, the Ninth 
Circuit, en bane, vacated the Norris opinion and judgment but ruled 
that the army was debarred on estoppel grounds from expelling Perry 
Watkins.615 
The 1993 debate over the president's proposed executive order 
ending the bar to gays in the military echoed the Norris-Reinhardt de­
bate, with added twists. Critics of the lesbigay exclusion emphasized 
the status denigration, reminiscent of the military's exclusion and later 
segregation of blacks and women; like these other minorities, lesbigay 
people would not enjoy the full status of citizens until they could 
openly serve their country as soldiers.616 Supporters of the exclusion 
were insulted by the parallel to discredited race and gender exclusions, 
because the antigay policy was grounded upon conduct not status. 
Unlike people of color, who were victims of prejudiced attitudes, gay 
people (this argument went) were themselves responsible for lowering 
morale and unit cohesion because of their disruptive behavior.617 Al­
though this kind of preservationist argument has been rejected in most 
other industrial countries, it prevailed in the United States in 1993. 
The result was a statutory exclusion of anyone who either engaged in 
"homosexual acts" or had a "propensity" to do so,618 assertedly (but 
612. Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1336. 
613. Id. at 1355-58 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). But see id. at 1339-42 (Norris, J., distin-
guishing Hardwick). 
614. See Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531 (1992). 
615. Watkins, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1 989) (en bane). 
616. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed 
Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499 (1991). 
617. See, e.g. , ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, SEXUALITY, supra note 420, at 388-400 (collecting 
materials reflecting opposition to the president's proposal); JANET E. HALLEY, DON'T: A 
READER'S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY'S ANTI-GAY POLICY (1999) (tracing the conduct­
status arguments through the legislative process). 
618. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 1 03-160, § 
571 (a), 107 Stat. 1670 (1993) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000)) .  Technically, there are three 
grounds for exclusion: the service member (1) has engaged in or attempted to engage in 
"homosexual acts," unless there are findings (essentially) that they were an isolated occur­
rence unlikely to recur; (2) has stated that he or she is a "homosexual or bisexual," unless 
the member can prove that he or she has no "propensity" to engage in "homosexual acts"; or 
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ambiguously) accompanied by an admonition against witch-hunts for 
closeted lesbigay personnel. The tag line for this policy - "don't ask, 
don't tell" - summarizes the normative compromise espoused by 
policymakers. This could be viewed as a triumph, of sorts, for prag­
matics in both movements - but for the fact that the "compromise" 
has not worked! Many traditionalists are upset that gay people con­
tinue to serve and have aggressively assaulted or outed them, while 
lesbian and gay personnel have challenged the policy as violative of 
First Amendment as well as equal protection rights.619 As the debate 
moved from Congress to the courts, the preservationist position was 
strengthened by Rostker arguments: without conceding the problems 
with their syllogism that openly lesbigay people could be excluded be­
cause of their propensity to sodomy,620 defenders of the updated lesbi­
gay exclusion have maintained - with uniform success so far - that 
judges must defer to the military's (and Congress's) judgment that ex­
clusion of open lesbigays is necessary for it to carry out its important 
missions.621 
b. Family Law and Same-Sex Marriage. At the same time a progay 
people's politics of recognition was being routed in the military arena, 
it was making some progress in family law. The family law progress 
has been possible only when TFV people have been divided or unen­
thusiastic in their opposition to equal treatment of lesbian and gay 
families of choice. Many lesbigay people are raising children or would 
like to do so. Although natural law traditionalists have fervently op­
posed the rearing of children by lesbigay biological or adoptive par­
ents, pragmatic traditionalists have generally not, because there is no 
reliable evidence indicating harm to children in such families and 
(perhaps more important) much harm can result from state intrusion 
into working family relationships. For these reasons, states have been 
increasingly supportive of gay families of choice. Thus, judges in gay­
friendly industrialized states have approved "second-parent adop­
tions,'' whereby lesbigay people adopt children of their partners, so 
(3) has married or has attempted to marry someone of the same sex. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) 
(2000). 
619. See ESKRIDGE, GA YLAW, supra note 14, at 174-204. 
620. To wit: openly straight people also have a propensity to commit sodomy. EDWARD 
L. LAUMANN ET AL., SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE 
UNITED STATES 98-99 ( 1994) (noting that more than three-quarters of the American people 
have engaged in oral sex; one quarter have engaged in anal sex). 
621 .  Deference has been virtually the only ground for upholding the exclusion in the 
leading cases. See United States v. Able, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 
F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (en bane); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en bane) 
(upholding pre-1993 policy on deference grounds). 
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that same-sex couples then raise children jointly.622 Likewise, judges 
have slowly become amenable to child custody by lesbigay parents di­
vorcing their different-sex spouses.623 Legislatures, especially at the 
municipal level, have recognized horizontal (romantic) relationships 
by creating registries for "domestic partnerships" between people of 
the same sex (as well as different sex in most cases).624 These have all 
been modest advances in lesbigays' politics of recognition, as the state 
has recognized that sexual variation has little or no bearing on a per­
son's capacity to raise children or establish a joint household. Tradi­
tionalists have objected, strongly, that this politics has come at the sac­
rifice of the rights of children to be raised in husband-wife households 
that are best for them, but so far their arguments have not been found 
credible by either social scientists or neutral judges.625 
The equality jackpot would be state recognition of same-sex mar­
riages, the last refuge of compulsory heterosexuality in American 
family law. Given Hardwick, as a barrier at the federal level, lesbigay 
couples have focused on state constitutional challenges. In 1993, the 
Hawaii Supreme Court ruled in Baehr v. Lewin626 that the law's refusal 
to recognize same-sex unions as marriages was a sex discrimination 
requiring strong justification under the state's ERA. The decision gal­
vanized gay rights and its countermovement in a big way. Lesbigays 
and their allies hailed the decision as a vindication of the idea that gay 
people are just as capable as straight people of forming loving and 
committed relationships which should be recognized on equal terms 
by the state. Because the supreme court remanded the case so that the 
622. See, e.g., In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995); In re Jacob, 660 
N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995); In re Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993); see Nancy 
Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of 
Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Households, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990). 
623. An increasingly large majority of judicial decisions since 1981 have deployed the 
"best interests of the child" approach without presuming against custody by lesbigay parents. 
The leading case, Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980), has been followed by 
most state appeals courts that have addressed issues of child custody. See, e.g., Boswell v. 
Boswell, 721 A.2d 662 (Md. 1998); see also ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, SEXUALITY, supra note 
420, at 836 n."c" (listing cases as of 1997). The old per se rule or strong presumption against 
custody has largely become confined to the deep South. See, e.g., Ex parte D.W.W., 717 
So.2d 793 (Ala. 1998). 
624. See Raymond C. O'Brien, Domestic Partnership: Recognition and Responsibility, 32 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 163, 166, 183 (1995). 
625. See Carlos Ball & Janice Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and 
Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 233 (responding to Lynn Wardle, The Poten­
tial Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833); see also Judith 
Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter?, 66 AM. 
SOC. REV. 159 (2001) (finding that lesbigay parenting may have some impact on children, 
but not the malignant impact claimed by traditionalists). 
626. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: 
CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 1-42 (2001) (hereinafter ESKRIDGE, 
EQUALITY PRACTICE) (situating Baehr in the context of sexuality politics). 
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state could offer possible justifications for the sex discrimination, gay 
lawyers had an opportunity to expose the lack of factual foundation 
for their discriminatory treatment.627 TFV people criticized the deci­
sion as illegitimate judicial usurpation promoting homosexuality and 
depriving traditional married couples of their unique status. Signifi­
cantly, both natural law and pragmatic traditionalists were intensely 
critical of Baehr - as were most Americans. 
In the short term, the politics of preservation triumphed more 
sweepingly than it had in the gays-in-the-military campaign. As of 
August 2002, thirty-six states have adopted statutes either reaffirming 
that marriage can only exist between one man and one woman or re­
fusing to recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages (in most cases 
both).628 Congress and the President united in support of the Defense 
of Marriage Act of 1996 ("DOMA"), which sought to validate the 
state nonrecognition statutes against full faith and credit clause chal­
lenge and amended federal law to ensure that spouse and marriage 
rules would not apply to same-sex couples.629 DOMA is the most 
sweepingly antigay statute adopted in American history. Although 
natural law extremists argued that gay people were abominations and 
same-sex marriage unholy or yucky, the TFV countermovement suc­
cessfully focused on the pragmatic position that each state ought to be 
able to decide the issue without coercion from extremist states (i.e., 
Hawaii); that states ought to decide the issue through a procedure 
where the voices of all people were heard and majorities respected; 
and that lesbigays should be tolerated, but their short-lived relation­
ships should not be valorized as much as heterosexual marriage.630 
Notwithstanding DOMA and what appeared to be a complete vic­
tory for the politics of preservation, a lesbigay grass-roots movement 
in Vermont challenged that state's same-sex marriage bar, also sue-
627. The state's main justification was the rights of children to be raised in households 
best serving their interests - a justification the trial judge rejected as unsupported either by 
the state's own expert witnesses or by any reputable social scientific evidence. See Baehr v. 
Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), slip op. 'll'll 125-27, 132, 
135-36, 139. 
628. The states are listed in  ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 626, at 27-28 
& n.*. 
629. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419, codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) (barring con­
struction of federal spousal and marriage rules to apply to same-sex marriages); 28 U.S.C. § 
1738B (2000) (validating state choice of law rules barring recognition of out-of-state same­
sex marriages). 
630. See ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 626, at 32-39; ANDREW 
KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW 127-40 
(2002) (containing a detailed history and constitutional critique of DOMA). After DOMA 
was enacted, Hawaiian voters amended their state constitution to authorize the legislature to 
limit marriage to different-sex couples. See ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 
626, at 39-42. 
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cessfully. In Baker v. State,631 the Vermont Supreme Court unani­
mously ruled that the bar violated the common benefits clause of the 
state constitution. Sensitive to the inevitable charge that judges were 
usurping the policymaking role of the legislature, the court did not en­
ter an immediate remedy but instead urged the legislature to try its 
hand first. Over both natural law and pragmatic arguments for pre­
serving the status quo, the legislature created a new institution, civil 
unions, under which same-sex couples would be governed by the same 
legal requirements and benefits applicable to different-sex married 
couples.632 There is no reason to believe that most American states will 
follow Vermont in the near term, but a few (California, Connecticut, 
Hawaii, Massachusetts, New York) have already adopted statewide 
laws recognizing same-sex couples as a family unit deserving some 
state protection or benefits. More will follow, even as other states lag 
behind the rest of the world.633 
c. Antidiscrimination Laws. One consequence of gay people's poli­
tics of remediation is that dozens of cities, thirteen states, and the Dis­
trict of Columbia have adopted laws prohibiting sexual orientation 
discrimination by private employers and (under some of the laws) 
public accommodations.634 The process of enacting such legislation 
calls forth the same arguments as those deployed elsewhere: lesbigay 
people claim they are subject to vicious private discrimination that the 
state ought not tolerate because sexual orientation is irrelevant to em­
ployment and other economic activities, while traditionalists warn that 
such laws will promote homosexuality and sacrifice third-party 
rights.635 The opponents' arguments are ultimately purely normative 
and reflect a deep-seated hostility to shameless public displays of ho-
631.  744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
632. VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 15, § 1202, 1204 (2000); see ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, 
supra note 626, at 57-82 (detailing legislative history of civil unions law); id. at 83-126 (re­
viewing state recognition of same-sex unions by Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and other western countries). 
633. What each state does will be the product of that state's internal political balance 
between the politics of recognition and preservation, a balance easily destabilized by outside 
events. Roughly speaking, states in the Northeast, West Coast, and around the Great Lakes 
are most likely to accord recognition to lesbigay families, and states in the Baptist South and 
the Mormon West least likely. See ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 625, at 231-
37 (chart of the states). 
634. See JAMES BUTTON ET AL., PRIVATE LIVES, PUBL!C CONFLICTS: BATTLES OVER 
GAY RIGHTS IN AMERICAN COMMUNlTIES (1997); ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, at 
356-61 (app. B2) (listing state and municipal laws as of 1998). As of 1998, California, 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin had antidiscrimination laws. Since the publication of 
my book, Delaware and Maryland have joined the ranks of states with such laws. 
635. For the best case study, which fully reveals the dynamic in text, see Peter M. 
Cicchino et al., Sex, Lies, and Civil Rights: A Critical History of the Massachusetts Gay Civil 
Rights Bill, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 549-631 (1991). 
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mosexual identity and (implicitly) sexuality, and so it cannot be sur­
prising that enactment of such laws has only been a point in the con­
tinuing dialectic of recognition, remediation, and preservation. 
From the very beginning, traditionalists have often been able to 
revoke antidiscrimination laws through popular referenda and initia­
tives.636 In 1992, Colorado for Family Values ("CFV") took this strat­
egy to its next level. Several municipalities in Colorado adopted anti­
discrimination laws, and the governor barred state employment 
discrimination by executive order. CFV proposed a state constitu­
tional amendment to preempt any state or municipal law or policy 
whereby homosexuality could be the basis for "any minority status, 
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination." In its 
campaign for voter ratification, CFV avoided open appeals to natural 
law and relied on pragmatic and constitutional arguments. Thus, its 
leaders argued that lesbigay people did not need these "special rights" 
and that special rights for gays would deprive ordinary citizens of their 
rights to speak freely, worship as they choose, associate with whom 
they choose, and control the education of their children.637 After the 
voters adopted the proposed amendment, lesbigays challenged it as a 
violation of the federal Equal Protection Clause, and the case made it 
all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The state's brief on appeal in Romer v. Evans638 emphasized 
themes of federalism, popular legitimacy, and personal liberty. That is, 
the state had made, in the most legitimate manner, a policy judgment 
that lesbigay people were not to be prosecuted for sodomy, but was 
not prepared to spend valuable civil rights enforcement resources on 
their additional protection, especially given the tendency of antidis­
crimination laws to interfere in "the choices people make in religious, 
familial, personal, and associational matters."639 Jean Dubofsky's brief 
636. The first such antigay initiative repealed Boulder, Colorado's antidiscrimination 
ordinance in 1 974. The first "big" repeal effort was Anita Bryant's 1 977 "Save the Children" 
campaign against an antidiscrimination law in Dade County, Florida. Between 1977 and 
1993, antigay initiatives had an unprecedented 79% success rate. See Gamble, supra note 
600, at 258. 
637. Equal Rights - Not Special Rights! (Colo. for Fam. Values), 1 992 (official ballot 
materials distributed to voters as an explanation of the proposed amendment), reprinted in 
Robert F. Nagel, Playing Defense, 6 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 167, 192-99 (1997); see 
BRANSFORD, supra note 597, at 40 (insider's account of the CFV campaign themes). Com­
pare Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government": The 
Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19 (1993) (describing similar Oregon 
antigay initiative). 
638. 5 17  U.S. 620 (1996), see also discussion infra Section II.CJ . 
639. Brief for Petitioners at 43, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 ( 1996) (No. 94-1039); see 
id. at 44-47 (showing how progay laws violate TFV people's religious liberties and rights of 
free association, relying on Robert Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual 
Rights Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393 
(1994)). Nine amicus briefs "supported" the state, some of them probably harmful because 
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for the challengers focused on the functional consequences of the 
amendment from the perspective of lesbigays: by preempting local an­
tidiscrimination protections, the amendment undermined their ability 
to participate in the political process;640 moreover, the amendment's 
broad denial of state "protection" to lesbigay people threatened their 
access to state services and protections of all sorts. Her conclusion was 
that the amendment was animated by antigay "antipathy" and not by 
the nice values in the state's brief.641 In reply, the state disavowed sup­
porters' antigay statements and insisted that "Coloradans are largely 
tolerant of homosexuality, yet unwilling to support governmental ac­
tion which confers benefits on a relatively privileged group at the ex­
pense of the less-privileged."642 
Surprisingly, the Rehnquist Court ruled that the antigay amend­
ment was invalid. That Colorado's arguments did not prevail owes 
something to the breadth of the amendment, which effectively 
authorized employers, landlords, and public accommodations to dis­
criminate against gay people but left local bars against discriminating 
against straight people in place. But six Justices pretended that the 
amendment was much broader than it clearly was, and Justice 
Kennedy's opinion for the Court was unprecedented in the extent to 
which it credited lesbigay people's politics of recognition. The opinion 
not only referred to the respondents respectfully as gay men, lesbians, 
and bisexuals, but articulated the protections served by antidiscrimina­
tion laws as "normal" protections everyone else either takes for 
granted or enjoys - and not as the "special rights" claimed by the 
state and the dissenting opinion.643 Justice Kennedy also openly recog­
nized that much of the support of the amendment was inspired by 
antigay "animus," again a striking contrast with the dissent's emphasis 
of their extremist (i.e., natural law) rhetoric. See, e.g. , Brief for Amicus Curiae Concerned 
Women for America, Inc. in Support of Petitioners, Evans (No. 94-1039) (arguing that ho­
mosexuality is immoral, and that "special rights" for homosexuals undermine public moral­
ity, marriage, economic liberty, and religious liberty). 
640. The state supreme court had adopted this theory. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 
1270, 1282 (Colo. 1993) (requiring heightened scrutiny for the amendment, which was struck 
down by the lower court on remand, and then affirmed by the state supreme court). 
641. See Brief for Respondents at 36-50, Evans (No. 94-1039); accord Brief for Amicus 
Curiae American Bar Association at 10-25, Evans (No. 94-1039) (first ABA brief filed on 
behalf of gay people at the Supreme Court, arguing that the amendment served no rational 
purpose). 
642. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 1 5, Evans (No. 94-1039). The state reported polling 
data showing that large majorities of Coloradans believed that "homosexuals are not really 
different from anyone else" and should be allowed to serve in the military and engage in pri­
vate intimacy with consenting adults. Id. at 15 n.24. 
643. Compare Evans, 517 U.S. at 630-31 (majority opinion), with id. at 638 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). On the deployment of "special rights" rhetoric by anti-civil rights as well as 
antigay groups, see Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the 
Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283 (1994). 
August 2002] Identity-Based Social Movements 2191 
on how tolerant Coloradans are.644 Finally, the six-Justice majority ig­
nored Bowers v. Hardwick, a gap stressed by Justice Scalia in dis­
sent.645 
Although commentators predictably embraced its result and its 
gay-friendly reasoning, Evans is a mystery: the breadth of its reasoning 
could signal the full constitutionalization of gay people's politics of 
recognition, but the squirreliness of the state amendment renders the 
case potentially sui generis.646 Under the theory of my project, the 
meaning of Evans depends on the balance of the cultural politics sur­
rounding it. The Court learned a lesson from Hardwick: don't commit 
the Constitution to one of the contending camps prematurely. The 
strategy of the Evans Justices was not to overrule Hardwick or to em­
brace the full legal equality demanded by gay people's politics of rec­
ognition, but to distance themselves from the antigay discrimination 
seemingly accepted in Hardwick and to invite feedback before taking 
a firm position on gay rights. 
If the Evans Justices aimed to respect lesbigay people, they were 
not eager to disrespect TFV people and their liberties. The year be­
fore Evans, a unanimous Court had ruled in Hurley v. Irish-American 
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston647 that Massachusetts 
could not constitutionally apply its antidiscrimination law to require a 
private St. Patrick's Day parade to include a contingent of openly les­
bigay marchers. The First Amendment protected the parade organiz­
ers' right to express a message through their orchestration of the pa­
rade, and the Court credited the organizers' claim that their message 
would be distorted by a gay contingent.648 After Evans, the Court con­
sidered whether the First Amendment permitted New Jersey's antidis­
crimination law to require the Boy Scouts to allow openly gay men to 
be assistant scoutmasters, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.649 The 
Scouts maintained that they wanted to be silent or neutral as to issues 
of homosexuality - neither "anti-gay" nor conveying "approval of 
644. Compare Evans, 517 U.S. at 632, 634-35 (majority opinion), with id. at 645 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
645. See id. at 640-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
646. Commentaries exploring this mystery but supporting the Court's result include 
Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203 
(1996); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanne Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 
257 (1996); Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45 (1996); and 
Louis Michael Seidman, Romer's Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of Warren Court Ac­
tivism, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 67. 
647. 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (also discussed in Section I I.F.3) . 
648. For a critical appraisal, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Coming 
Out": Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public 
Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411 (1997). 
649. 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (discussed also in Sections 11.F.3 and 111.B). 
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homosexual conduct either."650 Ironically, the presence of an openly 
gay scoutmaster presented the Scouts with a dilemma: either break 
their silence and appear anti-gay or sit tight and appear to promote 
homosexual conduct. They chose to resolve the dilemma by expelling 
the gay man and denying that the action was anti-gay. A divided 
Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment protects an expressive 
association like the Scouts from having the state direct its message or 
its membership. 
Table 1 summarizes the main analytical point of this part of the 
Article: all three IBSMs as well as their countermovements expressed 
their political aspirations through constitutional litigation. The liber­
tarian assurances of the First Amendment and Due Process Clause 
were the basis for each group's ongoing politics of protection, which 
was superseded by a politics of recognition and remediation developed 
by each group under the auspices of the Equal Protection Clause. To 
the extent each group was successful in its equal citizenship campaign, 
a politics of preservation presented constitutional arguments grounded 
on federalism, separation of powers, and personal liberty that could 
override or limit the equality each IBSM was seeking. One theme of 
my lengthy survey is that not only have different IBSMs followed the 
same constitutional tracks, but they have instinctively recognized that 
they are interdependent and should support one another. Thus, not 
only have women's and gay rights attorneys capitalized on equal pro­
tection and First Amendment arguments pioneered by the Inc. Fund, 
but their extensions of civil rights constitutional doctrines have been 
supported by current civil rights organizations, which in turn are sup­
ported by women's and gay groups. (And all are under the umbrella of 
the ACLU.) There is now an evolving ISBM constitutional vision to 
which each group now contributes; likewise, there is now a constitu­
tional countervision to which each countermovement (anti-civil rights, 
pro-life, TFV movements) contributes. Social movements in the new 
millennium are a powerful institutionalized engine of constitutional 
change. To understand how this engine works, it is useful to visit in 
greater detail some of the doctrinal transformations these movements 
generated in the last century. 
650. Brief for Petitioners at 21, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-
699). The Scouts took a harder line in their Reply Brief for Petitioners at 5, Dale (No. 99-
699) ("Boy Scouting wants boys to be tolerant. But Boy Scouting also wants boys to be mor­
ally straight, to live their lives with purity. Believing that homosexual conduct, along with 
other sex outside of marriage, is immoral, Boy Scouting does not want to promote homosex­
ual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."). 
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TABLE 1 
THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE POLITICS OF IBSMS 
Politics of Protection Politics of Recognition Politics of Preservation 
and Remediation 
' 
(1) Due process right (1) Right to vote (Texas (1) Federalism and 
against mob trials Primary Cases) and states' rights (Milliken; 
(Moore). Criminal serve on juries (Norris). Freeman v. Pitts) 
procedure rights to 
The Civil counsel, juries, etc. (2) Equal protection (2) Deference to politi-
Rights (Powell) anti-apartheid (Brown; cal process; institutional 
Movement Loving) competence 
(2) Right to hold ( Washington v. Davis) 
property and enter (3) Affirmative state 
into contracts protection through anti- (3) White liberties; do 
(Buchanan) discrimination laws not promote race con-
(Heart of Atlanta), voting sciousness (Adarand and 
(3) First amendment rights protections Affirmative Action 
rights of association (Katzenbach), desegre- Cases) 
(NAACP v. Alabama) gation decrees (Swann) 
and protest (Cox) 
(1) Due process pri- (1) Right to jury service (1) Localism: state and 
vacy right to control of (Hoyt, Taylor) parental responsibility 
reproduction and (ERA defeat; Hodgson) 
sexuality (Griswold; (2) Equal protection 
Women 's Roe) challenges to laws resting (2) Deference to politi-
Rights on sex stereotypes cal process; institutional 
Movements (2) Rape reform and (Reed; Frontiero) competence (Feeney; 
state enforcement of Rostker) 
sexual assault laws (3) Affirmative state 
protection through anti- (3) Rights of parents and 
(3) Access to jobs out- discrimination laws, sex- of fetuses; do not pro-
side the home ual harassment guide- mote abortion (Abortion 
(Goesaert) lines, suppression of Funding Cases; Casey 
porn and Carhart dissents) 
(1) First amendment (1) Equal protection (1) Federalism and local 
rights of association, challenges to state dis- control (DOMA; 
speech, publication crimination, especially Hardwick) 
(One, Inc.) jobs (Kameny) 
Gay Rights (2) Deference to politi-
Movement (2) Due process limits (2) Equal protection/due cal process; institutional 
to police stings and process right to same-sex competence (Hardwick; 
witch hunts marriage (Baker; Baehr) Gays in the Military 
Cases) 
(3) Due process (3) Anti-discrimination 
vagueness and privacy laws (Evans) (3) Rights of parents and 
challenges to sodomy, of antigay association; no 
solicitation, cross- promo homo (Dale) 
dressing laws 
(Boutilier; Hardwick) 
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II. IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 
One inference from the history is that the Supreme Court has ac­
commodated the needs of IBSMs, subject to constraints imposed by 
the comfort levels of different Justices and by national political equi­
libria. In this Part, I argue that these movements have been critical to 
the evolution of constitutional doctrines of all sorts, and I shall docu­
ment that view with an analysis of various doctrinal transformations. 
Let me start, though, with the logic of my hypothesis. How is it that 
IBSMs generate changes in constitutional doctrine? 
1. IBSMs Generate Constitutional Facts, Litigations, and Spirals. 
The United States in 1900 was full of rules and practices that discrimi­
nated against and subordinated people of color, women, and gay peo­
ple. Once some of those people got organized, there was plenty for 
them to complain about, and they brought case after case until they 
got some satisfaction from the political or judicial process. Because of 
social prejudice and stereotypes about the very people who were the 
objects of state discrimination, the political process was an unlikely 
venue for needed change.651 Given their history of activism and obvi­
ous constitutional hooks for IBSM political goals, courts were a forum 
that would at least give outcast social groups or individuals a hearing. 
Once there was a serious hearing, there was the possibility for judicial 
relief, accompanied by doctrinal innovation supported by the facts of 
the cases. Social movement litigators not only brought cases present­
ing new angles on old issues, but they constructed records in those 
cases that provided justifications and factual underpinnings for new 
constitutional rules or exceptions to old rules. In 1930, George 
Sutherland would not have said that men accused of capital crimes 
have a due process right to counsel - but he did say that when con­
fronted with the record compiled by civil rights counsel in Powell v. 
Alabama. Once that first case was won, other cases would follow, and 
constitutional doctrine would evolve, common law style. Thus, no one 
in 1932 could have expected that Powell would have been the basis for 
a due process right to counsel in all felony cases, but several decades 
of due process litigation in state as well as federal courts yielded pre­
cisely that result in 1963.652 
651. Despite constant petitions from civil rights groups and presidents to enact legisla­
tion protecting lives and liberties of blacks, it was not until 1957 that Congress enacted any 
such law. (People of color usually did not even bother to petition southern legislatures for 
protective laws.) Lesbigay people to this day have never been recognized as a group worth 
protecting by Congress. Women have had many more successes in state and national legisla­
tures. 
652. See infra Section I I.A.Lb. 
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The common law process for such rights was not an unguided one. 
IBSM litigating organizations - the NAACP, the ACLU, Planned 
Parenthood, NOW, Lambda, and others - chose the cases they 
wanted the Supreme Court (or a state high court) to hear and, if victo­
rious, then planned the next cases. The NAACP's campaign to end de 
jure segregation was the classic constitutional litigation campaign, 
carefully planned yet adaptable. Others have included Planned 
Parenthood's campaign for free use of contraceptives, which evolved 
also into an effort to decriminalize abortion; the NAACP's crusade 
against the death penalty; the ACLU's campaigns against sex-based 
discriminations and consensual sodomy laws; and Lambda's campaign 
for same-sex marriage. These campaigns have moved the law, even 
when IBSM organizations have not achieved their ultimate goals. 
As we have seen, successful IBSMs generate countermovements, 
which have pressed their own constitutional vision through new state 
or national statutes and in litigation defending those laws or limiting 
progressive laws. The culture clash between ISBMs and counter­
movements has yielded constitutional spirals: old laws fall before 
IBSM constitutional arguments, often to be replaced by new laws en­
acted and defended by countermovements in the face of new chal­
lenges. This is what happened in the politics of abortion, from Roe 
(old laws struck down) through Danforth (new laws struck down in 
part) through Webster (new laws start getting upheld) through Carhart 
(newer laws come to the Court). The spiral can go the other way: anti­
discrimination laws enacted in response to IBSM demands for reme­
diation fall or are limited in the face of countermovement constitu­
tional attack, which stimulates the IBSM to fight back on other fronts. 
After gay rights forces lost the TFV campaign to amend the Colorado 
Constitution in 1992, they turned to the U.S. Constitution and made 
new equal protection law (Evans) . After Lambda lost its constitutional 
litigation with the Boy Scouts in Dale, progay activists pressed state 
and local governments to withdraw their support from the newly 
antigay Scouts (no promo scouto); these measures are pressing state 
courts to make new state constitutional law and will probably generate 
federal constitutional issues as well. In short, IBSMs rarely generate 
pure triumphalist law stories - instead they and their doppelgangers 
generate constitutional spirals that have created great complexity in 
individual rights law. 
2. Judicial Motivations. IBSMs can bring cases and present them 
attractively, but unless judges are receptive, their arguments will get 
nowhere. The problem of properly motivating judges was a huge one 
for IBSMs throughout the century.653 To motivate judges to decide 
653. Not only did judges have to be strongly persuaded before they would overturn gov­
ernment rules and practices, but the process of persuasion was doubly difficult when (as was 
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cases in their favor, social movement attorneys followed a variety of 
strategies, often all at once. Naive strategies assumed that judges would 
more or less neutrally apply the law and sought to present an ex­
panded factual and normative context within which even a skeptical 
but open-minded judge would feel free to recognize the rights of a mi­
nority. Thus, in the Phillips County (Moore) and Scottsboro (Powell 
and Norris) cases, lawyers for black defendants presented the Court 
with scenarios where the Justices did not see their choice as being doc­
trinal innovation versus stare decisis; instead, they saw their choice as 
applying the Constitution to serve its underlying rule of law purposes 
versus tolerating a state of nature in the South. Once the Justices had 
decided these cases, the NAACP could cite them as precedent for 
regulating less-frightening scenarios. Viewing the evolution of doc­
trine from case to case provides many more examples of how judges 
from a range of perspectives could agree with minority claims when 
presented in the context of outrageous facts or new developments in 
formal law.654 
The problem with naive strategies was that the new fact situations 
and novel angles on old issues gave room for judges to create favor­
able doctrine but did not compel them to do so. Repeat-player IBSM 
organizations and their allied attorneys also followed sophisticated 
strategies, which assumed that judges' decisions were influenced by 
their own political preferences, and sought to mold or appeal to those 
preferences. The preferences of the Justices can be categorized in the 
following way for the century: 
• Plessy Era Court (1883-1911).655 After Reconstruction, the 
Court consisted of economic libertarians and law-and-order reaction­
aries who were little interested in the plight of women and minorities 
in the United States. Minorities were unable to make headway during 
this period. 
usually the case) the judges operated under some of the same prejudices and stereotypes as 
legislators and police officers. 
654. ln the contraception and early abortion cases, Planned Parenthood presented the 
Court with medical support for the legal proposition that women's "liberty" was tangibly 
threatened by state rules restricting their access to help in preventing or terminating preg­
nancies. Because the Court had never authoritatively denied women's rights to choose under 
those circumstances, the Justices were free to recognize such rights; because "experts" were 
harshly critical of elderly legal restrictions, some moderate and conservative Justices were 
willing to strike down the most objectionable Jaws, such as those in Griswold and Roe. Once 
the worst laws fell, Planned Parenthood urged the Court to read those decisions broadly, 
again supported by arrays of scientific experts that suggested the neutrality of their argu­
ments. 
655. See generally OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 
1888-1910 (1993) (volume 8 of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise, History of the Supreme 
Court of the United States); Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303. 
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• Pre-New Deal Court (1911 -37).656 The libertarianism of the prior 
period extended to government overreaching in matters of physical 
liberty and speech as well as property regulation. Minorities could ap­
peal to the Court's sense that the state should not over-criminalize and 
should conduct the criminal process fairly. 
• New Deal Court (1937-62).657 The nine Justices appointed by 
President Roosevelt were committed to upholding the constitutional­
ity of the modern regulatory state but were also increasingly con­
cerned about the operation of the regulatory state on minority groups. 
The Justices were committed to a democratic pluralism, whereby all 
groups would have a fair chance to sway public opinion and partici­
pate in government. Minorities could argue that deprivation of politi­
cal and civil rights (voting and jury exclusions, segregation) to minori­
ties was inconsistent with the open and pluralistic features of 
American democracy that set it apart from Nazi and Communist to­
talitarianism. This appeal of democracy-based arguments extended 
through the 1950s as well. 
• The High Warren Court (1962-71) .658 After the departure of 
Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker, most of the Justices were 
out-of-the-closet liberals; they believed the Court should police the 
political process for both procedural defects and substantive injustices. 
The Court was strongly committed to racial integration, redistribution 
of economic and social power, and procedural justice. Racial minori­
ties could call upon the Justices to back them up in their struggle with 
southern tyrants. 
• Nixon-Burger Court (1971 -86).659 The four Nixon Justices were 
more conservative legal process judges particularly concerned with in­
stitutional economics, namely, the institutional costs as well as the in­
dividual benefits of protecting rights. If minorities could persuade the 
Court that the institutional costs of protecting certain rights were low, 
as with women's rights, they could prevail. But countermovement 
pragmatists had a receptive audience for their conservative legal proc-
656. See generally ALPHEUS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 
(1956); ALPHEUS MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAIT: CHIEF JUSTICE (1964); Michael J. 
Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51  V AND. L. REV. 881 (1998). 
657. See generally BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE 
STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998); David M. Bixby, The Roosevelt 
Court, Democratic Ideology, and Minority Rights: Another Look at United States v. Classic, 
90 YALE L.J. 741 (1981). 
658. See generally BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPERCHIEF (1983); G. EDWARD WHITE, 
EARL WARREN (1982). 
659. See generally JEFFRIES, JUSTICE POWELL, supra note 171 (excellent biography of 
Justice Powell, the "soul" of the Nixon-Burger Court); THE BURGER COURT: THE 
COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983). 
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ess arguments, especially those based on federalism and institutional 
competence. 
• Reagan-Rehnquist Court (1986-??). 660 Under the presidencies of 
Reagan and Bush pere, liberals disappeared from the Court, and coun­
termovement judges assumed pivotal roles. Localism and libertarian­
ism reappeared as animating philosophies of the Justices. The Court as 
a whole has been particularly keen on protecting and expanding First 
Amendment liberties against state regulation. Minorities, including 
traditionalist ones, have been most likely to prevail when they are en­
gaging in expressive activities and associations the state is penalizing. 
Furthermore, recall that IBSMs are normative. Their ultimate po­
litical strategy - changing public norms from considering the minor­
ity's trait a tolerable or benign variation - had payoffs in constitu­
tional litigation as well. Once Justices realized that the audience for 
their opinions included many critics for whom the baseline was that 
latinos, women, and lesbigay people are just as important to the body 
politick as straight white men, the Justices changed the tone of their 
writing and made an effort to understand and appear responsive to 
minority claims. Thus, the conservative Burger Court was much more 
friendly toward women's claims for equality and privacy than the lib­
eral Warren Court, because the Justices accepted some of the coun­
try's new views about women's role in society. Several of the Burger 
Court Justices were exceedingly anxious about minority sexualities, 
and so it fell to the more conservative Rehnquist Court to handle the 
delicate issues of homosexuality and the law. And the Rehnquist 
Court, with two female Justices, has been quite receptive to the consti­
tutional and statutory claims of women's ongoing politics of protection 
and recognition. 
Cynical strategies have assumed that judges are partisan and essen­
tially just part of the political process. The most obvious punchline for 
this strategy is to fight for your allies to be appointed to the Court and 
vigorously to oppose appointment of known enemies. Twentieth cen­
tury IBSMs deployed this strategy with some success. It was very im­
portant for the civil rights movement that Thurgood Marshall be ap­
pointed to the Court, not just because he could be expected to vote for 
their interests and their politics of recognition and remediation, but 
also because his mere presence in conference discredited extremist 
(natural differences) arguments and undermined some moderate ar­
guments deployed by the politics of preservation. Even a conservative 
woman like Sandra Day O'Connor changed the Burger Court's sex 
660. See generally David Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. 
L. REV. 293 (1976) (his analysis of Rehnquist as favoring states rights and corporate power 
over individual rights and federal regulatory authority has held up over the decades). 
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discrimination jurisprudence and ultimately saved Roe v. Wade (sort 
of). Her appointment and that of Ruth Bader Ginsburg are both a tri­
umph of women's politics of recognition and a means to implement it 
through constitutional doctrine. Although there has been no openly 
gay Justice in recent years,661 the appointment of bachelor Justice 
David Souter has been the occasion for a transformation in the 
Court's language in majority opinions, from unashamed invocations of 
antigay stereotypes and rhetoric to relative civility toward lesbigay 
Americans.662 
Minority groups have also had some success in heading off hostile 
appointments. All four twentieth century judges nominated for the 
Court but defeated by a Senate vote (John Parker by President 
Hoover, Clement Haynsworth and Harrold Carswell by President 
Nixon, Robert Bork by President Reagan) were opposed mainly by 
IBSMs and their allies, who viewed the nominees as prejudiced against 
minorities.663 The rejected choices were succeeded by nominees 
(Owen Roberts, Harry Blackmun, Anthony Kennedy) who were more 
receptive to equality claims, and two of whom wrote leading minority 
rights opinions (Roe and Evans) . Other nominees were opposed by 
these groups but squeaked through, such as William Rehnquist and 
Clarence Thomas. On the whole, even the most conservative presi­
dents have been forced to take account of IBSMs in their efforts to re­
shape the Court. Through their clout with Republican presidents and 
senators, countermovement groups have been able to block the ap-
661. Frank Murphy was a closeted gay Justice whose sexual preference was surely ap­
parent to some of his colleagues and who, not coincidentally, was the most civil liberty­
protective Justice of the twentieth century. See MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 510, at 1 8-
2 1 .  He was one of the few dissenters in Korematsu (unlike Douglas and Black) and a strong 
proponent in conference of striking down sex as well as race discrimination in the 1940s. 
662. The obvious contrast is between Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) 
(majority opinion's fetishistic obsession with "homosexual sodomy" as the focus of the un­
gendered state law and its ignorant equation of "homosexuality" and "sodomy"), and Romer 
v. Evans, 515 U.S. 620, 624-26 ( 1996) (referring respectfully to "gays and lesbians"), but is 
even more striking in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (Souter, J.) (respectful treat­
ment of transsexual plaintiff, going so far as to avoid gendered references, lest the Court be 
thought to have prejudged the claim), and Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bi­
sexual Group of Boston, Inc. , 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (Souter, J.). 
663. The first three were opposed by civil rights groups, the fourth by civil rights, 
women's, and gay groups. On the Parker nomination, see KENNETH W. GOINGS, "THE 
NAACP COMES OF AGE": THE DEFEAT OF JUDGE JOHN PARKER (1990), and Richard L. 
Watson, Jr., The Defeat of Judge Parker: A Study in Pressure Groups and Politics, 50 MISS. 
VALLEY H IST. REV. 213 (1963). On the Haynsworth nomination, see JOHN P. FRANK, 
CLEMENT HAYNSWORTH, THE SENATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 57-61, 92-95 (1991) .  On 
the Carswell nomination, see id. at 100-17 .  On the Bork nomination, see sources cited infra 
note 899. 
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pointment of open liberals and have diversified the Court by support­
ing the appointment of conservative Republican minorities.664 
A less obvious but also a successful strategy has been for a minor­
ity group or its countermovement to show broader political support 
for its stance in particular cases. An appendix to the present study (on 
file with the Michigan Law Review) collects the incidence of amicus 
briefs, the sides they supported, and their success rate for cases dis­
cussed in this Article. Reflecting the explosion of IBSM litigating insti­
tutions, there has been a steady increase in the number of amicus 
briefs filed in individual rights cases. Table 2 is an aggregation of this 
data. The main conclusion to be drawn from the table is that the party 
with the most amicus briefs has usually won the case. Since the advent 
of the New Deal Court (around 1938), if there is a predominance of 
amici in a Supreme Court civil rights case, the balance of amici pre­
dicts the results in almost two out of three cases, a higher success rate 
than that associated with the Solicitor General during the same time 
span. 
TABLE 2  
SUPREME COURT SUCCESS RATE IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES FOR 
PARTIES SUPPORTED BY MOST AMICUS BRIEFS 
Amicus Briefs a 
Time Wash (usually b/c Party with More Party with More 
Period none filed) Amici Wins Case Amici Loses Case 
To 1937 21 (73%) 5 (17%) 3 (10%) 
1938-1968 39 (45 %) 32 (37%) 16 (18%) 
1969-2001 16 (18%) 47 (50%) 31 (32%) 
Totals 76 (35%) 84 (40%) 50 (24%) 
Source: Appendix listing amicus briefs filed in all U.S. Supreme Court cases that are 
both discussed in the text of this Article and were decided after full briefing. (Hence, 
summary dispositions and denials of certiorari are not included.) The appendix was 
compiled by Jillian Cutler, Lisa Mahle, and Bill Eskridge and is on file with the 
Michigan Law Review. 
664. Compared to the U.S. Senate in particular, the Supreme Court is a virtual rainbow 
coalition: its nine Justices include two women, one person of color, three Roman Catholics, 
two Jews, and one bachelor. Five of the seven "diversity" Justices are Republican appoint­
ees. 
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Amicus briefs serve various functions that their sponsors or allies 
find useful in the case. Sometimes, amicus briefs contain important in­
formation (such as Brandeis's social data brief in Muller) or legal ar­
gumentation (typical of ACLU briefs) not presented to the Court by 
the parties' briefs. From the perspective of my project, the most im­
portant role of amicus briefs has been political and cultural signals to 
the Supreme Court that a civil rights complaint or defense has merit 
from the perspective of a variety of allied groups or institutions. The 
logic is that swing Justices will see themselves and the Court as ex­
posed to fewer risks of shame or political retaliation if a broad array of 
interests supports a particular result. Thus, the more diverse and sig­
nificant your array of amici, the more your case ought to profit; con­
versely, a collection of amici having similar points of view and modest 
constituencies does not affect the Justices' deliberations much. (My 
colleague Ruth Colker has suggested to me that, in recent years, the 
amicus effect has vanished in the general run of cases.) The jackpot 
strategy is to persuade the Solicitor General as well as a majority of 
amici to support your cause: when the United States filed an amicus 
brief in support of the same party that also enjoyed a predominance of 
filed amici, that party won the case in more than ninety percent of my 
sample.665 
3. Doctrinal Ideas. Social movements did not revolutionize consti­
tutional doctrine simply by political force, strategic cleverness, or dog­
ged litigation campaigns. They also altered the course of doctrine by 
coming up with ideas, arguments which linked precedent and the pur­
poses of constitutional provisions with the interests of new social 
groups and a country needing to adapt to them. By necessity, social 
movement lawyers were creative, seizing upon the legally familiar and 
transforming it into a doctrinal tool helpful to a minority group. Many 
of the great constitutional ideas of the last century were the products 
of this kind of transformation. Among the great ideas were an under­
standing of due process as entailing those guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights that are essential to the fair operation of an adversary system 
of criminal justice (Section A); constitutional protection for people's 
sexual privacy (Section B); an anti-subordination understanding of 
equal protection, requiring heightened scrutiny for suspicious classifi­
cations and denials of important state benefits or disabilities to minori­
ties (Section C); abolition or curtailment of the death penalty as ra­
cially discriminatory (Section D); expansive state responsibility for 
665. By my count, there were thirty-five such cases; the combination of the United 
States together with a majority of filed amici predicted the winner in thirty-two cases. Most 
of these were civil rights cases when the United States was often allied with the NAACP 
(from Guinn to Cooper), but a fair number were more recent cases where the United States 
has sided with state regulations opposed by civil rights and pro-choice groups (Jefferson v. 
Hackney, Webster, Freeman v. Pitts). 
2202 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:2062 
ongoing discriminatory attitudes and structures (Section E); and an 
imperial First Amendment, bringing ever-expanding conduct into its 
regulatory orbit (Section F). The introduction to this Article contains 
a more detailed roadmap of the doctrinal innovations in this part. 
The new ideas pressed by IBSM attorneys were never uncritically 
received, because the Justices had to account for opposing arguments 
made by the state and (later) by countermovements and felt them­
selves under institutional constraints. Some of the most far-reaching 
IBSM ideas (such as the unconstitutionality of the death penalty) have 
not ultimately been accepted by the Court but have exercised a gravi­
tational force on doctrine or have pressed it into new directions. Other 
ideas (such as the right to sexual privacy and the anti-subordination 
principle) have been accepted only in part by the Justices, who have 
diluted the idea with their own exceptions or limitations. Finally, and 
ironically, some ideas (such as suspect classifications and the imperial 
First Amendment) have not only become important constitutional 
baselines, but have been deployed by countermovements now that 
IBSMs have the political ability to obtain anti-discrimination laws as 
part of their politics of remediation. The methodology of this part will 
be to explore the dialogue between IBSMs, countermovements, and 
the Court. In this endeavor, I shall not only focus on the IBSM and 
countermovement arguments as reflected in their briefs and amicus 
briefs to the Court, but also the Justices' reactions to those arguments, 
as revealed in transcripts of oral argument and notes taken of the post­
argument conferences when the Justices tentatively decided the cases. 
A. Procedural Due Process: National Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Dialectical Federalism, and Vagueness as an Anti-Discretion Doctrine 
At the beginning of the century, the Due Process Clause had been 
interpreted to require notice and a right to be heard before the gov­
ernment deprived people of their liberty or property, to impose 
heightened notice requirements for criminal statutes, and to protect 
against arbitrary state interference with contract or property rela­
tions. 666 Methodologically, the Supreme Court followed a history­
based approach: unless state processes deviated from procedures con­
sidered fundamental by the framers of the Fifth or Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Justices were loathe to strike them down.667 The 
666. See Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897) (requiring notice and opportunity to be 
heard before deprivation of liberty or property); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) 
(liberty of contract); Commonwealth v. Chance, 54 N.E. 551, 554-55 (Mass. 1899) (fair 
warning requirement for criminal laws); Edward Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of 
Law Before the Civil War (pt. 4), 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 460 (1911). 
667. Compare Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 100-14 (1908) (majority opinion, ap­
plying historical approach to allow state to require self-incrimination), with id. at 1 17-27 
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twentieth century's civil rights cases contributed centrally to the trans­
formation of the Due Process Clause into an evolving guarantor of na­
tional procedural rights in criminal cases. 
This transformation is exemplified in three interconnected lines of 
cases, all initiated by civil rights attorneys, to whom the Court re­
sponded with a steady stream of decisions ultimately guaranteeing a 
constitutionalized national code of criminal procedure. The Court's 
motivation was both libertarian and democratic. The Justices were 
moved by the records of southern "trials" that were inconsistent with 
both the rule of law and elemental standards of fairness; even conser­
vative libertarians like Holmes and Taft were appalled by what they 
learned. The Hughes Court was also concerned that "southern justice" 
was uncomfortably like the "justice" meted out by totalitarian regimes 
in Germany and Russia; symbolic acts of differentiation of American 
democratic justice from Nazi or Communist totalitarian justice (two 
"axes of evil") became a strong refrain during the New Deal Court. 
For both symbolic and genuine reformist reasons, the Justices were 
willing, some eager, to create bright-line rules of criminal procedure 
that protected defendants of color in the South. The Bill of Rights 
rules applicable to federal criminal procedure, including those created 
by the Court's interpretations, were a natural source for guidance, and 
the Court used them to give more concreteness to state procedural 
obligations through a process that has been (oversimply) termed se­
lective incorporation.668 I prefer to view the process the way the 
NAACP did: the Court was actively creating a constitutional code of 
national criminal procedure.669 Because the Justices could not trust 
southern state judges to implement this code fairly and could not 
themselves review the hundreds of questionable convictions each year, 
the Supreme Court simultaneously empowered federal district courts 
to enforce those rules through habeas corpus. The structure of dialec­
tical federalism entailed in this process unsettled rules of res judicata in 
criminal cases even as it saved the lives of an increasing number of un-
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (applying similar historical approach but reasoning that state rule 
violated fundamental tenets of the founding era). 
668. "Selective incorporation" means that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (applicable to the states) " incorporates" some of the specific protections of the 
Bill of Rights (applicable to the federal government). It is distinguished from "full incorpo­
ration," whereby the Due Process Clause, it has been argued, incorporated all the specific 
protections of the Bill of Rights. See generally Louis Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1964); Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: 
Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253 (1982). 
669. The legal academic literature has devoted some but insufficient attention to the 
role of the NAACP in the Court's nationalization of criminal procedure. A notable excep­
tion is Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. 
REV. 48 (2000) [hereinafter Klarman, Modern Criminal Procedure], who situates Moore, 
Powell, Norris, and Brown in American political and legal context. 
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fairly convicted defendants, especially in the South. Later, the Court 
gave greater teeth to the void for vagueness doctrine as a basis for in­
validating broad laws which vested excessive discretion in police and 
prosecutors to persecute unpopular defendants - not just people of 
color, but also sexualized women, lesbigay, and transgendered people. 
1 .  Selective Incorporation of Procedural Protections in Criminal 
Cases 
In Hurtado v. California,670 the Supreme Court ruled that the Due 
Process Clause allows states to proceed by information rather than in­
dictment in criminal cases. Contrasting the Fifth Amendment's explicit 
enumeration of a defendant's right to grand jury indictment for crimes 
in federal court with the Fourteenth Amendment's simple require­
ment of due process in state criminal proceedings, the Court reasoned 
by negative implication that the Constitution does not require the 
states to follow the Fifth Amendment.671 In an extensive discussion, 
the Court invoked the historical fact that grand jury indictment was 
not considered a "fundamental" or essential feature of criminal prose­
cutions by the founding or reconstruction generations.672 Following the 
historical analysis of Hurtado, the Court ruled in Twining v. New 
Jersey673 that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self­
incrimination is only a "wise and beneficent rule of evidence" and not 
an "essential part of due process."674 
The NAACP's appeal to reverse the mob-dominated proceedings 
in Moore v. Dempsey did not challenge the fundamental fairness prin­
ciple of Hurtado and Twining, but did render their text- and history­
based reasoning irrelevant. Following the NAACP's lead, the Taft 
Court judged the Arkansas proceedings against the metric of current 
understandings of procedural fairness - understandings influenced by 
consensus outside the South that any kind of mob-dominated or 
670. 110 U.S. 516 (1884). Hurtado interpreted the Due Process Clause. For precedents 
rejecting the argument that the Privileges and Immunities Clause incorporated the Bill of 
Rights, see O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); and 
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
671. Hurtado, 1 10 U.S. at 534-38. 
672. Id. at 521-34. 
673. 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
674. Id. at 106. Going beyond the Hurtado inquiry, the Court also inquired whether the 
privilege against self-incrimination is "a fundamental principle of liberty," id. , but the Court 
conducted that inquiry by delving into its importance during the founding era, id. at 107-10, 
and examining the Court's own precedents, which had almost always permitted state proce­
dural variations. Id. at 110-1 1. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion read the history as sup­
porting the idea that freedom from self-incrimination was a fundamental right. Id. at 114-27. 
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fraudulently run criminal trial was completely unacceptable.675 
Alarmed by the lawless as well as racist regime revealed by the civil 
rights appeals in Powell v. Alabama, Brown v. Mississippi, and Norris 
v. Alabama (Section 1.A.l), the Hughes Court was quick to distance 
American constitutionalism from trials that smacked of Nazi or 
Communist justice.676 The judiciary was not willing to tolerate convic­
tions obviously tainted by coercion or trickery, outside pressure, or 
partiality by the decisionmaker, especially when it appeared that men 
were being sentenced to death for crimes they probably did not com­
mit. Stated positively, the accused must be given a fair opportunity to 
develop his defense, which must be judged impartially. Precedent 
would have to accommodate the new standard. Hence, Justice 
Sutherland's opinion in Powell recognized a right to counsel, notwith­
standing Hurtado's "inclusio unius" approach to the Constitution as a 
document. He ruled that the Due Process Clause embraced those 
" 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of 
all our civil and political institutions,' " even though they had been 
"specifically dealt with in another part of the federal Constitution."677 
Although Sutherland emphasized the particular circumstances of the 
case, including the death sentences meted out to the defendants, much 
of his reasoning was broader and therefore susceptible to expansive 
interpretation.678 In Brown, the coerced confession case, the state in-. 
voked Twining to argue that its proceedings were not governed by the 
Fifth Amendment's standards, an argument the Court brushed aside, 
for "the question of the right of the State to withdraw the privilege 
against self-incrimination is not here involved. * * * Compulsion by 
torture to extort a confession is a different matter."679 
675. The NAACP's anti-lynching campaign was a normative success by the 1 920s; lead­
ing Republicans, including former President (and soon to be Chief Justice) Taft supported 
anti-lynching legislation, which failed in Congress only because of the power of southern 
senators. See ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CAMPAIGN AGAINST LYNCHING, 
1909-1950 chs. 2-3 (1980). 
676. Francis J. Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal 
Justice, 8 DEPAUL L. REV. 213, 218-19 (1959); see also CORTNER, A "SCOTTSBORO" CASE 
IN MISSISSIPPI, supra note 28, at 121 (linking the Court's willingness to reverse the Brown 
convictions to judicial efforts to distinguish American from totalitarian systems of justice); 
Klarman, Modern Criminal Procedure, supra note 669 (arguing that Powell, Norris, and 
Brown reflected the anti-totalitarian norm as well as the Justices' revulsion at lawless proc­
ess yielding death sentences for apparently innocent men). 
677. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 
312, 316 (1926)). 
678. "The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not compre­
hend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small 
and sometimes no skill in the science of Jaw . . . .  He requires the guiding hand of counsel at 
every step in the proceedings against him." Id. at 68-69 (emphasis added). 
679. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936). 
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In Powell, Norris, and Brown, the Hughes Court was doing more 
than abandon the formal and historical reasoning in Hurtado and 
Twining in favor of a dynamic due process; it was also abandoning the 
federalism baseline of those cases, the assumption that national uni­
formity was not necessary or desirable as to rules of criminal proce­
dure. The southern cases motivated the Justices to create higher 
minimal procedural standards, applicable nationwide to protect de­
fendants of color who were revealed to be more vulnerable than any­
one had been willing to admit, and in a political climate where mob 
pressure, police beatings, and racist exclusions were completely unac­
ceptable. Although the NAACP and the ACLU did not create the in­
corporation thesis, their insistence on tougher constitutional standards 
absolutely necessary to protect defendants of color in southern state 
courts led several Justices to support such standards. The unwilling­
ness of southern courts to police their own criminal justice process 
pushed even cautious and conservative Justices toward the norm of 
national standards. The selective incorporation doctrine was ulti­
mately one mechanism by which the Court addressed this problem. 
The other mechanism was to create bright-line prophylactic rules to 
protect criminal defendants against risks associated with custodial po­
lice interrogations and segregated juries. 
a. Fifth Amendment's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination. The co­
erced confession cases were key to the Court's incorporation of the 
self-incrimination protection into the concept of due process, because 
the NAACP viewed due process fairness as barring "involuntary" con­
fessions; once the Court ratified that view in Brown, challengers and 
states alike imported the federal (Fifth Amendment) standard for vol­
untariness into the state cases. Unlike Brown, the officials in 
Chambers v. Florida680 vigorously denied torturing the thirty to forty 
"negro suspects," one of whom "broke" after almost a week of 
continuous and intense questioning. Justice Black's opinion for a 
unanimous Court reversed the men's convictions nonetheless. He 
started with the general proposition that the Due Process Clause is the 
critical protection of "helpless political, religious, or racial minorities" 
against " [t]yrannical governments."681 Invoking Brown, Justice Black 
ruled that the detention of the defendants and their twenty-four-hour 
interrogation without charges or counsel rendered their confessions 
constitutionally inadmissible. Chambers was the basis for the Court's 
reversal of a number of convictions.682 
680. 309 U.S. 227 (1940); see also Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (1940) (companion 
case). 
681. Chambers, 309 U.S. at 236. 
682. Compare Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742 (1948) (reversing conviction of southern 
black defendant, on the authority of Chambers), and Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) 
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The Justices' deliberations in Chambers focused on whether the 
"repeated questioning" over a long and uninterrupted period ren­
dered the confession "involuntary,"683 an inquiry pretty much the same 
as that under the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause, as the 
NAACP suggested.684 After Chambers, even the states relied on Fifth 
Amendment precedents in arguing the validity of convictions.685 
Thurgood Marshall's brief for the petitioner in Lyons v. Oklahoma686 
similarly relied on the Fifth Amendment cases to make his argument 
that the confession in Lyons was involuntary,687 and two Justices ac­
cepted his implicit argument that the Fifth Amendment standard was 
applicable to the states under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth.688 Morris Lavine went beyond Marshall's argument and 
revived the idea that due process incorporated the Bill of Rights guar­
antees in Adamson v. California,689 yet another case involving a black 
defendant. Justice Black and three colleagues agreed with Lavine, 
based upon the original intent of the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.690 A majority of the Court, however, rejected the history­
based argument and further concluded that the privilege against self­
incrimination was not fundamental to the nation's ordered liberty.691 
(same), and Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942) (same), and Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 
143 (1944) (same), and Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 540 (1941) (summary reversal) (same), 
and Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544 (1941) (summary reversal) (same), and White v. Texas, 
310 U.S. 530 (1940) (same), with Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 ( 1941) (affirming con­
viction of white defendant, distinguishing Chambers on its facts) .  
683. Douglas Conference Notes for Chambers (Feb. 12,  1940), in Douglas Papers, supra 
note 192, Container 39 (O.T. 1939, Argued Cases, 39-195). 
684. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897) (stating that the Fifth 
Amendment requires that confessions be "free and voluntary" and protects against confes­
sions "extracted by any sort of threats or violence," or by the "exertion of any improper in­
fluence"). See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Brief in Support Thereof at 25-29, 
Chambers (1939 Term, No. 195) (relying on Fifth as well as Fourteenth Amendment prece­
dents to make the NAACP's involuntary confession argument). 
685. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 41-53, Lisenba (1940 Term, Nos. 4 & 5) (Califor­
nia Attorney General Earl Warren arguing that confessions were not involuntary and relying 
entirely on Fifth Amendment cases); see also Ashcraft, 322 U.S. 143, 154 n.9 (treating Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendment standards for involuntary confessions as the same). 
686. 322 U.S. 596 (1944). 
687. Brief for Petitioner at 27-29, Lyons (1942 Term, No. 433). 
688. Lyons, 322 U.S. at 605-06 (Murphy, J., joined by Black, J., dissenting). 
689. 332 U.S. 46 (1947); see Brief for Appellant at 13-15, Adamson (1946 Term, No. 102) 
(making general incorporation argument); Reply Brief at 1-9, Adamson (1946 Term, No. 
102) (urging the Court to overrule Twining). 
690. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 68-92 (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 123-
25 (Murphy, J., joined by Rutledge, J., dissenting) (going beyond Justice Black to urge in­
corporation of Bill of Rights, "plus" some unenumerated rights as well). 
691. Id. at 50-56 (opinion of the Court); see also Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth 
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949) (providing a detailed 
historiographical refutation of Justice Black's argument for total incorporation). 
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Justice Frankfurter, the critical fifth vote, objected to the rigidity of 
the total incorporation approach and urged the Court to adapt the dy­
namic Due Process Clause to new circumstances as they became ap­
propriate. 692 
While rejecting Justice Black's originalist campaign for "total in­
corporation,'' Adamson, therefore, did not reject the NAACP's 
nonoriginalist idea that the Due Process Clause ought to absorb Fifth 
Amendment's voluntariness standard for confessions. Thus, the Court 
not only continued to review and reverse state convictions based upon 
assertedly coerced confessions, but most of the opinions relied on the 
federal standard invalidating any confession "which is the product of 
other than reasoned and voluntary choice."693 Justice Frankfurter, the 
swing vote in Adamson, delivered the judgment of the Court in Watts 
v. Indiana,694 another NAACP case. Ignoring the Adamson debate, 
Frankfurter ruled that " [a] confession by which life becomes forfeit 
must be an expression of free choice" and cannot be "the product of 
sustained pressure by the police."695 Frankfurter tied this requirement 
of due process to our adoption of an "accusatorial as opposed to the 
inquisitorial system" of criminal procedure - a system characterized 
by "requirements of specific charges, their proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the protection of the accused from confessions extorted 
through whatever police pressures, the right to a prompt hearing be­
fore a magistrate, the right to assistance of counsel, to be supplied by 
government when circumstances make it necessary, the duty to advise 
an accused of his constitutional rights."696 Watts suggested an overall 
principle (fairness to criminal defendants in an adversarial system) 
that could be - and soon became - the basis for nationwide rules of 
constitutionalized criminal procedure. 
As Watts illustrated, the Court's disinclination to incorporate the 
Bill of Rights totally had no bearing on its willingness to incorporate 
them selectively. As early as 1940 (Chambers), the NAACP had per­
suaded the Court to incorporate some self-incrimination norms into 
the Due Process Clause. Not only did the Fourteenth and Fifth 
Amendment standards converge (voluntariness), but the Court ap-
692. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 59-68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Malinski v. 
New York, 324 U.S. 401, 412-20 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part) (articulating 
highly dynamic understanding of due process as a basis for rejecting full incorporation). 
693. Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742, 745 (1948); accord Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 
503 (1962); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1962). 
694. 338 U.S. 49 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion); see id. at 55 (Black, J., con­
curring on the authority of Chambers); id. at 56-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 57 
(Jackson, J., concurring in the result). 
695. Id. at 53 (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion). 
696. Id. at 54. 
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plied the voluntariness standard with similar vigor to overturn state 
convictions based upon hours of sustained interrogation without pres­
ence of counsel.697 The coerced confession cases played a role in the 
Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio,698 arguably the first of what criminal 
procedure scholars call the selective incorporation cases. Justice 
Clark's opinion relied on the unified constitutional standard the Court 
had already developed for coerced confessions (Fifth Amendment) as 
a reason to create a similarly national standard for physical searches 
and seizures (Fourth Amendment), which were a kind of self­
incrimina ti on. 699 
Given Mapp's stated connection between the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments, it was apparent that Twining's days were numbered. 
And it died, albeit by a close (5-4) vote, in a case not explicitly pre­
senting racial issues, Malloy v. Hogan.700 Yet Justice Brennan's opin­
ion for the Court started with what he considered the nationalization 
process initiated by Moore and Brown.701 "The shift [to the federal 
standard] reflects recognition that the American system of criminal 
prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege is its mainstay,"702 reasoned Brennan, echoing 
Watts. That principle, fortified by the Court's newer precedents, justi­
fied overruling both Adamson and Twining. Unmentioned in the 
opinion but weighing on the minds of several Justices was the fact that 
coerced confessions were, as Justice Black had said in Chambers, a 
means of oppressing "helpless political, religious, or racial minori­
ties. "703 
697. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) (mentally ill black defendant 
charged with robbery); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (mentally disabled nineteen 
year-old black defendant accused of killing white man); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 
(1957) (similar); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949) (black defendant accused of 
killing white man); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949) (white defendant). 
698. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
699. Id. at 656-57. The Court in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1948), had ruled that the 
Due Process Clause absorbed the Fourth Amendment's privacy protections but not the ex­
clusionary rule as an enforcement mechanism. Mapp overruled the latter holding of Wolf. 
Mapp is arguably the first "selective incorporation" decision, but even Wolf, like Chambers, 
incorporated some features of the federal constitutional standard into the Due Process 
Clause. This is a process the Court aggressively pursued in the 1950s. See Israel, supra note 
668, at 285. See generally William J. Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 761 (1961) (defending partial incorporation and increasing nationalization of the rules 
of criminal procedure). 
700. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
701. Id. at 6-7; cf. id. at 15-21 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (disputing the Court's inferences 
from the Brown line of cases). 
702. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 7 (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1962)). 
703. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236 (1940). The large majority of cases raising 
Chambers issues to the Court involved black defendants convicted in southern courts. See 
supra notes 682 and 697. 
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b. Sixth Amendment's Right to Counsel. The same process occurred 
in the right to counsel cases, albeit with less involvement of the 
NAACP and more by the ACLU. The Court initially read Powell v. 
Alabama to require appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in 
capital cases.704 But some of Powell's reasoning was not limited to such 
cases. "The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if 
it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel."705 From that 
language, defendants argued for required counsel in felony cases even 
when they did not generate a death penalty. Distinguishing Powell as a 
case involving youthful and ignorant defendants in a situation of great 
hostility, the Supreme Court in Betts v. Brady706 rejected the claim for 
required counsel in all felony cases and ruled that the Due Process 
Clause does not incorporate the Sixth Amendment.707 But the Court 
also expanded Powell to require counsel when a denial would be in­
consistent with "fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense 
of justice."708 As in Adamson, Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy 
dissented on the ground that the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights.709 
For the next twenty years, the Supreme Court took appeals from 
the diminishing number of states which did not provide counsel to in­
digent defendants in noncapital felony cases. The inquiry was whether 
a particular defendant's right to a fair trial was prejudiced (in retro­
spect) by not having counsel; thus, the Court considered the sophisti­
cation of the defendant, the claims he raised (perhaps with the assis­
tance of the court), and the claims an attorney would have raised for 
him.710 Under that approach, the Court overturned a good many con­
victions.71 1  This ongoing review process gave rise to restiveness within 
the Court. As early as 1948, Justice Reed suggested that "the Due 
Process Clause . . .  requires counsel for all persons charged with seri­
ous crimes."712 In 1960, Justices Douglas and Brennan explicitly sig-
704. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 674 
(1948); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 445 (1940). 
705. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932); see supra note 678 (quoting more of 
this broad reasoning). 
706. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
707. Justice Roberts' opinion emphasized the nation's historical diversity in regard to 
providing counsel, id. at 465-67, and the continuing diversity of state practice, id. at 467-72. 
708. Id. at 462. 
709. Id. at 474-77 (Black, J., dissenting). Appended to their opinion was a survey docu­
menting the movement of state policy to recognize this right. Id. at 477-80. 
710. See Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134, 135 (1951). 
711 .  Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633, 636 n.6 (1959) (collecting cases). The cases typically 
yielded passionate dissenting opinions when a conviction was not reversed. E.g. , Bute v. Illi­
nois, 333 U.S. 640, 677 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
712. Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948). 
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naled their desire to revisit Betts, a desire shared by Justice Black and 
probably by Chief Justice Warren.713 
One consideration motivating the Justices was the fact that the de­
nial of counsel in noncapital felony cases bore particularly on African­
American defendants.714 This was given some emphasis in the briefs 
for petitioner and the ACLU in Gideon v. Wainwright.715 Most of the 
Betts appeals came from southern states, and by 1962 there were only 
five states - all in the deep South - which did not make provision for 
appointment of counsel for indigents in felony cases.716 Even more 
blunt was the amicus brief for twenty-two state governments, arguing 
for overruling Betts and explicitly noting the many cases involving de­
fendants of color.717 At oral argument, these facts were deployed to 
undermine Justice Harlan's concern that overruling Betts would inter­
fere with the operation of state judiciaries. Abe Fortas (representing 
Gideon) pointed out that only a few states in the deep South would be 
affected, and the ACLU's Lee Rankin suggested that southern judges 
could not be trusted with enforcing anything but a bright-line rule.718 
As for Florida, where Gideon was convicted, Rankin pointed out that 
65% of those incarcerated (about 5,200 persons) had not been repre­
sented by counsel - men who were for the most part poor, illiterate, 
and (presumably) not white.719 There was no one on the Supreme 
Court willing to reaffirm Betts under these circumstances. Echoing 
these concerns, Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Gideon rested 
almost entirely on Powell; his case for overruling Betts was, essentially, 
that it was inconsistent with Powell.720 
713. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 519 (1962) (Black, J. concurring); McNeal v. 
Culver, 365 U.S. 109, 117  (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
714. For cases where the Court emphasized the race of the defendant denied counsel, 
see, for example, McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 
(1957); and Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945) (involving Native-American defendant). 
715. 372 U.S. 335, 338 (1963); see also ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964); 
Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 SUP. CT. REV. 211 .  
716. See Brief for Petitioner at 30-31, Gideon (1962 Term, No. 155) (only Alabama, 
Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina did not provide counsel in felony 
cases); Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, et al. at 48-49, Gideon (1962 
Term, No. 155) (of 139 reported Betts appeals, forty-four came from Pennsylvania and eighty 
came from six southern states; of the eighty southern cases, nine won some kind of relief). 
717. Brief for Amici Curiae State Governments at 6, Gideon (1962 Term, No. 155). 
718. See Oral Argument, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), in 57 LANDMARK 
BRIEFS, supra note 199, at 616-23, 628 (Fortas); id. at 633-35 (Rankin). Justice Douglas 
snidely summarized the federalism argument as "a constitutional right to provide a system 
whereby people get unfair trials." Id. at 616. 
719. See id. at 642, 647. 
720. Justice Black started with the idea that Powell found the right to counsel "funda­
mental," Gideon, 372 U.S. at 341-43, noted that subsequent decisions had repeated Powell's 
finding and that Betts was admittedly "an abrupt break" with the reasoning in those cases, id. 
at 343-44, and closed with Powell's explanation as to why a man charged with a serious crime 
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Incorporation of Fifth and Sixth Amendment guarantees within 
the Fourteenth Amendment was not the last important ramification of 
Powell and Brown. A constant concern that tied together the coerced 
confession and required counsel cases was the intrinsically coercive 
environment of a police interrogation of an unsophisticated defendant 
without counsel. Justice Roberts, who authored Betts, had opined in 
the Justices' conference for Chambers that "these men were not enti­
tled to be questioned; they had no lawyer; they were ignorant and did 
not know they had constitutional rights - That is denial of due proc­
ess. "721 Likewise, the Court ruled in Moore v. Michigan722 that a black 
defendant who pleaded guilty to charges of murder should have been 
provided counsel, because he was unaware of his constitutional rights 
and susceptible to manipulation by the sheriff during his confinement. 
The ACLU and criminal defense lawyers were hardly satisfied 
with applying Fifth and Sixth Amendment standards to the states; the 
standards themselves needed to be tougher to protect accused persons 
of color - Hispanic as well as African Americans by the 1960s -
against the overwhelming pressure of custodial police interrogations. 
The Supreme Court ruled in Escobedo v. Illinois723 that the police were 
required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to allow accused 
persons to speak with their attorneys if requested. In Miranda v. 
Arizona,724 Anthony Amsterdam's brief for the ACLU deployed po­
lice manuals to paint a verbal picture of the "inherently compelling" 
nature of police custodial interrogations.725 As Miranda's attorneys 
pointed out, these coercive interrogations operated against the same 
kind of defendants as in the coerced confession cases like Chambers 
and Watts - the "helpless, weak" people of color, "outnumbered" by 
white police officers.726 Responding to these arguments, the Supreme 
Court agreed to create a new prophylactic rule: neither federal nor 
state law enforcement officers could interrogate a suspect without 
needs a lawyer. Id. at 344-45; see also id. at 347-49 (Clark, J., concurring in the result) (also 
relying solely on Powell; the Court cannot ground the right to counsel on a distinction be­
tween capital cases like Powell and other felonies like Betts and Gideon). 
721. Douglas Conference Notes for Chambers (Feb. 12, 1940) (No. 195), in Douglas Pa­
pers, supra note 192, Container 39. Most of the post-Chambers reversals based on coerced 
confessions involved precisely that scenario. See supra notes 682 and 697. 
722. 355 U.S. 155 (1957). For similar cases, see Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); 
and Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948). 
723. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
724. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
725. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union at 13-21, Miranda (1965 
Term, No. 759). Chief Justice Warren borrowed heavily from this material for his opinion in 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-58. 
726. Brief for Petitioner at 35-38, Miranda (1965 Term, No. 759) (quoting Chambers, 
309 U.S. at 241). 
August 2002] Identity-Based Social Movements 2213 
warning him that anything he says might be used against him and in­
forming him of his (Escobedo) right to an attorney, including one pro­
vided by the state if he cannot afford one (Gideon) .  Miranda was more 
controversial than Malloy or Gideon, as it represented a much sharper 
departure from current police practices. Congress in 1967 sought to 
override its holding, and the Supreme Court after Earl Warren retired 
created a number of restrictions (or loopholes, depending on one's 
perspective) in the Miranda rule.727 Nonetheless, the Rehnquist Court 
has recently reaffirmed Miranda as a workable constitutional rule and 
invalidated the congressional override.728 
c. Sixth Amendment's Right to Jury Trial by Cross-Section of the 
Community. IBSM cases figured very differently in the Due Process 
Clause's incorporation of the Sixth Amendment's right to jury trials in 
criminal cases. Race discrimination cases strongly contributed to the 
public value that juries serve a representative function and should 
therefore reflect a rough cross-section of the community. I have little 
evidence to argue that the decision to apply the Sixth Amendment's 
jury trial right to the states was motivated by the race cases, but they 
did influence the Court's thinking about what features of the federal 
system of criminal juries was necessary to incorporate. The race and 
sex discrimination cases, moreover, pressed the Court to consider the 
representativeness principle essential to the functioning of proper ju­
ries in criminal cases and to conceive of arbitrary exclusion of jurors as 
violations of jurors' as well as defendants' rights. 
Recall Norris, where the Court overturned a conviction because no 
person of color had served on a jury "within the memory of witnesses 
who had lived there all their lives."729 The Court enforced Norris in 
cases where a complete exclusion of blacks generated a strong infer­
ence of purposeful discrimination,730 but also in several less dramatic 
cases, where some but few people of color had served on juries. A 
leading case was Smith v. Texas.731 Although blacks constituted twenty 
percent of the population and ten percent of the poll-tax payers of 
727. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994) (seeking to return judicial review of confessions to the 
old "voluntariness" standard and to render the Miranda requirement unenforceable). 
728. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
729. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 591 (1935). 
730. For cases where the Court applied Norris to overturn convictions of black defen­
dants based on evidence that people of color had not served on juries within memory, see 
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (Mexican Americans excluded); Hill v. Texas, 316 
U.S. 400 (1942); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 
(1938); and Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394 (1935). See also Arnold v. North Carolina, 
376 U.S. 773 (1964) (one in twenty-four years); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958) 
(one in eighteen years); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947) (none selected over thirty­
year period). 
731 .  311 U.S. 128 (1940). 
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Harris County, Texas, only five of the 384 persons serving on grand 
juries between 1931 and 1938 were people of color. The issue on ap­
peal was whether those bad numbers made out an equal protection 
claim. Justice Black's opinion for a unanimous Court held that they 
did: the disproportion between eligible people of color and those actu­
ally called to serve on juries could not have come by chance, and the 
jury commissioners' explanation (they chose people they knew) was 
insufficient. What is important for my purposes is the way Black 
framed the issue at the outset: 
It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of 
public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the commu­
nity. For racial discrimination to result in the exclusion from jury service 
of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our Constitution and the 
laws enacted under it, but is at war with our basic concepts of a demo­
cratic society and a representative government.732 
The principle of representativeness not only animated the body of law 
created by the Supreme Court to police state jury selection, but also 
influenced the Court's conceptualization of the appropriate rules for 
jury selection in federal courts. 
A year after Smith v. Texas announced the principle of representa­
tiveness for state juries, the Court ruled in Glasser v. United States,133 
that the federal statutory bar to race discrimination in federal court 
jury selection bespoke a design to ensure that federal juries are "a 
cross-section of the community." The Court applied the Glasser prin­
ciple beyond the race context in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co. 734 The 
majority opinion held that it was a violation of the statutory cross­
section policy to exclude from federal jury venires people who worked 
for a daily wage. Dissenting on that issue, Justice Frankfurter justified 
Smith and Glasser: citizens of color should not be excluded from jury 
venires "partly as assurance of a diffused impartiality" in the func­
tioning of a jury, and "partly because sharing in the administration of 
justice is a phase of civic responsibility."735 Thus, there are two impor­
tant interests underlying the representativeness principle: the interest 
of the defendant in receiving a fair trial, and the interest of the ex­
cluded jurors in performing their duty of citizenship. 
In Ballard, the Court extended this reasoning to overturn an in­
dictment by a federal grand jury that unlawfully excluded women.736 
732. Id. at 130 (emphasis added). 
733. 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1941). 
734. 328 U.S. 217 (1946). 
735. Id. at 227 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see id. at 224 (opinion for the Court) (simi­
lar). 
736. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 192-94 (1946), discussed in Section l.B.2. 
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But in Fay v. New York, the Court ruled that Smith's principle of rep­
resentativeness did not extend to exclusions of women from juries and 
that the Glasser/Ballard cross-sectionality principle did not extend to 
state courts as a constitutional matter.737 Four dissenting Justices ar­
gued that the Equal Protection Clause "prohibits a state from con­
victing any person by use of a jury which is not impartially drawn from 
a cross-section of the community."738 Justice Jackson's opinion for the 
Court responded that the due process standards for reviewing state 
jury exclusions (Fay) are much more lenient than the federal statutory 
and supervisory standards for reviewing federal jury exclusions 
(Ballard), for the Sixth Amendment and its caselaw had not been in­
corporated into the Due Process Clause at that time.739 
Even in race cases, the Court did not require proportional repre­
sentation of minorities on juries. In Swain v. Alabama,740 a divided 
Court upheld a conviction against evidence that black people made up 
twenty-five percent of the jury-eligible population, but only ten to fif­
teen percent of the names drawn for possible jury service, and zero 
percent of the people actually serving (because the prosecution struck 
minority jurors peremptorily). The NAACP and ACLU continued to 
press for a more generous interpretation of Smith's representativeness 
principle. In that campaign, they received a windfall from the Justice 
who authored Swain, Byron White. 
Justice White wrote for the Court in Duncan v Louisiana,741 hold­
ing that the Sixth Amendment's jury trial right in criminal cases is ap­
plicable to the states through the Due Process Clause. The race dis­
crimination cases may have played some (but not a major) role in the 
Court's decision,742 but the decision played an important role in the 
737. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 284-90 (1947). 
738. Citing Smith and Glasser, the dissenters explained: "That means that juries must be 
chosen without systematic and intentional exclusion of any otherwise qualified group of in­
dividuals. Only in that way can the democratic traditions of the jury system be preserved." 
Id. at 296-97 (Murphy, J., joined by Black, Douglas & Rutledge, JJ., dissenting) (citation 
omitted). 
739. Id. at 287-89. Nor had the Court extended heightened equal protection scrutiny to 
sex discriminations the way it had to race discriminations. This doctrinal lay of the land ex­
plains why it was difficult for the Court to overturn Gwendolyn Hoyt's conviction in 1961. 
See supra Section l.B.2. 
740. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
741 . 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
742. Duncan involved a misdemeanor prosecution of a black man who allegedly as­
saulted a white man, in the sort of scuffle that rarely yields an arrest, much less a prosecution 
plus jail time. Defendant was convicted before a white judge. The Court ruled that the Due 
Process Clause (incorporating the Sixth Amendment's jury trial right) entitled him to a jury 
trial; an impartial, integrated jury would not likely have convicted. Justice White's opinion 
did not place great emphasis on the early race cases and did not mention Smith's representa­
tiveness principle at all. Presumably, the most important factor in the Court's willingness to 
incorporate was the momentum from the Court's earlier decisions, like Malloy and Gideon. 
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Court's thinking about juries in criminal cases. Once the federal and 
state standards were ruled to be similar, it was open to the Justices to 
merge the Smith and Glasser principles, which had been kept formally 
separate since Fay. The Court did precisely that. Thus, in evaluating a 
due process challenge to a six-person state jury, the Court ruled that 
the number of persons on a criminal jury must "be large enough to 
promote group deliberation . . .  and to provide a fair possibility for ob­
taining a representative cross-section of the community."743 This doc­
trinal development opened the door for more aggressive judicial po­
licing of the composition of state juries - and to a reconsideration of 
Fay and Hoyt as well as Swain. 
The ACLU's Women's Rights Project argued to the Court in 
Taylor v. Louisiana744 that Hoyt was inconsistent with the norm that 
juries should be cross-sections of the community, a norm that Duncan 
made applicable to the states. A near-unanimous Court agreed, invali­
dating Louisiana's requirement that women opt-in to be eligible for 
jury service. Following Duncan, the decision rested on the Due 
Process and not the Equal Protection Clause. "The unmistakable im­
port of this Court's opinions, at least since 1940, Smith v. Texas . . . is 
that the selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of 
the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial."745 Hence, a system that requires women to opt 
into jury service that is routinely required of men is unconstitutional 
for the reasons developed in Ballard.746 
The norm that civil rights and women's politics of recognition sug­
gested was that juries should be microcosms of a diverse society. 
Adoption of such a representativeness principle as a matter of due 
process law provided a doctrinal basis for civil rights groups to press 
for greater judicial monitoring of race-based peremptory challenges by 
state prosecutors. In People v. Wheeler,747 the California Supreme 
Court declined to follow Swain for this reason; the court ruled that 
trial judges must require prosecutors to provide a neutral reason for a 
pattern of race-based deployments of their peremptory challenges. 
Based upon Wheeler and Taylor, various civil rights groups petitioned 
743. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 ( 1970); accord Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 
404, 410- 1 1  ( 1 972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970) (racial exclusion, fol­
lowing Smith) .  
744. 41 9 U.S. 522 (1975). 
745. Id. at 528; see id. at 530-31 (invoking the dual interests articulated by the Thiel dis­
sent) . 
746. Id. at 531-33; see id. at 533-37 (overruling Hoyt). 
747. 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978). 
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the U.S. Supreme Court for a reconsideration of Swain.748 In Batson v. 
Kentucky,749 the Court overruled Swain and essentially adopted the 
California approach as the federal constitutional rule - sort of a 
reverse-incorporation move. Justice Powell's opinion for the Court 
invoked both the Equal Protection Clause as applied in Norris and 
Smith, and the Sixth Amendment representativeness idea as recog­
nized in Duncan's progeny. When the Court extended Batson to cases 
where the prosecutor struck jurors of a race different from that of de­
fendant, it relied more strongly on the representativeness principle 
and the Thiel idea that the juror's as well as the defendant's rights are 
implicated. 750 
The independent force of the representativeness principle and the 
rights of prospective jurors also justified the extension of Batson to 
police other kinds of peremptory challenges. In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex 
rel. T.B. ,75' the Supreme Court extended Batson's rule to sex-based 
peremptory challenges. Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court 
rested on Sixth Amendment and due process values as much as those 
of the Equal Protection Clause: 
Discrimination in jury selection, whether based on race or on gender, 
causes harm to the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors 
who are wrongfully excluded from participation in the judicial process. 
The litigants are harmed by the risk that the prejudice that motivated the 
discriminatory selection of the jury will infect the entire proceedings. The 
community is harmed by the State's participation in the perpetuation of 
invidious group stereotypes and the inevitable loss of confidence in our 
judicial system that state-sanctioned discrimination in the courtroom en­
genders.752 
Note how diversity informs the choreography of the courtroom, which 
the Court considered critical to the legitimacy of the process. This idea 
would have been inconceivable before the civil rights and women's 
rights movements reshaped American public norms. 
748. See Brief of Amici Curiae the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., et 
al. at 37-46, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (No. 84-6263);  Brief for Amicus Curiae 
the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law at 7-1 1 ,  Batson (No. 84-6263); Brief for 
Amici Curiae Michael McCray, et al. at 16, Batson (No. 84-6263) (the use of peremptory 
challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race "offends basic notions of equality and dis­
torts the representative function of the jury"). 
749. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). If  the judge detects a pattern of discriminatory peremptory 
challenges by the prosecutor, the judge is obliged to require an explanation and to invalidate 
the challenges if the prosecutor cannot provide a neutral (non-race-related) reason. 
750. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991); cf. id. at 418 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(viewing the discrimination as affecting only the criminal defendant and therefore finding it 
constitutionally harmless). 
751. 5 11 U.S. 1 27 (1994). 
752. Id. at 140 (citation omitted). 
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The dissenters in J.E.B. complained that this extension of Batson 
was an exercise in political correctness that would spell the end of per­
emptory challenges, because other IBSMs would surely seek to insert 
their trait.753 And so they have. Thirteen years after Wheeler held that 
the state constitution's requirement that a jury be drawn from a "rep­
resentative cross-section of the community" is violated when a "cogni­
zable group" is excluded from the jury, the California Court of 
Appeals extended that decision's rule to people excluded for being 
gay or lesbian, in People v. Garcia.754 Whereas Justice Blackmun deni­
grated evidence that men and women view matters differently in 
J.E.B. , the California judges concluded that the purpose of cross­
sectionality is to foster diverse perspectives within the jury room, to 
assure that "the facts will be viewed from a variety of angles."755 The 
court also emphasized that any official exclusion of lesbians and gay 
men undermines the community as well. "If we deny that civic respon­
sibility to any group . . .  we deprive them of part of their membership 
in the community, and while that has an impact on the excluded 
group, it must inevitably damage the community as well."756 This last 
point is a linchpin of gay people's politics of recognition: the state 
should not deny gay people the duties of citizenship (like jury service 
and military obligations and marital commitment) any more than it 
should deny them its benefits and privileges.757 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has never endorsed California's 
any-cognizable-group approach, the line of thinking opened up by 
Norris and Smith - and now deepened by J.E.B. and Garcia - is now 
critical to the way the state thinks about who is on the jury. On the 
one hand, the race, sex, and sexual orientation cases illustrate the way 
in which jury service has become interconnected with the idea of full 
and equal citizenship in our polity. Citizenship entails duties as well as 
benefits; just as required military service, required jury service has 
been a symbolic battleground for group equality claims. On the other 
hand, these cases illustrate an important feature of fairness in criminal 
trials: in a country where the state and society have long treated race, 
753. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 161-62 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
754. 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (applying the test formulated in Rubio v. 
Superior Court, 593 P.2d 595 (Cal. 1979)). The legislature codified the court's rule in 2000 
Cal. Stat. ch. 43 (June 27, 2000). 
755. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 344. 
756. Id. at 346. 
757. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Relationship Between Obligations and Rights of 
Citizens, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 721 (2001);  Paul R. Lynd, Comment, Juror Sexual Orienta­
tion: The Fair Cross-Section Requirement, Privacy, Challenges for Cause and Per-emptories, 
46 UCLA L. REV. 231 (1998). The Lynd comment also addresses concerns about inappro­
priate "outing" of possible gay or lesbian jurors and the practical problems with identifying 
antigay patterns of peremptory challenges. 
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sex, and sexual orientation as fundamental traits, a jury will not be 
considered a neutral collection of decisionmakers if stacked to favor 
only one race, sex, or sexual orientation. 
2. Habeas Corpus and Dialectical Federalism: Federal Courts as 
Monitors of State Criminal Proceedings 
The precise guarantees of the Due Process Clause in criminal cases 
cannot be understood without an account of the procedures by which 
they are enforced. The traditional mechanism for enforcement of con­
stitutional rights is by the state trial judge, with review by the state ap­
peals courts and, potentially, the U.S. Supreme Court. For people of 
color in the twentieth century, this was impractical. The due process 
defects, such as lack of adequate counsel and coerced confessions, 
typically precluded effective appeal. Even when direct appeal could 
present the proper arguments, many state judges were either preju­
diced or cowed by public opinion, especially in rape cases, and review 
by the Supreme Court was rarely attainable. A partial solution to this 
dilemma has become the system of "dialectical federalism": federal 
district courts monitor state trials for constitutional errors through the 
writ of habeas corpus.758 
Dialectical federalism is a product of the twentieth century, spe­
cifically in response to challenges to convictions of black men pressed 
by civil rights attorneys. Federal courts before 1867 did not have statu­
tory authority to free state prisoners on writs of habeas corpus.759 The 
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 granted federal courts that authority but 
did not specify the conditions under which it should be exercised.760 
Apparently there were few such petitions before 1900. The first major 
habeas case of the new century was Frank v. Mangum,761 involving the 
conviction of Leo Frank for the murder of a child. An anti-Semitic 
mob atmosphere surrounded the trial, and he was convicted of a crime 
there is every reason to believe he did not commit. After unsuccess-
758. The term is taken from Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical 
Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977). The idea that "jurisdic­
tional redundancy" can improve the overall functioning of a two-tier adjudicatory system is 
defended in Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and 
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981). 
759. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 98 (1807) (dictum), criticized in ERIC 
M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 29-41 
(2001) .  
760. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.  28, § 1 ,  14 Stat. 385. 
761. 237 U.S. 309 (1915). For background, especially linking the case to anti-Semitism in 
the South, see LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, THE LEO FRANK CASE (1968); HARRY GOLDEN, A 
LITTLE GIRL Is DEAD (1965); and ROBERT SEITZ FREY & NANCY THOMPSON-FREY, THE 
SILENT AND THE DAMNED: THE MURDER OF MARY PHAGAN AND THE LYNCHING OF LEO 
FRANK (1988). 
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fully appealing the conviction,762 Louis Marshall, Frank's pro bono at­
torney, filed a federal habeas corpus petition asserting that the mob 
domination violated both due process and equal protection guaran­
tees. The district judge denied the petition because he did not believe 
the habeas law gave him "supervisory power over the action of the 
State courts," and also because he believed himself bound by the re­
jection of Frank's federal claims by the Supreme Court on direct ap­
peal.763 
The Court took the habeas appeal for review and affirmed, with 
Justices Holmes and Hughes in dissent. Justice Pitney's confusing 
opinion for the Court agreed with Marshall that the federal habeas 
court had authority to adjudicate the due process claim764 and that the 
prior determinations were not res judicata.765 But Frank's claim was 
defeated by the state courts' findings of fact, which could be disre­
garded only if they were clearly erroneous.766 The opinion also sug­
gested, and may have held, that habeas was not available unless the 
prisoner could show that the state had failed to provide adequate 
"corrective process" (such as an appeal) for errors made at trial.767 The 
habeas petition was dismissed. Although the governor commuted 
Frank's death sentence because of problems with the trial, a mob of 
citizens removed Frank from state custody and lynched him.768 · 
The Frank case was the first time the Court had focused on a case 
where local prejudices and mob pressure arguably rendered a fair trial 
impossible; at least two of the Justices (Hughes and Holmes) were 
personally upset by the matter, and at least two future Justices 
(Brandeis and Frankfurter) were furious at the Court's excessive def­
erence to the state proceedings. But the deference holding of Frank 
suggested that the habeas right might not have much teeth. Eight 
years later, the NAACP brought its habeas appeal in Moore v. 
Dempsey to the Court. Relying on Frank, the state argued that federal 
habeas courts had to defer to state court findings of fact. In both his 
brief and his oral argument, U.S. Bratton, counsel for the appellants, 
ignored Frank and sought to "get a mental picture in the minds of the 
Court as to the exact conditions in Arkansas," which "were such that it 
762. In re Frank, 235 U.S. 694 (1914). 
763. Frank Transcript at 15, quoted in FREEDMAN, supra note 759, at 58. 
764. Frank, 237 U.S. at 331.  
765. Id. at 334. 
766. Id. at 336. 
767. Id. at 335. 
768. The anti-Semitic violence illustrated by the Frank case helped forge a lasting alli­
ance between Jews and African Americans through the century. See CLIVE WEBB, FIGHT 
AGAINST FEAR: SOUTHERN JEWS AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS (2001). Marshall, for example, 
became a leading attorney for the NAACP after his work on the Frank case. 
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was preposterous to have imagined a fair trial was had. "769 Most of the 
Justices got the message. Without questioning Frank directly, Justice 
Holmes's opinion in Moore insisted that the federal habeas judge had 
a "duty of examining the facts for himself when if true as alleged they 
make the trial absolutely void."770 
It is a debated question whether Frank and Moore are logically in­
consistent,771 but Moore clearly invited much greater federal habeas 
scrutiny than Frank. Moore allowed the habeas court to characterize 
constitutional claims as involving "mixed" issues of law and fact, 
whereas Frank saw them as just unreviewable issues of fact. Professor 
Frankfurter and Justice Brandeis certainly saw the cases as practically 
inconsistent; the latter opined that the new approach came about be­
cause "the Court had changed."772 There were five new Justices (in­
cluding libertarians Brandeis and Taft), and public norms were more 
sensitive to the abuses of racist mobs. According to contemporaries, 
the different stance in the cases owed much to the nation's alarm at 
greatly higher levels of racial violence and lynchings following World 
War I, and to the NAACP's public campaign for federal anti-lynching 
legislation.773 This, combined with the negative reaction to the Frank 
decision and its shocking aftermath, surely influenced the Justices' 
willingness to allow habeas scrutiny of egregious due process viola­
tions in state criminal proceedings. 
The NAACP took advantage of this greater procedural liberality 
which it had won in Moore and without which many of the selective 
incorporation cases would not have reached the Supreme Court.774 
769. Letter from U.S. Bratton to Walter F. White (Jan. 1 1 ,  1923), quoted in FREEDMAN, 
supra note 759, at 83. 
770. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 92 (1923); see id. at 91 (if the "whole proceeding" 
were a "mask" and state courts failed to "correct the wrong" then federal courts were avail­
able to secure constitutional rights). 
77 1 .  The conventional wisdom is that the cases are inconsistent, e.g. , Paul M. Bator, Fi­
nality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 
441, 485-89 (1963) (Moore was a mistaken departure from Frank); Gary Peller, In Defense of 
Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 646-48 (1982) (Moore 
was a good departure), a wisdom challenged by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 457-58 (1963) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting); FREEDMAN, supra note 759, at 86-94. 
772. Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 SUP. CT. REY. 
299, 316 (quoting from a conversation of July 3, 1923). 
773. Note, Mob Domination of a Trial as a Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 37 
HARV. L. REV. 247, 250 (1923). On the race riots and increased lynching activities after the 
war, see MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL 
VIOLENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN SOUTH 8 (1987); and 
STEWART E. TOLNAY & E.M. BECK, A FESTIVAL OF VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF 
SOUTHERN LYNCHINGS, 1882-1930 at 31 (1995). 
774. There was a practical reason for this phenomenon. Sometimes, the NAACP did not 
become involved until after the defendant's appeals 0f death sentences were exhausted or 
well under way. In such cases, the availability of a federal hearing into alleged improprieties 
was literally a life or death matter for potentially innocent defendants. 
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Three race discrimination cases involving black defendants convicted 
of serious offenses in North Carolina by all-white juries formed the 
core of the Supreme Court's next leading habeas appeals, reported as 
Brown v. Allen.775 Judge John Parker - the man the NAACP vetoed 
for the Supreme Court in 1930 - spoke for many southern judges in 
objecting to the increase in habeas petitions, especially in the South, 
after Moore, an increase that became a boom after World War II.776 
His view was that habeas petitions should be rejected if either the 
Supreme Court had denied review on direct appeal or the state courts 
had thoroughly considered the federal claim and resolved it as a mat­
ter of fact against the defendant.777 The appeals in Brown presented 
both issues. As to the first issue, Justice Frankfurter wrote for a bare 
majority of the Court that denial of certiorari should have no preclu­
sive effect.778 
As to the second issue, the Court was substantially of one philo­
sophical view but divided as to its articulation. Justice Reed's plurality 
opinion rejected the Parker view that prior state adjudications were 
ordinarily res judicata but was willing to defer to state court findings 
of fact, but not law, and then only if "the state process has given fair 
consideration to the issues and the offered evidence, and has resulted 
in a satisfactory conclusion."779 Within the Court, Justice Frankfurter 
vigorously defended the writ of habeas corpus against dilution by def­
erence. "The uniqueness of habeas corpus in the procedural armory of 
our law cannot be too often emphasized . . . .  [T]he unavailability of 
the writ in totalitarian societies [is] naturally enough regarded as one 
of the decisively differentiating facts between our democracy and to­
talitarian governments."780 His published opinion required federal ha­
beas judges to accept state determinations of historical fact, " [u]nless a 
775. 344 U.S. 443 (1952). For an exhaustive analysis of the Justices' deliberations over 
two Terms of the Court, see FREEDMAN, supra note 759, at 106-30. 
776. See John J. Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1949); 
John W. Winkle, I I I ,  Judges as Lobbyists: Habeas Corpus Reform in the 1940s, 68 
JUDICATURE 263 (1985). 
777. E.g., Speller v. Allen, 192 F.2d 477 (4th Cir. 195 1 )  (per curiam) (panel including 
Parker, C.J.), affd sub nom. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 
778. Brown, 344 U.S. at 488-97 (Frankfurter, J.) (stating that he spoke for a majority of 
the Court on the weight-of-certiorari-denied issue). The vote on this issue was 6-3 at confer­
ence, with Reed and Minton believing denial of certiorari should have some weight but 
should not be preclusive. Douglas Conference Notes for Daniels v. Allen (Oct. 27, 1952) 
(No. 20), in Douglas Papers, supra note 192, Container 223. 
779. Brown, 344 U.S. at 458, 463 (opinion of Reed, J.). 
780. Memorandum from Justice Frankfurter to The Brethren re Nos. 20, 22, 31 ,  and 32 
(Dec. 31,  1952) at 1 ,  in Burton Papers, supra note 249, Container 230, Folder 13. Frankfurter 
here was much more aggressively liberal than his legal process philosophy was in other kinds 
of cases, explicable surely by his revulsion at the Frank case and his personal involvement as 
an adviser to the NAACP. 
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vital flaw be found in the process of ascertaining such facts," but fully 
to adjudicate "mixed questions or the application of constitutional 
principles to the facts as found,'' for as to those issues " [t]he State 
court cannot have the last say when it, though on fair consideration 
and what procedurally may be deemed fairness, may have miscon­
ceived a federal constitutional right."781 Justices Black and Douglas 
read Moore as standing for the "principle that it is never too late for 
courts in habeas corpus proceedings to look straight through proce­
dural screens in order to prevent forfeiture of life or liberty in flagrant 
defiance of the Constitution."782 
Alone on the Court, Justice Jackson urged adoption of a restrictive 
reading of Frank, whereby habeas was only available for prisoners 
with no effective state remedy.783 Jackson's draft opinion of December 
29, 1952 situated the debate about habeas within the larger revolution 
the race cases were facilitating in the rules of criminal procedure 
binding on the states:784 
I can not exonerate the state courts from some responsibility for the ex­
tension of federal interference. One is sometimes shocked at the callous­
ness with which the rights of defendants are treated, particularly where 
the defendant happened to be of particularly unpopular groups in the lo­
cality. We cannot claim either that federal justice is free of that. But it 
has been lawless procedures and savage penalties which were discredit­
able to the profession that originally moved the federal government into 
the state field [Moore] . . . .  [T]here were . . .  cases of obtaining confes­
sion by the most brutal third degree methods of criminal and physical 
abuse of the person and by acts of terrorism which, given jurisdiction, no 
decent court could condone [Brown v. Mississippi; Chambers] . There 
were instances of virtual denial of counsel to the accused [Powell] a'nd 
there were flagrant violations in some parts of the country of the federal 
statute which prohibits discrimination of a racial character in the selec­
tion of juries [Norris]. 
781. Brown, 344 U.S. at 506-08 (Frankfurter, J.); see id. at 487-88 (opinion of Burton & 
Clark, JJ.) (substantially agreeing with Frankfurter). 
782. Id. at 553-54 (Black, J., dissenting). On the merits, Frankfurter, Black, and Douglas 
felt the habeas petitions should have been granted. Id. at 554-60 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting 
on the merits of the habeas petitions). The remainder of the Justices agreed with Reed that 
they were properly denied. 
783. Id. at 532, 545 (Jackson, J., concurring in the result). Jackson's position was devel­
oped after the conference of October 27, 1952, for Jackson is represented in Douglas's notes 
as agreeing with Frankfurter on the certiorari issue and not as dissenting on the state court 
preclusion issue. 
784. Jackson's Draft Opinion in Brown (Nos. 20, 22, 31 & 32) (Dec.29, 1952) at 4-5, in 
Robert H. Jackson Papers, Library of Congress, Container 120 (Opinion Notes: Habeas 
Corpus) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Jackson Papers]; see FREEDMAN, supra note 759 
(excellent analysis of Jackson's stance within conference). I have added both emphasis and 
bracketed reference to race and gender cases that illustrated Jackson's points and that he 
likely would have had in mind when he wrote the draft. 
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These decisions, however . . .  have left the boundaries of federal power 
to interfere and of the grounds upon which interference may be based so 
vague and indefinite that no prisoner is wholly without hope of release if 
he can only get his case here . . . .  
Jackson deleted this candid discussion in his published opinion, but 
the draft illustrates three important points. First, the rules of defer­
ence in habeas cases had become increasingly liberalized and there­
fore increasingly inconsistent with the policies underlying res judi­
cata. Second, the Justices were aware that their liberalization of 
habeas was largely driven by their reactions to the savage injustices 
against people of color. Third, a traditionalist position existed within 
the Court which, for institutional and rule of law reasons, urged the 
return to what was supposed to have been the habeas rules of the 
nineteenth century. 
Justice Jackson's position had a receptive audience in Congress,785 
but the Court moved in precisely the opposite direction under Chief 
Justice Earl Warren. In Warren's opinion in Townsend v. Sain,786 the 
Court created liberal bright-line rules to guide habeas judges' deci­
sions whether to hold Brown v. Allen evidentiary hearings.787 Justice 
Brennan's opinion in Fay v. Noia788 interpreted Moore as not only 
overruling Frank, but as also suggesting that habeas defendants not be 
required to exhaust all state remedies.789 Justice Harlan (who had suc­
ceeded to the Jackson seat) dissented from that reading of Moore and 
articulated an understanding of habeas that was more in tune with tra­
ditional notions: so long as the state provided an adequate process for 
constitutional objections to be heard by an impartial decisionmaker, 
its judgments in criminal cases ought ordinarily to be conclusive.79° Fay 
was not a race case, and after 1963 race-based prosecutions in the 
South failed to play the determinative role they did before 1963, but 
the leading civil rights groups (the NAACP and the ACLU) remained 
785. See Bruce R. Ewing, Habeas Corpus Legislation in the United States Congress, 
1955-66 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also Louis H. Pollak, Proposals to 
Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for Prisoners: Collateral Attack on the Great Writ, 66 YALE 
L.J. 50 ( 1956). 
786. 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (yet another coerced confession case). 
787. Where facts were in dispute that would constitute a constitutional violation, district 
judges were instructed to hold evidentiary hearings if there were no determinative state 
court findings of fact or if such findings were not supported by the record as a whole (which 
must be scrutinized by the district judge) or there was newly discovered evidence or there 
were some other reasons to believe the defendant did not receive a full and fair state hear­
ing. Id. at 312-18. 
788. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
789. See id. at 41 1 n.22, 421 (Moore overrules Frank); id. at 424-25 n.36 (Moore left open 
the possibility that procedural defaults not be held against the habeas petitioner). 
790. Id. at 449-63 (Harlan. J., dissenting) (substantially following Bator, supra note 771); 
see also Townsend, 372 U.S. at 325-34 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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the most active political as well as legal proponents of liberal proce­
dures in habeas cases, surely because constitutional violations unre­
medied in state courts continued to bear disproportionately upon peo­
ple of color, especially black and latino men. 
Correlatively, the pragmatists who were taking charge of the new 
politics of preservation made law and order - which many in their 
audience understood as "control of crimes by people of color" - their 
most popular calling card. The nation's turn to the right in the 1968 
election repopulated the Court with Justices friendly to the Jackson­
Harlan position. Since his appointment in 1971, Justice Rehnquist has 
carried out a campaign to replace Fay and Brown with a regime such 
as the one he outlined to Justice Jackson, for whom he clerked during 
the Brown v. Allen Term: follow ordinary principles of res judicata 
and deny habeas petitions so long as the prisoner had a full and fair 
chance to litigate his claims in the state courts.791 Although this cam­
paign has been successful in overruling Townsend and Fay,792 it has not 
directly challenged Brown and Moore. Nor did Congress override the 
rules created by these early race cases when in 1996 it created new re­
strictive statutory standards for habeas cases.793 The preservationists 
have created many procedural roadblocks to habeas relief, but the 
core holdings of Brown and Moore remain not only good law, but 
have saved the lives of hundreds of men denied their constitutional 
rights by the modern variation of the Phillips County proceedings, to 
wit: on the basis of their own incriminating statements made without 
lawyers present, indigent persons of color are still railroaded to capital 
convictions as their public defenders slumber, and their only possible 
rescue from the electric chair is at the hands of a federal habeas judge. 
Thus, even in the heyday of the law-and-order politics of preservation, 
791 . Habeas Corpus, Then and Now, Or, 'If I Can Just Find the Right Judge, Over 
These Prison Walls I Shall Fly,' Memorandum from Law Clerk Rehnquist to Justice Jackson 
in McGee (1951 Term, No. 517), in Jackson Papers, supra note 784, Container 120 (Legal 
File 1952 Term, Brown v. Allen, Nos. 32, 22, 20, 31 ). It is discussed by Saul Brenner, The 
Memos of Supreme Court Law Clerk William Rehnquist: Conservative Tracts or Mirror of 
His Justice's Mind?, 76 JUDICATURE 77 (1992). Rehnquist advanced a similar policy vision 
when he headed the Office of Legal Counsel and has followed this stance on the Court. 
Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2353-55 (1993) 
(Rehnquist's DOJ proposal), id. at 2367-72 (Chief Justice Rehnquist's appointment of the 
Powell Committee to draft habeas reform legislation), id. at 2376-2416 (decisions of the 
Rehnquist Court creating new procedural limitations on the availability of habeas relief). 
792. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), confirmed in Coleman v. Thompson, 
501 U.S. 722, 749-51 (1991) (overruling Fay's "deliberate bypass" standard for procedural 
default by habeas petitioners and adopting a tougher standard); Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 
504 U.S. 1 (1992) (overruling Townsend and adopting more restrictive standards for district 
court hearings in habeas cases). 
793. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (added in 1996); see Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Sym­
bolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen­
alty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1 ,  37-47 (1997). 
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1973-95, federal courts granted habeas relief in forty percent of the 
capital cases that came before them.794 
3. The Vagueness Doctrine as a Mechanism for Restricting Law 
Enforcement Discretion 
Anglo-American law at the turn of the nineteenth century consid­
ered problematic penal laws whose bars were expressed in language 
that was excessively vague. This idea required judges either to inter­
pret such statutes narrowly (the rule of lenity) or to strike them down 
(the void-for-vagueness doctrine). The animating purpose of these 
doctrines was notice: it is inconsistent with the transparent rule of law 
for the state to punish people without giving them clear guidance as to 
what conduct is transgressive.795 By the end of the century, these doc­
trines flourished more than ever before, but under a different ration­
ale. Most scholars and judges either rejected or deemphasized the no­
tice rationale and stressed structural ones: vague criminal laws cannot 
be tolerated because they encourage police, prosecutors, and judges to 
engage in illegitimate and risky lawmaking, as they expand those laws 
to fit their own moral codes and because some of these laws discour­
age people from exercising their freedoms to speak, walk about, and 
be nonconforming. IBSMs played a critical role in this transformation, 
because racial, sexual, and gender minorities were often the victims of 
unbridled police discretion, and once they became legally organized 
they challenged these abuses. 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine had its origins in substantive due 
process review of criminal sanctions for violating economic regula­
tions, and most of the earliest cases involved such statutes; notice to 
potential wrongdoers was the announced policy. With the decline of 
substantive due process during the New Deal period, litigants and the 
Court applied the vagueness doctrine to a broader array of public or­
der and morals statutes and ordinances, many of which not only car­
ried criminal penalties but also touched on people's speech and asso­
ciation.796 Anthony Amsterdam's brilliant student note, published in 
794. JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL 
CASES, 1973-1995 at App. D (2000). For every 100 death sentences imposed in this period, 
47 were overturned on appeal or collateral attack in state courts, even before habeas review. 
Id. , pt. I I ,  at 5-6. This suggests the hypothesis that dialectical federalism has some backward 
bite: knowing that they a.re being monitored, state judicial processes catch most errors - but 
not so many that further review is not useful. 
795. E.g. , Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); 
McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (rule of lenity); Connally v. Gen. Constr. 
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
796. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (law barring subversives 
from serving in public universities); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (li­
censing ordinance barring movies considered "sacrilegious"); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 
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1960, maintained that the notice policy could not justify or explain the 
Court's range of decisions and must be supplemented with a second 
rationale: the Court was properly inclined to strike down broadly 
phrased laws that gave police and other enforcers too much discretion 
to pick on unpopular people and points of view.797 While Amsterdam 
did not emphasize how some of the important precedents involved ra­
cial minorities, a case that best illustrated his thesis was Herndon v. 
Lowry.798 The defendant was a black man convicted of violating Geor­
gia's "incitement to insurrection" statute, by circulating to minority 
audiences literature indicating that the Communist Party opposed 
apartheid and other policies unfair to them and by soliciting blacks to 
join that party. Ignoring the notice rationale, Justice Roberts' opinion 
for the Court struck down the law as vague, as it amounted to a "drag­
net which may enmesh anyone who agitates for a change of govern­
ment."199 
The Amsterdam note had the good fortune to be published just be­
fore thousands of civil rights protesters were arrested in connection 
with the sit-ins and marches of 1960-63. His argument that arbitrary 
enforcement as well as notice undergirded the void-for-vagueness doc­
trine had an immediate appeal to civil rights lawyers and, ultimately, 
judges. Solicitor General Cox and the Inc. Fund argued that broadly 
phrased trespass and disturbing the peace laws could not constitution­
ally be applied to peaceful sit-in protesters, for both notice and arbi­
trary enforcement reasons.800 As to notice, the argument was that the 
(1939) (permits to march or parade could be denied to prevent "disorderly assemblage"); 
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (overturning the conviction of a Communist 
sympathizer for flying a red flag - first time void-for-vagueness was applied to protect indi­
vidual rather than economic rights). 
797. See Anthony Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme 
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 80, 88-90 (1960). "The common fault of . . .  [vague statutes] is 
that each injects into the governmental wheel so much free play that in the practical course 
of its operation it is likely to function erratically . . .  and to result in a significant number of 
impermissible public-versus-private-interest resolutions which are beyond the effective dis­
covery or appraisal of the Court." Id. at 90. 
798. 301 U.S. 242 (1937). An earlier race case was United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 
(1875) (overturning conviction of white election official who refused to count the vote of a 
black man). Compare Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (reversing conviction of 
white sheriff for fatal beating of black man and remanding for new trial; vagueness problem 
solved by reading a scienter requirement into the federal criminal statute), with Beauharnais 
v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding against void-for-vagueness attack conviction of 
white man for publishing racist literature). 
799. Lowry, 301 U.S. at 263. Four Justices believed that Lowry's conduct was legally 
found to be intentional incitement to forcible overthrow of apartheid. Id. at 264-78 (Van 
Devanter, J., dissenting) (describing the anti-apartheid pamphlets and allegedly subversive 
goals in greater detail). For an earlier case where a unanimous Court struck a law aimed at 
harassing Chinese merchants, see Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 (1926) (Taft, CJ.). 
800. Brief for Petitioners at 28-36, Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (1961 Term, 
Nos. 26-28); Brief for Amicus Curiae the United States at 34-36, Garner (1961 Term, Nos. 
2228 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:2062 
protesters were engaged in valuable normative activities that reason­
able people might expect not to be criminal; because "their object was 
to prick the conscience of the community and of the Nation," the 
vagueness doctrine was fully mobilized.801 "Equally dangerous is the 
absence of a clear guide for the policeman who must initially adminis­
ter the law," whose open-endedness could be "a license for abuse of 
power or for discriminatory enforcement, especially in an area, as 
here, where the pressures of local prejudice invite misuse of author­
ity."802 Although the Supreme Court only decided one sit-in case on 
vagueness grounds,803 these kinds of arguments figured into the 
Court's overturning all the convictions. In the protest march cases, the 
Court invoked the vagueness doctrine to overturn the application of 
disturbing the peace and loitering laws by white police against civil 
rights protesters. 804 
Amsterdam's concern that vague statues risked arbitrary enforce­
ment had even more relevance to the cases brought by the NAACP 
against state laws seeking to suppress its activities. In Button, the 
NAACP maintained that Virginia's law barring its legal activities was 
so broadly worded as to invite arbitrary (i.e., racially biased) enforce­
ment and to discourage even lawful activities. Agreeing, the Supreme 
Court issued one of its leading pronouncements on the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine. "The objectionable quality of vagueness 
and overbreadth does not depend upon absence of fair notice to a 
criminally accused or upon unchanneled delegation of legislative pow­
ers, but upon the danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment 
freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and 
improper application."805 The Court bluntly said, "a vague and broad 
statute lends itself to selective enforcement against unpopular 
26-28); Brief for Amicus Curiae the United States at 25 ff., Griffin (1963 Term, Nos. 6, 9, 10, 
12 & 60) [hereinafter U.S. Griffin Brief]. 
801. U.S. Griffin Brief, supra note 800, at 30 (citing Button and Lowry). The argument 
here was probably inspired by the old notion that the rule of lenity is most readily applicable 
to conduct that is ma/um prohibitum (wrong only because the law prohibits it) rather than 
ma/um in se (intrinsically wrong). 
802. Id. at 31. 
803. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964) (overturning trespass con­
viction because it was enforced by authorities much more broadly than its plain language 
would have suggested). 
804. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90-92 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 
536, 551-52 (1965); see id. at 579 (Black, J.) (arguing that the void-for-vagueness doctrine 
protects against "government by the moment-to-moment opinions of a policeman on his 
beat"). For a later case to the same effect, see Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 
(1969). 
805. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963). 
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causes. "s06 From these cases, Amsterdam amended his student note to 
identify a third policy served by the void-for-vagueness doctrine: 
broadly phrased statutes that touch on people's fundamental liberties, 
especially those covered by the First Amendment, require particularly 
skeptical judicial attention, for their uncertainty will chill citizens' ex­
ercise of their rights.so7 
The civil rights protest decisions and the post-Gideon availability 
of counsel in felony (and later misdemeanor) cases contributed to a 
small boom of challenges by sex and gender nonconformists to va­
grancy and public morality laws.sos The same policies were applicable: 
such laws often failed to provide fair warning, gave the police discre­
tion to harass sexual nonconformists, and in some cases chilled peo­
ple's exercise of their First Amendment or privacy rights. In Harris v. 
State,809 the Alaska Supreme Court invalidated a crime against nature 
law on vagueness grounds. The court linked vagueness's notice policy 
with yet another concern, statutory obsolescence. Almost all of the 
Supreme Court's vagueness cases had involved either new laws going 
after fresh social or political ills or old laws whose core prohibitions 
were easily supportable. Harris involved an old statute whose meaning 
was no longer very clear because social morals had changed. And it 
was a statute whose core prohibition (nonprocreative sex) was no 
longer malum in se. " [T]he widening gap between our formal statutory 
law and the actual attitudes and behavior of vast segments of our soci­
ety can only sow the seeds of increasing disrespect for our legal institu­
tions."810 Other state courts were deploying an invigorated 
void-for-vagueness doctrine as a basis for invalidating laws restricting 
public indecency, abortion, and other morals laws. The Supreme 
Court seemed potentially receptive to this kind of thinking, as it had 
806. Id. at 435; see id. at 445 (Douglas, J., concurring) (linking his skepticism about the 
law to the apparent legislative purpose to "penalize the NAACP because it promotes deseg­
regation of the races"). This theme - the South's war against the NAACP and, with it, defi­
ance of Brown - was one raised by several other Justices at conference. See Brennan Notes 
for the Gray Conference, in Brennan Papers, supra note 129, Box I: 76, Folder l ;  see also 
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (deploying the void-for-vagueness doctrine to 
strike a southern law aimed at chilling the NAACP's advocacy). 
807. Anthony L. Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the Punishment of 
Crimes of Stallls, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police Officers 
and the Like, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 205 (1967). 
808. E.g., In re Davis, 51 Cal. Rptr. 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 966) (invalidating public inde­
cency law); State v. Sharpe, 205 N.E.2d 1 1 3  (Ohio 1966) (invalidating statute barring solicita­
tion to commit "unnatural acts"). See generally Robin Yeamans, Recent Developments, 
Constillltional Attacks on Vagrancy Laws, 20 STAN. L. REV. 782 (1 968). 
809. 457 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1969). 
810. Id. at 645. For other state court decisions to the same effect, see Franklin v. State, 
257 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1971) (per curiam), and Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478 
(Mass. 1974) (narrowing construction exempting sodomy between consenting adults from 
the crime against nature law). 
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consistently invalidated, on vagueness grounds, old-fashioned state li­
censing standards for censoring movies that depicted "sacrilegious" or 
"immoral" activities or "sexual promiscuity. "81 1 
The U.S. Supreme Court implicitly endorsed an anti-obsolescence 
feature of the void-for-vagueness doctrine in Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville,812 a decision that applied stricter vagueness scrutiny for 
laws restricting fundamental liberties outside the First Amendment. 
Jacksonville made it a crime to be "vagabonds" or "lewd, wanton and 
lascivious persons" or "habitual loafers" (and so forth). The lead de­
fendants were two white women and two black men who were doing 
nothing more sinister than riding around together in an automobile. 
On appeal of their conviction to the Supreme Court, they argued that 
the state and local "vagrancy laws are archaic vestiges of long-past 
economic conditions and social philosophies"813 which posed risks of 
unfairness, arbitrary enforcement, and chilling of people's fundamen­
tal right to walk around and loaf together.814 The Justices were unani­
mous in their judgment that the law was void for vagueness. In confer­
ence, they were less concerned about notice than about the discretion 
these laws gave "police or judges . . .  to go after anyone they do not 
like. "815 A secondary theme of the conference was the obsolescence of 
these laws. The Chief Justice scoffed, "This ordinance wins a prize -
but most of them are on their way out."816 Justice Douglas's opinion 
for a unanimous Court ruled that the "archaic" law was unconstitu­
tionally vague, because it "makes criminal actions which by modern 
standards are normally innocent," and which are indeed fundamental 
freedoms traditionally enjoyed by Americans; was "not intelligible to 
the poor among us, the minorities, the average householder"; and 
seemed to be enforced mainly against "nonconformists" and "suspi­
cious persons."817 Papachristou did not disturb the conventional wis-
81 1 .  See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 ( 1948) (leading case); see also Interstate 
Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 682-83 (1968) (summarizing cases). 
812. 405 U.S. 1 56 (1972). 
813. Brief for Petitioners at 14, Papachristou (No. 70-5030); 
814. See id. at 13 (listing policies the vagueness doctrine embodies and suggesting how 
they applied in this case). The substantive obsolescence of the laws was a major theme of the 
Oral Argument in Papachristou.  See Rebuttal of Petitioner at 43-44, Papachristou (No. 70-
5030) (Supreme Court Library). 
815. Douglas Conference Notes for Papachristou (Dec. 10, 1971) in Douglas Papers, 
supra note 192, Container 1 558 (Douglas's own remarks, which explicitly relied on the Am­
sterdam note). Similar observations were made by Burger, Brennan, and Stewart. 
8 16. Id. 
8 17. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162-63, 169, 1 70. For all these reasons, the Court followed 
Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1969), in ruling that this kind of statute was inconsistent 
with the evenhanded rule of law. "The rule of law, evenly applied to minorities as well as 
majorities, to the poor as well as the rich, is the great mucilage that holds society together." 
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dam that the twin policy bases for the void-for-vagueness doctrine 
were fair notice and arbitrary enforcement, but expanded the lesson of 
the protest cases of the 1960s: the Court will be particularly vigilant 
when broad ill-defined statutes touched upon any fundamental rights 
(not just First Amendment ones), especially when the statutory values 
were obsolete. 
Papachristou's concerns with substantive obsolescence and un­
guided and arbitrary enforcement of rules restricting women's funda­
mental rights were precisely the concerns Justices Brennan and 
Douglas had in Roe v. Wade,818 which involved a 100 year old statute 
barring all abortions, excluding only those rendered "by medical ad­
vice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother." Although the 
challengers had only perfunctorily made a vagueness attack on the 
statute (and the amici made no presentations along this line), Douglas 
and Brennan pressed this as one basis for overturning the Texas law, 
with Stewart and Marshall agreeing.819 In May 1972, Justice Blackmun 
circulated an opinion avoiding the right to privacy issues and deciding 
Roe solely on vagueness grounds: the curt exception for abortions pro­
cured by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the 
mother left many questions unanswered (e.g., who can render "medi­
cal advice"? how sure does he have to be that the mother will die?) 
and therefore did not give fair notice to medical professionals as to 
when they were justified in performing abortions.820 This superficial 
treatment of both the abortion issue and the void-for-vagueness doc­
trine did not fly with the Brethren,821 and the abortion cases were car­
ried over to the next term. Although Justice Blackmun abandoned his 
void-for-vagueness draft for a much more far-reaching right to privacy 
opinion, in retrospect a vagueness decision might have been prefer-
Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 171. For the opinion author's views about vagrancy laws, see 
William 0. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1 (1960). 
818. See Memorandum from Justice Brennan to Justice Douglas regarding Papachristou 
(Dec. 30, 1971), in Douglas Papers, supra note 192, Container 1558. 
819. See Douglas Conference Notes for Roe v. Wade (Dec. 16, 1971), in Douglas Papers, 
supra note 192, Container 1590 (Nos. 70-18, 70-40: Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton) . 
820. Memorandum of Justice Blackmun regarding Roe v. Wade (May 18, 1 972), in 
Brennan Papers, supra note 129, Box I :  285, Folder 7 (Opinions, No. 70-18: Roe v. Wade) . 
821. For several reasons: ( 1 )  the Court had just upheld the D.C. abortion law against 
vagueness attack, United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971), and Justice White circulated a 
dissenting opinion demonstrating that Justice Blackmun's draft was not consistent with the 
earlier decision; (2) Justice Brennan opined that four of the seven participating Justices had 
also agreed at conference to strike the Texas law on the broader right to privacy ground, see 
Memorandum from Justice Brennan to Justice Blackmun (May 18, 1972), in Brennan Pa­
pers, supra note 129, Box I: 285, Folder 9 (Opinions, No. 70-40: Doe v. Bolton); (3) the Court 
could not avoid the right to privacy question by the vagueness decision in Roe, unless it dis­
missed the appeal in Doe, where the Court was faced with a much more particularized and 
modem abortion law, as to which vagueness was not a plausible doctrinal response. 
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able in Roe, as it would have swept away the obsolescent (nineteenth 
century) statutes like that in Texas and might have stimulated more 
precise legislation that could have been more thoughtfully tested 
against a privacy rationale. 
Just as the void-for-vagueness doctrine ultimately provided no 
traction for the Supreme Court in the abortion cases, neither did it in a 
variety of cases brought by sexual and gender minorities. Recall Fleuti 
and Boutilier, where the Warren Court considered whether gay or bi­
sexual men fell under the immigration law exclusion of people "af­
flicted with psychopathic personality" (Section I.C.l). The Ninth 
Circuit opinion in Fleuti found the law void for vagueness, citing the 
indeterminacy of the statutory term even among doctors and suggest­
ing that whatever medical consensus there had been in 1952 for the 
idea that "homosexuals" were "psychopathic,'' that consensus had ut­
terly disappeared by the mid-1960s.822 The logic of the civil rights cases 
was directly applicable to the psychopathic personality cases, except 
that the Supreme Court had the option of giving federal statutes a nar­
rowing construction rather than voiding them entirely, as Justice 
Douglas strongly urged in both Fleuti and Boutilier.823 The other big 
difference was that the immigration cases involved sexual rather than 
racial minorities, and the Justices' own prejudices or stereotypes about 
gay or bisexual men influenced their legal analysis.824 The Warren 
Court not only construed the vague immigration laws in the most 
broadly antigay manner in Boutilier, but refused to hear other void­
for-vagueness challenges brought by lesbigay defendants.825 
822. See Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652, 658 & n.19 (9th Cir. 1962), aff d on other 
grounds and vacated, 374 U.S. 449 (1963). 
823. See Douglas Conference Notes for Fleuti (Mar. 29, 1963), in Douglas Papers, supra 
note 1 92, Container 1281 (O.T. 1962, Argued Memos, No. 248); Douglas Conference Notes 
for Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 1 18 (1967), in Douglas Papers, supra note 192, Container 1391 
(O.T. 1966, Argued Memos, No. 440). These cases also involved immigration law, where the 
Court strongly defers to Congress - but also where the Court often imports constitutional 
values into its construction of statutes. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a 
Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statlllory interpretation, 100 
YALE L.J. 545 (1 990). 
824. Recall from Section J.C.1 , that Justice Goldberg (the fifth vote to overturn the 
Ninth Circuit in Fleuti) found the alien "more than a homosexual - he had such a dominant 
sex drive that he performed [sexual acts] publicly - he was a psychopath in the conventional 
sense." See supra notes 528-529 and accompanying text. In Boutilier, Justice Stewart was 
persuaded that "Congress intended to bar homos." Douglas Conference Notes for Boutilier 
(Mar. 17, 1967), in Douglas Papers, supra note 192, Container 1391 (Q.T. 1966, Argued 
Memos, No. 440). Strongly homophobic Justice Clark lobbied hard for a reversal in Fleuti, 
374 U.S. at 463-68, and wrote the opinion for the Court in Boutilier, 387 U.S. 118. 
825. E.g., Talley v. California, 390 U.S. 1031 (1968) (denying certiorari to gay couples' 
vagueness challenge to a "lewd conduct" arrest for kissing one another in the Black Cat 
Beer Bar). 
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The Burger Court was no more receptive, even after Papachristou. 
In two cases brought to the Supreme Court in 1973 and 1975, gay 
rights attorneys argued that statutes making the crime against nature a 
serious felony had the same vices as the vagabond laws struck down in 
Papachristou: they were old, normatively outdated laws deploying 
language that no one understood anymore and therefore vesting the 
police with broad discretion to invade people's fundamental liberty (in 
this case, privacy). These plausible arguments did not even generate 
full briefing and oral argument in the gay-avoiding Burger Court; over 
dissenting opinions by Justice Brennan, Court majorities denied the 
vagueness challenges summarily, on the ground that previous state 
court constructions of the old statutes had made them determinate 
enough to satisfy the Due Process Clause.826 This reasoning contrasts 
strikingly with that in the race cases, where the Court discounted prior 
judicial constructions as a way to meet vagueness challenges.827 
Was Papachristou an aberration, limited to race cases? Although 
the U.S. Supreme Court has not applied Papachristou broadly outside 
the race arena, state courts have done so. For example, dozens of mu­
nicipalities between 1845 and 1945 had adopted ordinances making it 
a crime to dress in the "attire of the opposite sex"; police had tradi­
tionally used such laws to harass cross-dressers and (later) transsexuals 
- who fought back in the 1970s with Papachristou lawsuits. Although 
the U.S. Supreme Court would not touch these cases, state court 
judges found the laws vague mainly because of their obsolescence: 
current dress codes made it unclear exactly what constituted "attire of 
the opposite sex," and this normative muddiness meant that "inno­
cent" dress decisions could fall within the statute's domain.828 Other 
sex crime laws met the same fate, usually at the hands of state and not 
federal judges. The leading case was Pryor v. Municipal Court,829 
which involved a challenge by the National Committee for Sexual 
Civil Liberties against California's "lewd vagrancy" law. The challeng-
826. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973) (per curiam) (summarily revers­
ing lower court opinion holding Florida's crime against nature law vague); Rose v. Locke, 
423 U.S. 48 (1975) (similar for Tennessee's law); see also Mayes v. Texas, 416 U.S. 909 (1974) 
(denying certiorari to a vagueness challenge to Houston's nineteenth century cross-dressing 
law). Contrast Perkins v. North Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333, 336, 340 (D.N.C. 1964) (offering, 
in dicta, heavy criticism of obsolescent sodomy law). 
827. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) (refusing to find that previous 
state court construction saved a statute drafted more narrowly than it was applied); cf Gregg 
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 200-02 (1976) Qoint opinion) (holding that state judiciary's nar­
rowing construction of death penalty "aggravating circumstances" solved vagueness prob­
lem). 
828. See, e.g. , City of Columbus v. Rogers, 324 N.E.2d 563, 565 (Ohio 1975) (leading 
case); see also Eskridge, Establishing Conditions, supra note 555, at 861-63 (collecting unre­
ported as well as reported state court decisions striking down old cross-dressing ordinances). 
829. 599 P.2d 636 (Cal. 1979). 
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ers demonstrated that the broadly phrased law invited discretionary 
enforcement, in this case against gay and bisexual men. Following 
Papachristou, Justice Matthew Tobriner found the law vague but re­
paired the vagueness by narrowing the statute to open sexual solicita­
tion in a public place by anyone.830 
Cases like Pryor might have signaled that the U.S. Supreme Court 
could rely on lower courts, including state courts, to implement 
Papachristou. Also, as Chief Justice Burger had observed in the 
Papachristou conference, states and cities were updating or weeding 
these old statutes out of their criminal codes. Although the Court reaf­
firmed the three policy concerns of the void-for-vagueness doctrine,831 
the Justices took very few cases after 1972. Some of the new genera­
tion of laws, however, were suspicious under the Papachristou criteria, 
including those empowering the police to stop individuals and ask 
them to identify themselves, move on, or both.832 Police and other law 
and order groups supported such statutes - as did a growing number 
of racial minorities and poor people who have always been the pri­
mary victims of crime.833 In City of Chicago v. Morales,834 the Court 
faced an "anti-gang" ordinance empowering police to order people 
they believed to be gang members loitering with other persons to dis­
perse and making failure to obey such an order a crime. As amici, the 
United States, thirty-two states and territories, and the National 
League of Cities supported the ordinance, with the Inc. Fund, other 
civil rights groups, and defense lawyers attacking it as inconsistent 
with Papachristou. Two briefs merit attention. Representing a rainbow 
coalition of Chicago neighborhood organizations, Professors Dan 
Kahan and Tracey Meares argued that the full force of Papachristou's 
fierce review should be limited to settings where "discretionary polic­
ing techniques the coercive incidence of which is concentrated on a 
830. Id. at 645-46; accord State v. Phipps, 389 N.E.2d 1 128 (Ohio 1979). See generally 
Eskridge, Establishing Conditions, supra note 555, at 857-61 (surveying similar cases in vari­
ous states). 
831. E.g. , Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (reaffirming three 
policies of vagueness doctrine [fair warning, arbitrary enforcement, chilling effect on exer­
cise of First Amendment liberties] but upholding anti-noise ordinance challenged by black 
protesters). 
832. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (striking down law requiring people 
to provide "credible and reliable" identification when requested by police, as vesting them 
with too much enforcement discretion). 
833. On the new wave of loitering ordinances, see Dan M. Kahan & Tracey Meares, 
Foreword: The Coming Crisis in Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1 156-59 (1998); 
Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Com­
munities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997); and Dorothy E. Roberts, 
Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775 (1999). 
834. 527 U.S. 41 (1999). 
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politically disempowered minority."835 Representing their own rain­
bow coalition, Professors Stephen Schulhofer and Randall Kennedy 
vigorously opposed Kahan and Meares' suggestion: constitutional law, 
they argued, should never depend on the race of those burdened or 
benefited, and the idea of community policing does not entail the kind 
of open-ended ordinance as the one Chicago adopted.836 
A divided Supreme Court reaffirmed the Papachristou approach. 
Six Justices ruled that the ordinance did not give the police sufficient 
standards to prevent the law from being deployed in an arbitrary 
way.837 Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion powerfully attacked a 
broad reading of Papachristou. Like Kahan and Meares, Thomas em­
phasized the overriding need for the city, and especially its minority 
communities, to vest police officers with effective means to break up 
the vicious cycle of gangs.838 His opinion suggests, I think, that 
Papachristou ought to be applied with greater lenity toward the police 
perspective when there is an overriding need and, perhaps, when there 
is no reason to believe the police will exercise their discretion dis­
criminatorily .839 Unlike Kahan and Meares, Thomas examined the ar­
bitrary enforcement concern from the perspective of the historical na­
ture of policework: orders for potential troublemakers to disperse 
have long been at the core of the job of "peace officers," and that fact 
ought to discourage the notion that police would exercise their 
authority under the anti-gang ordinance arbitrarily.840 
835. Brief of Amicus Curiae Chicago Neighborhood Organizations at 6, Morales (No. 
97-1121). Kahan and Meares argued that other constitutional doctrines apply with different 
force when there is suspicion that the political process is picking on marginalized people or 
interests and the same should be true of Papachristou.  Id. at 6-9. Now that people of color 
are well-represented in the political process, and better represented in police forces, their 
concerns have shifted toward protecting their communities against crime and Papachristou's 
concern about arbitrary enforcement targeting minorities is greatly ameliorated. Id. at 9-14. 
836. Brief of Amici Curiae Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety, [et al.] at 25-29, 
Morales (No. 97-1121). 
837. Morales, 527 U.S. at 60-63 (Stevens, J., for the Court on this issue); see id. at 64-67 
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part); id. at 69-70 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). Only Jus­
tices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg believed the notice was insufficient. Id. at 59-60 
(Stevens, J., for a plurality). 
838. Id. at 107-11 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
839. Unlike Kahan and Meares, Justice Thomas believed Papachristou to have been 
wrongly decided and roundly denounced its language about the fundamental right of people 
to walk around and loiter. Id. at 112-14. 
840. Id. at 1 10-11 .  In another doctrinal innovation, Thomas proposed that enforcement 
problems should not be anticipated through prophylactic rules such as the void-for­
vagueness doctrine, but should only be addressed as they arise. Id. at 1 13-14. 
2236 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:2062 
B .  Substantive Due Process: The Right to Sexual Privacy 
There was no explicitly recognized constitutional "right of privacy" 
in 1900, but there was a nascent constitutionalization of what Louis 
Brandeis and Samuel Warren famously called a "right to be let 
alone. "841 In one line of cases, the Court recognized bodily integrity as 
a species of liberty substantively protected against state interference 
by the Due Process Clause. For example, in Union Pacific Railroad v. 
Botsford,842 the Court ruled that the state could not require a personal 
injury plaintiff to submit to a medical examination. Another line of 
due process cases treated family governance as a species of liberty and 
gave it protection against excessive state regulation.843 The leading 
case was Meyer v. Nebraska,844 which struck down a law barring the 
teaching of German in schools, as an infringement on parents' rights 
to rear their children. A third line of cases recognized the idea of inac­
cessibility: the state is barred, by the Fourth Amendment especially, 
from invading or snooping into people's private spaces without a 
proper warrant.845 
Privacy as bodily integrity, family governance, and inaccessibility 
have had continuing relevance for modern constitutional law, but the 
dominant mode of priv;icy discourse in the second half of the twenti­
eth century was that introduced by IBSMs: sexual privacy. By this, I 
mean the freedom of individuals and couples to make their own 
choices and decisions about sexual satisfaction, without being forced 
into natural law roles by the state. It is a synthesis of the earlier­
established modes of thinking about privacy, but with a sexualized or 
841. Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (1890); see also ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE 
SOCIETY (1988). Ironically, Brandeis and Warren's right to be let alone was mainly articu­
lated as we would call informational privacy, a tort cause of action for persons whose private 
affairs were exploited by others. For an intellectual history of the different constitutional 
ramifications of this idea, see Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. 
REV. 1335. 
842. 141 U.S. 250 (1891), essentially overruled by Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 
(1941 ); see also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (allowing state-required vac­
cination, notwithstanding invasion of personal liberty involved). 
843. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888) (noting the importance of marriage). 
844. 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (strik­
ing down state law requiring all children to attend public schools); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 
247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down federal law regulating child labor). 
845. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (holding that Fourth Amend­
ment protects the "sanctities of a man's home and the privacies of life"); THOMAS M. 
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE 
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 299-300 (1868) (similar). 
For an extension of Brandeis's tort-protecting "right to be let alone" to the Fourth Amend­
ment, see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-73 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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romantic focus.846 A constitutional right to sexl1al privacy would have 
seemed odd, incoherent, or even scandalous to the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment but gained a foothold in the Court because 
middle class American mores steadily shifted from sex as procreation 
to sex as pleasure and interpersonal intimacy.847 This shift rendered in­
creasingly obsolete laws making it a crime to engage in nonprocreative 
sex (crimes against nature), to engage in procreative sex but with con­
traceptives, and to negate the byproduct of procreative sex through 
abortion. The unevenness of the political process in updating sexual 
crimes drove women and lesbigay people into court to challenge these 
laws as a violation of what came to be called a right of privacy. As he 
had done in the selective incorporation and dialectical federalism 
cases, Justice William Brennan was the primary conduit through which 
new social mores and the views of women and gay people filtered into 
the Court's due process jurisprudence. 
Before the Supreme Court, the earliest link between sexual choice 
and the Constitution came in Jonah Goldstein's 1919 brief appealing 
Margaret Sanger's conviction for violating New York's anti­
contraception statute. The brief explicitly celebrated the joy people 
can find in marriage and parenting but insisted that both be the result 
of the voluntary choice of the man and the woman - not "compulsory 
motherhood" forced upon them by state prohibitions and regimes of 
ignorance.848 Reflecting Sanger's views, the brief implicitly valorized 
the sexual relationship between a man and a woman as an end in itself 
and not as a means toward procreation. Goldstein then tied this hu­
man good to the Due Process Clause and to the cases recognizing 
some kind of privacy right: 
Personal "liberty" includes not only freedom from physical restraint, but 
. also the right "to be let alone," to determine one's mode of life . . .  and is 
invaded not only by a deprivation of life, but also by a deprivation of 
846. Thus, sexual privacy entails freedom to deploy one's body as the individual rather 
than the state sees fit (bodily integrity); to form families we choose rather than those dic­
tated by the state (family governance); and to engage in intimate activities in private places 
(physical inaccessibility). 
847. On changing sexual mores, see JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE FREEDMAN, INTIMATE 
MATTERS: A H ISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA (1988), and PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL 
PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER IN MODERN AMERICA (1998). 
The best contemporary sources are KATHARINE BEMENT DA VIS, FACTORS IN THE SEX LIFE 
OF TWENTY-TWO HUNDRED WOMEN (1929), and Havelock Eilis's treatises on sexual prac­
tices in England and the United States. 
848. Brief on Behalf of the Plaintiff-in-Error at 40-41, Sanger v. New York, 251 U.S. 537 
(1919) (1919 Term, No. 75). "The man and the woman have as much natural right to say how 
many children they will bring into the world and when, as to say when and whom and why 
they will marry . . . .  Barbarous peoples coerce their women into matrimony; civilized people 
coerce them into maternity under [anti-contraception laws]." Id. at 43 (emphasis in original). 
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those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the 
nature, temperament and lawful desires of the individual.849 
This claim was way ahead of the judicial and legal culture of 1919,850 
and perhaps of 1939 as well, for Planned Parenthood abandoned such 
a sweeping claim in Tileston. Morris Ernst's brief for Dr. Tileston em­
phasized the "consensus of opinion among physicians" as well as lay 
people that access to contraceptives is essential to the life and health 
of married women.851 
But the social trends giving rise to the claim of autonomy to "de­
termine one's mode of life" continued unabated: men as well as 
women wanted the freedom to choose the sexual relationship most 
congenial to them, not that dictated by the state. When the Court 
struck down Oklahoma's sterilization law in Skinner v. Oklahoma,852 it 
recognized as "basic civil rights of man" the ability to form marital 
relationships and to procreate.853 Professor Fowler Harper revived and 
expanded on Sanger and Goldstein's argument in his landmark brief 
for appellants in Poe. His main argument was that the state cannot 
regulate "the most sacred relationship between a man and his wife," 
but much of his analysis supported the broader proposition that "sex­
ual pleasure" is an important end in itself, and frustration of one's pre­
ferred sexual outlet, by the state or otherwise, is psychologically harm­
ful to the individual as well as the family.854 " ' [W]hile in the lower 
animals sexual pleasure is primarily a means to an end, in human be­
ings it is not only a means to an end but also a very important end in 
itself,' " and suppressing sexual pleasure through a regimen of conti­
nence " 'is harmful to the personality' " and even risks emotional tur­
moil that give rise to " 'pathological expression. '  "855 Similar but less 
849. Id. at 44 (quoting Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905)). 
Pavesich was the first important case to adopt Brandeis and Warren's privacy tort. Gormley, 
supra note 841, at 1353-54. 
850. See Sanger, 251 U.S. 537 (summarily denying Sanger's appeal); accord Buck v. Bell, 
274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding state sterilization law). 
851 .  Brief for Appellant at 11-26, Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (1942 Term, 
No. 420). Indeed, Ernst argued that "the well recognized indicia of [sexual] immorality, such 
as abortion, illegitimacy, promiscuity, etc., have tended to be less where no such prohibitions 
[on contraceptives] are in force." Id. at 26. 
852. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
853. Id. at 541 (essentially overruling Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)). On the medical 
and social developments that made reproductive autonomy both easier and more desired, 
see, for example, Christopher Tietze, The Current Status of Fertility Control, 25 LA w & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 426 (1960); Comment, The History and Future of the Legal Battle Over 
Birth Control, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 275 (1964). 
854. See Brief for Appellants at 29-31, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) ( 1960 Term, 
No. 60) (harm of sexual abstinence to the individual); id. at 31-33 (harm to family life). 
855. Id. at 29-30 (quoting Karl Menninger, Psychiatric Aspects of Contraception, 7 
BULL. MENNINGER CLINIC 36 (1943)). 
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far-ranging was the ACLU's amicus brief, written by Melvin Wulf and 
Ruth Emerson.856 Planned Parenthood and a collection of eminent 
doctors filed amicus briefs in the case, reprising the medical consensus 
arguments made in Tileston. Although the Court dismissed the appeal 
on odd justiciability grounds, Harper's arguments had a receptive 
(even if discreet) audience in Justices Douglas and Harlan, both of 
whom defended a privacy right against state intrusion "into the inti­
macies of the marriage relationship."857 
In Griswold, Harper's argument was adopted in the briefs for ap­
pellants (Thomas Emerson and Catherine Roraback), Planned 
Parenthood (Morris Ernst and Harriet Pilpel), and the ACLU (Wulf). 
They emphasized the "basic freedom, namely, the right of married 
people to have sex relations and (not or) to decide whether to bring 
new life into the world." The state's interference with this right "in the 
light of the facts of human sexuality, the traditional place of marriage 
in our society and the obvious need, medical and otherwise, for many 
couples to plan or limit their families, cannot rationally be de­
fended."858 Like Harper's brief in Poe, the briefs in Griswold empha­
sized that the state ought not be able to require married couples to 
choose between the health or life of the wife and the sexual abstinence 
of the couple: given the realities of the human sex drive, abstinence is 
not possible for most couples or is destructive of their relationship.859 
The Justices had still not caught up with Fowler Harper. They were 
receptive to counsel's invitation to recognize some kind of constitu­
tional right of sexual privacy only for married couples. Chief Justice 
Warren at conference was "inclined to reverse," because the statute 
intruded too broadly into the "most confidential relationship in our 
856. Also emphasizing the marital relationship, they maintained that its most "inviola­
ble" incident was "the right to express that love through sexual union, and the right to bear 
and raise a family. No other rights are entitled to greater privacy than that normally be­
stowed upon the acts of intercourse and procreation." Brief for the ACLU and the Con­
necticut Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae at 8, Poe (1960 Term, Nos. 60-61). For an at­
tempt, after Harper's death, to characterize the ACLU's brief as the only one emphasizing 
the right of sexual privacy, see Melvin Wulf, On the Origins of Privacy, NATION, May 27, 
1991, at 700. 
857. Poe, 367 U.S. at 519 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that he cannot imagine anything "more private and more intimate than a husband 
and wife's marital relations"). Douglas also argued that the law violated the First Amend­
ment rights of doctors to counsel their patients. Id. at 512-15. 
858. Brief and Appendices as Amicus Curiae for Planned Parenthood Federation of 
America, Inc. at 8-9, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (1964 Term, No. 496); see 
Brief for Appellants at 30-75, Griswold (1964 Term, No. 496) (similar). 
859. Brief for Appellants at 62-65, Griswold (1964 Term, No. 496); Brief of Amicus Cu­
riae Planned Parenthood at 9-10, Griswold (1964 Term, No. 496). At oral argument, Tom 
Emerson emphasized that the challenge in this case only went to married couples. 61 
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 199, at 407, 414 (oral argument in Griswold, Mar. 29, 1965). 
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society," marriage.860 Other Justices propounded doctrinal theories to 
support the Chief's result: a right of association "on the periphery" of 
the First Amendment's protection (Douglas, Goldberg); the Due 
Process Clause's protection of liberty (Harlan); and a nontextual 
"right to marry, maintain a home, have a family," perhaps related to 
the Fourth Amendment's "right to be Jet alone" (Clark).861 Justice 
Black was inclined to recognize the First Amendment right of doctors 
to counsel their patients and was open to a due process argument that 
the law was vague.862 Justice White voted to reverse, apparently under 
an equal protection reasonableness criterion. Only Justice Stewart 
seemed unwilling to go along. 
The Chief Justice assigned the case to Justice Douglas, who dashed 
off an opinion linking the intimacies of marriage with various rights 
implicated in or "peripheral" to the First Amendment, including in­
struction within the family, association, and expression.863 In a note to 
Justice Douglas, Justice Brennan suggested "a substantial change in 
emphasis." He argued for a "right to privacy created out of the Fourth 
Amendment and the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth, together 
with the Third, in much the same way as the right to association has 
been created out of the First. Taken together, those amendments indi­
cate a fundamental concern with the sanctity of the home and the right 
of the individual to be let alone. "864 Douglas recast his "zones of pri­
vacy" as falling within "penumbras" of the particular protections of 
the Bill of Rights; one such zone was a "right of privacy older than the 
Bill of Rights," namely, marriage and (implicitly) its sexual intima­
cies.865 Because the Connecticut law regulated that most private of 
zones, it required an unusually strong justification, which the state had 
not provided. Douglas' broad and odd constitutional basis for the pri­
vacy right pushed Justices Harlan and White into opinions concurring 
860. Douglas Conference Notes for Griswold (Apr. 2, 1965), in Douglas Papers, supra 
note 1 92, Container 1 347. At oral argument, Justice Brennan pressed an equal protection 
argument, which Professor Emerson rejected. 61 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 199, at 
407-08, 4 10- 12 (oral argument in Griswold, Mar. 29, 1965). 
86 1 .  See Douglas Conference Notes for Griswold (Apr. 2, 1965), in Douglas Papers, su­
pra note 1 92, Container 1347; Brennan Conference Notes for Griswold, in Brennan Papers, 
supra note 129, Box I: 1 14, Folder 1 [hereinafter Brennan Conference Notes for Griswold] . 
862. See Brennan Conference Notes for Griswold, supra note 861. 
863. See Justice Douglas, Draft Opinion (Griswold) (Apr. 1965), in Douglas Papers, su­
pra note 192, Container 1347. 
864. Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice Douglas (Apr. 24, 1965), in Douglas Papers, 
supra note 192, Container 1347. 
865. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965). 
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only in the Court's judgment;866 Justice Black fell into dissent with 
Justice Stewart.867 But the opinion commanded a majority of the 
Court. 
Although Griswold emphasized the state's intrusion into the mari­
tal relationship, the next cases fell outside that arena. In Stanley v. 
Georgia,868 the Court ruled that possession of obscene matter in the 
privacy of one's home was protected by the First Amendment, as in­
formed by Griswold and Olmstead.869 Justice Marshall's opinion inter­
preted the First Amendment to mean that "a State has no business 
telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read 
or what films he may watch," or (apparently) what masturbatory fan­
tasies he could secretly entertain.870 
Eisenstadt involved a law tailored by the state to avoid Griswold's 
focus on marriage: Massachusetts allowed married couples to obtain 
contraceptives with a doctor's prescription but barred them from un­
married persons. The plaintiffs and their amici recast the right of pri­
vacy as "the right of personal choice over those events which, by their 
character and consequences, bear in a fundamental manner on physi­
cal and sexual privacy," a right that of course extended to single as 
well as married persons.871 At conference, there was no majority for 
this point of view. Chief Justice Burger and Justice White favored up­
holding the statute; the other five Justices (with Powell and Rehnquist 
not participating) were inclined to strike down the law, but for a vari­
ety of reasons: Justice Douglas saw a First Amendment right to hand 
out contraceptives in public; Justice Brennan Qoined by Justice 
Marshall) felt that there was a right to sexual privacy for single people 
"in [the] penumbra of Griswold" (hobo); Justice Stewart felt there was 
no rational basis for the state to discriminate so completely against 
unmarried persons and also invoked Griswold; Justice Blackmun was 
866. Id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (finding the right of marital pri­
vacy necessary to due process ordered liberty); id. at 502 (White, J., concurring in the judg­
ment) (anti-contraception law fails rational basis test). 
867. Id. at 507 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
868. 394 U.S. 557 (1969) . 
869. There was no evidence in the record that Mr. Stanley had or intended to display the 
movie to others. Indeed, the only such evidence was that the police and then the prosecutors 
displayed the film to groups of people. 67 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 199, at 846-47 
(Stanley oral argument, Jan. 14-15, 1969) . 
870. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565. Three Justices voted to overturn the conviction on the ba­
sis of an unreasonable seizure of the film in Stanley's home by the police. Id. at 569 (Stewart, 
J., joined by Brennan & White, JJ., concurring in the result). Harlan probably captured the 
mood of the conference when he said the "state can't make a crime out of what an individual 
draws or paints in the privacy of his own room." Douglas Conference Notes for Stanley (Jan. 
17, 1969) , in Douglas Papers, supra note 192, Container 1433. 
871 .  Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU and Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts at 6, 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (No. 70-17) . 
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bothered by the requirement that contraceptives even for married per­
sons required a doctor's prescription.872 From this disarray, Justice 
Brennan was able to cobble together four votes (Douglas, Stewart, 
Marshall, himself) for a majority opinion striking down the law be­
cause it discriminated between single and married persons.873 Note 
that, in 1965, it is doubtful a majority of the Court would have invali­
dated the Connecticut statute if it had applied to unmarried couples 
only. But once the Court handed down Griswold, some of the Justices 
- including Stewart, who had dissented in Griswold - came to un­
derstand the Court as committed to the proposition that the right of 
privacy was a personal right and not just a marital one. That the 
Court's opinion in Griswold was hailed as a wise and useful exercise of 
judicial review surely encouraged the Justices to read the precedent 
more broadly than it was written. 
Within a month of the Eisenstadt conference, the Court heard the 
first argument in the abortion cases (Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton) , 
which also involved an unmarried as well as two married plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs and their amici articulated their interests as involving the 
"related rights to personal privacy and physical integrity";874 "the fun­
damental right to choose whether or not to bear a child";875 "reproduc­
tive autonomy," namely, " [t]he personal, constitutional right of a 
woman to determine the number and spacing of her children, and thus 
to determine whether to bear a particular child. "876 (The briefs also 
spoke of women's rights to life and health and of doctors' rights to 
provide advice and treatment to patients.) As they had done in the 
contraception cases, the Justices in the abortion cases struggled to de­
fine the right and its constitutional source. In the first conference, a 
majority of the Justices seemed inclined to strike down the old Texas 
law as excessively vague, a resolution that ultimately "did not write," 
872. Douglas Conference Notes for Eisenstadt (Nov. 19, 1971), in Douglas Papers, supra 
note 192, Container 1544. 
873. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 452-55. 
874. Brief for Appellants at 103-05, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 1 13 (1973) (No. 70-18). At 
oral argument, appellants' counsel Sarah Weddington was more expansive, articulating the 
abortion right as needed to plan and control one's own life. Because "a pregnancy to a 
woman is perhaps one of the most determinative aspects of her life," it is fundamental that a 
woman have the freedom to terminate it. 75 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 199, at 787 
(Roe oral argument, Dec. 13, 1971). 
875. Brief of Amici Curiae Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. and 
American Association of Planned Parenthood Physicians at 32-36, Roe (No. 70-18); Brief of 
Amici Curiae Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. and American Association 
of Planned Parenthood Physicians at 32-36, Roe (No. 70-18). 
876. Brief of Amici Curiae on Behalf of Organizations and Named Women in Support 
of Appellants in Each Case at 8, Roe (No. 70-18) and Doe (No. 70-40); Brief of Amici Curiae 
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. and American Association of Planned 
Parenthood Physicians at 32-36, Roe (No. 70-18). 
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in part because the Court had just upheld the D.C. statute against 
vagueness attack.877 The conference notes and subsequent memoranda 
also suggest that several of the Justices had, since Griswold, changed 
their minds about the constitutional root of the privacy right, viewing 
it as within the liberty interest of the Due Process Clause.878 
At least some of the Justices recognized the normative as well as 
doctrinal complexity of the privacy right. Justice Brennan gave the 
matter his most sustained attention and set forth in a letter "three 
groups of fundamental freedoms that 'liberty' encompasses: first, free­
dom from bodily restraint or inspection, freedom to do with one's 
body as one likes, and freedom to care for one's health and person 
[Botsford] ; second, freedom of choice in the basic decisions of life, 
such as marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, and the educa­
tion and upbringing of children [Eisenstadt, Griswold, Meyer] ; and, 
third, autonomous control over the development and expression of 
one's intellect and personality [Stanley] ."879 This letter synthesized the 
different formulations of the privacy right offered by various amicus 
briefs into the different ways of understanding privacy. It was also a 
dynamic synthesis of the traditional ideas about privacy, confirming 
privacy as physical integrity, expanding privacy as family governance, 
and recognizing a new understanding of privacy as life choices. Privacy 
as life choices was similar to Jonah Goldstein's argument against 
"compulsory motherhood" in Sanger and Sarah Weddington's "life 
disruption" argument in Roe. "The decision whether to abort a preg­
nancy obviously fits directly within each of the categories of funda­
mental freedoms I've identified and, therefore, should be held to in­
volve a basic individual right," concluded Justice Brennan.880 It is 
unlikely that most of his colleagues completely agreed, however. 
Reflecting the Court's (and his own) ambivalence, Justice 
Blackmun's opinion in Roe merely catalogued the various "activities" 
the Court had found private - marriage, procreation, contraception, 
family relationships, childrearing and education - and concluded that 
877. See Douglas Conference Notes for the Abortion Cases (Dec. 16, 1971), in Douglas 
Papers, supra note 192, Container 1590 (Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall were in­
clined toward vagueness argument). Compare Justice Blackmun, Draft Opinion 1 (Roe) (No. 
70-18) (vagueness reason for striking down the Texas statute), with Justice White, Draft Dis­
sent (Roe) (relying on United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971)). 
878. See Douglas Conference Notes for the Abortion Cases (Dec. 16, 1971), in Douglas 
Papers, supra note 192, Container 1590 (Marshall); Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice 
Douglas (Dec. 30, 1971), in Douglas papers, supra note 192, Container 1590 (Douglas and 
Brennan). Counsel for appellants focused on the Due Process Clause as well. See 75 
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 199, at 788-89 (oral argument in Roe, Dec. 13, 1971). 
879. Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice Douglas (Dec. 30 1971), at 5-6 in Douglas 
Papers, supra note 192, Container 1590 (file 70-14) (bracketed references added). 
880. Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 
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the right was part of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause 
and was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or 
not to terminate her pregnancy. "881 Writing only for himself, but also 
reflecting the views of Justice Brennan, Justice Douglas opined that 
the Due Process Clause reflected three different kinds of privacy 
rights: (1) "autonomous control over the development and expression 
of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and personality"; (2) "freedom of 
choice in the basic decisions of one's life respecting marriage, divorce, 
procreation, contraception, and the education and upbringing of chil­
dren"; and (3) "the freedom to care for one's health and person, free­
dom from bodily restraint or compulsion, freedom to walk, stroll or 
loaf."882 Only Justices White and Rehnquist, in dissent, rejected a con­
stitutional basis for this right of decisionmaking privacy.883 
The briefs of women and doctors challenging the post-Roe abor­
tion statutes increasingly emphasized women's sexual privacy and 
autonomy, while the briefs of their opponents emphasized the auton­
omy of the potential life in the fetus and the privacy values inherent in 
traditional families. Recall the lawsuits challenging state laws regulat­
ing the availability of contraceptives and abortions for minors (Section 
I.B.3.a). Groups challenging these statutes insisted on the importance 
to adolescent women of the freedom to make their own choices re­
garding sexual activity and pregnancy and on the dangers of state­
imposed parental involvement to their personal development.884 States 
and their supportive amici emphasized privacy's double edge in these 
cases and maintained that the minor's sexual privacy must give way to 
the older line of cases recognizing the family governance side of pri­
vacy. In Danforth, the state and the Catholic Conference objected to 
the liberal feminist argument, drawn from Eisenstadt and Roe, that the 
right to terminate a pregnancy is an individual right. They cited the 
Meyer line of cases as support for "an organic view of the family and 
social relationships attendant thereto. These cases accept, as a prem­
ise, the view that the family is something more than the sum of its ag-
881. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). 
882. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211-13 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
883. Roe, 410 U.S. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Doe, 410 U.S. at 221 (White, J., 
dissenting). 
884. Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU at 3-15, Carey v. Population Servs. lnt'l, 431 U.S. 
678 (1977) (No. 75-443) (arguing that many horrible things happen to teenage girls who be­
come pregnant because they have no access to contraceptives); Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Planned Parenthood of America, et al. at 14-20, Carey (No. 75-443) (similar); Brief for Ap­
pellees at 90-105, Danforth v. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) 
(No. 74-1 151) (similar, but for pregnant minors who cannot obtain abortions). 
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gregate members."885 If the family is organic and foundational, they 
maintained that the state must, and certainly may, empower parents to 
regulate their daughters' decisions and husbands to participate jointly 
in their wives' decisions. As to parental consent, traditionalists also 
made the liberal argument that minors are not fully capable decision­
makers. The state of New York made the liberal argument during the 
next Term of the Court in Carey v. Population Services International,886 
which involved a law barring the distribution of contraceptives to mi­
nors. 
By 1976, the Court was committed to a liberal rather than organic 
view of the family - but a liberal view whereby parents could exercise 
control over their children's sexuality. Although the Court in Danforth 
overturned the parental consent rule, at least four Justices (White, 
Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens) worried about "parental rights," as 
Powell put it.887 In Carey, the Justices considered themselves bound by 
Danforth to strike down the too-broad state regulation, but most of 
the Justices also supported Powell's view that, " [the] state has far 
greater interest in regulating morals of minors. Don't see how 
Constitution gets into that area."888 Although seven Justices applied 
Eisenstadt to strike down the New York law, only four joined that part 
of Justice Brennan's opinion concluding that the anti-contraception 
rule could not be defended as a way to discourage "promiscuous sex­
ual intercourse among the young."889 Justice Powell's opinion during 
the same Term in Bellotti suggested that there was an audience within 
the Court for the ideas he and Stevens had expressed in conference, a 
dictum that the Court fleshed out in subsequent cases and ringingly 
confirmed in Casey: the state has a wide berth in regulating minor 
women's access to abortions, and the Court will uphold rules based on 
the family governance idea of privacy even when the evidence sug­
gests that the rules have devastating consequences for pregnant girls 
885. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States Catholic Conference at 26, Danforth (No. 74-
1 151  ); see id. at 26-32 (this view of the family supports the parental consent requirement); id. 
at 32-37 (spousal consent). 
886. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
887. See Brennan Conference Notes for Danforth, in Brennan Papers, supra note 1 29, 
Box I: 368, Folder 6. Recall that White, Rehnquist, and Stevens dissented from the Court's 
judgment as to the parental consent requirement. 
888. Brennan Conference Notes for Carey, in Brennan Papers, supra note 1 29, Box I :  
401 , Folder 7 .  As Justice Stevens said, "Don't have doubt state can prohibit sexual inter­
course by minors." Id. 
889. Carey, 431 U.S. at 691-99 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.); see id. at 702-03 
(White, J., concurring in part and in the judgment); id. at 707-08 (Powell, J. , concurring in 
part);.id. at 7 13-16 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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and serve no discernible function in facilitating communication within 
the family.890 
Even more difficult for the Justices were the sodomy cases. On the 
one hand, these could be considered analytically similar to Griswold 
and Roe, for sodomy (like kissing) is a form of nonprocreative inti­
macy. The Court directly protected a woman's right to nonprocreative 
intimacy in Griswold and indirectly in Roe - and in the face of serious 
claims that human life was being sacrificed. Why not in the sodomy 
cases? Especially for lesbigay people, the freedom to engage in inti­
mate relations with someone of the same sex implicated all of the deep 
purposes Justices Brennan and Douglas had identified for the privacy 
right in Roe: freedom to care for and deploy one's body, to make fun­
damental life decisions, and to develop one's intellect and personality. 
On the other hand, the sodomy cases presented the sexual privacy 
right in its most naked form to the Justices. The Court had never di­
rectly ruled that a sexual act itself is constitutionally protected,891 and 
the earlier sexual privacy cases were all connected to straight people's 
decisions to procreate (or not). A majority of the Justices in Griswold 
had specifically indicated that there is no constitutional right to engage 
in " ' [a]dultery, homosexuality and the like.' "892 On the other hand, 
there had been a big change since Griswold: the lesbigay rights move­
ment had become an insistent normative force for reconsidering sod­
omy laws. Lambda, the ACLU, and other groups vigorously litigated 
the issue in both state and federal courts. 
For more than a decade, the Supreme Court dodged the issue, and 
the case that resolved it - Bowers v. Hardwick893 - came to the 
890. Compare Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899-900 (1992) (joint opin­
ion) (upholding one-parent consent requirement with judicial bypass), with Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1356-57 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (findings of fact after trial 
that parental consent requirement could create "dangerous and prohibitive" delays and be 
"extremely costly and burdensome" on minors seeking abortions), rev 'd, 947 F.2d 682 (3d 
Cir. 199 1 ), affd in relevant part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Compare Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 
U.S. 41 7, 458-61 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (providing fifth vote to uphold 
two-parent notification law so long as there is a judicial bypass procedure to protect the in­
terests of the minor), with Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. 756, 768-69 (D. Minn. 1986) (finding as 
matter of fact that two-parent notification requirement can be harmful to minors seeking 
abortion and that judicial bypass is an additional burden), aff d, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 
1 988), rev'd, 497 U.S. 417 (1990). 
891. Carey, 431 U.S. at 688 n.5 & 694 n.17 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.); see id. at 
703 (Powell, J. , concurring in part and in the judgment) (unwilling to go along with height­
ened scrutiny for "state regulation affecting adult sexual relations"). 
892. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Goldberg, J., joined by 
Warren, C.J., and Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961 ) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting)); id. at 507-27 (Black, J., joined by Stewart, J., dissenting from any 
recognition of a right of sexual privacy). 
893. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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Court through a tragi-comedy of errors.894 Representing the chal­
lenger, Professor Larry Tribe's strategy was to suppress the sexual fea­
tures of the privacy right he was defending and to emphasize the tradi­
tional features: the freedom to be secure in your home (Olmstead), to 
control one's own body (Roe), and to make important personal deci­
sions ( Griswold).895 In the tradition of Margaret Sanger and Fowler 
Harper, amici argued that sexual fulfillment through conduct prohib­
ited by consensual sodomy laws was critically important to the mental 
health and well-being of lesbigay people; their arguments linked sex­
ual privacy to meaningful citizenship for gays.896 Four Justices agreed 
with the amici: the principle underlying Griswold and Roe is that peo­
ple's choices in matters of marriage and family planning "form so cen­
tral a part of an individual's life" that it would be a denial of people's 
most fundamental liberty for the state to make those decisions for 
them; that same principle protects the ability of lesbigay (and other) 
people to "define themselves in a significant way through their inti­
mate sexual relationships with others," including consensual sod­
omy.897 No brief could have persuaded the other five Justices to recog­
nize any kind of constitutional right to engage in "homosexual 
sodomy," but Justice Powell dimly perceived that upholding the law 
would be inconsistent with his moderately preservationist viewpoint 
and initially voted to invalidate on poorly reasoned Eighth 
894. The E leventh Circuit interpreted Griswold and Roe to be inconsistent with 
Georgia's consensual sodomy law in Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (1985), rev'd 478 
U.S. 186 (1986). Only Justices White and Rehnquist were inclined to grant certiorari in the 
case - until Justice Brennan joined them, presumably thinking that he could persuade a 
majority to affirm the lower court. This triggered a vote for certiorari from Justice Marshall. 
Reconsidering his strategy, Brennan switched his vote, leaving only three for granting review 
- until Chief Justice Burger switched his vote to grant. See generally MURDOCH & PRICE, 
supra note 510, at 656-57. 
895. Hobbs, the attorney for Georgia, opened his oral argument with the statement that 
this case was about whether the state could regulate "homosexual sodomy." 164 LANDMARK 
BRIEFS, supra note 199, at 633 (Hardwick oral argument, Mar. 31, 1986). Tribe opened his 
argument, "This case is about the limits of governmental power." Id. at 642. Justice Powell 
immediately pressed him, What limiting principle would Tribe support? How can you pro­
tect "sodomy" without also protecting "bigamy involving private homes or incest or prostitu­
tion." Id. Tribe's response: The right to privacy "includes all physical, sexual intimacies of a 
kind that are not demonstrably physically harmful that are consensual and noncommercial in 
the privacy of the home." Id. at 643. Hobbs' rebuttal reposed the issue: Would the Court bar 
Georgia from preserving "ordered liberty" in the face of "licentiousness." Id. at 657. (Wow.) 
896. See, e.g. , Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association and American 
Public Health Association in Support of Respondents, Hardwick (No. 85-140) (consensual 
sodomy is just as important to the intimate lives of lesbigay people as contraception is to the 
lives of straights). 
897. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 204-05 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall & 
Stevens, JJ., dissenting). 
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Amendment grounds, before he fell back into his accustomed anxiety 
about issues of (homo )sexuality.898 
The Court's opinion in Hardwick called a halt to the expanding 
right of sexual privacy and may yet stand for the proposition that the 
state can make any particular sex act a felony. Justice Blackmun 
feared that, as the Court was being populated with countermovement 
appointments, the privacy right itself (including Roe) was in peril. His 
fears seemed justified when President Reagan named Judge Robert 
Bork to replace retiring Justice Powell in 1987. Bork had been the 
academy's most vehement critic of the Griswold-Eisenstadt right of 
sexual privacy, and as a judge he denounced Roe v. Wade and antici­
pated Bowers v. Hardwick. His vote would surely tip the balance of 
power on a divided Court toward the Justices opposed to sexual and 
perhaps other forms of privacy. Progressive groups, including feminist, 
lesbigay, and civil rights organizations, mobilized to oppose the nomi­
nee.899 Although some of their charges were distortions of Bork's emi­
nent academic and judicial record, verily it was Bork's own testimony 
that sunk his nomination: the judge not only insisted in his oral testi­
mony that Griswold and Roe were wrongly decided, but afterward 
sent the Senate Judiciary Committee a fifteen-page letter attacking the 
decisions.900 A week after Bork's testimony, an opinion poll reported 
that the American people opposed the Bork nomination by a fifty­
seven percent to twenty-nine percent margin; almost all opponents 
were troubled by his rejection of Griswold's right of privacy. On 
October 23, 1987, the Senate voted 58-42 against the nomination. 
"If the Bork hearings accomplished anything . . .  it was the enshri­
nement of Griswold v. Connecticut as 'a fixed star in our constitutional 
firmament.' "901 The enshrinement of Griswold, of course, did not 
898. Although the records of the Hardwick conference are not now available, we know 
more about the Justices' deliberations in that case than in almost any other discussed in this 
Article, because of detailed and reliable insider accounts fueled by dozens of chatty (and 
cross-checkable) law clerks. See JEFFRIES, JUSTICE POWELL, supra note 171, at 511-30 (ac­
count from the perspective of Powell's past and contemporary law clerks); MURDOCH & 
PRICE, supra note 510, at 271 -345 (account drawn from several dozen law clerks who served 
before, during, and after the 1985 Term). 
899. See MICHAEL PERTSCHUCK & WENDY SCHAETZEL, THE PEOPLE RISING: THE 
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BORK NOMINATION (1989). For a dispassionate view of the cam­
paign, see ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE (1990). 
900. See Hearings on the Nomination of Robert H. Bork: Hearings Before the Senate 
Comm. of the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1 st Sess. 184-85, 3547-49, 3896-3910 (1987). For Bork's 
unrepentant critique, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 120, 250 (1989). 
901. Gary McDowell, Congress and the Courts, PUB. INT., Summer 1990, at 89, 100 
(quoting West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)); accord HARRY 
H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 121 (1990); Glenn H. Reynolds, Sex, Lies, and Jurisprudence: 
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mean that women were entitled to abortion on demand or gay people 
to consensual intimacy, but the public rejection of Robert Bork un­
derlined the less-noted social facts that virtually all respected legal 
scholars and most Americans were critical of the anti-privacy result in 
Hardwick and were supportive of women's right to choose abortions 
under some circumstances. Six years after the Bork hearings, five con­
servative Republican Supreme Court Justices reaffirmed (and reinter­
preted) Roe in Casey v. Planned Parenthood. Seven years after that, in 
Carhart, the Court invalidated a partial-birth abortion law, over pas­
sionate objection by four dissenters. 
The cutting edge of sexual privacy continues to be the consensual 
sodomy cases. When the Supreme Court decided Hardwick, twenty­
five states and the District of Columbia made consensual sodomy a 
crime. In the sixteen years since Hardwick (1986-2002), three states 
and the District of Columbia have repealed their laws,902 and as many 
as nine states have seen their laws nullified by judicial invalidation as a 
violation of state constitutional rights of sexual privacy.903 Ironically, 
the Georgia Supreme Court struck down the consensual sodomy law 
that the U.S. Supreme Court upheld in Hardwick. The court found 
that "unforced, private adult sexual activity," including sodomy, "is at 
the heart of the Georgia Constitution's protection of the right of pri­
vacy."904 In short, Hardwick notwithstanding, the emerging constitu­
tional norm of sexual privacy would bar the state from criminalizing 
sodomy or penile vaginal sex between consenting adults. A decade af­
ter Hardwick (and exactly 100 years after Justice Harlan's dissent in 
Plessy) ,  six Justices in Evans v. Romer rejected Bork's view that "ho­
mosexuals" have minimal equal protection rights because they are 
presumptive criminals (sodomites) and thrust Hardwick into a consti­
tutional closet. At the close of the millennium, the right of sexual pri­
vacy championed by Emma Goldman, Margaret Sanger, and Fowler 
Robert Bork, Griswold, and the Philosophy of Original Understanding, 24 GA. L. REV. 1045, 
1 105 (1990). 
902. The repealing jurisdictions are Arizona (2001), the District of Columbia (1993), 
Nevada (1993), and Rhode Island (1998). 
903. See Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002); Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 
1998); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); Williams v. State, 1998 Extra 
LEXIS 260 (Bait. Cir. Ct. 1999); Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders v. Att'y Gen., 763 
N.E.2d 38 (Mass. 2002) (narrowing construction of sodomy law); Doe v. Ventura, 2001 WL 
543734 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. Ct. May 15, 2001); State v. Cogshill, 997 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. 
App. 1999); Gryczan v. Montana, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 
S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. App. 1996) (appeal denied). In a few states, constitutional challenges 
have been rejected. See Smith v. State, 766 So.2d 501 (La. 2000). 
904. Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 24-25. Also in contrast to Hardwick, where the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled that anti-homosexual "sentiment" was enough to justify Georgia's consensual 
sodomy Jaw, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that "social morality" could not save it under 
the state constitution. 
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Harper was a fuzzy but forceful constitutional reality, not just for 
women desiring to control the conditions of their pregnancies, but also 
for lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals desiring to form relationships and 
families with their same-sex partners, and for men and women of all 
sexualities desiring to have sex (including sodomy) outside of mar­
riage. 
C. Equal Protection's Sliding Scale: Suspect Classifications, Invidious 
Motives, and Fundamental Interests 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court had 
bleached most of the life out of the Equal Protection Clause. Many of 
the abolitionists who participated in the Reconstruction amendments 
viewed the Equal Protection Clause as radically transformative, but 
the Court had construed it with exceeding caution. Plessy reflected the 
classic understanding of the post-Reconstruction Court: a law is con­
sistent with equal protection so long as its distinctions are reasonable, 
a criterion satisfied by a showing that the distinctions reflect the moral 
or social feelings of the community.905 Distinctions that openly ex­
cluded a whole class of persons from the benefits and protections of 
law were vulnerable because they were irrational, but the Court was 
by 1900 no longer willing to look deeply into the operation of a statu­
tory policy that bore harshly on minorities but did not exclude them 
on the face of the statute.906 And race had been the core concern of the 
Equal Protection Clause; it had no bite for sex- and sexuality-based 
exclusions common in American law by the turn of the century. 
That equal protection doctrine looked completely different by 
2000 is the result of the cases brought and the arguments posed by the 
civil rights, women's rights, and gay rights movements. The agenda of 
these social movements was to get the courts involved with equality 
issues and to persuade judges that they should apply the rationality 
model with attention to the systematic irrationality of certain classifi­
cations and to the subordinating effects of those classifications on cer­
tain classes of Americans. The Court substantially adopted this under­
standing of the Equal Protection Clause. The effect of this process has 
been as complex as it has been revolutionary, because the civil rights 
agenda was always adapted to the Court's own institutional interests 
and to the concerns of the national political process and because the 
facts and normative visions of the many IBSMs were often cross­
cutting rather than mutually reinforcing. The civil rights movement's 
905. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
906. Even in the one area of unquestioned equal protection activism after Reconstruc­
tion - the exclusion of blacks from juries - the Court by 1900 was substantially unwilling to 
monitor local compliance. 
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understanding of equal protection, which was dominant during the 
Warren Court, lost steam in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, which 
were more responsive to concerns of civil rights traditionalists and, 
ironically, feminists. 
During the twentieth century, there was probably no doctrinal de­
velopment in the Court's application of the Equal Protection Clause 
that was not influenced by IBSMs - especially the Court's recogni­
tion that the reasonableness scrutiny of Plessy must give way to a 
more searching and suspicious examination when the state deploys 
certain suspect classifications; denies a well-defined group of persons 
fundamental rights; or acts because of prejudice or other illegitimate 
motives. IBSMs pioneered all three of these inquiries, but the Court 
adapted them to its own institutional and its Justices' ideological ends. 
The result has been a doctrinal structure whose architecture is clear 
enough but so manipulable (and manipulated) as to be of declining 
utility in the new millennium. The most impressive doctrinal synthesis 
is one developed by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the first IBSM lawyer 
appointed to the Court. His sliding scale theory both captures what the 
Court has been doing in the cases and provides a normative roadmap 
for the Court's future in equal protection jurisprudence, a project that 
will occupy the next two sections (II.D. and ILE.) as well as this one. 
1. Tiers: The Story of Suspect and Other Classifications 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Plessy era was one which ex­
amined the reasonableness of statutory distinctions, without much at­
tention to their subordinating effects. The goal of civil rights attorneys 
was to show how race-based policies were founded on prejudice rather 
than reason and how the subordination of one racial group was both 
unjust for the people stigmatized and destabilizing for society as a 
whole.907 Doctrinally, they maintained that race-based classifications 
motivated by prejudice and having subordinating effects on black 
people should essentially be per se violations of the Equal Protection 
Clause. In Guinn, for example, Moorfield Storey deployed the statute 
admitting Oklahoma to the union to frame this argument: there should 
be a flat and broad "prohibition of distinctions on account of race or 
color * * * as to all civil and political rights whatever." " [N]ow when 
on every hand race prejudice is exercising a most baleful influence in 
our affairs," it was especially important for the Court to deploy the 
Equal Protection Clause to protect people who had been held down 
907. These themes were derived in part from Justice Harlan's classic dissent in Plessy, 
163 U.S. at 552, which civil rights attorneys often cited and always followed. 
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but "who ought to be helped up."908 In Nixon v. Herndon, Storey and 
Louis Marshall (Leo Frank's counsel) argued that the white primary 
statute was invalid because it was "a flagrant, unjust discrimination 
against a citizen solely on account of his race and color," one that 
would "brand him with a mark of inferiority."909 
In all of these appeals, the NAACP's attorneys maintained that 
race-based classifications were presumptively unconstitutional because 
they were inspired by prejudice, not rational public policy, and be­
cause they had the intended and deleterious effect of subordinating 
minority citizens. The Justices agreed with the challengers in all these 
cases, but sought to frame their opinions along traditional reasonable­
ness lines. A partial exception was Justice Holmes' opinion in 
Herndon, which summarily accepted the proposition that "color" can­
not be the basis for voting "classification[ s]. "910 The Court's coyness 
changed after 1938, the year the New Deal Court issued its declaration 
of revised activism in footnote 4 of Carotene Products. Paragraph 
three of the footnote said:911 
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the re­
view of statutes directed at particular religious . . .  or national . . .  or ra­
cial minorities[;] whether prejudice against discrete and insular minori­
ties may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the 
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to pro­
tect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching 
judicial inquiry . . . .  
As David Bixby has shown, Justice Stone (the author of the footnote) 
and his colleagues on the Court were responding directly to the civil 
rights movement's objections to the violence involved in apartheid, 
which they considered a national embarrassment.912 
The Japanese curfew and evacuation cases during World War II 
were the occasion for the Court's formal rearticulation of equal pro­
tection scrutiny. Lawyers for Gordon Hirabayashi maintained that a 
908. Brief for the NAACP at 16-17, Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (1913 
Term, No. 96). 
909. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 31, Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (1925 
Term, No. 1 17). ' 
910. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (Holmes agreed that "it is too clear for 
extended argument that color cannot be made the basis for a statutory classification affect­
ing the right set up in this case," namely, voting). 
91 1 .  United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 1 53 n.4 (1938). 
912. Bixby, supra note 657, at 762-67 (Stone), 767-70 (Frankfurter, former adviser to the 
NAACP and a proponent of civil rights for African Americans), 770-74 (Murphy, who as 
Attorney General had established the Civil Rights Section), 774-75 (Black, an anti-racist 
southerner), 775-77 (Douglas, an avid and long-serving advocate for civil rights), 777-78 
(Roberts, Reed, Rutledge); see also Louis Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public Interest, 52 
YALE L.J. 1, 3-6, 20-21 (1942) (arguing that racial minorities must be protected by judicial 
review). Louis Lusky was the law clerk who drafted the footnote for Justice Stone. 
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curfew on citizens of Japanese descent violated the Fifth Amendment 
because " [r]acial discrimination is abhorrent to our institutions." Not 
only had Congress never attempted "to differentiate between citizens 
on the ground of their racial or national origins," but the Court "has 
condemned discrimination on racial grounds whenever the problem 
has come before it."913 Amicus briefs traced the history of state anti­
Asian laws and policies and argued that, like those older laws, any 
kind of discrimination among citizens on the basis of race is a danger­
ous and divisive policy.914 Although the Supreme Court upheld the 
wartime curfew in Hirabayashi, Chief Justice Stone's opinion cau­
tioned that " [d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their an­
cestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institu­
tions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. For that reason, 
legislative classification or discrimination based upon race alone has 
often been held to be a denial of equal protection."915 
In the next case, involving the evacuation of Japanese-American 
citizens, the ACLU pressed the same point: any "classification of citi­
zens based solely on ancestry . . . is forbidden."916 Following 
Hirabayashi, the Court in Korematsu v. United States917 stated that "all 
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group 
are immediately suspect" and must be subjected to the "most rigid 
scrutiny," but upheld the restrictions because of the wartime emer­
gency. Justices Murphy, Roberts, and Jackson agreed that race-based 
classifications should be subjected to strict scrutiny but dissented from 
the holding that such a test was satisfied.918 The other Justices were not 
insensitive to these claims. In Ex parte Endo,919 handed down the same 
day as Korematsu, a unanimous Court found no specific statutory 
authorization for the indefinite detention (following the permitted 
913. Brief for Appellant at 14, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1 943) (1942 
Term, No. 870); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Japanese American Citizens League at 10-
12, Hirabayashi (1942 Term, No. 870) (curfew orders "affecting only American citizens of a 
particular race or ancestry violate the minimum requirements of equality inherent in due 
process of law"); Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU, Hirabayashi (1942 Term, No. 870) (simi­
lar). Recall that the Fifth Amendment has no equal protection component, but the partici­
pants in the Japanese curfew and detention cases treated that amendment's Due Process 
Clause as analogous to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 
914. Brief of Amicus Curiae Northern California Branch of the ACLU at 78-80, Hira-
bayashi (1942 Term, No. 870). 
915. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). 
916. Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU at 6, Korematsu (1943 Term, No. 22). 
917. 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
918. See id. at 225 (Roberts, J., dissenting); id. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (linking 
orders to racist sentiment); id. at 242 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
919. 323 U.S. 283 (1944). 
2254 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:2062 
evacuation) of concededly loyal Japanese Americans.92° For quasi­
constitutional reasons, the Justices refused to assume that "Congress 
and the President intended that this discriminatory action should be 
taken against these people wholly on account of their ancestry even 
though the government conceded their loyalty to this country."921 
After the war, both litigants and jurists routinely referred to race­
based classifications as "not reasonably related to any legitimate leg­
islative objective."922 The Justices (three of whom were southerners) 
articulated the emerging doctrine cautiously in the anti-apartheid 
cases, lest there be a massive southern political reaction. Thus, ironi­
cally, the strongest statements continued to come in cases involving 
discrimination against Asian rather than African Americans. In 
Oyama v. California,923 for example, the Court declined to rule on the 
constitutionality of a California law barring property ownership by 
people who could not become U.S. citizens, namely, Japanese people. 
But the Court did rule that the son of Japanese parents born here (and 
therefore a U.S. citizen) could not be denied the right to inherit. The 
state "discriminated against Fred Oyama; the discrimination is based 
solely on his parents' country of origin; and there is absent the com­
pelling justification which would be needed to sustain discrimination 
of that nature. "924 
With authorities like Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and Oyama in place, 
several amici in Brown invoked a two-tier approach to equal protec­
tion scrutiny: whereas in cases involving ordinary (economic) legisla­
tion the Court presumed reasonableness, the Court's decisions "reveal 
a special scrutiny and constant vigilance in those instances where 
920. Presuming that the President and Congress "are sensitive to and respectful of the 
liberties of the citizen," the Court read the statute to impose "no greater restraint on the 
citizen than was clearly and unmistakably indicated by the language they used." Id. at 300; 
see also id. at 299 (invoking the Ashwander idea favoring a statutory construction that "gives 
it the greater chance of surviving the test of constitutionality"). Justice Douglas, the author 
of Endo, was originally a dissenter in Korematsu on this ground, but Chief Justice Stone per­
suaded him that the Court was only upholding the evacuation, and not any detention, in that 
case. See Douglas Conference Notes for Korematsu (Oct. 16, 1944), in Douglas Papers, supra 
note 1 92, Container 1 13. 
921. Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. at 303-04; see id. at 307-08 (Murphy, J., concurring) (much 
stronger objection to the Army's interpretation; criticizing the "racism" at the heart of the 
executive order). 
922. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 226 n.14 (1952); accord Takahashi v. Fish & Game 
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948). 
923. 332 U.S. 633 (1940). 
924. Id. at 640. Four concurring Justices were more aggressive. See id. at 649 (Black, J., 
joined by Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that any denial of rights because of "race or 
color" is presumptively a violation of the equal protection clause); id. at 650 (Murphy, J., 
joined by Rutledge, J., dissenting) (characterizing underlying statute, barring property own­
ership by "aliens," per se unconstitutional as an "outright racial discrimination" deserving 
"constitutional condemnation"). 
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[state] action was predicated upon alleged racial distinctions or where 
racial classifications were involved. "925 Although the Supreme Court's 
decision in Brown emphasized the fundamental right to an education 
rather than the race-based classification, the lower courts and civil 
rights attorneys took it for granted that Brown rejected apartheid and 
accepted the long-litigated Inc. Fund view that race-based classifica­
tions are per se violations of the Equal Protection Clause. And the 
Court summarily affirmed lower court decisions striking down race­
based classifications in all manner of public regulations.926 In short, the 
Court as early as 1944 was moving toward a two-tiered approach to 
equal protection scrutiny: race-based classifications were "immedi­
ately suspect" and subject to the "most rigid scrutiny,'' in contrast to 
the reasonableness scrutiny applied to other classifications.927 This was 
the likely basis for the holdings of the post-Brown per curiams. The 
Court formalized the double standard in the interracial cohabitation 
and marriage cases, McLaughlin v. Florida928 and Loving v. Virginia.929 
Thus, I disagree, in part, with Michael Klarman's insistence that 
the equal protection double standard was not established until 
Loving.93° Chief Justice Warren's opinion treated the issue as having 
925. Brief on Behalf of ACLU et al. at 12, Brown v. Bd. of Educ. , 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
(1953 Term, No. 1) (citing Hirabayashi and Korematsu); see Brief of American Veterans 
Comm., Inc. at 12, Brown (1953 Term, No. 1) (contrasting general reasonableness test for 
ordinary legislation and "the most rigid. scrutiny" applied to race-based restrictions, "which 
are immediately suspect"). 
926. See the cases cited supra note 108. 
927. Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
928. 379 U .S. 184 (1964). 
929. 388 U.S. 1 (1967); see also Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term -
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal 
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972) (noting the Court's "double standard" and urging the 
Court to create new categories of intermediate scrutiny). 
930. Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. 
L. REV. 213, 227-40 (1991). Klarman is right to say that the Court's race discrimination 
opinions in the 1940s and 1950s sometimes used "rationality language," id. at 234, but 
Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and Oyama explicitly deployed the suspect classification language. 
So the verbal formulation was in place by the time Brown was decided. E.g., Perez v. 
Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 20 (Cal. 1948) (different-race marriage bar cannot meet Supreme 
Court's requirement that racial classifications can only be justified by "a clear and present 
peril arising out of an emergency"). As a practical matter, the Court was more scrutinizing as 
to what we today would call "fundamental rights," Klarman, supra at 236, but neither the 
Justices nor commentators in the 1940s defended stringent scrutiny along these lines. 
(Klarman, id. at 240 & n.118, is wrong to say that Perez rested on that distinction; the rea­
soning of the opinion focused only on the classification; its statement that the state "cannot 
base a law impairing fundamental rights of individuals on general assumptions as to traits of 
racial groups" was not "backtracking," as Klarman claims, but icing on the constitutional 
cake.) The university and school desegregation cases, from Gaines through Brown, did not 
employ the Hirabayashi/Korematsu strict scrutiny formulation but were understood by civil 
rights attorneys and by federal judges as rendering any race-based classification presump­
tively invalid. There is no theory except mine for the Court's per curiams affirming lower 
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been settled by Hirabayashi and Korematsu, whose language he 
adopted as the statement of Loving's holding.931 It is how civil rights 
lawyers read those precedents in the 1950s.932 The lower courts read 
the cases the same way. As I shall demonstrate below, so did lawyers 
for other identity-based social groups, such as women and gay people. 
Thus, well before 1967, it was clear that the Court would engage in 
"more searching judicial inquiry" of statutes which deployed racial 
classifications to deny people of color rights or privileges of all sorts. 
And it was apparent, from Brown and its progeny, that classifications 
separating the races were suspect for the same reason. What was not 
clear - and here I agree with Klarman - was how committed the 
Court was to the verbal formulation and whether it applied across the 
board. Loving brought the Court's approach fully out of the constitu­
tional closet,933 and was analytically important in its holding that what 
was objectionable to the Equal Protection Clause was the way that an 
irrational classification contributed to the subordination of a vulner­
able class by perpetuating an ideology grounded upon prejudice and 
stereotypes. This has become the classic articulation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. Although it was a codification of half a century's 
effort on the part of the NAACP and its allies, this formulation was to 
have a life of its own, as it was appropriated by social movements, 
countermovements, and Justices - each with different agendas and 
interpretations. 
To begin with, Loving accelerated an equal protection classifica­
tion-fest, for it coincided with the explosion of new social movements 
representing the political mobilization of women, poor people, the 
elderly, people with disabilities, and lesbigay people. Social movement 
lawyers vied to replicate the Inc. Fund's success. Each IBSM argued 
that its members had been subjected to prejudice- or stereotype-based 
disadvantages legally similar to those suffered by blacks, and that ani­
mus against the group's defining trait was just as irrational and coun­
terproductive as racism. After 1968, the Court picked its way through 
a minefield of equal protection claims. For each claim, the Court con-
court decisions which declared racial segregation of parks, swimming pools, and other facili­
ties invalid. See note 108 supra. 
931. Loving, 388 U.S. at 2. What Loving and (more precisely) McLaughlin add to the 
prior cases is the idea that discrimination on the basis of the race of one partner is race dis­
crimination, simpliciter. 
932. "The decisions of this Court in [Hirabayashi et al.] have declared that racial distinc­
tions are irrelevant, unjustified, inexcusable, odious, and constitutionally suspect, and that a 
pressing public necessity or exceptional circumstances must be shown to justify them." Brief 
in Opposition to Appellee's Motion to Dismiss or Affirm at 4, Nairn v. Nairn, 350 U.S. 891 
(1955) (1 955 Term, No. 366). 
933. See, e.g., Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 
(1 969). 
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sidered the rationality and anti-subordination arguments pressed by 
the social movement lawyers, but in light of its own political calculus: 
Which classifications struck the Justices as most irrational? Which 
groups were unable to rely on the political process to repeal or nullify 
discriminations harming them? For example, the Court soon after 
Loving confirmed that state alienage classifications required "close 
judicial scrutiny," because they were often deployed to harm a vulner­
able minority and with questionable bases in the public good.934 The 
result of this constitutional litigation process was the creation of a 
complicated system of "tiers" of equal protection scrutiny. Each new 
tier, however, has carried with it ambiguities which have exposed 
fuzziness in the enterprise of categorization. 
a. Sex: Intermediate Scrutiny. Before Loving, feminist attorneys 
were arguing that sex-based classifications were invalid or suspect for 
the same reasons race-based classifications were. Dorothy Kenyon's 
brief in Hoyt, for example, maintained that sex discriminations are just 
as unreasonable as race discriminations, and that women's campaign 
to serve on juries was a politics of recognition similar to the one blacks 
had long been fighting.935 After Loving, both litigants and lower courts 
formally rearticulated this as a claim that sex-based classifications are 
suspect because (like race-based classifications) they rely on an immu­
table trait that typically bears no relationship to rational state policy 
and that has been the basis for stigmatizing the class defined by that 
trait because it reinforces a subordinating ideology grounded on 
prejudice or stereotypes.936 As in Loving, there was an explicit alliance 
of rationality and subordination in this kind of argument. Craig v. 
Boren was the first case where a majority of the Supreme Court ac­
cepted these feminist arguments, halfway. The Court did not rule that 
934. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (following Takahashi v. Fish & 
Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948)). As an additional reason undermining state alien­
age classifications, the Court relied on the federal government's plenary authority over im­
migration and naturalization and its frequently announced policy that aliens should be 
treated fairly while they are in this country. Graham, 403 U.S. at 376-80. For this reason, a 
national law using alienage-based classifications is not suspect in the way a state law is. See 
generally Gerald Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and the 
Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425 (1995). 
935. Brief of Amicus Curiae Florida Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU at 8-19, Hoyt 
v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (1961 Term, No. 31) (women as a class have been subordinated 
in many of the ways blacks have been, especially in jury service); id. at 1 9-26 (reasons for 
excluding women for jury service are unreasonable in light of the "revolution [that] has 
taken place in the lives and status of women"). 
936. This was Professor Herma Hill Kay's line of argument, which the California 
Supreme Court accepted in Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 540-41 (Cal. 1971), and 
Professor Ruth Bader Ginsburg's argument in Brief for Appellant at 14-24, Reed v. Reed, 
404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4), where the Court ducked the issue, and in Brief of Amicus Cu­
riae ACLU at 24-34, Frontiero v. Laird, 409 U.S. 1 123 (1973) (No. 71-1694) (urging the 
Court to follow Sail'er Inn), where four Justices accepted her argument. Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.). 
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sex-based classifications must be subjected to the strict scrutiny of 
race-based classifications, but held instead that such classifications 
"must serve important governmental objectives and must be substan­
tially related to achievement of those objectives,''937 what has become 
known as an intermediate standard of review. 
The subsequent history of Craig has raised questions about pre­
cisely what standard the Court applies to sex-based classifications. In 
Rostker, for example, the Court seemed to apply a more relaxed stan­
dard, due to the deference owing to congressional-presidential deci­
sions regarding military policy. Conversely, the Court applied a tight­
ened standard in Kirchberg v. Feenstra.938 Invalidating a law giving the 
husband, as "head and master" of the household, the right to dispose 
of community property without the consent of his wife - an easy kill 
under Craig or even Reed - Justice Marshall's opinion reasoned that 
the state had a burden of demonstrating an " 'exceedingly persuasive 
justification' for the [sex-based] classification."939 Justice O'Connor 
deployed this tougher test in Hogan to strike down a bar to men's ad­
mission into a state school of nursing: although the announced state 
policy of compensating women for past workplace discrimination was 
a valid policy, the exclusion of men from nursing was not the "ex­
ceedingly persuasive" justification required by the Equal Protection 
Clause.940 Quoting both Kirchberg and Hogan, Justice Ginsburg's 
opinion in the VMI case ruled that a post-hoc rationalization cannot 
be an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for a sex-based policy and 
that such justification must be analyzed in light of (and perhaps sup­
ported by) the historical context of the policy.941 This application was a 
tougher scrutiny than that followed by the Court in at least some of its 
prior sex discrimination cases,942 a stringency justified by the anti­
subordination principle supported by both the civil rights and women's 
movements: statutes resting on sexist stereotypes rarely survive when 
they also tangibly disadvantage women as a class, whereas they often 
survive when women as a class are not harmed.943 
937. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 197 (1976). 
938. 450 U.S. 455 (1981). 
939. Id. at 461 (quoting dictum in Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) 
(emphasis added)). 
940. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-31 (1982). 
941. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
942. Id. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming that the Court "drastically revises our 
established standards for reviewing sex-based classifications"). Compare, for example, Mi­
chael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981), where Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion 
engaged in precisely the kind of post-hoc justification that Virginia rejects. 
943. See Lawrence G. Sager, Of Tiers of Scrutiny and Time Travel: A Reply to Dean 
Sullivan, 90 CAL L. REV. 819 (2002). 
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Contrast Nguyen v. INS,944 where a narrow majority of the Court 
upheld a requirement that children born of American fathers and for­
eign mothers provide affirmative evidence of paternity not required of 
children with an American mother and foreign father. Applying the 
Craig formulation, the Court found that the national interests in as­
suring that a parent-child relationship exists and that a personal rela­
tionship accompanies it, were reasonably well served by the sex-based 
discrimination.945 Applying the Kirchberg-Hogan-Virginia formulation, 
dissenting Justice O'Connor argued that the Court was being too gen­
erous to the government, reading a more benign purpose to the dis­
crimination than was justified by the record and demanding too little 
of a fit between the asserted purposes and the gendered means.946 
Nguyen involved a discrimination founded on the sex of the parent 
and not of the more directly injured child,947 which helped the majority 
Justices to see the discrimination as noninvidious. The Court's disposi­
tion also reflects the continued difference between race and sex dis­
tinctions in equality jurisprudence. Is there much doubt that the Court 
would have overturned a law making one's citizenship turn in any way 
on the race of one's American (or non-American) parent? 
The sex discrimination cases illustrate several themes of the 
Court's post-Loving classification fest. On the one hand, to make out 
its case for strict scrutiny, each identity group claimed that its defining 
trait was like race and its disadvantages were akin to those suffered by 
African Americans. On the other hand, none of the groups was situ­
ated the way African Americans have been in our history, and the 
other identity traits operate differently from race in many ways.948 As a 
result, it was never easy for the Justices to figure out what to do about 
new claims for suspect classification status. 
b. Illegitimacy: Intermediate Scrutiny. In Levy v. Louisiana,949 
Professor Norman Dorsen (working with the ACLU) argued that ille­
gitimacy should be a suspect classification, like race, because it has no 
bearing on fair public policy yet has traditionally been a situs for 
944. 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
945. Id. at 60-71 .  
946. Id. at 74-97 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
947. Compare Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (allowing state to discriminate 
against putative fathers with no custodial, personal, or financial relations with child), with 
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (barring state from discriminating against unwed 
father who has established a relationship with the child). 
948. Some traits (like noncitizenship, poverty, age, sexual orientation) are not consid­
ered "immutable" in the way race and sex are. Discrimination against some groups (such as 
women, the aged, people with disabilities) owes more to cognitive stereotypes than to emo­
tional prejudice. Unlike people of color, women are a majority of the population; aged peo­
ple are a big minority, and a status to which we all aspire. 
949. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
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prejudice-based legislation severely disadvantaging nonmarital chil­
dren.950 Professor Harry Krause (working with the Inc. Fund) devel­
oped the further argument that discrimination based on illegitimacy 
"covertly discriminates on the basis of race," because "it operates far 
more severely upon Negroes as a class than it does upon whites."951 
The facts of the case made Levy an easy decision: the state barred 
nonmarital children from suing in tort for the wrongful deaths of their 
natural parents. At conference, Chief Justice Warren could not see 
"any interest" the state would have in such a policy, other than spite 
or prejudice, and all but Justices Black and Harlan went along with a 
decision invalidating the discrimination as irrational.952 
Levy was not clear as to its level of scrutiny, and for the next 
twenty years the Court heard one case after another before ruling; in 
1988, that illegitimacy-based classifications are subject to an interme­
diate level of scrutiny.953 Even if it is rational for the state to encourage 
adults to have children only in a marital relationship, it struck the 
Justices as unfair to pursue any kind of punitive policy at the expense 
of children.954 Thus, the Court has struck down most laws denying 
nonmarital children the same basic rights as those accorded marital 
children,955 but has upheld laws requiring such children to establish 
their biological relationship with their parents through a formal proc­
ess.956 The naturalization discrimination adjudicated in Nguyen was a 
recent, and gendered, example of this kind of allowance. 
950. See Brief for Appellant at 6-8, Levy v. Louisiana, 341 U.S. 68 (1968) (1967 Term, 
No. 508); see also Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 
477 (1967). 
951 .  Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Accompanying Brief Amicus 
Curiae Inc. Fund at 18, Levy (1967 Term, No. 508). 
952. Brennan Conference Notes for Levy, in Brennan Papers, supra note 129, Box I: 
161 ,  Folder 1. Justice Black agreed that this was "bad state policy" but could not say it was 
entirely irrational in light of its having been an acceptable classification "for generations." 
Id. 
953. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988). Contrast Mathews v.  Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) 
(rejecting strict scrutiny for illegitimacy classifications and upholding federal policy of de­
nying survivorship benefits to many nonmarital children). 
954. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). Notice that the Justices 
viewed this as "unfair" and not wholly "irrational," for it is plausible that stigmatizing chil­
dren born outside of marriage would influence some adults to formalize their relationship 
before the children's births. Since illegitimacy statutes have fallen out of vogue, much larger 
numbers of children are in fact born outside of marriage. 
955. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (holding that state may not categori­
cally deny inheritance rights to nonmarital children); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) 
(holding that state may not deny nonmarital children child support rights). 
956. E.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (holding that state may require nonmarital 
children to be adjudged children of deceased in order to qualify for intestate inheritance 
rights). 
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c. Wealth: Rational Basis? Like illegitimacy, poverty could be 
analogized to race in that it strikes many people as an unfair basis for 
apportioning state benefits and obligations and has been severely 
stigmatized in our capitalist society. Also, the group afflicted by pov­
erty contains a disproportionate number of racial minorities. The 
ACLU and many reformist lawyers objected to legal fees that fenced 
poor people off from government processes. The lawyers had many 
successes. The Warren Court ruled that poor people did not have to 
pay state fees required for pursuing felony appeals in Griffin v. 
Illinois957 and that poll taxes were invalid (for everyone) in Harper v. 
Virginia Board of Elections.958 The Burger Court ruled that the state 
could not constitutionally deny indigent married couples a free forum 
for divorce.959 In the 1960s, people on welfare and their allies coa­
lesced into a (nascent) social movement, whose attorneys argued from 
Griffin and Harper that wealth is a suspect classification.960 The 
California Supreme Court agreed with this interpretation of the Equal 
Protection Clause in 1971,961 but the U.S. Supreme Court went another 
way in three decisions handed down in 1973, the chief of which was 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.962 
The plaintiffs, Mexican-American parents challenging the inequal­
ity in state-funded public schools, argued that wealth is a suspect clas­
sification requiring strict scrutiny, at least where a fundamental right 
like education is involved.963 Justice Powell's opinion for the Court 
held that the challenged scheme of public funding did not clearly dis­
criminate against all poor families and, if it did, discriminated only 
relatively and not absolutely.964 This revealed a general problem with 
viewing wealth as a suspect classification: rather than being formally 
957. 351 U.S. 12 (1956); accord Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (extending the 
Griffin rule to appeals of misdemeanor convictions). 
958. 383 U .S. 663 (1966). "Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of 
race, are traditionally disfavored." Id. at 668 (internal citations omitted). 
959. Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U .S. 371 
(1971), invoked a substantive due process right to marry, in contrast to the equal protection 
analysis of several concurring Justices. See id. at 386 (Brennan, J., concurring in part); id. at 
383 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment); see also United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 
(1973) (limiting Boddie to the fundamental-right-of-marriage context). 
960. See ELIZABETH BUSSIERE, (D1s)ENTITLING THE POOR: THE WARREN COURT, 
WELFARE RIGHTS, AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1997); MARTHA F. 
DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1 960-1973 
(1 993); R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS (1994). 
961 .  Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1 241 (Cal. 1971). 
962. 411 U.S. 1 (1973); see also Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (upholding bankruptcy law's minimal 
fee scheme even though the plaintiff was too poor to go bankrupt); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 
U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam) (upholding fees for civil appeals, distinguishing Griffin). 
963. Brief for Appellees at 38-44, Rodriguez (No. 71-1332). 
964. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 18-29. 
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excluded, as people of color and women have been, from voting and 
other public activities, poor people have been functionally unable to 
take advantage of activities that cost money. Powell was suggesting 
that wealth would be an unwieldy mode of equal protection analysis.965 
Since 1973, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to invalidate fee 
schemes on the ground that they deploy a suspect classification. As we 
shall see below, however, fee schemes remain vulnerable if they deny 
poor people access to fundamental legal rights and opportunities. 
d. Age: Rational Basis. Older Americans engaged in their own so­
cial and political activism in the 1960s. The Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, for example, protected people over age 
forty from workplace discrimination. In the 1970s, gray power activists 
turned to constitutional litigation. The American Association of 
Retired Persons and other elder-law groups challenged a mandatory 
retirement rule for police officers in Massachusetts Board of 
Retirement v. Murgia.966 The challengers were able to show that the 
bright-line rule was substantially overinclusive, dismissing many offi­
cers well able to discharge their physical duties, and somewhat under­
inclusive, allowing many physically less able people to serve. Under 
any kind of heightened scrutiny, the rule would have been vulnerable, 
but the Court ruled that ordinary rational basis scrutiny must apply to 
age-based classifications. The reasoning was, essentially, that age bore 
none of the distinctive features of race as a classification requiring 
heightened judicial attention. Thus, age is often relevant to legitimate 
state policy, and the elderly "have not experienced 'a history of pur­
poseful unequal treatment' or been subjected to unique disabilities on 
the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their 
abilities. "967 Also, because old age "marks a stage that each of us will 
reach if we live out our normal span," the political process has been 
attentive to the interests of the elderly.968 
e. Disability: Rational Basis with Bite? Like the other IBSMs dis­
cussed in this paper, the disability rights movement engaged in an in­
tense politics of recognition urging legislatures and courts to revoke 
disability-based exclusions.969 Their politics scored major legislative 
965. Much less cogently, Powell added that the classification had "none of the tradi­
tional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to 
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political proc­
ess." Id. at 28; cf id. at 70 (Marshall, J . ,  dissenting) (sustained critique of Court's position). 
966. 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam). 
967. Id. at 313. 
968. Id. at 313-14. 
969. See generally RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: 
TRANSFORMING FEDERAL DISABILITY POLICY (2d ed. 2001) (chronicling passage and im­
plementation of the Rehabilitation Act and mobilization of disability rights movement that 
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and administrative successes in the 1970s, and lawyers for the disabled 
(like other social movement attorneys before them) also sought consti­
tutional recognition of their special status. In Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center,970 disability rights lawyers challenged a municipal zon­
ing law which discriminated against a group home for disabled people. 
The lawyers conceded that mental disability is sometimes a legitimate 
basis for state policy decisions but argued that this trait had tradition­
ally been deployed in a stigmatizing way to exclude disabled people 
from a wide ,array of state benefits, on the basis of prejudice and 
stereotypes.971 The Reagan Administration intervened to oppose this 
claim, on the ground that "unlike members of racial minorities, 
mentally retarded individuals are different from others in respect to 
their needs and capacities."972 At conference, Justice Brennan laid out 
a strong case for strict scrutiny: like race, disability is an immutable 
trait that has frequently been the basis for denying basic civil rights; 
like people of color in the 1940s and 1950s, disabled people, he main­
tained were not politically strong enough to overturn all of the unfair 
legal discriminations.973 Justice White argued against creating another 
suspect classification for the reasons suggested by the Solicitor 
General. Chief Justice Burger opined that the "retarded" were "enti­
tled to special attention but not heightened scrutiny."  Justice Stevens 
felt that there was not even a rational basis for the ordinance. The 
Court split evenly ( 4-4) on the merits of the claim and ordered rear­
gument so that ailing Justice Powell could participate. On reargument, 
Powell was "hesitant" to create a new suspect classification, a process 
he had "never favored" (Rodriguez) ,  but he was willing to find the or­
dinance invalid on rational basis grounds. And so went the Court. 
Justice White's opinion for the Court in Cleburne first held that 
mental disability was not a suspect classification and so did not trigger 
strict scrutiny, for three reasons: the "mentally retarded" are "differ-
brought it about); JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A 
NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1993) (providing excellent overview of the "political 
awakening" and mobilization of people with disabilities in the late twentieth century); 
JONATHAN M. YOUNG, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: THE 
MAKING OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (1997) (comprehensive account of 
the efforts leading to passage of the ADA). 
970. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
971 .  Brief of Amicus Curiae American Association on Mental Deficiency [and six other 
disability rights groups], Cleburne (No. 84-468); Brief of Amicus Curiae Association for 
Retarded Citizens/USA [and twelve other disability rights groups] at 21-25 (app. A), 
Cleburne (No. 84-468) (compendium of laws segregating or excluding mentally disabled 
people in each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia.). 
972. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States Supporting Reversal at 8, Cleburne (No. 84-
468). 
973. See Brennan Conference Notes for Cleburne, in Brennan Papers, supra note 129, 
Box. I: 662, Folder 3 (notes for both conferences in Cleburne). 
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ent, immutably so, in relevant respects" having to do with their re­
duced mental capacities;974 since 1970, "lawmakers have been ad­
dressing their difficulties in a manner that belies a continuing antipa­
thy or prejudice and a corresponding need for more intrusive 
oversight by the judiciary";975 if mental disability were a suspect classi­
fication, then it would be hard not to recognize other groups as simi­
larly protected, namely, "the aging, the [physically] disabled, the 
mentally ill, and the infirm."976 In dissent, Justice Marshall objected to 
the first two rationales: like alienage (a suspect classification), gender 
(quasi-suspect), and illegitimacy (on its way to quasi-suspect), mental 
disability is sometimes relevant to legitimate policymaking, but often 
it is not, and the very point of heightened scrutiny is to sort out the 
two; as women had learned, recent legislative solicitude had followed 
centuries of bad attitudes and has done little to erase vicious preju­
dices and stereotypes that persist at the local level.977 The Court had no 
cogent response to these concerns - except to apply the rational basis 
test with the bite of heightened scrutiny (or perhaps "special atten­
tion," as the Chief Justice had suggested in conference). The city's jus­
tification for refusing to allow a group home of mentally disabled per­
sons was the negative attitudes and fears of neighbors. The Court 
unanimously rejected this as an irrational justification. " 'Private bi­
ases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly 
or indirectly, give them effect.' "978 
The review in Cleburne was not nearly as forgiving as standard ra­
tional basis review. Had the zoning regulation only involved a business 
that wanted to open up in the neighborhood, the concerns of fearful 
neighbors would have been enough to satisfy any judge. Clearly, the 
Justices were responding to the dreadful history of invidious discrimi­
nation and the survival of stereotypes about and prejudice against dis­
abled people in their tougher look at the local decision. On the other 
974. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442. 
975. Id. at 442-47 (noting the Rehabilitation Act of 1 973, Education of the Handicapped 
Act, and other laws designed to protect the mentally disabled from ongoing discrimination). 
976. Id. at 446. 
977. Id. at 468-70 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
978. Id. at 448 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)); see also Cleburne, 
473 U.S. at 451-55 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that rational basis, properly conceived 
as involving a sliding scale, cannot abide by this justification); id. at 455-56 (Marshall, J., dis­
senting) (contending that heightened scrutiny is a more appropriate standard and that, under 
it, this justification was insufficient). The Court also rejected the city's other justifications, 
based on fears that local teens would harass the group home persons, that the home was on a 
flood plain, and that too many people would live in the home, essentially as pretexts that 
would not have been raised had the home been for non-disabled persons. See id. at 449-50. 
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hand, the Court has not applied Cleburne to strike down a disability­
based classification in any case since 1985.979 
f Sexual Orientation: Rational Basis with Bite? In 1960, Frank 
Kameny's petition for Supreme Court review argued that anti­
homosexual policies "constitute a discrimination no less illegal and no 
less odious than discrimination based upon religious or racial 
grounds."980 The ACLU's Norman Dorsen revived that argument in 
1970, urging the Court to recognize that sexual orientation discrimina­
tions were problematic because they were based upon irrational 
prejudices and stereotypes and unfairly harmed many decent peo­
ple.981 The Burger Court denied certiorari in Dorsen's cases, and the 
issue of the proper equal protection standard for scrutiny of sexual 
orientation discrimination went into constitutional hibernation for 
more than a decade, as the gay rights movement focused on issues of 
privacy and free speech. 
The heightened scrutiny claim resurfaced in the appeal of Marjorie 
Rowland, a guidance counselor allegedly discharged because of a con­
fidential conversation she had with her secretary and the assistant 
principal about her bisexuality. Although her counsel did not clearly 
argue for strict scrutiny on appeal, Justice Brennan took up the matter 
as a personal crusade; joined only by Justice Marshall, he wrote an 
impassioned dissent from the Court's denial of certiorari.982 Brennan 
argued that sexual orientation is a suspect classification, because gay 
people have been "the object of pernicious and sustained hostility" 
and state discrimination, based upon prejudice and not rational public 
policy.983 Brennan's goal was to stimulate judicial attention to this 
issue, but most of that attention occurred in challenges to the mili­
tary's exclusion of gay people. Recall the debate between Judges 
Norris and Reinhardt in Watkins v. United States Army.984 Ruling that 
979. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (rejecting equal protection attack on law 
making it easier to commit "mentally retarded" people to hospitals than "mentally ill" per­
sons). 
980. Brief for Petitioner at 56, Kameny v. Brucker, 365 U.S. 843 (1961) (1960 Term, No. 
676). 
981. Brief for Petitioner at 6-9, Schlegel v. United States, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970) (1969 
Term, No. 1 257) (appealing 416 F.2d 1372 (Ct. Cl. 1969)); Brief for Petitioner at 5, Adams v. 
Laird, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970) (1969 Term, No. 1258) (appealing 420 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). 
982. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009 (1985) (Brennan, J., dis­
senting from the denial of certiorari). Cf. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19-24, Rowland 
(No. 84-532) (arguing that Rowland's discharge was unconstitutional whatever standard was 
applied). 
983. Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1014; see also Kenneth Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Asso­
ciation, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980). See generally Symposium on Sexual Preference and Gender 
Identity, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799-1181 (1979) (especially Rivera, supra note 552). 
984. 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated en bane, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (dis­
cussed supra Section l.C.3.a). 
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the army's antigay policy violated the Fifth Amendment, Norris drew 
from the Court's equal protection precedents three criteria supporting 
heightened scrutiny in the race and sex cases: (1) a history of purpose­
ful trait-based discrimination by the state; (2) gross unfairness of dis­
crimination because (a) the trait is generally not relevant to a person's 
ability to contribute to social projects, (b) the discrimination imposes 
unique disabilities on a class of productive people, or ( c) the trait is 
immutable or very hard to change; and (3) the inability of the stigma­
tized group to obtain political redress for the discrimination.985 The 
government scarcely disputed that antigay discrimination met most of 
the criteria, and Norris ruled that sexual orientation was a suspect 
classification - notwithstanding Hardwick's suggestion that lesbigay 
people can be imprisoned for engaging in private, consensual "homo­
sexual sodomy."986 
Hardwick, in fact, pushed most gay rights litigation into state 
courts. A number of state appellate courts have ruled that sexual ori­
entation is a suspect classification under their state constitutions, given 
the irrelevancy of sexual orientation to legitimate state policy and the 
tradition of prejudice-driven antigay laws in this country.987 The U.S. 
Supreme Court has remained silent as to the level of scrutiny to be 
applied to sexuality traits. In contrast to Cleburne, where the Court 
explicitly rejected heightened scrutiny for disability classifications be­
fore striking down a local zoning decision, Romer v. Evans left open 
the level-of-scrutiny question when it struck down the state antigay 
constitutional amendment. Evans offers an opportunity for reflection 
on the Court's experience with its classification-based tiers of judicial 
review. 
The briefs in Evans reflected three kinds of factors the Court has 
considered in determining level of scrutiny: (1) the extent to which the 
discriminatory classification is relevant to rational public policy; (2) 
the history of prejudice and disadvantage of the class stigmatized by 
985. Id. at 1345-48 (developing criteria in text and applying them to conclude that sexual 
orientation ought to be a suspect classification). The Canadian Supreme Court has reached a 
similar conclusion under its Charter. See Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 156 D.L.R.4th 385, 387. 
986. That the legitimacy of sodomy laws validated antigay discrimination was not only 
the conclusion reached by Judge Reinhardt in Watkins, but also by the large majority of ap­
pellate judges in the military exclusion cases. E.g. , Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (deferring to Navy's presumption that a gay cadet will have a propensity to engage in 
forbidden sodomy); Dronenberg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.) (antici­
pating Hardwick's holding, its precise rationale, and [eerily] some of the majority's lan­
guage). 
987. For state court decisions announcing strict scrutiny for sexual orientation classifica­
tions, see Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999) (summary disposition); Commonwealth 
v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); Tanner v. Oregon Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435 
(Or. App. 1998); see also Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (applying rational basis 
with a lot of bite to sexual orientation discrimination). 
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the trait in suit; and (3) the extent to which the current political proc­
ess can be expected to avoid or even rectify the first two problems. 
These three considerations map onto three theories about what the 
Equal Protection Clause is supposed to be enforcing: (1) the rational­
ity principle, whereby laws are supposed to be public-regarding rather 
than private rent-seeking; (2) the anti-subordination policy, whereby 
the state ought not contribute to the social oppression of a worthy 
class of people; and/or (3) the representation-reinforcement idea, 
whereby the Court makes a judgment as to whether the disadvantaged 
class can rely on the political process to correct irrational laws that 
hurt them. The Court's implicit assumption has been that the Equal 
Protection Clause ought to be applied with attention to each of these 
principles or policies. The first principle has been instinct in the 
Court's equal protection jurisprudence since the beginning, through 
the Plessy and then Brown periods. The second principle was impor­
tant in the framing of the Equal Protection Clause, but was ignored 
during the Plessy period; civil rights lawyers kept it alive, and lawyers 
for other IBSMs have given it expanded meaning. The third principle 
has been a product of the twentieth century, with civil rights lawyers, 
political theorists, and the Justices themselves giving it shape. 
The third principle is complicated by the paradox of the tiers: 
During the period when a minority is truly marginalized politically be­
cause society accepts its defining trait as a malignant variation, its 
members would most benefit from a judicial corrective pluralism -
but this is the period when the Court is least likely to respond to their 
political need.988 The Court is the most vulnerable branch and has for 
institutional reasons almost always been unwilling to extend extraor­
dinary constitutional protections to invalidate laws designed to margi­
nalize the most despised minorities. Once the minority has organized 
itself as a recognition-seeking IBSM and made some headway per­
suading popular culture that its defining trait is a tolerable variation 
(at least), then the Court will be responsive to the group's demands for 
constitutional equality. But at that point, the ISBM will have gained 
political clout, a development that might render judicial protection 
less important for the group, and less compelling from the perspective 
of a well-functioning political process. The paradox of the tiers ex­
plains why the Supreme Court failed to recognize heightened scrutiny 
for race and sex classifications until the civil rights and women's 
movements had gained national power, but not so much power that 
they could eliminate hundreds of blatant and no longer acceptable dis­
criminations. The disability rights movement, in contrast, has been 
successful in repealing outmoded discriminations and in obtaining 
988. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1 993 Term -
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994) (developing this idea). 
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legislation protecting its members against many forms of private dis­
crimination - a political success that undermined the movement's pe­
tition for heightened scrutiny.989 
Now that the lesbigay rights movement has matured as a national 
phenomenon, the Court cannot indefinitely avoid the issue of what 
scrutiny is appropriate for sexual orientation classifications. Recall 
Evans's context: responding to open appeals to antigay stereotypes 
and prejudice, Colorado voters revoked local ordinances protecting 
lesbigay people against discrimination. If this scenario persists, the 
Court will be under pressure to follow the state courts in applying 
heightened scrutiny, because lesbigay people have mobilized as a mi­
nority no longer willing to accept second-class citizenship, while at the 
same time antigay prejudice remains politically powerful enough to 
invite periodic bouts of new antigay lawmaking and to thwart legisla­
tive efforts to repeal obsolescent antigay laws and policies.990 
Evans and the lesbigay rights cases also suggest this lesson of 
Cleburne: the usefulness of the tiers has eroded. It is easy to establish a 
prima facie case for making one's trait a suspect classification in a cul­
ture like ours which is cynical about the "rationality" of the legislative 
process, has generated an ever-increasing array of disadvantaged mi­
nority groups, and accepts prejudice as multivocal and proliferate 
rather than univocal and exceptional. In a judicial culture concerned 
with efficient management of caseloads, the prospect of recognizing 
new suspect classifications - and thereby triggering a new generation 
of cases - is daunting; the burden has always been on the minority 
group, but Cleburne suggests that the burden is a higher one than it 
was in 1971-76, when the Court recognized alienage, sex, and (infor­
mally) illegitimacy as suspect or quasi-suspect. On the other hand, 
Cleburne and Evans demonstrate that rational basis scrutiny some­
times has bite; the contrast between Rostker and Hogan demonstrate 
that intermediate scrutiny depends on institutional context, among 
other things; Fullilove and Bakke demonstrate that even race-based 
classifications can pass strict scrutiny. This suggests that the Court has 
989. Indeed, judges have given the disability community's greatest political success, the 
ADA, a chilly reception, in part because the law went through too easily, without the kind of 
well-publicized normative struggle that surrounded the Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights 
Act, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and other landmark IBSM legislation. Cf Matthew 
Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 1 9  (2000) (discussing the judicial backlash against the ADA). 
990. Under my theory, the old people's movement (and its powerful arm, the AARP) 
has been too successful to tempt the Court to protect its members against discrimination. 
The political process is quite generous to the elderly, as Murgia noted. The welfare rights 
movement had the opposite problem: it was never enough of a political success to motivate 
much constitutional protection. All the current Justices were appointed by presidents who 
vowed "welfare reform" (that is, reduction in benefits), and the nation's political balance has 
shifted far away from the agenda of welfare rights activists of the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
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informally moved away from giving such critical importance to the 
level of scrutiny and has moved toward a sliding scale approach.991 
Five Justices in Cleburne rejected the now-traditional tiers analysis in 
favor of such an approach.992 Before developing the sliding scale idea 
further, I should like to examine other doctrinal contributions IBSMs 
have made to equal protection doctrine. 
2. Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Interests: The Equal 
Protection Sliding Scale 
The Warren Court explicitly recognized a second occasion for 
equal protection strict scrutiny implicit in earlier precedents: state dis­
crimination in the allocation of "fundamental" rights, primarily voting. 
IBSMs played a key role in this development because many voting re­
strictions were legacies of apartheid. In Harper, for example, the 
Court agreed with the ACLU's challenge to Virginia's poll tax, which 
had originally been adopted as part of that state's program to disen­
franchise people of color and poor whites.993 Justice Douglas's opinion 
for the Court did not address the ACLU's argument that the poll tax 
violated the Fifteenth Amendment because of its racially discrimina­
tory origins and impact but instead treated the "wealth" classification 
as reason enough for suspicion. Douglas further ruled that "where 
fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal 
Protection Clause," including the right to vote, "classifications which 
might invade or restrain them," perhaps including non-suspect ones, 
"must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined."994 In the wake of 
Harper and Loving, there were two officially accepted routes to 
heightened scrutiny that guaranteed success for equal protection 
plaintiffs: the statutory classification is "suspect" or the interest as to 
which there is claimed discrimination is "fundamental."995 Unad-
991. See Leslie Friedman Goldstein, Between the Tiers: The New[est} Equal Protection 
and Bush v. Gore, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 372, 382 (2002); Peter S. Smith, Note, The Demise 
of Three-Tier Review: Has the United States Supreme Court Adopted a "Sliding Scale" Ap­
proach Toward Equal Protection Jurisprudence?,  J. CONTEMP. L. 475 (1997). See generally 
Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45 (1996) (arguing the ad­
vantages of a genuine rational basis review for IBSMs generally and Iesbigay people specifi­
cally). 
992. Specifically, concurring Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Burger as well as dis­
senting Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun. 
993. Brief for Appellants at 19-22, Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 
663 (1966) (1965 Term, No. 48). 
994. Harper, 383 U.S. at 670. Contrast Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. of Elec­
tions, 360 U.S. 45 (1960) (in absence of ACLU or NAACP involvement in the case, Court 
unanimously upheld literacy requirement for voting). 
995. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 625-30 (1969). The Burger 
Court applied Loving along these lines. Although Loving's equal protection holding rested 
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dressed but clearly open after Harper was a third route being pressed 
by the ACLU and the NAACP: heightened scrutiny is also appropri­
ate for state policies having a strongly negative and disparate impact 
on a traditionally subordinated class, especially racial minorities. 
Just as this potentially expansive structure emerged, the Court was 
reconstituted by Richard Nixon. The Nixon Justices sounded caution­
ary themes of separation of powers, federalism, and institutional com­
petence. Expansive application of equality jurisprudence would turn 
the Court into a "super-legislature," trumping legitimate state policy 
choices and embroiling the judiciary in polycentric issues it could not 
adequately handle. Accepting the nation's political consensus against 
apartheid and any form of race discrimination, the new Justices recog­
nized Loving as a polestar, but one beyond which they were reluctant 
to venture - except in deference to their own (and their class's) op­
position to state-imposed duties of motherhood and traditional gender 
roles (Roe and Craig) . Authored by the Court's most rigorous lawyer, 
Rodriguez (the school financing case) epitomized the new majority 
view. 
Justice Powell's opinion opened with an essay on the inappropri­
ateness of judicial intervention into the complicated budgetary politics 
of education finance.996 As Justice Blackmun said in conference, "if we 
affirm, federal courts will destroy the state systems; we cannot legis­
late equality in education."997 For the Nixon Justices, the many diffi­
culties in implementing Brown by federal injunctions suggested that 
this was an exercise the Court cannot often initiate. If the Court were 
to intervene, it should do so only when the disadvantaged class has 
been "subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or 
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command . 
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."998 
only on the suspect classification (race), Chief Justice Warren's opinion also recognized a 
fundamental right to marry. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 ,  12 ( 1967). The Burger Court in 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), applied strict scrutiny to strike down a law barring 
remarriage by deadbeat spouses, not because the law deployed a suspect classification (being 
in arrears in one's obligations owed after termination of prior marriages), but only because 
the law touched upon people's fundamental right to marry. See also Turner v. Safely, 482 
U.S. 78 (1987) (overturning bar to marriage by prisoners). 
996. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 56-59 (1973). 
997. Douglas Conference Notes for Rodriguez (Oct. 17, 1 972), in Douglas Papers, supra 
note 192, Container 1575. Justice Powell, who had chaired the school board in Richmond, 
expounded at length in support of Justice Blackmun; the Chief Justice briefly made a similar 
point. Justice Rehnquist (alone) argued that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
would have been comfortable with Texas's school financing plan. Justice Stewart - the only 
non-Nixon Justice ultimately in the majority - was an uncertain vote and is not on record as 
having been concerned about the factors that troubled the Nixon Justices. Accord Brennan 
Conference Notes for Rodriguez (No. 71 -1332), in Brennan Papers, supra note 1 29, Box I: 
281, Folder 1. 
August 2002] Identity-Based Social Movements 2271 
This was the normative background for the entire opinion: the base­
line for state allocative decisions is either the market or democratic 
politics (the legislature), and it requires "extraordinary" justification 
for the Court to intervene. 
Justice Powell applied a careful lawyer's examination to the state 
statutory scheme and found no explicitly wealth-based classification in 
it, a contrast to Loving, where the suspect (race-based) classification 
was on the face of the statute. This part of the opinion expressed the 
reason Justice Stewart joined the new Brethren.999 Even if the plain­
tiffs could show a wealth-based effect of the system in Rodriguez, 
Powell's opinion suggested that they would then have to show how 
"the financing system is designed to operate to the peculiar disadvan­
tage of the comparatively poor." 1000 This statement takes on added 
significance in light of the fact that the plaintiffs and their amici were 
arguing that the Texas system was subject to heightened scrutiny be­
cause it had strong race-based effects; the education deficit assured by 
the financing inequities fell mostly on latino and black schoolchil­
dren.1001 Powell was suggesting that Loving was the limit of the Court's 
activism: statutes bearing a suspect classification would generally be 
invalidated, while those only having a big impact on disadvantaged 
groups would be invalid only if "designed" to hurt minorities. 
In greater detail but less cogency, Powell took a restrictive view of 
fundamental-interest strict scrutiny. Conceding that Brown had recog­
nized the foundational importance of public education for both citi­
zens and our democracy, Powell observed that " 'virtually every state 
statute affects important rights. '  "1002 To protect all these important 
rights would render the Court a "super-legislature,'' making or re-
998. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28. Of course, that claim has been forcefully made for poor 
people, but it was not developed in the Rodriguez record, at least as read by Justice Powell. 
But see Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 121-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
999. Ironically, Stewart was open to finding wealth to be a suspect classification, see 
Memorandum from Justice Stewart to Justice Powell (Feb. 8, 1973), in Brennan Papers, su­
pra note 129, Box I: 296, Folder 9, but believed there was no "discrete class of people invidi­
ously discriminated against." For him, " 'the poor,' 'pauper' are too general" to capture the 
classificatory scheme challenged in the case. Id. Box I: 281, Folder 1 .  
1000. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at  26. Powell cited authorities suggesting that facially neutral 
laws could not be challenged under the suspect classification wing unless the challengers 
could show that the laws were motivated by animus against vulnerable classes of citizens. See 
id. at 27 n.62 (citing Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 547-49 (1972); John Hart Ely, Leg­
islative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1258-59 
(1970)). I discuss Hackney, which is probably the leading case, in Section l.A.3.b. 
1001. This was an ancillary point in the Brief for Appellees at 16-17, Rodriguez (No. 71-
1332), but was the lead argument in Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU et al .  at 14-23, Rodriguez 
(No. 71-1332), and Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense Fund and Educational 
Fund, Inc. at 3-9, Rodriguez (No. 71 -1332). 
1002. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 30-31 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661 
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
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viewing countless political decisions; to protect only some of them re­
quired a neutral principle rather than a utilitarian (and subjective) 
assessment of "how important" each right was. Powell's neutral prin­
ciple was "whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly 
guaranteed by the Constitution."1003 Whereas the rights to vote and 
privacy are implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, the right to an 
education is not, he claimed. But, as Justice Marshall argued in dis­
sent, the reason voting and privacy have been viewed as implicit in the 
Constitution is that they are foundations for the exercise of other 
rights, such as speech and participation - which is how Brown charac­
terized education.1004 Implicit in his dissent was the proposition that 
education, voting, and privacy constitute a trilogy of rights strongly af­
fecting women and minorities, which (along with jury service) have 
been the central policy foci for liberationist movements of the twenti­
eth century. 
Rodriguez was a doctrinal harbinger in many respects. Consistent 
with Powell's opinion, the Court after 1973 promoted only two classi­
fications (sex and illegitim&cy, in both cases following implications of 
pre-1973 cases) to those formally entitled to heightened scrutiny; ap­
plied rational basis scrutiny to laws with disparate effects on racial mi­
norities or women, except on the rare occasion that challengers could 
show that the laws were inspired by animus;1005 and refused to create 
new fundamental interests whose discriminatory allocation would jus­
tify strict scrutiny. The actual operation of this doctrinal consensus, 
however, defies simple characterization. Ironically, its main effect is 
that the Court committed itself to considering evidence that social 
movement litigators had long been exploring in their briefs to the 
Court: What ideology motivated policymakers when they adopted a 
challenged discrimination?1006 Before 1971,  the rule was that such ar-
1003. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33. 
1 004. Id. at 1 10-17, (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting, inter alia, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). Rodriguez has hardly ended school finance litigation, which has 
for the past 30 years been extensively litigated in state courts pursuant to state constitutional 
guarantees of a right to an efficient education. See James Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 
109 YALE L.J. 249 (1999). 
1005. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and its progeny, analyzed in Section 
l.A.3.b. 
1006. Thus, civil rights attorneys had long maintained that race-based classifications 
were "drawn with great ingenuity with a view to placing the negro citizens . . .  in as inferior a 
position as possible" and thereby seeking to establish "a permanent superiority for the white 
race." Brief for the Plaintiff in Error at 31-33, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (1915 
Term, No. 33). Feminist counsel maintained that most sex-based rules were grounded upon a 
desire to reinforce "archaic stereotypes" about men and women. Gay rights litigators argued 
that sexuality-based rules, such as employment exclusions, were based on the same "odious" 
prejudice as race-based exclusions. See Brief for Petitioner, Kameny v. Brucker, 365 U.S. 843 
(1961) (1960 Term, No. 676). 
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guments were not strictly admissible as a basis for challenging legisla­
tion.1007 After Rodriguez and its progeny, such arguments were not 
only required in disparate impact cases, a requirement confirmed in 
Washington v. Davis, but encouraged in disparate treatment cases, an 
encouragement taken up in the affirmative action cases that were then 
reaching the Court (discussed below). 
Rodriguez was the Magna Carta of a conservative pragmatic juris­
prudence in race cases, for it reformulated anti-discrimination law in a 
way that would minimize its costs to (white) Middle America. By 
drawing the line with Loving, the Court was reaffirming the nation's 
symbolic distance from formal apartheid even as the Court strongly 
discouraged constitutional litigation that could challenge racial dis­
crimination that was more indirect. So long as racial segregation or ex­
clusion was ostensibly the product of private choices and of state poli­
cies deploying non-race criteria, it was immune from constitutional 
challenge because of the Hackney-Rodriguez-Davis rule that plaintiffs 
had to show "discriminatory intent."1008 Nor was the Court prepared to 
add new classifications (like poverty or wealth) to those requiring 
heightened scrutiny. Finally, although the importance of the depriva­
tion could also trigger heightened scrutiny, the Court was closing off 
any expansion of that avenue toward strict scrutiny as well. The effect 
of the Rodriguez package of doctrines was that state allocative and 
developmental policies were protected from constitutional challenge, 
no matter how badly they bore on people of color. 
Another way of understanding Rodriguez and its companion cases 
is through the lens of principle: the moderate politics of preservation 
privileged rationality as the core principle of the Equal Protection 
Clause and deemphasized anti-subordination and representation­
reinforcement except as weakly understood from a majoritarian per-
1007. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-26 (1971) (municipal action closing 
public swimming pool cannot be held to violate equal protection "because of the motivations 
of the men who voted for it") (following Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810)). 
Justice Black's opinion conceded that the Court had referred to racist motives in Griffin v. 
County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 
(1960), but distinguished those cases (rather unpersuasively, according to Justice White, dis­
senting in Palmer, 403 U.S. at 263-67). 
1008. There is an impressive literature attacking the problems with the intent require­
ment for disparate impact cases. E.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Ef­
fects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1 153 
(1991) (demonstrating empirically that the Court's intent test has discouraged constitutional 
challenges to facially neutral policies); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White 
Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 
958 (1993) (arguing that intent requirement is "transparently white," which reflects a failure 
by whites "to scrutinize the whiteness of facially neutral norms"); Lawrence, supra note 185 
(criticizing the Court's approach for its inability to deal constructively with "unconscious 
racism"); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court 
Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279 (1997) (similar). 
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spective. Against Justice Powell's classic synthesis of the moderate 
politics of preservation, Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion stood as 
the classic synthesis of a pragmatic politics of minority recognition. At 
the level of principle, Marshall reminded the Court that the greatness 
of Brown did not rest on the rationality principle, but rather on its 
embodiment of the anti-subordination and representation­
reinforcement goals of equal protection. At the level of doctrine, the 
dissenting opinion objected to the majority's "rigidified approach to 
equal protection analysis." Indeed, Marshall maintained, the two-tier 
structure of equal protection law did not really describe what the 
Court had been doing in the 1960s and early 1970s. The cases sug­
gested a "spectrum of standards,'' whereby "the degree of care with 
which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications [depends] on 
the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely af­
fected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the 
particular classification is drawn."1009 Although not drawn from briefs 
filed by the parties, as most doctrinal innovations discussed in this Ar­
ticle have been, Marshall's synthesis drew from his decades-long work 
as a litigator for the civil rights movement. In my view, it is one of the 
greatest contributions of IBSMs to constitutional doctrine in the twen­
tieth century. Marshall's theory brings a great measure of coherence to 
equal protection law, not only as it had evolved before 1973, but also 
as it has unfolded since then. 
In the spirit of Dan Ortiz's recharacterization of the role of intent 
in equal protection law,1010 I should like to frame Marshall's approach 
in the following way. Almost all laws have arguable purposes that can 
be expressed in terms of the public interest and rationality, but the 
statutory criteria are usually both overinclusive (regulating activities 
not needed to meet the statute 's rational goals) and underinclusive 
(failing to regulate some activities inconsistent with the goals). Where 
the state is regulating the market and the classification is a purely eco­
nomic one, courts will not be interested in the actual, typically messy, 
motivations of the legislature and will simply attribute plausible public 
interests to such laws; additionally, they will tolerate a great deal of 
over- and underinclusion in the choice of statutory criteria. 1 01 1  In con-
1009. Rodriguez, 411  U.S. at 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Dandridge v. Wil­
liams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (similar sliding-scale approach, 
quoted in the Rodriguez dissent). 
1010. Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1 105 
(1989); see also Julie A. Nice, The Emerging Third Strand in Equal Protection Jurisprudence: 
Recognizing the Co-Constitutive Nature of Rights and Classes, 99 U. ILL. L. REV. 1209 
(1999). 
1011 .  Thus, the Court has not been inclined to invalidate economic legislation that is 
clearly the product of special interest rent-seeking at the public's expense. E.g., United 
States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980). 
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trast, where important constitutional rights are involved and the classi­
fication one that has been found consistently invidious, courts will pre­
sume irrational motives (prejudice and stereotypes) to the legislature 
and may strike down the law on that ground alone. This was the 
holding of race cases such as Guinn (voting) and Loving (marriage) 
and gender cases such as Taylor ijury service).  A more recent example 
is Palmore v. Sidoti,1012 where the Court ruled it per se inadmissible for 
state courts to consider race as a basis for making decisions regarding 
child custody. Even if the state were able to show that rational motives 
inspired a rule like that in Palmore, the Court would not tolerate the 
least amount of over- or underinclusion when such a suspicious crite­
rion acts to deprive people of fundamental rights. 
The foregoing cases, including the use of suspect classifications to 
allocate fundamental rights, are so easy that they have dried up; legis­
latures themselves have repealed virtually all such statutes. Only a lit­
tle harder are cases in which a suspicious classification deprives people 
of important but not constitutionally fundamental interests such as 
education. After Brown, these cases have also dried up - except for 
affirmative action cases such as Bakke. In such cases, the burden is on 
the state to prove that its motivation is not grounded on prejudice or 
stereotypes; even if the state carries that burden, the Court will not 
tolerate much over- or underinclusion, which doomed the program in 
Bakke. This is a problem with state justifications grounded on diver­
sity or remediation: the state must show that the goals or quotas are 
not only sufficient to solve the problem but also necessary. Marshall's 
model would suggest that the Court would be more forgiving in cases 
(like Bakke) involving graduate schools, which hardly bear the fun­
damental features that Brown extolled for primary and secondary 
schools. And when only economic rights are involved, as in Fullilove, 
Metro Broadcasting, and Adarand, it ought to be possible for benignly 
motivated affirmative action programs to survive, as they did in the 
first two cases and may yet in the third. 
Hard cases are those where the state has apportioned rights using 
criteria that have a disparate racial impact. The doctrine is that chal­
lengers have to show race-based motivations, and the leading cases 
seem to require but-for causation: but for racial prejudice, the policy 
would not have been adopted or perpetuated.1013 The Court's practice 
has been more nuanced, however. Where the rights are constitution-
1012. 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
1013. See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Viii. of Arlington 
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 269, 270 n.21 (1977) (following Paul Brest, 
Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 
1971 SUP. Cr. REV. 95); see also Paul Brest, Reflections on Motive Review, 15 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 1 141 (1978). But see Foster, supra note 378, for a more complex view of the "doctrine." 
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ally fundamental, such as voting and jury service, the Court has actu­
ally engaged in a serious investigation into motivation. Thus, Batson 
and J.E.B. require prosecutors (and now other counsel as well) to pro­
vide a neutral reason for a pattern of discriminatory peremptory chal­
lenges.1014 The voting cases are even more dramatic. Rogers v. 
Lodge1015 affirmed a lower court finding of discriminatory intent in 
maintaining an electoral system that produced no black officeholders. 
In contrast to the Court's stingy inquiry into legislative motivations in 
employment and housing cases, the Court in the voting case de­
manded no direct evidence of racially biased decisionmaking and 
rested its judgment on indirect evidence stemming from the historical 
operation of the system. In the racial gerrymandering cases seeking to 
increase minority representation, the Court inferred discriminatory in­
tent from the "bizarre" shape of majority-minority districts in Shaw v. 
Reno. 1016 The Court cited any other kind of "persuasive circumstantial 
evidence" that race was the dominant consideration as its basis for 
finding discriminatory intent in Miller v. Johnson.1017 
The hardest cases are those where the state has apportioned im­
portant but not "fundamental" rights using criteria that are fishy but 
not among the classifications the Court has recognized as "suspect." A 
classic case was Plyler v. Doe.1018 Texas denied public education to 
children who were not legally admitted into the United States. Chief 
Justice Burger scrupulously applied existing doctrine to the matter: il­
legal alienage was surely not a suspect classification, as it served many 
legitimate state functions; Rodriguez had held that education is not a 
fundamental right; Q.E.D., Texas's exclusionary law was only subject 
to rational basis analysis, which it passed. But only four Justices joined 
this logic. 1019 Five joined Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court, 
which conceded the doctrinal points but maintained that denying chil­
dren minimal education because of the actions of their parents (illegal 
entry) raised red flags under the Equal Protection Clause.1020 Viewed 
skeptically, the Texas statute was way over- and underinclusive of its 
stated objective, discouraging illegal immigration: the penalty would 
fall on children who had nothing to do with their parents' illegal immi-
1014. See Ortiz, supra note 1010, at 1119-26; supra Section II.A.2. 
1015. 458 U.S. 613 (1982); see also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (essen­
tially inferring discriminatory intent from the obvious race-based effects of redistricting). 
1016. 509 U.S. 630 (1993); see Richard Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Par-
tisan Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505 (1997). 
1 017. 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995). 
1018. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
1019. Id. at 242-54 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
1 020. See id. at 218-20 (harm in penalizing children); id. at 221-23 (importance of educa­
tion). 
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gration, while at the same time doing little to discourage most illegal 
immigration.1021 Plyler reveals the continuing relevance of the anti­
subordination and representation-reinforcement goals of the Equal 
Protection Clause. Even conservative Justices were concerned with 
penalizing "innocent children," which seemed vicious,1022 and with cre­
ating a "permanent underclass," which seemed like a recipe for social 
disorder and political strife. 1023 At conference, Justices White and 
Rehnquist saw the fairness and underclass problems as ones that 
should be addressed by Congress, but the other Justices - including 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor - were not moved by this 
concern because of the political powerlessness of such aliens ("wet­
backs," as Rehnquist reportedly termed them in conference ) . 1024 
Until the Supreme Court decides that sexual orientation is a 
( quasi-)suspect classification, Romer v. Evans can be read as analo­
gous to Plyler v. Doe. In both cases, the severe consequences for the 
affected persons (alien children and lesbigay people) and the fact of 
traditional prejudice against such persons raised the stakes of judicial 
scrutiny. In both cases, the state was asserting legitimate public goals, 
but the statutory means were disproportionate to the harm and were 
unlikely to solve the problem.1025 The big mismatch between ends and 
means and the severe consequences for the affected persons raised an 
1021.  That is, the Texas policy would have no effect on aliens who come here without 
their children or whose children are born here (and hence are American citizens). Its effect 
on parents with children was speculative at best. Justice Stevens forcefully pressed this ar­
gument in conference, as well as the related cost-benefit argument: while Texas would save a 
little money in the short term, the "countervailing cost to society in not educating children" 
more than offset it. See Brennan Conference Notes for Plyler, in Brennan Papers, supra note 
129, Box I: 554, Folder 2. 
1 022. The challengers' brief centrally argued: "Legislation that visits the 'wrongs' of 
parents on their innocent children in such a drastic manner is deserving of heightened scru­
tiny." Appellees' Brief on the Merits at 24-26, Plyler (No. 80-1538). This argument resonated 
with several Justices, especially Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell. Marshall put it this way: 
"Kids are not involved in anything illegal - victims of being born. It's the kids we must fo­
cus on and I can't treat them as 'illegals.' " Brennan Conference Notes for Plyler, in Brennan 
Papers, supra note 129, Box I: 554, Folder 2. Powell: "Hard to think of [a] category more 
helpless than children of illegal aliens." Id. 
1023. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 231 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 236 (Powell, J., con­
curring). . 
1024. See Brennan Conference Notes for Plyler, in Brennan Papers, supra note 1 29, Box 
I: 554, Folder 2. The Chief Justice observed that Congress was responsive to Texas employ­
ers, allowing illegal aliens to work in this country for low wages. Id. This feature of the case 
also troubled Justice O'Connor. Id. Justice Rehnquist conceded that this was "an intractable 
problem in the southwest. Wetbacks or not, question is validity of Texas' policy choice." Id. 
1 025. The state interest in Plyler was discouraging illegal immigration by adult aliens, 
but the means focused on innocent children and was probably ineffective. See supra note 
1015 and accompanying text. The state interest in Evans was conservation of scarce en­
forcement resources for antidiscrimination laws, but the Justices viewed the measure as 
threatening a range of other government services that gay Coloradans needed and were 
probably unpersuaded that the measure solved the scarcity of resources problem. 
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inference that the democratic process was motivated by animus rather 
than by rational problem-solving. In neither case was the state able to 
refute that inference. Indeed, Evans is a particularly compelling case, 
because there was direct evidence of animus. The official ballot 
materials prepared by the sponsors of the antigay initiative argued 
that gay people should be denied the "special" protections of antidis­
crimination law because they were assertedly "diseased," predatory, 
selfish, and privileged.1026 All of these arguments are factually false or 
too vacuous to be falsified, and hence reflect inaccurate stereotypes 
about gay people. All of these arguments also fit snugly into classical 
categories of prejudice-based thinking about gay people and other 
scapegoated minorities. 1027 
A very different kind of equal protection decision, M.L.B. v. 
S. L.J. ,1028 is both explicable and subject to critique according to my un­
derstanding of Justice Marshall's sliding scale. The issue was whether 
the state could insist that M.L.B. pay over $2000 in fees to prepare a 
record before she could appeal a judgment stripping her of her paren­
tal rights. Three Justices sought to overrule Griffin v. Illinois, which 
required the state to waive fees for poor people appealing their crimi­
nal convictions, but a majority reaffirmed that precedent and extended 
it to include appeals of family relations matters.1029 As the dissenters 
pointed out, wealth is not a suspect classification, and there is no con­
stitutional right to appeal civil judgments, but that ought not always be 
the end of equal protection analysis. What makes M.L.B. different 
from Plyler and Evans, however, is that there was no inference of 
animus or suggestion that the legislature was ill-motivated. Instead, 
the Court simply found the legitimate state interest in saving money 
outweighed by the mother's fundamental interest in seeking a forum 
to protect her family relationship. This strikes me as unlike the other 
equal protection cases, and I would understand the decision the way 
concurring Justice Kennedy did, as a due process decision ensuring the 
mother the fairest possible process when her parental rights were at 
stake. 1030 
1026. See Nagel, supra note 637, at App. A (reproducing ballot materials prepared by 
Colorado for Family Values, which sponsored Amendment 2). 
1027. Thus, hysterical prejudice attributes disease and uncleanliness to hated minorities; 
obsessional prejudice views the minorities as threats to one's self and family; narcissistic 
prejudice insists on differentiating the minority from the majority. See ESKRIDGE, GAYLA w, 
supra note 14, at 211 (drawing from ELIZABETH YOUNG-BRUEHL, THE ANATOMY OF 
PREJUDICES (1996)). 
1 028. 519 U.S. 102 (1996). 
1029. Compare id. at 129 (Thomas, J., dissenting), with id. at 106 (Ginsburg, J., for the 
Court). 
1030. Id. at 128 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (following Boddie v. Con­
necticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (Harlan, J.) (state cannot prevent indigent couple from divorc-
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Table 3 below summarizes the doctrinal features of the sliding 
scale approach to equal protection law that is suggested (to me) by the 
Court's experience with IBSM claims in the twentieth century. 
TABLE 3 
THE SLIDING SCALE: THE COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF LEGISLATIVE 
MOTIVES IN EQUAL PROTECTION CASES 
Classification Ordinary 
(Allocative) 
Economic 
Interests 
(Quasi-) Presumption of 
Suspect bad legislative 
Classifications motives 
(Fullilove; 
Adarand) 
Neutral Presumption 
Classifications against bad leg-
with Disparate islative motives 
Race/Sex (Washington v. 
Effects Davis; Feeney) 
Fishy but Presumption 
Nonsuspect against bad leg-
Classifications islative motives 
(Kras) 
Important 
State Benefits 
and Rights 
Strong presump-
tion of bad legis-
lative motives 
(Brown) 
Weak presump-
tion against bad 
legislative mo-
tives (Rodriguez) 
Open to evidence 
of bad legislative 
motives (Plyler; 
Evans) 
Fundamental 
Constitutional 
Rights 
Conclusive pre-
sumption of bad 
legislative mo-
tives (Loving) 
Open to evidence 
of bad legislative 
motives (Rogers 
v. Lodge) 
Presumption of 
bad legislative 
motives (Harper) 
3. The Disaggregation of Suspect Classifications and Subordinated 
Classes 
The interplay among IBSMs, countermovements, and the Justices 
after Loving has at least one final dimension. Loving was open to a 
reading of the Equal Protection Clause that demanded heightened 
scrutiny solely because the state deployed a suspect classification, even 
when the deployment did not directly harm a traditionally subordinate 
minority. The civil rights movement and most feminists in the 1960s 
resisted such a reading of Loving, for it gave short shrift to their anti­
subordination understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.1031 (In-
ing because they cannot afford filing fees; state monopoly on the important rights of civil 
marriage and divorce requires a particularly open and fair process)). 
1031. Thus, civil rights attorneys such as Thurgood Marshall and feminist attorneys such 
as Dorothy Kenyon and Pauli Murray believed race and sex could not be the basis for state 
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de�d, civil rights and women's movement attorneys followed the anti­
subordination principle to disaggregate classification and class in' the 
reverse way: even when the state does not announce a suspect classifi­
cation, its policy should be subjected to heightened scrutiny if it 
strongly disadvantages traditionally stigmatized classes.) But the ra­
tionality principle seemed to support an approach focusing on unreli­
able classifications. Moreover, as liberal feminists, critics of affirmative 
action, and supporters of gay marriage argued in the 1970s, the disag­
gregation of suspect classifications and stigmatized classes was justi­
fied in cases where sex classifications harmed men, race classifications 
harmed whites, and sex classifications harmed gay people. Consistent 
with Loving, if you viewed the operation of the classifications through 
the lens of their ideology (racism and sexism) sex-based classifications 
harming men and gay people reinforce the rigid gender roles that hurt 
women, and race-based classifications harming whites reinforce 
stereotypes that hurt people of color. The Court's reception of these 
various disaggregation arguments teaches us much about the politici­
zation and complexity of current equal protection doctrine. 
The classic articulation of this particular synthesis of rationality 
and anti-subordination jurisprudence, along the lines suggested by 
Loving, has been by liberal feminists. Ruth Bader Ginsburg's briefs 
maintained that most if not all sex-based classifications were unconsti­
tutional, even those discriminating against men, to the extent they re­
flected an ideology of sexism, which has been the deep cause of 
women's subordination as a class. For an example, in Kahn v. 
Shevin,1032 Ginsburg and the ACLU challenged a state law allowing 
widows, but not widowers, a small property tax exemption. The allow­
ance was an "invidious discrimination," they argued, because it was 
based on stereotypes of "a woman left alone by the death of her hus­
band," who is assumed to be destitute, in contrast with the widower, 
who "is believed to suffer scant financial loss upon the death of his 
wife."1033 Following Loving, Ginsburg was very careful to tie this classi­
fication-based argument to a class-based one: laws perpetuating out­
moded stereotypes of women as dependent on men contribute to 
women's ongoing inequality, because they encourage Americans to 
think about women as second-class citizens or as confined to the do-
exclusions, but could be the basis for programs of integration and remediation for past ex­
clusions. 
1032. 416 U.S. 351 (1974). 
1033. Brief for Appellants at 5, Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (No. 73-78); see id. 
at 6-8 (showing that many married women work outside the home, and some of them make 
more than their husbands). 
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mestic sphere.1034 The Supreme Court disagreed with Ginsburg's 
analysis in Kahn - upholding the tax law as a permissible even if im­
perfect remedy for social and state obstacles to women's advancement 
in the marketplace. But the Court accepted her argument in Craig v. 
Boren, which deployed heightened scrutiny to invalidate a law barring 
only eighteen to twenty-one-year-old males from buying two percent 
beer.1035 Ginsburg continued to press the Court to invalidate sex-based 
classifications that directly injured men, and the Court usually went 
along - except in cases where there was evidence that the intended 
effect of a gendered social security calculation was remedial.1036 
A similar kind of argument was emerging in the race cases, but 
pressed by the new politics of preservation: when the state engages in 
"reverse discrimination" in favor of racial minorities, it is deploying a 
race-based classification that perpetuates racist ideology that ulti­
mately harms people of color as a class. This argument was first made 
to the Court in DeFunis, involving affirmative action in university ad­
missions (Section I.A.3.c ). The NAACP responded that "benign" clas­
sifications were not like the one in Loving, because they sought to 
remedy past discriminations and were not motivated by the ideology 
of racism. The challengers, in turn, rearticulated the questionable ide­
ology as "race-consciousness," rather than just racism: blacks as well 
as whites suffer when the state acts, even remedially, on the basis of 
citizens' race.1037 There was surprisingly little enthusiasm for the chal­
lengers' position within the conservative Court. At the DeFunis con­
ference, only the Chief Justice spoke in their favor.1038 Justices Bren­
nan and Powell accepted the institutional deference argument, "that 
courts have no business limiting in any significant way admissions 
policies of graduate schools," and at least two other Justices (White 
and Marshall) were with them.1039 Justice Douglas, who passed at con­
ference, ultimately agreed with the challengers on the merits. 
1 034. See id. at 12. The proposition was asserted with no support, either from empirical 
or sociological surveys or even from feminist theory. 
1035. In Craig, the bar to beer purchase by 18-21 year-old boys but not girls was objec­
tionable because it reflected stereotypes of boys as wild and crazy and girls as civilizing; 
hence, the discrimination against men rested upon "archaic and overbroad" generalizations 
that have traditionally segregated women in their "separate sphere" of the household. 
1036. E.g. , Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977). 
1037. This argument pervaded the briefs in DeFunis but was most forcefully and elo­
quently pressed in Alexander Bickel and Philip Kurland's Brief of Amicus Curiae B'nai 
Brith, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (No. 73-235). See supra notes 207-214 and 
accompanying text. 
1038. See Douglas Conference Notes for DeFunis (Mar. 1, 1974), in Douglas Papers, 
supra note 192, Container 1655; Brennan Conference Notes for DeFunis, in Brennan Papers, 
supra note 129, Box 1: 311  
1039. Douglas Conference Notes for DeFunis, (Mar. 1, 1974), in  Douglas Papers, supra 
note 192, Container 1655. Brennan's docket book reflects four Justices inclined to affirm, 
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Whatever tentativeness judges may have felt in the early and even 
mid-1970s,1040 had dissipated by 1978. The reason was that the politics 
of preservation had made the issue of affirmative action a centerpiece 
of its anti-civil rights agenda; correlatively liberals supporting the civil 
rights agenda fell in behind affirmative action, whatever their misgiv­
ings. This polarization was apparent in the amicus briefs for Bakke: 
there were more of them (sixty-two all told) than ever before, and 
their arguments were completely predictable from the ideology of the 
supporting organization.1041 The polarization had infected the Court. 
As Bernard Schwartz has documented, the Court's three egalitarian 
Democrats (Brennan, White, and Marshall) lined up in favor of af­
firmative action, ultimately joined by Blackmun, whom Brennan had 
been wooing all decade; the four libertarian Republicans (Burger, 
Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens) lined up against affirmative action, 
albeit on statutory grounds to satisfy Stevens; the Nixonian Democrat 
occupied the middle (Powell).1042 Moreover, the arguments bruited 
about by the Justices had almost nothing to do with the original intent 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, its history, or the Court's precedents; 
they were straight out of the newspapers. Justices opposing "reverse 
discrimination" argued that it violated the rights and liberties of white 
people and discouraged people of color from assimilating into the 
American melting pot the way previous minorities had done. 1043 
Justices supporting "affirmative action" argued that it was consistent 
with the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause and necessary to ef­
fectuate its anti-subordination goal.1044 Justice Powell, writing only for 
himself but delivering the judgment of the Court in Bakke, accepted 
the preservationist argument in part: "benign" racial preferences 
might reinforce "common stereotypes holding that certain groups are 
four believing the case moot (including the Chief Justice), and one (Douglas) passing. Bren­
nan Conference Notes for DeFunis, in Brennan Papers, supra note 129, Box 1 :  311. 
1040. Thus, liberal Justice Douglas voted for strict and fatal scrutiny for "benign" racial 
quotas in DeFunis, and liberal Justice Stanley Mosk wrote the California Supreme Court's 
opinion doing the same in Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152 (Cal. 1976), aff d 
in part and rev'd in part, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
1041. With this exception: the Carter Administration's Department of Justice. Frank 
Easterbrook, a strongly conservative lawyer in the Solicitor General's Office, wrote an anti­
affirmative action brief which the pro-affirmative action Solicitor General Wade McCree 
rewrote under the direction of the pro-affirmative action Carter White House. The result 
was an incoherent jumble. See JEFFRIES, JUSTICE POWELL, supra note 171, at 462-63. 
1042. See SCHWARTZ, BEHIND BAKKE, supra note 217, at 56-141. 
1043. See William H. Rehnquist, Memorandum of Nov. 10-11 ,  1 977, reprinted in 
SCHWARTZ, BEHIND BAKKE, supra note 217, at 1 73-94 app. B; id. at 38-39 (Burger). 
1 044. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Memorandum of Nov. 23, 1 977, reprinted in 
SCHWARTZ, BEHIND BAKKE, supra note 217, at 225-44 app. D; Thurgood Marshall, Memo­
randum to the Conference for Bakke (Apr. 13, 1978), discussed in SCHWARTZ, BEHIND 
BAKKE, supra note 217, at 127-29. 
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unable to achieve success without special protection based on a factor 
having no relationship to individual worth," but (as in DeFunis) he 
was willing to accept graduate school admissions criteria that included 
race as one among several "pluses." 
As detailed in Section I.A.3.c of this Article, the Court continued 
to debate the constitutionality of affirmative action for a quarter cen­
tury after Bakke, and another major case awaits the Justices in the 
2002 Term.1045 Although there are no reliable records of the Court's 
internal deliberations available after 1986,1046 the Justices' votes closely 
followed their ideological predispositions: the most conservative 
Republican Justices (Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas) have fol­
lowed the Reagan Administration's stance that all or virtually all af­
firmative action plans are unconstitutional; the moderate Republicans 
(Stevens, Souter) and Clinton Democrats (Ginsburg, Breyer) would 
allow many such plans. Justice O'Connor has succeeded to the Powell 
position (swing vote) and so authored the Court's opinions in Croson 
and Adarand. Her opinions reached back to Hirabayashi and 
Korematsu to insist that any kind of racial classification must be sub­
jected to "the most searching judicial inquiry," but also that such in­
quiry might permit some such classifications, as in instances where 
they are truly needed to remedy past racial discrimination. So one ef­
fect of the affirmative action cases has been to convert strict scrutiny 
from an examination which once was automatically fatal to an exami­
nation that some statutory schemes would pass. 
Dissenting Justices in Croson and Adarand maintained that reme­
dial race-based classifications should only be subjected to the kind of 
intermediate scrutiny followed in the sex-discrimination cases, where 
the Court had generally upheld them. There are some interesting les­
sons to be drawn from this contrast. Doctrinally, the contrast between 
race-based classifications (strict scrutiny) and sex-based ones (inter­
mediate scrutiny) operates to prefer remedial preferences for women 
over remedial preferences for racial minorities; easiest to defend 
would be preferences based upon income, geography, or another fac­
tor that would produce diversity along several dimensions without de­
ploying a suspect identity trait. Recall that this is consistent with 
Justice Marshall's sliding scale approach, which further suggests that 
the benefit being apportioned is also a relevant variable. Here, I 
should think that race- or sex-based preferences would be more defen­
sible in government spending programs (Fullilove, Croson, Adarand) 
1045. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (en bane), cert. granted, 2002 
U.S. LEXIS 8677 (Dec. 2, 2002) (No. 02-241). 
1046. The Brennan Papers, supra note 129, do not allow access after the 1985 Term. The 
Blackmun Papers, which appear to have conference notes, have been catalogued by the 
Library of Congress but will not be available to scholars until 2004 at the earliest. 
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than in university admissions (DeFunis, Bakke) , because the latter in­
volve a more important symbolic interest in education. In employment 
cases, preferences that require the discharge of white or male employ­
ees are harder to defend than those expanding promotion opportuni­
ties for women or minorities.1047 
Compare the reasoning in equal protection sex cases involving 
male challengers, such as Kahn and Hogan, and in equal protection 
race cases involving white challengers, such as DeFunis and Bakke. 
Whereas Justice Douglas thought the quota program in DeFunis in­
sisted on a factor long associated with "invidious discrimination," he 
wrote the opinion for the Court in Kahn which refused even to label 
the tax exemption for widows a discrimination.1048 Justice Rehnquist's 
internal memorandum in Bakke labeled the affirmative action pro­
gram "Orwellian" because it discriminated against whites, while in 
Hogan he voted to uphold the state nursing school's exclusion because 
it was " [d]iscrimination vs. men [and] they weren't victims in past."1049 
Justice Powell's opinion treated Allan Bakke's claim as one of race 
discrimination, triggering the highest scrutiny, but he did not agree 
that Joe Hogan, excluded because he was a male, was a "victim of sex 
discrimination" and so looked only for a rational basis in that case.1050 
As Earl Warren suggested in Loving and Thurgood Marshall in 
Rodriguez, you cannot intelligently decide these cases without a the­
ory that considers the classification, the class affected, and the legisla­
tive motivation. Before affirmative action became such a polarizing 
issue, most of us did not even tend to use the term "discriminate" un­
less the decisionmaker was maliciously invoking a classification with a 
shady past to disadvantage a member of the stigmatized group. Con­
sider another equal protection argument that disaggregates classifica­
tion and class and dramatically illustrates my point that the way the 
interpreter (unconsciously) frames the relationship among classifica­
tion, class, and motive essentially predetermines the interpretive an­
swer. 
1 047. Compare Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (striking down 
collective bargaining agreement setting racial quotas for minority layoffs), with United 
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (upholding court order setting racial quotas for future 
promotions), and Local 28 Sheet Metal Workers Int'! Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) 
(upholding race-conscious membership remedy against union). 
1048. Compare DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 333 (Douglas, J., dissenting), with Kahn, 416 U.S. 
at 352-56 (Douglas, J. , for the Court) (refusing to characterize the statute as discriminating 
against men). 
1049. Compare Rehnquist Bakke Memo, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, BEHIND BAKKE, su­
pra note 217, at 176-94, with Brennan Conference Notes for Hogan (Aug. 27, 1981), in 
Brennan Papers, supra note 129, Box I: 555, Folder 2 (reporting Rehnquist's reasons for up­
holding the exclusion). 
1050. Compare Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294-95 (Powell, J.), with Brennan Conference Notes 
for Hogan (Aug. 27, 2981), in Brennan Papers, supra note 129, Box I: 555, Folder 2. 
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At the same time Professors Ginsburg and Bickel were deploying 
the Loving structure to urge heightened scrutiny for all sex- and race­
based classifications, Professor Paul Freund was deploying it as an ar­
gument for rejecting the ERA. In 1972, Freund told Congress that if 
the ERA were added to the Constitution, the courts would compel 
states to recognize same-sex (homosexual! )  marriages.1051 His logic was 
the logic of Loving: just as bars to different-race marriage are race dis­
crimination because they differentiate based on the race of one part­
ner, so bars to same-sex marriage are sex discrimination because they 
differentiate based on the sex of one partner. No one except the most 
fervent ERA opponents quite believed Freund's logic, and the 
Supreme Court had summarily and unanimously rejected the argu­
ment in Baker v. Nelson.1052 The analytical problem was the same one 
that confronted liberal feminists and reverse discrimination preserva­
tionists: the classification (sex) did not directly harm the traditionally 
disadvantaged group (women). As Andy Koppelman has demon­
strated in great detail, the miscegenation analogy for same-sex mar­
riage can be supported against this charge. In Loving, people of color 
as a class were harmed by miscegenation laws only because of the 
laws' underlying ideological motivations, namely, racist desires to pre­
serve the purity of the "white" race. Likewise, women as a class are 
harmed by same-sex marriage bars because of their ideological moti­
vations, namely, sexist desires to preserve traditional sex roles for 
women and men. 1053 
The sex discrimination argument for gay rights is analytically hard 
to distinguish from arguments the Court accepted in Hogan and 
Adarand. In the latter cases, the Court gave heightened scrutiny to, 
and struck down, sex and race classifications (respectively) whose im­
mediate disadvantage was felt by men and whites (respectively) . 
Under a rationality theory of equal protection, heightened scrutiny 
was defensible because race and sex are unreliable criteria for state 
policy - but in that event state marriage bars grounded on the sex of 
one partner ought to be scrutinized carefully, just as the Court did to 
bars grounded on the race of one partner in Loving. Under an anti-
1051. See 118 CONG. REC. 9096-97 (1972) (reproducing testimony of Prof. Freund); id. 
at 9315 (Sen. Ervin, relying on Freund testimony to oppose ERA). But see id. at 9320-21 
(Sen. Bayh, ERA sponsor, denying that ERA would require same-sex marriage). See gener­
ally Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973). 
1052. 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (mem.) (dismissing appeal because state bar to same-sex mar­
riage raised no substantial federal question, even though challenger had presented Loving 
and Reed arguments). 
1053. Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex 
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); see also ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, 
at 218-28. For a response which starts with my own framing of the issue and turns it against 
Koppelman, see Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and 
Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471 (2001). 
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subordination or representation-reinforcing theory of equal protec­
tion, heightened scrutiny was defensible in Hogan because the state 
was completely excluding men from an occupation traditionally filled 
by women and so was directly reinforcing traditional sex stereotypes 
and gender roles. The state bar was perpetuating old patterns of sex 
segregation and marginalization which have been harmful to women. 
It is for this very reason, however, that anti-subordination theory does 
not support strict scrutiny in Adarand: the race-based classification 
was not perpetuating old patterns of segregation and was, to the con­
trary, eroding them. To the extent that the Court is now operating 
primarily under a rationality approach (as Adarand suggests),  the 
Court is obliged to accord heightened scrutiny to state same-sex mar­
riage bars unless it retreats either from Craig/Hogan or from Loving. 
To the extent the Court returns to an approach considering anti­
subordination values, it should also accord heightened scrutiny, for the 
reasons Koppelman has advanced. 
The cultural and political answer to the sex discrimination argu­
ment for same-sex marriage is that it cannot be accepted until there is 
more support in society for the norm of benign sexual variation as the 
basis for state policy. So long as most people, and judges, continue to 
believe unfounded stereotypes about lesbigay people and close their 
eyes to the existence of committed lesbigay families, any argument for 
same-sex marriage looks bizarre or brave. (It looks dangerous to peo­
ple, and judges, who are prejudiced against and hate lesbigays.) Con­
versely, in polities whose judges and culture have been able to accept a 
fact-based rather than stereotype-dominated view of lesbigays and 
their families, the sex discrimination argument for same-sex marriage 
has either been accepted or treated with respect. 1054 Just as unpreju­
diced observers felt that Brown was the death knell for state bars to 
different-race marriages, so they feel that Hogan and Craig should 
speed the demise of same-sex marriage bars. But it took half a genera­
tion, and a sea change in our culture, for the Court to get from Brown 
to Loving, and it will probably take longer for our culture to get to 
same-sex marriage. Note a final contrast. Canada's political culture 
has moved toward viewing sexual variation as benign, and this has fa­
cilitated its willingness to recognize lesbian and gay unions. 1055 
1054. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (plurality opinion accepts sex di­
crimination argument requiring prohibition on same-sex marriage to be subjected to height­
ened scrutiny), remanded sub nom. Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235, at *21-22 (Haw. Cir. 
Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) (finding after evidentiary hearing that state cannot meet its burden under 
strict scrutiny), rev'd, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999) (mem.); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 905-12 
(Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring) (adding sex discrimination argument as alternative 
ground to majority invalidation of same-sex marriage bar on rationality grounds). 
1055. See M. v. H., [1999) 171 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (Can.) (invalidating state discrimination 
against lesbian and gay couples); ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 626, at ch. 3 
(surveying recent developments in Canada). 
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D. The Death Penalty Cases: Equal Protection and the Eighth 
Amendment 
The Supreme Court in Weems v. United States1056 ruled that the 
Eighth Amendment's bar to "cruel and unusual punishments" is not 
limited to measures that would have been unacceptable in 1791. Ap­
plication of the amendment has been dynamic, requiring attentiveness 
to current mores and circumstances. Although no one in 1910 would 
have thought the Eighth Amendment regulated the ability of states to 
impose the death penalty, by the close of the century some of the most 
conservative Justices were voting to strike down the death penalty on 
those grounds. Rape can no longer be punishable by death, and the 
imposition of the death penalty along racial lines is subject to never­
ending constitutional challenges. The transformation of the Eighth 
Amendment could not have occurred without the civil rights move­
ment. 
The story begins with the "Martinsville Seven," black youths con­
victed in 1949 of raping a white woman in Martinsville, Virginia. 1057 
Their trials were not afflicted with the dozens of glaring irregularities 
of the trials in the Phillips County and Scottsboro cases, and it appears 
that most and perhaps all the men were culpable of sexual assault or 
assisting in it. All seven men, including the aiders and abettors, were 
sentenced to death. That was hardly unheard-of in the South. During 
the slavery period, rape of a white woman by a black man was typi­
cally a capital offense (sometimes even when it was not a capital of­
fense for a white defendant), and the end of the formal distinction af­
ter the Civil War had virtually no effect on the operation of the death 
penalty for that crime. Between 1930 and 1967, 455 men were exe­
cuted for rape in the United States, almost all in the South; 405 of 
them were black men, almost all accused of raping a white women. 
For reasons developed earlier in this Article, the foregoing history 
was ripe for challenge after World War II. The death sentences for the 
Martinsville Seven caught the attention of civil rights journalists, po­
litical groups, and lawyers.1058 In response to thousands of letters re­
questing mercy, the governor stayed the men's executions pending the 
Inc. Fund's appeal, which raised serious challenges to the conduct of 
the trials: the judge should have granted a change in venue because of 
1056. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
1057. An excellent descriptive and analytical account of the Martinsville Seven case is 
ERIC W. RISE, THE MARTINSVILLE SEVEN: RACE, RAPE, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
(1995). 
1058. The Civil Rights Congress ("CRC"), a merger of various progressive groups in 
1946, publicized the case as an example of how the system brutalized African Americans; the 
CRC was an important player in the case but often at odds with the more moderate 
NAACP. See id. at 55-69. 
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the publicity given the case, defendants' confessions were tainted, and 
the judge's close questioning of jurors as to their stance toward the 
death penalty focused their attention unduly on that as the proper 
penalty.1059 These arguments were unsuccessful in the Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court declined to 
review their decision.1060 Various civil rights groups renewed appeals to 
the governor for clemency. Echoing a theme in many of the letters, 
Martin Martin, counsel for defendants, argued that " [t]he prime rea­
son [they] were sentenced to the electric chair was because all of them 
are colored and that the prosecutrix was a white woman and the juries 
were composed of all white men." 1061 After the governor denied the 
pleas, Martin and the Inc. Fund petitioned in state court for a writ of 
habeas corpus, based upon the argument that death sentences in rape 
cases were meted out by race: since 1908, Virginia had sentenced fifty­
three blacks and one white to death for rape and had executed forty­
five blacks and no whites.1062 This radical argument failed to persuade 
either the habeas judge or the Virginia appeals judges. Martin's last 
chance was Supreme Court review of the habeas appeal. The Court 
denied certiorari on Janmify 2, 1951.1063 One month later, the 
Commonwealth electrocuted the seven men. 
The Martinsville Seven case was the first time anyone had chal­
lenged a capital sentence because of racial disparity, but the Supreme 
Court's silence was hardly encouraging. An equal protection challenge 
to death sentences in rape cases posed questions the Justices were not 
prepared to answer affirmatively in 1950:1064 Could you be sure the 
1059. For an account of the Inc. Fund's arguments, see id. at 70-94. 
1060. Hampton v. Commonwealth: 58 S.E.2d 288 (Va. 1950), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 989 (1950) . The Inc. Fund argued that the "undue attention from the public press" created an 
"atmosphere of prejudice and hostility" to the defendants, especially given the interracial 
nature of the crime. A law clerk's memorandum to Justice Frankfurter suggested that, even 
if " 'popular sentiment . . .  was crystallizing' " against defendants, it was not legally prejudi­
cial, because " 'it seems clear that any jury would have found petitioners guilty.' " RISE, su­
pra note 1057, at 92 (quoting Cert. Memorandum, in Papers of Felix Frankfurter (microfilm), 
pt. 1, reel 45, frames 6268-69) . 
1061 . RISE, supra note 1057, at 103 (quoting Martin's letter); see id. at 103-12 (summa­
rizing other letters and the clemency review process). 
1062. See id. at 112-25 (detailing arguments and decisions in the Virginia habeas pro­
ceedings); see also Donald H. Partington, The Incidence of the Death Penalty for Rape in 
Virginia, 22 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 43 (1965) (updating the data: all 56 men executed for 
rape since 1908 were African American). On the eve of Brown v. Allen, the Inc. Fund did 
not file their habeas petition with the federal court but instead followed the route of state 
habeas. 
1063. Hampton v. Smyth, 340 U.S. 914 (1951). 
1064. See Brief for Respondent in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8-
10, Hampton v. Smyth, 340 U.S. 914 (1951) (1950 Term, No. 245, Misc.); RISE, supra note 
1057, at 129-30 (relying on a memorandum to Justice Burton, suggesting that certiorari be 
denied in the Martinsville Seven case). 
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race differential was not caused by some other factor? So long as there 
was no outside racist pressure from a mob or the judge, could the race­
based differential be properly attributed to the state? Was it justifiable 
to prevent all applications of the death penalty because of the race dif­
ferential? For these reasons, state judges rejected these arguments in 
the 1950s.1065 The issue lay dormant at the Supreme Court level - un­
til Justices Goldberg, Douglas, and Brennan renewed it in a dissent 
from the denial of certiorari in 1963. Their dissent asked that the 
Court consider whether the Eighth Amendment (freshly applicable to 
the states) should be construed to permit �tate execution of rapists 
who have neither taken nor endangered human life.1066 Although the 
Justices did not tie their published dissent to the race differential, it 
was clearly a concern of theirs.1067 This episode, moreover, directly 
stimulated interest within the Inc. Fund to develop their Martinsville 
Seven arguments in the context of the Eighth Amendment as well as 
the Equal Protection Clause.1068 
The Inc. Fund's campaign against the death penalty commenced in 
earnest at a point when most states outside the South had repealed the 
penalty for rape cases and executions everywhere were steeply in de­
cline. And, as the Fund's lawyers soon learned, a huge number of capi­
tal cases were infected with serious procedural errors that could sup­
port a variety of challenges. In the wake of the Supreme Court's 
liberalization of habeas corpus rules in Fay v. Noia, such challenges 
could generate federal hearings on issues not raised in state court. In 
the wake of new criminal law precedents such as Mapp, Malloy, 
Gideon, Escobedo, and Miranda, such challenges could raise issues 
that would not have been legally cognizable during the earlier state 
proceedings. For each state where it picked up a test case, the Inc. 
1065. E.g., Williams v. State, 1 10 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959) (rejecting relevance of evidence 
that 33 blacks and 1 white executed for rape, 1925-59); Brickhouse v. Commonwealth, 159 
S.E.2d 611 (Va. 1968) (rejecting relevance of evidence that fifty-six blacks and zero whites 
were executed for rape, 1908-65) .  
1066. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting from the de­
nial of certiorari). The matter was also being debated among lawyers and academics. See 
Gerald Gottlieb, Testing the Death Penalty, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 268 (1961) (arguing that the 
death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment). 
1067. In an earlier draft, Justice Goldberg suggested that barring capital punishment in 
rape cases "would also eliminate the well-recognized disparity in the imposition of the death 
penalty for sexual crimes committed by whites and nonwhites." This evidence was uncov­
ered by Dennis D. Dorin, Two Different Worlds: Criminologists, Justice and Racial Discrimi­
nation in the Imposition of Criminal Punishment in Rape Cases, 72 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1667, 1694 (1981). 
1068. MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 28-59 (1973); see also Jack Greenberg & Jack Himmelstein, Varieties 
of Attack on the Death Penalty, 15 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 112 (Jan. 1969); Eric Muller, 
The Legal Defense Fund's Capital Punishment Campaign: The Distorting Influence of Death, 
4 YALE LAW & POL'Y REV. 158 (1985). 
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Fund developed sophisticated empirical surveys showing not only that 
race was the probable variable determining death sentences for rapes 
and other capital crimes, but also that other observable factors were 
not statistically significant contributing factors.1069 
The first major challenge to reach the Supreme Court was Maxwell 
v. Bishop. 1070 Representing the defendant, the Inc. Fund demonstrated 
that Arkansas' imposition of the death penalty was almost exclusively 
against black men, like William Maxwell, who had been convicted of 
raping white women.1071 There were two interconnected constitutional 
infirmities generating these statistics: the state gave racially biased ju­
rors no standards to follow in deciding between life in prison and 
death for a defendant, and the defendant was not practically able to 
plead for his life for fear that his testimony seeking leniency could 
help convict him of the crime in a single-verdict (on guilt and sen­
tence) trial.1072 The Court was, on the whole, sympathetic to the 
NAACP's concerns. As Chief Justice Warren put it in conference, 
"Death [is] known to be reserved for [the] poor and underprivileged 
- rarely does one who can afford a good lawyer suffer the death pen­
alty. "1073 Six Justices (Warren, Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, Fortas, and 
Marshall) were prepared to strike down Arkansas' death penalty and 
to require states to conduct a separate hearing (after the trial convict­
ing the defendant) before such a penalty could be imposed, but only 
three (Warren, Douglas, and Brennan) agreed with the NAACP on 
the issue of standards.1074 
Douglas circulated an opinion in April 1969 that followed the 
NAACP on both issues but was unable to attract a majority to join the 
opinion.1075 Justice Harlan, in particular, was not at rest as to his posi­
tion and ultimately agreed to write for the Court in McGautha v. 
1069. See Marvin Wolfgang & Marc Reidel, Race, Judicial Discretion, and the Death 
Penalty, 407 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 119 (1973) (study of death sentences in 
eleven southern states over twenty-year period, finding seven times as many blacks sen­
tenced to death as whites; a black defendant harming a white victim was eighteen times more 
likely to be sentenced to death than any other combination of defendant/victim). 
1070. 398 U.S. 262 (1970). 
1071. Brief for Petitioner at 11-24, Maxwell (1968 Term, No. 13); see id. at la-23a (Ap­
pendix A, statistical evidence compiled by Professor Wolfgang). 
1072. Id. at 24-66 (no standards); id. at 66-79 (single-verdict trial). 
1073. Brennan Conference Notes for Maxwell, in Brennan Papers, supra note 129, Box 
I: 201, Folder 2. 
1074. Douglas Conference Notes for Maxwell (Mar. 6, 1969), in Douglas Papers, supra 
note 192, Container 1470; Docket Sheet for Maxwell, in Brennan Papers, supra note 1 29; 
Box I: 201, Folder 2 (initial votes on the merits in Maxwell) . 
1075. See Justice Douglas, Memorandum to Conference, Re: No. 622 - Maxwell v. 
Bishop (Apr. 4, 1969) (draft opinion attached), in Douglas Papers, supra note 192, Container 
1470. 
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California,1076 which declined to find unitary trials unconstitutional. As 
the term ran out, the Court ordered reargument in Maxwell for spring 
1970. By then, the retirements of Warren and Fortas meant that 
Douglas had permanently lost his majority. After reargument, there 
were only four votes for requiring bifurcation (Douglas, Harlan, 
Brennan, and Marshall) and three for requiring standards (Douglas, 
Brennan, and Marshall) . 1077 But there were six Justices (all but Burger 
and Black) willing to overturn Maxwell's death sentence on a narrow 
procedural ground, and so the Court ruled. The case which death pen­
alty abolitionists felt would end this form of punishment had fizzled -
at the very point when the Court was veering sharply to the right. 
There could not have been much cause for optimism on the part of 
abolitionists when the Court announced in 1971 that it was taking two 
rape and two murder cases as vehicles to consider the constitutionality 
of the death penalty. (Any optimism would have faded when two 
more Warren Court Justices were then replaced with Nixon appoint­
ees Rehnquist and Powell.) Nonetheless, briefs filed by the Inc. Fund 
(counsel of record in two of the cases) and the NAACP pressed upon 
the Court historical and social science accounts showing that the death 
penalty in the South (where it was, by 1971, increasingly concentrated) 
had traditionally been reserved for defendants of color, especially in 
rape cases, and that the continuing race differential could be directly 
traced to laws of the slavery period and practices of the Jim Crow 
era.1078 The fact that the death penalty was rarely imposed but, when 
imposed, was typically reserved for black defendants gave rise to the 
conclusion that it was applied "freakishly," an arbitrariness that, 
movement lawyers maintained, violated the Eighth Amendment in its 
cruelty and unusualness.1079 One problem with this position was that 
the vagueness of the Eighth Amendment standard seemed to leave 
too much discretion with judges to strike down laws simply because 
1076. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). 
1077. See Douglas Conference Notes for Maxwell (May 6, 1970), in Douglas Papers, su­
pra note 192, Container 1470; Brennan Conference Notes for Maxwell (reargument), in 
Brennan Papers, supra note 129, Box I: 201, Folder 2. 
1078. Brief for Petitioner at 50-54, Aikens v. California, 406 U.S. 813 (1971) (1968 Term, 
No. 5027) (adopted in Brief for Petitioner at 1 1-12, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) 
(1969 Term, No. 5003)); Brief of Amici Curae NAACP et al. at 7-19, Aikens (1968 Term, 
No. 5027). But see Brief for Respondents at 103-09, Aikens (1968 Term, No. 5027) (demon­
strating that, for California, there was no appreciable race differential). 
1079. E.g. , Brief for Petitioner at 36-39, 50-61, Aikens (1968 Term, No. 5027); see also 
Brief of Amicus Curiae The Synagogue Council of America and the American Jewish Con­
gress at 29-35, Branch (1969 Term, No. 5031) (death penalty imposed overwhelmingly in 
former apartheid states and against blacks; such "unequal punishment" is both "unjust" and 
"cruel"). Furman, which became the lead case, presented a different complexity: the defen­
dant was mentally disabled, and so there was an added Eighth Amendment concern. Brief 
for Petitioner at 8-11 ,  Furman (1969 Term, No. 5003). 
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they felt the laws unfair as a policy matter. At oral argument, Anthony 
Amsterdam, the counsel in two of the appeals, responded to this con­
cern with an "objective" standard that fit well with the sociological ar­
gument in the briefs: the Eighth Amendment does not allow legisla­
tures to leave capital punishment in place for crimes for which society 
would recoil if death were meted out evenhandedly; if the only reason 
legislatures leave rape and even murder as capital crimes is that they 
know those penalties will be rarely applied, and then "only" to poor 
men of color, that is unconstitutional.1080 
As unlikely as the odds of success might have seemed, 
Amsterdam's arguments moved the Justices. Even Chief Justice 
Burger and Justice Blackmun expressed hesitancy about the death 
penalty in the rape cases, but they and the other Nixon appointees 
voted to affirm in all the cases. 1081 Justice Douglas voted to reverse in 
all the cases: the "lack of standards makes [the] system discrimina­
tory," which renders it "unusual" under the Eighth Amendment, he 
argued in conference. Justice Brennan expressed concern that the dy­
namic application of the Eighth Amendment be guided by "objective" 
criteria, which he found satisfied in the demonstrated "selectivity" of 
its imposition; because that selectivity was racial, equal protection 
concerns were also mobilized. Justice Marshall voiced similar views, 
surely based on his own first-hand experience with the racially dis­
criminatory deployment of the penalty in the South. Justices Stewart 
and White, both of whom had rejected the Inc. Fund's position in the 
Maxwell conferences, were won over by the Amsterdam argument: 
they had ultimately been persuaded that the death penalty was not 
"meted out fairly." White was bothered that death came too infre­
quently, Stewart that it came arbitrarily, like a "bolt of lightning." 
Unless death were a mandatory or better structured penalty, it served 
neither deterrent nor retributive goals of the criminal justice system. 
The opinion for the Court in Furman v. Georgia1082 was short per cu­
riam announcing that all four of the challenged statutes violated the 
Eighth Amendment. It was accompanied by five lengthy concurring 
opinions by the majority Justices, three of whom explicitly relied on 
1080. 73 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 199, at 835, 838 (Amsterdam's oral argument 
in Aikens); id. at 861 -62 (presenting an even blunter argument in Furman: because "Georgia 
executes black people," there was "no pressure on the legislature" to reform the death pen­
alty). 
1081. The Justices' views in this paragraph are taken from Douglas Conference Notes 
on the Death Penalty Cases (January 2 1 ,  1972), in Douglas Papers, supra note 192, Con­
tainer 1542. See also BOB WOODWARD & SCOTI ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE 
THE SUPREME COURT 242-53 (1979) Qournalistic account, based on interviews with law 
clerks and possibly a Justice or two: Marshall, Douglas, White, and Stewart were all troubled 
by the racially discriminatory application of the death penalty). 
1082. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
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the race differential as the main reason they were finding an Eighth 
Amendment violation.1083 
Furman was not the death knell of capital punishment in the 
United States, as the abolition movement had hoped. Indeed, as 
Brown and Roe had done with civil rights and abortion, Furman con­
tributed to a powerful death penalty countermovement that drew its 
strength from a mix of popular fears, including safety concerns, re­
sentment that the Court had intervened, and racist associations be­
tween crime and color.1084 Between 1972 and 1976, states responded 
with new death penalty statutes, each seeking to solve the problem of 
excessive discretion: seventeen states adopted laws making death the 
mandatory punishment for a limited and well-defined number of 
crimes; six states and the federal government enacted laws requiring 
the death penalty when statutory defined aggravating (and no miti­
gating) circumstances are found by the jury; seven states enacted laws 
requiring the sentencer to find one or more statutorily defined aggra­
vating circumstances but also to consider particular mitigating circum­
stances before imposing death; five states enacted laws requiring the 
sentencer to impose the death penalty if it finds one statutory defined 
aggravating circumstance.1085 Consistent with my hypothesis that death 
penalty litigation was driven by civil rights concerns, every single peti­
tion for Supreme Court review came from the South, which also had 
the harshest death penalty statutes.1086 The Court selected cases repre­
senting five different kinds of statutes. In each appeal, the Inc. Fund 
and other civil rights attorneys argued that the new statutes did not 
solve the problem of excessive discretion and would predictably gen­
erate the same kind of racially disparate sentencing the Court had 
seen in Furman.1087 The state briefs had no intelligent response to this 
1083. See id. at 248-56 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); 
id. at 364-66 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
1084. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY 267-71 (2002); JAN GORECKI, 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIMINAL LAW AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION 97-113 (1983); 
RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 127-28; FRANKLIN E. 
ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 38-
45 (1986); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two 
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 410-12 
(1995). 
1085. See Memorandum from James B. Ginty to the Conference, Re: Capital Cases, at 
1 -4 (Jan. 15, 1976), in Brennan Papers, supra note 129, Box I: 366, Folder 3. 
1086. For example, only three southern states made rape a capital crime. The most dra­
conian mandatory death statutes were in the South; North Carolina's was easily the most 
severe. 
1087. See Brief for Petitioner at 28-64, Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (No. 75-'i394) 
(excessive discretion), id. at 81 -84 & nn.146-147 (racially discriminatory applications) incor­
porating by reference arguments made and data assembled in Brief for Petitioner, Fowler v. 
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 904 (1 976) (No. 73-7031) (earlier appeal)). The petitioners in 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (No. 75-5491) (also represented by the Inc. 
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concern, but Solicitor General Robert Bork's comprehensive amicus 
brief supporting the states claimed that the NAACP's empirical stud­
ies only established patterns of race discrimination in rape cases, not 
the murder cases that the Court had selected here.1088 
At conference, Justices Brennan and Marshall reiterated the fun­
damental opposition to the death penalty they had expressed in their 
Furman concurring opinions; Chief Justice Burger and Justices 
Blackmun and Rehnquist stuck with their deferential Furman dis­
sents.1089 Justice White was satisfied that all five statutes met his 
Furman concerns that the states were not serious about enforcing out­
dated statutes. Focusing on "evolving standards of decency," Justice 
Stewart was impressed that thirty-five state legislatures had re­
established the death penalty for murder, but remained concerned 
that jury imposition of that penalty be guided by rational standards. 
Although a Furman dissenter, Justice Powell concluded that the ear­
lier decision had played a "salutary role" in requiring states to rethink 
their capital statutes and, in reenacting them, to provide new proce­
dural safeguards to ensure against its arbitrary imposition. Justice 
Stevens agreed with both Stewart (standards) and Powell (procedural 
safeguards) but was appalled at the "monster" North Carolina statute, 
which imposed mandatory death sentences on a wide range of crimes. 
As the center on this issue, Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens 
essentially took the cases away from Justice White, to whom the Chief 
Justice had assigned the opinions. The three centrists delivered a joint 
opinion announcing the judgment of the Court in each of the five 
cases, upholding three statutes and striking down two. In the lead case, 
Gregg v. Georgia,1090 the joint opinion interpreted Furman as requiring 
that "where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so 
grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or 
Fund), Roberts v. Lousiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (No. 75-5844) (same), and Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 1 53 (1976) (No. 74-6257), followed the Jurek excessive-discretion argument and 
adopted the race discrimination argument by explicit reference. 
1088. Compare Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States at 65-69 & la-9a (app. A), 
Gregg et al. (No. 74-6257) (detailed analysis of empirical studies), with Consolidated Reply 
Brief for Petitioners at 15-19 n.26, Jurek et al. (No. 75-5394) (refuting Bork's analysis). The 
Inc. Fund's reply brief also brought the Court's attention to a new empirical study showing 
that the percentage of people of color on death row had increased under the post-Furman 
regime. See Marc Riedel, Discrimination in the Imposition of the Death Penalty: A Compari­
son of the Characteristics of Offenders Sentenced Pre-Furman and Post-Furman, 49 TEMPLE 
L.Q. 261 (l 976). 
1089. My discussion of the conference in this paragraph is taken from Brennan Confer­
ence Notes for Jurek et al., in Brennan Papers, supra note 129, Box I: 371 , Folder 2. 
1090. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding Georgia law where the jury considered statutorily 
defined aggravating and mitigating circumstances before it could enter a death sentence). 
The Court also upheld the laws in Jurek, 428 U.S. 262 (similar), and Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242 
(similar, where the judge was required to consider aggravating and mitigating circum­
stances). 
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spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to 
minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."1091 The 
new Georgia statute had ample safeguards to protect against arbitrari­
ness: the trial was bifurcated, so that the defendant could abstain from 
testifying at the guilt phase without losing the opportunity to plea for 
his life in the sentencing phase; the jury was instructed as to the par­
ticular aggravating and mitigating factors they must consider; and sub­
stantive searching review of every death sentence was assured by the 
state's supreme court.1092 The joint opinion did not specifically respond 
to the Inc. Fund's concern, documented for the post-Furman cases, 
that the new statute would continue to be applied in a racially dis­
criminatory manner, apparently because these Justices were confident 
that the procedural protections would ensure substantive fairness. In 
Woodson v. North Carolina,1093 the joint opinion ruled that mandatory 
death sentences for a specified range of cases violated the Eighth 
Amendment, in part because such laws were substantively unfair in 
light of the nation's evolving standards of decency and in part because 
they did not provide standards to constrain juries, which would engage 
in an unguided process of frequent nullification of the substantive of­
fense under such statutes.1094 
Three states adopted post-Furman statutes imposing the death 
penalty in cases of rape. This was a significant consequence of 
Furman, as it required states to drop capital punishment from offenses 
for which there was insufficient popular support. The Inc. Fund chal­
lenged those statutes in Coker v. Georgia.1095 Its brief laid out the fa­
miliar history of Georgia's highly raced application of the death pen­
alty for rape and argued that this penalty was guaranteed to be both 
racially disproportionate and freakishly applied.1096 Joining the Inc. 
Fund in attacking the law was a brief filed by Ruth Bader Ginsburg for 
the ACLU's Women's Rights Project and other feminist groups. Capi-
1091. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 159 Uoint opinion); see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stew­
art, J., concurring); id. at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 291-95 (Brennan, J., concur­
ring). 
1092. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188-205 Uoint opinion). The concurring Justices would not have 
required as much of the state. Id. at 220-26 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 226 
(statement of Burger, C.J. and Rehnquist, J.); id. at 227 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
1093. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
1094. Id. at 285-305 Goint opinion); see id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judg­
ment for his Furman reasons); id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment for his Furman 
reasons). But see id. at 303-24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (detailed critique of joint opinion's 
reasoning). See also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (also striking down a manda­
tory death penalty law for particular kinds of murders). 
1095. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) . 
1096. Brief for Petitioner at 48-59, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (No. 75-5444); 
see id. at app. A (detailing the raced history of punishment for rape in Georgia). 
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tal rape statutes enjoyed a history that was patriarchal as well as racist: 
this extreme penalty for sexual assault was a vestige of an era when 
women's value rested mainly on their presentability for marriage (vir­
ginity) but men distrusted (seductive) women to be sufficient guaran­
tors of their own chastity and were hysterical at the possibility that 
women would fall prey to men of color.1097 Georgia's law therefore 
failed the Court's requirement that capital punishment satisfy "con­
temporary standards regarding the infliction of punishment." Unlike 
Gregg and Woodson, this was an easy case for the Justices. At the 
Gregg conference, Justice Stevens had opined that "death is impermis­
sible for rape - only five or six states have it and they are deep South 
with potential for racial bias behind it."1098 The combination of the 
racist history of capital punishment for rape and the plummeting 
popular support for such statutes (except in the "deep South" ! )  were 
lethal for all the Justices except Burger and Rehnquist, who dissented 
half-heartedly. 
Gregg and Coker by no means ended the NAACP's campaign 
against the death penalty. The Inc. Fund returned to the equal protec­
tion argument it had initiated in the Martinsville Seven case, but with 
more sophisticated statistical techniques than ever before. Again, the 
situs of the challenge was Georgia. David Baldus and his colleagues 
demonstrated that the post-Gregg application of the death penalty in 
that state was most decisively influenced by the race of the victim. 1099 
Even after considering hundreds of other variables, the researchers 
found that defendants accused of killing whites were four times more 
likely to receive capital sentences than those accused of killing 
nonwhites. The raw statistics were damning enough, even without 
fancy numerology.1 100 Most victims of homicide in Georgia were black 
people. But since Gregg, Georgia had executed seven men, all of 
whom had killed white people; six of the seven executed men were 
1097. This background of patriarchal racism generated a "schizophrenic law of rape, 
characterized on the one hand by unenforceably severe penalties, and on the other, by spe­
cial rules requiring corroboration of the victim's testimony" and so forth (except in interra­
cial rape cases). Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU et al. at 1 9, Coker (No. 75-5444); see also 
BARBARA BABCOCK ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND 
REMEDIES 868 (1975). 
1098. Brennan Conference Notes for Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), in Brennan 
Papers, supra note 129, Container I: 371, Folder 2. There were three such laws in 1976, two 
of which were mandatory death penalty laws that were disapproved in Woodson. Three 
other states had laws making rape of children a capital offense, and three of the Justices, 
White, Stewart, and Powell, commented that it might be allowable. 
1099. See DAVID c. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A 
LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990). 
1100. See Brief of Amici Curiae the Congressional Black Caucus, the Lawyers' Commit­
tee for Civil Rights Under Law, and the NAACP at 5-6, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 
(1987) (No. 84-6811) .  
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black men convicted of killing white people. Of the fifteen men 
Georgia was holding on death row before Warren McCleskey arrived, 
thirteen were black men, nine of whom killed white people (the two 
white men on death row also killed white people). These raw numbers 
suggested that the death process in Georgia was not only as raced as it 
had been before Furman (even with the rape cases excluded), but in 
ways that were symbolically squalid under Brown's normative regime: 
a life for a life was the punishment only when white people died; white 
lives were worth more than black lives. Seventeen men had been con­
victed in Georgia for killing police officers; Warren McCleskey, a 
black man convicted of killing a white officer, was the only man to re­
ceive a death sentence. The Inc. Fund strenuously argued that this 
violated both the Eighth Amendment (Furman) and the Equal 
Protection Clause (Norris) .  
Justice Powell was not persuaded. In  a memorandum urging his 
colleagues not to take review in McCleskey v. Kemp,1 101 he questioned 
whether discrimination as to the victim's race made out an equal pro­
tection claim by the defendant and opined that the Baldus study re­
vealed a reasonably well-operating system of criminal justice.1 102 
Powell believed that the procedural checks approved in Gregg, to­
gether with Batson's requirement that judges monitor prosecutors' 
peremptory strikes of black jurors, were a sufficient regime to regulate 
racism in the system. In his opinion for the Court, Powell emphasized 
the same simple point that the Commonwealth of Virginia had em­
phasized half a century before in the Martinsville Seven case: there 
was no evidence of juror discrimination in the particular case before 
the Court. 1103 Like the NAACP, Justices Brennan, Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Stevens believed the system of criminal justice itself 
was on trial - and the evidence against it was damning. The majority 
of the Court - the four Reagan Justices and Powell - refused to see 
the case as anything but an individual appeal for which they could not 
grant relief.' 1°4 After a second unsuccessful trip to the Court on habeas 
1 101. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
1 102. Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell to the Conference (June 27, 1986), discussed 
in JEFFRIES, JUSTICE POWELL, supra note 171, at 439. The Baldus study had found the racial 
differential unimpressive for low-aggravation crimes (almost no one was sentenced to death) 
or for the high-aggravation crimes (most were sentenced to death). The race differential was 
most pronounced for those in McCleskey's category of medium-aggravation: juries over­
whelmingly favored defendants who killed black people over defendants who killed white 
people. 
1 103. Compare McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297, 309-12 (finding Baldus study insufficient to 
demonstrate that this defendant's sentence was tainted by discrimination), with Brief for Re­
spondent in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Hampton v. Smyth, 340 
U.S. 914 (1951) (1950 Term, Misc. No. 245) ("Did the juries in the instant cases discriminate 
against the petitioner? There is no such evidence."). 
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review,1105 Warren McCleskey was executed on September 25, 1991, 
thirteen years after he had killed the police officer. 
Does McCleskey, decided at the tail end of the century, mean the 
end of the constitutional discourse against the death penalty? Proba­
bly not. The Powell opinion itself left open the possibility that par­
ticularized evidence of the operation of racial prejudice in a specific 
case would justify overturning a death sentence. Indeed, the debate 
within the Court revealed that most of the Justices were actually per­
suaded that juries acted upon the basis of conscious or unconscious ra­
cism. The four dissenters openly made that charge - and they found 
an unlikely echo in Justice Antonin Scalia. In a remarkable memo to 
his colleagues, Scalia objected to Powell's suggestion that racist moti­
vations by jurors would justify reversing a sentence. Because "the un­
conscious operation of irrational sympathies . . .  including racial, upon 
jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial [decisions], is real, acknowl­
edged by the [decisions] of this court, and ineradicable, I cannot hon­
estly say that all I need is more proof."1 106 More firmly than Powell, 
however, Scalia was unwilling to act upon this knowledge to overturn 
capital punishment statutes. An open acknowledgment of this position 
in a judicial opinion would be almost unthinkable. Not only is the on­
going racism of the criminal justice system being pushed into a consti­
tutional closet, but so is the acknowledgment that it does not matter. 
Nonetheless, the core lesson of the Martinsville Seven case reso­
nates still: the administration of capital punishment in this country 
must be understood against the backdrop of the persistence of racial 
distinctions and fears; ignoring or denying the effect of race - docu­
mented in every respectable study that I have seen1107 - does not 
solve the problem and leaves the criminal justice system vulnerable to 
questions about its legitimacy. One does not have to be a radical to be 
troubled by this. Justice Blackmun, a consistent ally in Chief Justice 
Burger's campaign to uphold the death penalty in the 1970s, dissented 
passionately in McCleskey. At the end of his tenure, he announced his 
belief that the death penalty was per se unconstitutional. 1 108 After he 
1 104. Like Virginia in 1950, Powell in 1987 could not envision a remedy for the bad 
numbers that a restrained court could implement. Stevens' suggestion that the Court rule 
against the death penalty for all but the most egregious circumstances smacked too much of 
judicial legislation for the majority. For a nuanced critique of the Powell decision, see 
KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME , supra note 202, at 326-50. 
1 105. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991). 
1 1 06. Justice Scalia's internal memo was uncovered and analyzed in Dennis D. Dorin, 
Far Right of the Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies from the Perspective of Justice 
Antonin Scalia 's McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1035 (1994). 
1107. See the list of sources in KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, supra note 202, at 450-51 n.51 .  
1 108. Callins v.  Collins, 510 U.S.  1141 ,  1 157 (1 994) (Blackmun, J . ,  dissenting from denial 
of certiorari). 
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left the Court, Justice Powell told his biographer that he regretted his 
vote in McCleskey and had concluded that the death penalty could not 
be properly administered in this country. 11°9 
E. Equal Protection and the Shifting Fortunes of the Political 
Question, Federalism, and State Action Doctrines 
The newly vital Equal Protection Clause engineered by the civil 
rights · politics of recognition had ancillary but ambiguous conse­
quences for a whole range of other constitutional doctrines: the politi­
cal question doctrine, federalism limits on congressional regulatory 
authority, and the state action doctrine. The Supreme Court's long 
campaign to support the civil rights movement's politics of recognition 
motivated the Justices to relax each of these limitations on judicial and 
legislative authority. Specifically, the voting and desegregation cases 
drew the Court irrevocably into the political thicket and contributed 
directly to the Court's great activism in legislative apportionment 
cases; the Court's desire to approve new federal statutes protecting 
people of color against various forms of state and private discrimina­
tion represented an extension of both Commerce Clause and 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment authorizations for Congress to 
regulate local affairs; the complicated interrelationships between pub­
lic and private oppression of minorities triggered loopholes and excep­
tions to the state action requirement for constitutional intervention by 
the courts and, in some cases, the Congress. The Court's equal protec­
tion activism in all these venues went against the grain of traditional 
doctrine - which made a comeback in the last quarter of the century. 
Separation of powers, federalism, and libertarian values were constitu­
tional tropes to which the anti-civil rights, anti-ERA and pro-life, and 
TFV countermovements could successfully appeal. 
But the revival of these constitutional values did not, and could 
not, turn back the clock to 1950, and so these areas of law well illus­
trate how the interaction between IBSMs and their countermove­
ments create doctrinal webs and spirals. The webs, moreover, were 
woven in unpredictable patterns. The most unexpected beneficiary of 
those patterns was George W. Bush, whose selection as President 
owed more than a little to the legacy of the civil rights movement in 
voting cases. 
1 109. See JEFFRIES, JUSTICE POWELL, supra note 171, at 451-52. 
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1 .  Voting Cases and the Displacement of the Political Question 
Doctrine 
American courts long refrained from deciding "political" ques­
tions. The classical doctrine rests upon the constitutional notion that 
the role of the Court is to enforce legal rights, and not to decide mat­
ters of policy the Constitution has allocated to the discretion of offi­
cials in the other branches of government. 1 1 10 But most of the great 
political question decisions have emphasized pragmatic considerations 
as well. For example, in Luther v. Borden,1 1 1 1  the Court refused to ad­
judicate a controversy over which competing faction represented the 
legitimate government of Rhode Island, in part because the 
Guarantee Clause seemed to vest Congress with primary responsibil­
ity for determining whether a state government was properly "republi­
can," but also because a judgment would have presented problems of 
interpretation and enforcement beyond the Court's institutional com­
petence.1 1 1 2 Some of the political question cases have emphasized a 
court's "equitable discretion" not to issue injunctive relief in cases 
presenting political or other problems with enforcement. Accordingly, 
I would separate three different strands of what might be collectively 
deemed a political question doctrine: (1) constitutional, arising out of 
the Constitution's allocation of authority to other branches of gov­
ernment; and (2) pragmatic, relating to the competence of the judici­
ary to discern rules and principles of law to the matter and (3) to ad­
minister a remedy.1 1 13 
A classic statement of the pragmatic rule-discernment and admin­
istrability features of the political question doctrine was Giles v. 
1 1 10. E.g. , Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (dictum). One feature that has made 
Marbury a great case is that the Court distanced itself from "political" issues while at the 
same time framing its legal opinion so as to minimize "political" risks to the Court. See 
William Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1 .  Academic 
articulations of the rule of law basis for the doctrine include Oliver P. Field, The Doctrine of 
Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. REV. 485 (1924). 
1 1 11 .  48 U.S. (7 How.) 1,  47 (1849). 
1 1 12. Id. at 39-40; see also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939) (plurality 
opinion of Hughes, C.J.) (citing lack of judicially manageable standards as reason for refus­
ing to determine an expiration date for ratifying a proposed constitutional amendment); Pa­
cific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 1 18, 141-42 (1912) (another Guarantee 
Clause case, but with much greater emphasis on pragmatic reasons for abstaining). 
1 1 13.  For a more elaborate typology, see Louis Henkin, Is There a Political Question 
Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976) (political question doctrine is a collection of various doc­
trines of abstention). For a simpler typology, see Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than 
Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002) (emphasizing the "prudential" features of the political question 
doctrine). One might also usefully distinguish among political question justifications for fed­
eral courts to (a) refuse jurisdiction over a matter, (b) determine there is no constitutional 
cause of action, or (c) withhold relief in the court's discretion. 
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Harris.1114 The case involved a claim tha't Montgomery County, 
Alabama unlawfully refused to register more than 5000 qualified 
African-American voters. Such a claim, routinely justiciable today, 
was not in 1903. Although "traditional limits of proceedings in equity 
have not embraced a remedy for political wrongs," Justice Holmes' 
opinion for the Court assumed that the circuit court had jurisdiction, 
and the complaint made out a constitutional claim, but ruled that the 
court properly declined to issue an injunction to remedy the wrongs. 
The main reasons were that popular opinion would defeat the injunc­
tion, rendering it pointless, and that only the national political process 
could truly assure that voting rights could be enforced under these cir­
cumstances, making the injunction unnecessary.1115 The latter point 
was fanciful, as the federal government had abandoned those "sullen 
peoples" to the operation of local politics. 1 1 1 6  If Giles were read 
broadly, it would have rendered southern voting practices immune 
from constitutional challenge - not because the Constitution denied 
federal courts authority to adjudicate such cases, but because the 
courts saw themselves as incompetent to do so or impotent to adminis­
ter a remedy. Under the theoretical framework in this Article, Giles 
would be read broadly only so long as its victims were completely 
marginalized - which of course was the object of the Alabama voting 
practices. 
Giles was not read broadly, in part because of the political and le­
gal efforts of the NAACP and its allies. In Guinn, none of the parties 
cited Giles, presumably because the state grandfather clause was 
transparently unconstitutional, the remedy straightforward (simple in­
validation of the statute), and its enforcement highly likely. The last 
point owed much to the fact that the United States itself was prose­
cuting the case, a stance that civil rights activists had orchestrated. 
When the NAACP later challenged Texas's white primary law in 
Nixon v. Herndon,11 17 without the support of the Solicitor General, the 
pragmatic-administrability considerations of Giles were more relevant. 
1 1 14. 189 U.S. 475 (1903). For an excellent exegesis, see Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, 
Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST'L COMM. 295 (2000). 
1 115. Giles, 189 U.S. at 487. Holmes made two other arguments against relief: the plain­
tiffs' cause of action was founded on the very statutory scheme they were challenging, and 
plaintiffs were unable to sue the state because of Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), and 
so would not be able to obtain a genuine remedy. This latter difficulty would be cured by Ex 
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which allowed civil rights plaintiffs to sue state officials for 
injunctive relief. 
11 16. Pildes, supra note 1 1 14, at 307 (quoting William A. Dunning, The Undoing of Re­
construction, 88 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 437, 449 (Oct. 1901)); see id. at 309-10 (Congress in 
1904 abandoned any effort to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment even as to the legitimacy of 
its own members' elections, leaving the matter to the courts). 
1 1 17. 273 U.S. 536 (1927), discussed supra Section I.Al. 
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The plaintiffs sought to get around that equitable precedent by bring­
ing an action at law for damages resulting from the denial of their right 
to vote. 11 18 More broadly, the NAACP argued that the political ques­
tion doctrine was inapplicable to cases where citizens were asserting 
individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution, specifically the rights 
to vote and to the equal protection of the laws. 1 1 19 
Justice Holmes again wrote for the Court. He followed the 
NAACP in distinguishing Giles on the ground that it was a decision in 
equity not applicable to actions at law and then ruling that the classifi­
cation of voting rights as "political" and therefore unreviewable is "lit­
tle more than a play upon words."1 120 Herndon effectively disposed of 
Giles as a barrier to future challenges to southern denial of the fran­
chise to people of color, because such suits could usually be brought as 
damage actions and could always be understood as individual rights 
cases.1 121 But Herndon was more than a technical departure from 
Giles. The earlier decision was written with a spirit of resignation and 
brusque dismissal of the individual rights claim: So long as the South 
was dedicated to suppressing black votes, wasn't it futile for courts to 
intervene? The later decision just as brusquely dismissed the state's 
political question argument. It reflected the Justices' awareness that 
people of color were fighting for their rights and that the federal 
courts were their only effective avenue for relief, which the Taft Court 
Justices, conservative in other arenas, were willing to grant.1 122 
The Court revisited these issues in Colegrove v. Green,1 123 where 
some Illinois voters objected to the dilution of their vote because of 
the state's obsolescent law setting congressional districts. The state's 
lead argument was that Giles precluded equitable relief in this "politi­
cal" matter.1 124 Writing for three Justices and invoking Giles, Justice 
1118. See Reply Brief for Plaintiff-in-Error at 22-23, Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 
(1927) (1926 Term, No. 117). 
1119. See id. at 20. Most ambitiously, the NAACP confronted the Court with the 
South's defiance of the Constitution. "We are not here concerned with a political question. It 
is one that transcends all politics. It is one which involves the supremacy of the Constitution 
both in its letter and in its spirit." Id. at 33. 
1120. Herndon, 273 U.S. at 540. 
1121. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 272-73 (1939) (distinguishing Giles from civil 
rights actions brought in law); Petitioner's Points at 16-17, Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 
(1932) (1931 Term, No. 265) (next lawsuit also brought in law rather than equity to fall un­
der Herndon rather than Giles). 
1122. Recall that the Giles Court had earlier decided Plessy, while the Herndon 
Court had already handed down Moore v. Dempsey, and its most articulate conservative 
(Sutherland) would soon author Powell v. Alabama. 
1123. 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
1124. Brief and Argument for Appellees at 8-9, Colgrove (1945 Term, No. 804). But see 
Brief and Argument for Appellants at 80-88, Colgrove (1945 Term, No. 804) (relying on the 
race cases, Classic and Allwright, to refute the Giles argument). 
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Frankfurter reasoned from the constitutional structure and the greater 
institutional competence of the political branches that " [c]ourts ought 
not to enter this political thicket."1 125 Although not cited, Giles was 
even more central to Justice Rutledge's concurring opinion, which ar­
gued that voting matters were not political questions in the constitu­
tional sense, but posed "delicate" issues of remedy and enforcement 
that judges should exercise their equitable discretion to refrain from 
issuing relief.1 126 With the race cases in n:iind, Justices Black, Douglas, 
and Murphy - the three most pro-civil rights jurists on the Court -
dissented. "It is true that voting is part of elections and that elections 
are 'political,' " but it does not follow that "courts are impotent in 
connection with evasions of all 'political' rights."1 127 
After Colegrove and Herndon, Giles could not be cited for the 
proposition that voting rights were per se nonjusticiable (the core con­
stitutional feature of the political question doctrine). But Giles could 
be the basis for two other kinds of claims: enforceability difficulties 
should inform a court's decision whether to issue an injunction (the 
pragmatic-administrability idea, followed by Rutledge in Colegrove); 
or vote dilution or manipulation, as opposed to vote denial, presented 
issues not susceptible of a principled judicial, as opposed to legislative, 
determination because of its polycentric nature (the pragmatic-rule­
discernment idea, followed by Frankfurter in Colegrove). How the 
Court viewed these claims was influenced by its experience with the 
school desegregation cases, which I think strengthened the Black­
Douglas position. In the briefing for Brown II, southern states argued 
that local mores and resistance should be considered in judicial deci­
sions crafting injunctions to remedy de jure segregation. The Court 
unanimously rejected their arguments, in part because the Eisenhower 
Administration supported a tougher approach to enforcement. 1 1 28 The 
arguments returned in sharper form in Cooper v. Aaron. Counsel for 
the Little Rock School Board relied on Giles to support his assertion 
that desegregation orders could not be issued by federal judges when 
1 125. Colgrove, 328 U.S. at 556 (plurality opinion of Frankfurter, J., joined by Reed & 
Burton, JJ.). "This is not an action to recover for damage because of the discriminatory ex­
clusion of a plaintiff from rights enjoyed by other citizens," like Herndon was. "The basis for 
the suit is not a private wrong, but a wrong suffered by Illinois as a polity," making the case 
closer to Giles. Id. at 552. 
1 126. Id. at 564-65 (Rutledge, J., concurring); see also Alexander M. Bickel, The Dura­
bility of Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 39 (1962) (defending abstention in reapportion­
ment cases as necessary for the Court to avoid adjudicating politically delicate issues; urging 
that the Court avoid the error of Plessy, which rashly reaffirmed a squalid practice). 
1 127. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 572-73 (Black, J., dissenting). 
1 128. The state briefs and the Solicitor General's stance are discussed supra Section 
I.A.2. 
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the people of the state were massively unwilling to go along.1 129 Given 
the Court's commitment to Brown and the district's underlying (but 
never directly asserted) challenge to its duty to follow that precedent, 
this was an argument that even Justice Frankfurter summarily dis­
missed.1 130 The Court did not even mention the Giles issue in its land­
mark opinion, which held that local opposition was no justification for 
a federal judge to delay entry of an injunction enforcing constitutional 
rights.1 131 
The second kind of claim, administrability, presumably survived 
the early school desegregation cases but was weakened in the Court's 
first important case involving racial vote dilution, Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot. 1 132 The NAACP challenged an Alabama statute altering the 
city limits of Tuskegee, to the effect that virtually all the black voters 
were moved outside the new limits. The challengers recognized that 
Colegrove was a problem for their lawsuit. The ACLU distinguished 
between what I am calling the constitutional dimension of the political 
question doctrine and the pragmatic-administrability dimension.1 133 
The Court's prior cases, starting with Herndon, made clear that the 
first was no barrier. Nor was the second, because Congress in 1957 had 
explicitly authorized federal courts to exercise jurisdiction in voting 
rights cases. Unspoken but also relevant was the Solicitor General's 
participation in the case, suggesting that the Eisenhower 
Administration would back the Court up (as it had reluctantly done in 
Cooper). At conference, the Chief Justice and Justice Frankfurter 
(fervently) distinguished Colegrove from the new case, but Justice 
Black insisted that any "distinction between this and Colgrove is not 
sound . . . .  [O]ur opinion will be received with as much hostility as 
Brown v. Board of Education - if political considerations are to keep 
us from adjudicating a case, this should be the one - all cities in the 
south do this."1 134 Distinguishing Colgrove, Justice Frankfurter's 
1129. See Brief for Petitioners at 13, 19, 27-29, 33, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) 
(Aug. 1958 Special Term, No. 1). 
1130. At oral argument in Cooper, counsel analogized this situation to one in which a 
drayman is ordered by a court to go from A to B. To do so he must cross a bridge. If the 
bridge is down, the drayman ought not be required to follow the original order. 54 
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 199, at 673-74. Justice Frankfurter objected to the analogy 
and then added, "a court of equity would not be beyond its powers to require that the bridge 
be restored." Id. at 674. 
1131 .  Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 , 15-17 (1958). 
1 1 32. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
1 133. Motion for Leave to File Brief for the ACLU as Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus 
Curiae at 6-10, Gomillion (1960 Term, No. 32); see also Brief for the United States as Ami­
cus Curiae at 6-14, Gomillion (1960 Term, No. 32). 
1134. Douglas Conference Notes for Gomillion (Oct. 21, 1960), in Douglas Papers, su­
pra note 192, Container 1234. Speaking right after Black. Frankfurter responded that Col­
grove was different because Article I, Section 4 vested Congress (not the Court) with redis-
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opm1on for the Court saw the challenged law as just the same as 
Guinn and Lane: a subterfuge to deny people of color their rights to 
vote and therefore no different from any other individual rights 
case.1135 
Notwithstanding Frankfurter's cautious opinion, Gomillion was a 
doctrinal fulcrum for the Court to reconsider Colegrove.1 136 The same 
Term, the Court took review in Baker v. Carr,1 137 where urban and 
suburban voters in Tennessee challenged the state's rural-biased ap­
portionment law, which had not been revised since 1901. The lower 
court dismissed the complaint on grounds that it had no subject matter 
jurisdiction over this "political question" and that the complaint failed 
to state a valid claim. The challengers, including the Solicitor General, 
argued that the political question doctrine did not preclude the court 
from taking jurisdiction. They relied on Gomillion to support their 
principle that voting rights cases did not involve any of the three fea­
tures of what I am calling the political question doctrine.1 138 The con­
ference discussion in Baker was among the most heated I read. 
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan were infuriated by the Solicitor Gen­
eral's "reckless" invitation for federal courts to enter the political 
thicket, thereby imperiling the Court's legitimacy.1 139 Viewing the case 
as on a par with Brown in its potential importance, Justice Stewart was 
"not at rest" on the matter, and an evenly (4-4) split Court ordered re­
argument. 
The more the Justices deliberated in the matter, the more relevant 
the Tuskegee and other race cases became. 1 14° Frankfurter circulated a 
tricting authority. No other Justice is recorded as responding to either point, but all agreed 
to overturn the racial gerrymander. Id. 
1135. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346. 
1136. Indeed, the Solicitor General's Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae sug­
gested that the Department of Justice was open to a rethinking of Colegrove. Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae at 11 ,  Gomillion (1960 Term, No. 32). 
1 137. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
1 138. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 29-41, 44-46, Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186 (1962) (1961 Term, No. 6) (relying on 1957 CRA and Gomillion) ; Brief for Ap­
pellants at 31-34, Baker (1961 Term, No. 6) (Herndon as well as Gomillion) . I am citing here 
to the briefs on reargument, which mainly reiterated points made in earlier briefs and at oral 
argument on April 19-20, 1961. 56 LANDMARK B RIEFS, supra note 199, at 568-69 (Solicitor 
General generalizing from the Texas white primary cases). 
1 139. Douglas Conference Notes for Baker (Apr. 20, 1961), in Douglas Papers, supra 
note 192, Container 1267. 
1140. The reargument in Baker v. Carr on October 9, 1961, saw counsel for appellants, 
return repeatedly to the Texas white primary cases, Gomillion, and the 1957 and 1960 civil 
rights laws to distinguish or overrule Colegrove. See 56 LANDMARK B RIEFS, supra note 199, 
at 629-35. Solicitor General Cox insisted that the race discrimination cases could not be dis­
tinguished from the case at hand, which presented an equally "arbitrary" discrimination. Id. 
at 642-43. 
2306 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:2062 
lengthy memo distinguishing Gomillion, and it was the focus of a long 
speech by Harlan at the second conference. As Harlan expounded on 
the Court's wise avoidance of "political contests" throughout its 
history, Douglas jotted down, "My God - what does he think the 
Segregation Cases were - or the Youngstown Case - or the 
Tuskegee Case?"1141 Invoking Shelley v. Kraemer for the idea that the 
state ought to play no part in denying people their rights, Justice 
Stewart finally took a firm position against viewing the case as raising 
a political question. It is clear from both the conference evidence and 
the context of Baker v. Carr that the voting rights cases provided not 
only the precedential basis for overruling Colegrove and ignoring 
Giles, but also the motivation for the Justices. Except for Frankfurter 
and Harlan, the Justices viewed the dangers of injecting the Court into 
the political thicket of electoral line-drawing as both manageable and 
justified by the benefits. The NAACP's cases, especially Gomillion, 
had already involved the Court, and any impact on the Court's legiti­
macy had been to enhance it. 
Justice Brennan was ultimately able to persuade six Justices to join 
his opinion overruling Colegrove. His important synthesis of political 
question history and doctrine posited the relevance of six factors:1 142 
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or [2) a lack of judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3) the impossibility of de­
ciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonju­
dicial discretion; or [4) the impossibility of a court's undertaking inde­
pendent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate 
branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning ad­
herence to a political decision already made; or [6) the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various depart­
ments on one question. 
Thus, Baker emphasized the pragmatic (factors [2]-[6]) rather than 
constitutional (factor [1]) dimensions of the political question doctrine 
and, within the pragmatic dimension, emphasized competence to dis­
cern rules of law rather than the administrability concerns. Indeed, 
Baker can be read as narrowing the kinds of administrability concerns 
courts ought to consider and as decisively rejecting Giles's holding that 
problems with enforcement are a reason for refusing to exercise juris­
diction. Since Baker, of course, the Court has reached the merits of a 
host of constitutional voting cases - most notably the decisions re­
quiring one-person, one-vote in state legislatures and the U.S House 
1 141. Douglas Second Conference Notes for Baker (Oct. 13, 1961), in Douglas Papers, 
supra note 192, Container 1267. 
1 142. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (bracketed numbers added). 
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of Representatives,1143 extending that principle to local govern­
ments, 1 144 and evaluating discriminatory intent in cases raising vote 
dilution claims on the part of people of color, 1145 political parties, 1 1 46 
and white people. 1 147 Although the Court usually does not grant relief 
in its voting cases, there is a general consensus that they present justi­
ciable issues. 
Without expounding more than preliminarily, I should say that 
Brown and Baker have contributed to the Court's increasing disincli­
nation to invoke the political question doctrine in many kinds of cases, 
apart from voting. The Court's encouragement of aggressive school 
desegregation decrees in Green and Swann reflected the Justices' di­
minished concern for embroiling federal courts in local politics 
(Section I.A). Patterned on the Brown II lawsuits, institutional reform 
class actions ask federal courts to declare conditions in state institu­
tions (prisons, hospitals) unconstitutional and then to retain jurisdic­
tion over a period of time to assure that the state restructures the 
flawed institutions. As Malcom Feeley and Ed Rubin have argued, this 
kind of litigation necessarily involves courts in allocational and mana­
gerial decisions.1 148 For another example, the Court adjudicated arid 
endorsed Representative Adam Clayton Powell's claim that he was 
improperly excluded from the Ninetieth Congress.1149 This was re­
markable even under the Baker test, as the Constitution vests broad 
authority in the House to judge the qualifications of its members, and 
1 143. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (equal protection clause requires one per­
son, one vote). For examples of applications, see Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), 
and Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (one-person, one-vote required for House dis­
tricts by U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2). See also United States Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 
U.S. 442 (1992) (Department of Commerce correct to allocate Montana only one House 
member). This line of cases contributed to a political revolution in this country and is one of 
the biggest constitutional legacies of the twentieth century Court. 
1 144. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 
U.S. 50 (1970). 
1 145. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 
(1982). 
1 146. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 118-27 (1986) (rejecting on the authority of 
Baker and the race cases the argument that political gerrymandering cases were nonjusticia­
ble political questions, an argument pressed in id. at 144-45 (O'Connor, J., concurring with 
judgment)). 
1 147. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
1 148. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND 
THE MODERN STATE: How THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS (1998); see also 
ROBERT COVER ET AL., PROCEDURE ch. 2 (1988); OWEN FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
INJUNCTION (1978); Susan Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. 
L.J. 1355 (1991). 
1 149. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in 
Powell suggested that the underlying concern for some of the Justices was that this represen­
tative was singled out because of his race. Id. at 553 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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a judgment of wrongful exclusion by the Court would normally be 
embarrassing to a coordinate branch of government. The decline of 
the political question doctrine is hardly limited to civil rights cases. It 
has been pervasive in all kinds of cases.1 150 One major reason for this 
phenomenon was suggested by Professor Charles Black, who helped 
draft the briefs in Brown: the civil rights era has confirmed that judi­
cial review to protect individual rights is the norm and not the excep­
tion. 1 15 1 Scholars have overwhelmingly endorsed the Court's disinclina­
tion to apply the political question doctrine expansively, and some 
have called for abolishing the doctrine: in a constitutional world where 
Brown is the triumph and Plessy the disaster, courts should presump­
tively decide and protect the scrupulous operation of the electoral 
process especially . 1 1 52 
Although no constitutional scholar has any but nasty words nowa­
days for the kind of abstention involved in Giles v. Harris, the 
Supreme Court's recent willingness to engage in aggressive equal pro­
tection review of the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Palm Beach 
County Canvassing Board v. Harris 1 153 (which had required manual re­
counts in the famously close 2000 presidential election) has stimulated 
some academic nostalgia for the old political question doctrine. 
Rachel Barkow maintains that the Supreme Court should not have 
adjudicated the first appeal of the (recent) Harris case, because the 
issues surrounding the choice of presidential electors were nonjusti­
ciable for constitutional as well as pragmatic reasons. 1 154 There are 
many ironies in the second Harris litigation, almost 100 years after the 
first. From my perspective the main irony is that the utter demise of 
Giles v. Harris by the Texas white primary cases and subsequent 
1150. A Court majority has invoked the political question doctrine in only two cases 
since Baker: Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (Senate's delegation of factfinding 
in impeachment matters to a committee is nonjusticiable); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 
10-12 (1973) (challenges to national guard training nonjusticiable because Article I, § 8, cl. 
16 vests Congress rather than the Court with supervision). On the Court's disinclination to 
invoke the doctrine in cases raising plausible concerns under the Baker factors, see David J. 
Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as Political Questions, 70 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1439 (1999), and R. Brooke Jackson, The Political Question Doctrine: Where Does It 
Stand After Powell v. McCormack, O'Brien v. Brown and Gilligan v. Morgan?, 44 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 477 (1973). 
1151 . Charles L. Black, Inequities in Districting for Congress: Baker v. Carr and Col­
grove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 13 (1962). 
1 152. See, e.g. , ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 99-100 
(1 987); THOMAS FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS (1992); Martin H. 
Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question, "  79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1031 (1985). 
11 53. 772 So.2d 1220 (Fla. 2000), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach 
Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000), on remand, 772 So.2d 1273 (Fla. 2000), rev 'd, 531 U.S. 78 
(2000). This is the infamous Bush v. Gore litigation. 
1 154. See Barkow, supra note 1113, at 277-95 (constitutional form of the doctrine re­
quired abstention); id. at 295-300 (prudential considerations support abstention as well). 
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precedents rendered the various dimensions of the political question 
doctrine virtually invisible in Canvassing Board v. Harris. After 100 
years of adjudicating voting rights irregularities under the Equal 
Protection Clause, neither the litigating parties nor any Justice even 
mentioned abstention in a case which seemingly presented political 
questions that Article II of the Constitution has vested in Congress 
and the states to resolve and whose resolution was hard to justify 
along traditional rule of law grounds. The new judicial supremacy re­
flected in the later case - widely condemned by legal scholars - has 
been in some measure made possible by the civil rights revolution that 
legal scholars just as overwhelmingly endorse.1 155 
So Giles v. Harris is a doctrinal dinosaur, whose demise has un­
leashed nine Justices to intervene in the political process at will. But, 
in a final irony, Giles' pragmatic spirit has returned to haunt modern 
civil rights cases. While it would be unthinkable for a modern Holmes 
to refuse jurisdiction altogether in a race discrimination case, he or she 
might still refuse or tailor relief because of the underlying constitu­
tional and pragmatic concerns that once animated the political ques­
tion doctrine. Specifically, the constitutional and pragmatic underpin­
nings of the political question doctrine have, to some extent, migrated 
to doctrines of standing, deference to legislative judgments, and other 
passive virtues. In cases like Allen v. Wright,1156 the Court for reasons 
of separation of powers and the constitutionally limited role of courts 
has held that civil rights plaintiffs have no standing under Article III to 
raise claims best left to the political branches. 1 157 In cases like Hunt v. 
Cromartie,1 158 the Court, for reasons of separation of powers and fed­
eralism, has ruled that even when enforcing voting rights the judiciary 
needs to tread cautiously.1 159 In cases like Milliken v. Bradley, 1 160 the 
1 155. And so there is now a cottage industry seeking to show how the current activism is 
"new." See, e.g. , Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term - Foreword: We the 
Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001) [hereinafter Kramer, We the Court]. 
1156. 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (black parents have no standing to sue Treasury Department 
to revoke tax exemption of private academies violating tax law by their race discrimination). 
1 157. See also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997), where the Court refused standing to 
members of Congress complaining of the line item veto; id. at 833-34 (Souter, J., concurring) 
(justifying the Court's result explicitly along political question lines); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186, 286-87 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (constitutional standing doctrine implements 
same values as political question doctrine) (citing Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922)). 
1158. 121 S. Ct. 1452, 1466 (2001) (lower court acted improperly in overturning North 
Carolina redistricting decision, given the "extraordinary caution" that courts must show be­
fore treading on legislative prerogatives) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). 
1 159. See also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976) (local government needs wide 
latitude in running its police department, thereby supporting abstention from adjudicating 
allegation of system-wide misconduct). 
1160. 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974) (lower courts in Brown II cases do not have authority 
to issue interdistrict remedies), followed in Missouri v. Jenkins (III), 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
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Court for reasons of practicality and competence laid down restric­
tions of lower court relief in Brown II cases. In Nairn v. Nairn, even 
the Warren Court ducked the politically charged miscegenation issue 
in the 1950s, not by ruling it a political question or by denying equita­
ble relief, but instead by a fabricated technical ruling.1 161 
Although technically no longer good law, Giles v. Harris might re­
tain some vitality as a cautionary limit to a court's discretionary exer­
cise of remedies in equity. The difference today is that federal courts 
will often demand the "best plaintiffs" before they will adjudicate a 
civil rights case or will apply the Giles concerns in thinking about how 
broad the injunction should be. An updated reading of Giles points 
the way toward a smarter role for the Supreme Court in lesbigay rights 
cases, for example. The Court has decided too many important cases 
beclouded by procedural defects. Bowers v. Hardwick should have 
been booted for lack of standing (there was no prosecution nor any 
danger thereof by the time the case reached the Supreme Court) or on 
grounds of mootness, the wise move by which the Court avoided an 
early decision on the issue of affirmative action (DeFunis). Boy Scouts 
of America v. Dale should have been dismissed as improvidently 
granted because the association's actual stance toward lesbigay people 
seemed more a lawyer's post-hoc justification than one that saturated 
its members' goals and identities. On the other hand, the Vermont 
Supreme Court's savvy decision in Baker v. State was a good example 
of the possible utility of an updated Giles: the court recognized lesbi­
gay people's rights claim and insisted on efficacious relief, but delayed 
issuing an injunction so that the political process could respond 
first. 1 162 
2. Federalism and Expanded National Authority to Protect Civil 
Rights 
The autonomy of the states to govern themselves and make local 
policy decisions is enshrined in the U.S. Constitution and protects de­
sirable values of liberty, efficiency, civic engagement, and account­
ability in governance. 1 163 So constitutional federalism is valuable, but if 
1 161. See BICKEL, supra note 140, at 174 (classic defense of the Court's decision in 
Nairn: by striking down the miscegenation law (the only proper ruling after Brown), the 
Court would have undermined the political conditions needed for enforcing Brown itself). 
1162. See ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 626, at chs. 2, 4-5 (explication 
and defense of the court's pragmatic approach to relief). 
1 163. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (federalism 
justifications for super-strong clear statement rule protecting against national regulation of 
core state activities); PETERSON, supra note 485; Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path ": A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1447 (1995); Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Powers": In Defense of 
U.S. v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REY. 752 (1995) ; Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause 
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carried too far would impose significant costs. As the Constitution of 
1789 recognized, the nation needs to speak with one voice as to certain 
matters, especially foreign policy, immigration, military affairs, and 
commerce. Both the original Constitution and the Reconstruction 
amendments also spoke to the danger that local majorities would be 
especially prone to oppress minorities.1164 The remedy was to nation­
alize individual rights: the Reconstruction amendments, in particular, 
offered federal courts as a neutral forum where victims of local dis­
crimination could find protection against oppressive local measures, 
and empowered the national Congress to pass legislation effectuating 
those rights. Congress enacted various civil rights laws between 1866 
and 1875 that established federal causes of action for discrimination 
on the basis of race in matters of contracts and property (1866), voting 
(1870), jury service (1875), and public accommodations (1875).'165 
The Supreme Court's decision in the Civil Rights Cases1 166 invali­
dated the public accommodations provisions of the 1875 law and 
generally constricted the equality-enforcing potential of the 
Reconstruction amendments. First, the Court ruled that the Equal 
Protection Clause regulates only the actions of states and not private 
parties, and that the authorization of congressional "enforcement" in 
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is similarly limited.1'67 
Second, the Court understood "state action" narrowly, to mean af­
firmative state conduct and not mere acquiescence in private conduct. 
Third, while conceding that the Thirteenth Amendment applies di­
rectly to private "badges and incidents" of slavery, the Court limited 
Congress's power to those regulations that had historically buttressed 
the institution of slavery.' 168 This conservative interpretation of federal 
and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988). But see 
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 
UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994). 
1 164. A more modern point, recognized during Reconstruction, was that redistributive 
policies (including resdistribution of legal entitlements as well as wealth) would not readily 
occur at the local level; the comparative advantage of local governments is ordinary police 
power functions (roads, trash, schools). See PETERSON, supra note 485 (public choice theory 
along these lines). The Reconstruction amendments represented a massive redistribution of 
rights and duties in the South, and reconstructors would rationally have expected that this 
redistribution could not be left to local organs. Hence the delegation of enforcement 
authority both to the Supreme Court (§ 1 of each amendment) and to Congress (the en­
forcement clauses of each amendment). 
1 165. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (2000); Voting Rights Act of 
1870, 16 Stat. 140 (1870); Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 336 (1875). 
1166. 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating federal statute prohibiting race discrimination by 
public accommodations). 
1 167. Id. at 10-14. 
1 168. Id. at 22: "Compulsory service of the slave for the benefit of the master, restraint 
of his movements except by the master's will, disability to hold property, to make contracts, 
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power to legislate for the protection of people of color was significant, 
for local politics in the South not only punished people of color with 
apartheid laws but effectively excluded them from participation in the 
process by which laws were made (through voting exclusions) and en­
forced (through jury exclusions).  The NAACP recognized that feder­
alism was a shield for the local operation of racist sentiments, and that 
the only feasible route for redistribution of rights and entitlements was 
at the national level. Women's and gay rights groups have assimilated 
the same lesson: activists have won equal rights in states located on the 
east and west coasts, but states of the South in particular have re­
quired national pressure or compulsion before they will provide any 
measure of equality to women working outside the home and to lesbi­
gay people. For each IBSM, a central goal of its politics of remediation 
has been the adoption of a broad antidiscrimination law by Congress. 
But until the 1950s, it was only the Supreme Court and sometimes 
the Department of Justice that intervened (episodically) to interrupt 
the cycle of subordination. So the Civil Rights Cases were not in play 
for most of the twentieth century. But once the civil rights movement 
became a mass mobilization in 1962-63, Congress acted in a big way 
with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("CRA") and the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965 ("VRA"), as well as other important statutes.1 169 These were 
super-statutes that transformed constitutional law. Their opponents' 
main constitutional as well as policy argument was that the laws in­
vaded "states' rights" by imposing unauthorized national rules onto 
traditionalist locales. Supporters responded that these laws were mod­
est efforts to deliver on the original promises of Reconstruction and of 
Brown. There was no doubt that the Warren Court was friendly to the 
latter arguments; between 1965 and 1969, the Court transformed fed­
eralism jurisprudence in response to states rights challenges to the new 
laws. 
The CRA provisions barring racial discrimination by public ac­
commodations such as private hotels and restaurants were immedi­
ately challenged as beyond Congress's authority in Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States1 110 and Katzenbach v. McClung.1171 The chal­
lengers basically relied on the Civil Rights Cases, which they read to 
bar Congress from regulating discrimination by private parties, either 
directly under the section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or indi-
to have a standing in court, to be a ·vitness against a white person, and such like burdens and 
incapacities, were the inseparable incidents of the institution." 
1 1 69. See text accompanying notes 133-154. 
1170. 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
1171 .  379 U.S. 294 (1964). An excellent account of the litigation is RICHARD C. 
CORTNER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS: THE HEART OF A TLANTA 
MOTEL AND MCCLUNG CASES (2001) (hereinafter CORTNER, PU9LIC ACCOMMODATIONS]. 
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rectly under the Commerce Clause. 1172 Over the objections of many in 
the Justice Department, Solicitor General Archibald Cox defended 
the law only as a regulation of interstate commerce and did not ask the 
Court to reconsider the Civil Rights Cases.1173 At conference, three 
Justices (Black, Douglas, Goldberg) were prepared to overrule the 
Civil Rights Cases' holding that Congress could not regulate private 
actors under section 5 . 1 174 Two Justices (Clark and Harlan) were op­
posed to any such overruling, and Harlan would have invalidated the 
law had it rested only on section 5. 1175 The remainder of the Court 
(Warren, Brennan, Stewart, White) found the Commerce Clause basis 
for the law so clear that discussion of a section 5 ground was pointless, 
and unanimous Courts ruled in both cases that Congress could legis­
late antidiscrimination rules upon its finding "overwhelming evidence 
that discrimination by [public accommodations] impedes interstate 
travel."1 176 The conference in the CRA cases, however, set the stage 
for the Court to consider the issue squarely in the VRA cases that 
immediately followed. 
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach1 177 and Katzenbach v. Morgan,1 178 
the Court upheld the VRA's suspension of literacy tests. This was sig­
nificant because the Court had earlier refused to hold that literacy 
tests were per se violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.1179 Chief 
1 172. Moreston Rolleston, Jr.'s Jurisdictional Statement and Brief for the Appellants in 
Heart of Atlanta (1964 Term, No. 515) was presumably the last brief filed with the Court 
whose rhetoric was unashamedly that of the natural law defense of segregation. Rolleston 
argued, inter alia, that because many of the framers were slaveholders, their Constitution 
would not countenance racial integration. "George Washington did not intend that the new 
Constitution would provide any rights of personal freedom for his Negro slaves and certainly 
not the right to use the taverns and inns in which George Washington slept." Id. at 28. 
1 173. See 60 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 199, at 560-84 (Cox's oral argument); 
CORTNER, PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS, supra note 1 171, at 5-7. 
1 174. Douglas Conference Notes for Heart of Atlanta and McClung (Oct. 5, 1964), in 
Douglas Papers, supra note 192, Container 1348 (Q.T. 1964, Nos. 515 & 543). Douglas and 
Goldberg expressed their views in concurring opinions; see Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 279 
(Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 291 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
1 175. In the late Warren Court, only Justice Harlan unwaveringly followed the Civil 
Rights Cases - ironic because his grandfather had dissented in that case. Civil Rights Cases, 
109 U.S. at 26-62 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
1 176. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 253; see McClung, 379 U.S. at 304-05. 
1 177. 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (rejecting facial challenge to VRA). 
1 178. 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (rejecting challenge to VRA preemption of New York's re­
quirement that voters be able to read and write English). See generally Alexander M. Bickel, 
The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 79. 
1 179. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). In South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, intervening plaintiff Virginia argued that the Congress drafting the 
Fifteenth Amendment was aware of literacy tests and consciously rejected language that 
would have barred them. See Brief on Behalf of the Commonwealth of Virginia, Amicus Cu­
riae app., South Carolina (1965 Term, Orig. No. 22). 
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Justice Warren's opinion for a unanimous Court in South Carolina 
ruled that Congress has broader authority under section 2 of the 
Fifteenth Amendment than the Court has under section 1 to recognize 
and remedy voting rights problems. Rather than determine how the 
Court would have ruled (or did rule), the Chief Justice's test was 
whether Congress's remedy was reasonable under the circum­
stances.1 180 Given the Court's and Congress's long experience with 
trying to enforce equality of voting in the South - starting with Guinn 
and proceeding through the CRA of 1957 and 1960 - and the persis­
tence of racial exclusions, Congress's judgment that strong prophylac­
tic rules were necessary was one that the Court found amply sup­
ported by the impressive record compiled during the congressional 
deliberations. 1 181 
Morgan was harder for the Justices, because it involved a provision 
preempting New York's literacy requirement, as to which there were 
no congressional findings of invidious racial operation. New York's 
law mainly excluded Puerto Ricans who did not read English. While 
such a law therefore had a disparate impact upon an ethnic minority, 
most of the Justices did not find it unconstitutional - but they found 
Congress's judgment "not too far out of line" with their own equal 
protection jurisprudence. 1 182 Reflecting this relative consensus and 
following South Carolina's lead, Justice Brennan's opinion in Morgan 
held that section 5 did not limit Congress to "the insignificant role of 
abrogating only those state laws that the judicial branch was prepared 
to adjudge unconstitutional."1 183 Instead, Congress's section 5 power 
extended to laws " 'adapted to carry out the objects the amendments 
have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions 
they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect 
equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against 
State denial or invasion.' "1 184 Because there was a factual basis under 
1180. Warren imported the expansive McCulloch test for congressional authority under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause: " 'Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of 
the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, 
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are consti­
tutional.' " South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 326 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat) 316, 421 (1819)). 
1181. Id. at 308-1 5  (reviewing the evidence); cf id. at 355-59 (Black, J., concurring as to 
the § 2 test and the factual basis for Congress's judgment but dissenting from the Court's 
upholding the unprecedented remedy of a national administrative veto for state electoral 
rule changes). 
1182. See Brennan Conference Notes for Morgan, in Brennan Papers, supra note 1 29, 
Box I: 130, Folder 2. The quotation in text is from Justice White; similar sentiments were 
expressed by Justices Black, Douglas, and Stewart. 
1 183. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 649; see id. at 651 n.10 (stating that Congress can enact stat­
utes going beyond judicially protected rights but cannot abrogate or dilute such rights). 
1 184. Id. at 650 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879)). 
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which Congress "could have believed" that language discrimination in 
voting was linked to a wide array of discriminations against the Puerto 
Rican community, the Court ruled that Congress acted within the dis­
cretion conferred by section 5. In dissent, Justice Harlan objected that 
the Court should not defer to congressional findings unless Congress 
had actually engaged in factfinding.1185 Four years later, in Oregon v. 
Mitchell,1186 the Court unanimously upheld a VRA amendment sus­
pending literacy tests nationwide.1187 
At the same time the Court was construing Congress's Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendment powers broadly against the states, it was 
suggesting new bases in the Reconstruction amendments for congres­
sional regulation of private discriminatory conduct. In United States v. 
Guest, 1 188 the Court was faced with a federal criminal prosecution of 
private parties for allegedly interfering with the equal use of public fa­
cilities. 1 189 Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall asked the Court to 
trim back the Civil Rights Cases and find that section 5 permits 
Congress to reach private conspiracies to deprive people of their civil 
rights. 1 190 Justice Stewart's initial draft opinion for the Court would 
have ruled that Congress did not have the authority to regulate purely 
private action under section 5, 1 191 but he withdrew these paragraphs 
upon objection from Justices Black and Brennan.1 1 92 His revised opin­
ion asserted that there was state responsibility, because the indictment 
charged that defendants had conspired with state actors to deprive the 
black victims of access to public facilities; this was a retreat from 
1185. See id. at 660-69 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
1 186. 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
1 187. Id. at 131-34 (Black, J., delivering the judgment of the Court, and relying on the 
enforcement clauses of both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments); see id. at 144-47 
(Douglas, J., concurring in part); id. at 216-17 (Harlan, J., concurring in part); id. at 231-36 
(Brennan, J., joined by White and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part); id. at 282-84 (Stewart, J., 
joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J., concurring in part). The Court by 5-4 margins 
struck down that portion of the law which sought to lower the minimum age for voting from 
21 to 18 in state elections, see id. at 124-31 (Black, J., joined on this issue by Burger, C.J., 
Harlan, Stewart, and Blackmun, JJ.), but upheld that portion of the law lowering the voting 
age in national elections, see id. at 1 19-24 (Black, J., joined on this issue by Douglas, 
Brennan, White & Marshall, JJ.). 
1 188. 383 U.S. 745 (1966). 
1 189. The indictment also charged defendants' interference with the victims' right of 
interstate travel. The Justices unanimously agreed that Congress could and did make private 
interference with a constitutional right to travel a crime. Id. at 757-60 (Stewart, J., for the 
Court), followed in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) (upholding tort claim for re­
lief against private parties by blacks denied freedom of travel). 
1 190. Brief for Appellant at 18-52, Guest (1965 Term, No. 65). 
1 191. See Justice Stewart, Draft Opinion 1 (Guest) (Jan. 26, 1966), in Douglas Papers, 
supra note 192, Container 1353 (O.T. 1965, Argued Cases, No. 65-99). 
1 192. See Memorandum from Justice Stewart to the Conference (Guest) (Feb. 21, 1966), 
in Douglas Papers, supra note 192, Container 1353. 
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statements in the Civil Rights Cases. 1 193 A majority of the Court were 
open to Marshall's argument that the Civil Rights Cases be overruled 
altogether. 1 194 Justice Brennan persuaded six Justices to endorse the 
following proposition: 1 195 
[S]ection 5 empowers Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies 
to interfere with the exercise of Fourteenth Amendment rights, whether 
or not state officers or others acting under the color of state law are im­
plicated in the conspiracy. Although the Fourteenth Amendment itself, 
according to established doctrine, "speaks to the State or to those acting 
under the color of its authority,'' legislation protecting rights created by 
that Amendment, such as the right to equal utilization of state facilities, 
need not be confined to punishing conspiracies in which state officers 
participate. Rather, section 5 authorizes Congress to make laws that it 
concludes are reasonably necessary to protect a right created by and 
arising under that Amendment; and Congress is thus fully empowered to 
determine that punishment of private conspiracies interfering with the 
exercise of such a right is necessary to its full protection. 
This is the broadest articulation of Congress 's authority under section 
5 ever to have commanded a majority of the Court. 
Soon after Guest's broad statement of Congress's section 5 powers, 
the Court addressed Congress's powers under section 2 of the 
Thirteenth Amendment in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 1 196 Construing 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to bar private as well as public race dis­
crimination in property transactions, the Court then ruled that the law 
was "necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of 
slavery" as required by section 2. Justice Stewart's opinion distin­
guished the Civil Rights Cases, which had involved rights to public ac-
1 193. Guest, 383 U.S. at 755-56; cf. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) ("[T]he 
wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any [state] authority, is simply a private 
wrong, or a crime of that individual; an invasion of the rights of the injured party . . .  but if 
not sanctioned in some way by the state, or not done under state authority, his rights remain 
in full force, and may presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws of the State for re­
dress."). 
11 94. Justices Douglas and Black had already suggested their willingness to do so in the 
Katzenbach cases, and Justice Brennan (who had held back on the earlier cases) expressed 
his willingness in the Guest conference. See Douglas Conference Notes for Guest (Nov. 12, 
1965), in Douglas Papers, supra note 192, Container 1353. Justice Clark opined that § 241 
could reach conspiracies to deny people of color their rights to use public accommodations 
covered by the CRA of 1964, a position that entailed a rejection of the Civil Rights Cases. 
Chief Justice Warren had earlier joined an opinion seeking to narrow or overrule the Civil 
Rights Cases. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 288-312 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
Although we do not have a record of Justice Fortas' reasons at conference, it is likely that 
he, too, was in favor of overruling that precedent. 
1 195. Guest, 383 U.S. at 782 (Brennan, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J., con­
curring); see id. at 762 (Clark, J., joined by Black and Fortas, JJ., concurring) (agreeing with 
the Brennan statement of Congress's § 5 powers). 
1196. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See generally Note, The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1294 (1969). 
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commodations not considered fundamental in 1866 the way property 
rights were in 1866 and thereafter. 1 197 Because it was not irrational for 
the 1866 Congress to conclude that ghettoization was a "relic of slav­
ery," Stewart ruled that Congress could make it a tort. "At the very 
least, the freedom that Congress is empowered to secure under the 
Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy whatever a white 
man can buy, the right to live wherever a white man can live."1 198 This 
functional approach to badges and incidents of slavery was more 
open-ended and deferential to Congress than the narrowly historical 
approach of the Civil Rights Cases. 
All of the cases discussed above were handed down in the last four 
years of the Warren Court, the high point of the Court's pro-civil 
rights activism. Although the post-Warren Justices were big fans of 
federalism, they were unable or unwilling to overturn any of the 
Warren Court's activism.1199 Instead, the Burger Court modestly ex­
panded upon the Warren Court precedents in three ways. First, the 
Burger Court continued and occasionally extended the Warren 
Court's liberal construction of Reconstruction era statutes. For exam­
ple, skeptical Justices not only reaffirmed Jones but expanded its 
holding to justify another part of the CRA of 1866, which made it ille­
gal to discriminate in making private contracts.1200 The Court's dy­
namic expansion of Reconstruction era statutes assured a steady 
stream of lawsuits against private parties as well as local governments 
that abused the civil rights of minorities. 
Second, the Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer1201 ruled that Congress 
had authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to subject the states 
1197. Jones, 392 U.S. at 440-41 ,  441 n.78 (opinion for the Court); see also Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. at 22 (distinguishing statutory right to be served at public accommodation 
from "those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom," such as the right to 
convey and receive property). 
1 198. Jones, 392 U.S. at 443. But see id. at 450-77 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (suggesting un­
likelihood that 1866 Congress intended this norm to be enforceable against private defen­
dants). 
1 199. There are several reasons for this: (1) In most of the cases, the Department of Jus­
tice (including Nixon's) supported the nationalizing civil rights vision; Congress was even 
stronger in its support. Anti-civil rights decisions would have brought a firestorm of protest 
onto the Court. (2) Two of the Nixon Justices (Blackmun and Powell) were strong adherents 
of stare decisis, which they extended to Warren Court precedents. (3) Most of the Nixon Jus­
tices were somewhat sympathetic to the need for national civil rights laws, and all the holdo­
ver Justices were committed to that posture. 
1200. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (reaffirming Jones and upholding 
Congress's Thirteenth Amendment authority to create a cause of action for refusal to con­
tract on the basis of race, 42 U.S.C. § 1 981 (2000)); id. at 187-89 (Powell, J., concurring) (ex­
pressing skepticism that Jones was right but adhering to it for reasons of stare decisis); id. at 
189-92 (Stevens, J.) (same); see also Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) 
(overruling Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)). 
1201. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). See generally Vicki · c. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1259 (2001). 
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to suit in federal court and to abrogate their Eleventh Amendment 
immunity from such litigation. Although the Nixon Justices had joined 
to revive the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments as a limitation on 
Congress's authority to impose labor regulations on states as employ­
ers,1202 they all ultimately agreed with Solicitor General Robert Bork 
that the Reconstruction amendments authorized Congress' extension 
of Title VII to state employers and its abrogation of state immunity 
from Title VII lawsuits.1203 By holding state immunity abrogated, the 
Court exposed the states not only to backpay judgments, but also 
awards of counsel fees to prevailing job discrimination challengers.1204 
Third, the Burger Court took a broad view of Congress 's authority 
to assure voting rights. Not only did the Court interpret the VRA ex­
pansively, but it reaffirmed the Katzenbach cases in City of Rome v. 
United States. 1205 Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court ruled that the 
VRA's preclearance requirements can, consistent with section 5, bar 
proposed voting practices that have a racially discriminatory effect, 
even if there is no evidence of discriminatory intent.1206 The opinion 
was remarkable insofar as it was handed down the same day the Court 
made clear that the Washington v. Davis standard applied to Fifteenth 
Amendment cases. 1207 Hence, the constitutional precept that voting 
rules having discriminatory effects were invalid only if there were 
some evidence of discriminatory motive as well, was not a ceiling to 
Congress's section 5 power. 
The rules of national authority looked very different in 1981 than 
they had looked in 1961, and the changes encouraged the expansive 
exercise of regulatory authority by Congress. The Commerce Clause, 
Thirteenth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment were grounds 
for national antidiscrimination laws and hate crime laws applicable to 
private as well as public actors. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments had been read to authorize the VRA, which created 
tough rules against racial vote dilution and essentially put southern 
states into federal voting rights receivership for at least a genera-
1202. William E. Leuchtenburg, The Tenth Amendment over Two Centuries: More than 
a Truism, in THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 41, 55-63 (Mark R. 
Kellenback ed., 2002) .  
1203. Compare Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Bitzer (No. 75-251), with 
Bitzer, 427 U.S. at 456 (accepting the Unites States' position); see also Brennan Conference 
Notes for Bitzer, in Brennan Papers, supra note 129, Box I: 369, Folder 1 (Burger, 
Blackmun, and Rehnquist readily agreeing that § 5 authorized Congress to supersede the 
Eleventh Amendment; only Powell expressed doubts) . 
1204. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000). 
1205. 446 U.S. 156 (1980), followed and reaffirmed by Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 
U.S. 266 (1999). 
1206. Rome, 446 U.S. at 1 73-78. 
1207. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (handed down same day as Rome). 
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tion.1208 States could be sued in federal court under all these statutes, 
and private plaintiffs could obtain damages and attorneys' fees under 
statutes authorized by the Reconstruction amendments. Except for 
Bitzer, a sex discrimination case, all these decisions were in race cases, 
but other IBSMs as part of their ongoing politics of remediation suc­
cessfully petitioned Congress to adopt further antidiscrimination 
laws.1209 All of these laws applied antidiscrimination rules to state as 
well as private employers, included monetary as well as injunctive 
remedies, and offered counsel fees to prevailing complainants.1210 The 
broad substance of modern antidiscrimination law was made possible 
by the Warren Court precedents of 1965-69, and the Burger Court's 
acquiescence in them. 
While Congress was moving to protect ever more minority groups 
through broad antidiscrimination laws, the Court - repopulated with 
Reagan and Bush Justices - was becoming increasingly concerned 
that this national rule-fest was undermining the autonomy of the 
states. More important, forty years after Brown, and thirty years after 
the VRA and CRA, the idea of states' rights was no longer a shibbo­
leth for segregation. The result has been a rollback of federal legisla­
tive power. At the turn of the millennium, a block of five 
Reagan/Bush Justices reasserted the federalism principle to draw lim­
its on Congress's power. It is unclear how much of the Court's feder­
alism rollback has been driven by a politics of preservation.121 1  On the 
one hand, most of the rollback precedents have not involved laws pro­
tecting people of color, women, or sexual minorities. Thus the Court 
in United States v. Lopez1212 invalidated a federal gun possession law 
1208. E.g. , Connor v. Coleman, 440 U.S. 612, 615-25 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
1209. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994); 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended in scat­
tered sections of 29 U.S.C.); Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k); Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scat­
tered sections of 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C. and 2 U.S.C.); Civil Rights Restoration Act 
of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 
U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); cf. Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 1995, S. 932, 
104th Cong. (1995) (proposed (but not enacted) legislation protecting against sexual orienta­
tion discrimination in the workplace). 
1210. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12205 
(2000). 
1211.  My tentative view is that Justice O'Connor, the main theorist, has been inspired 
by constitutional principle and public policy rather than by a rollback of civil rights. Com­
pare Bednar & Eskridge, supra note 1 163 (principles and policies supporting the new feder­
alism), with Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 
(2001) (criticizing the Court's changing the rules on Congress); Kramer, We the Court, supra 
note 1 155, at 146-49 (contending the Court sought to retain interpretive control of the Con­
stitution). 
1212. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that Congress could not under its Commerce Clause 
power make it a crime to possess a gun near a school zone). 
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because it had no asserted connection to " 'commerce' or any sort of 
economic enterprise."1213 While this holding certainly set limits on 
Heart of Atlanta and McClung, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for 
the Court cited and relied on both precedents to frame his analysis.1214 
In City of Boerne v. Flores,1215 the Court ruled that Congress did not 
have authority to bar the states from burdening religious minorities in 
ways that did not violate the free exercise clause. Citing the 
Katzenbach cases, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court confirmed 
that section 5 authorizes Congress to adopt "measures that remedy or 
prevent unconstitutional actions,"1216 but does not authorize Congress 
to "make a substantive change in the governing law."1217 Even if 
Congress identifies legitimate constitutional violations, as it did in the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, " [t]here must be a congruence 
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied 
and the means adopted to that end."1218 This is a much tougher means 
test than that announced in Katzenbach. 
On the other hand, the Court's federalism rollback has also re­
versed gains made by women's and disabled people's politics and, 
more important, has imposed a narrowing theory of equality on the 
political as well as the judicial process. Recall the fate of the Violence 
Against Women Act (Section I.B.3.c). In United States v. Morrison,1219 
Solicitor General Seth Waxman and various amici defended the tort 
statute as supported by the massively documented effects of sexual 
violence on interstate commerce and by the failure of state criminal 
justice systems to enforce sexual violence laws adequately.122° Five 
Justices rejected both arguments. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion 
for the Court read Lopez for the proposition that Congress cannot 
regulate intrastate noneconomic activity simply by citing its cumula-
1213. Id. at 561. 
1214. Id. at 558-59. Compare id. at 573-75 (Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concur­
ring) (emphasizing their commitment to not disturbing the twentieth century Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence), with id. at 584-602 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that twentieth 
century jurisprudence should be reconsidered because inconsistent with original meaning of 
"'commerce"). 
1215. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). For a thoroughgoing critique, see Michael W. McConnell, 
Comment, The Supreme Court, 1996 Term - Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997). 
1216. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517. 
1217. Id. at 517-19. 
12 18. Id. at 520. From this proposition, there was no dissent. Cf id. at 545 (O'Connor, J. ,  
dissenting in part) (agreeing with the Court's test but disagreeing with its application). 
1 219. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
1220. E.g. , Brief of Amici Curiae Equal Rights Advocates, et al., Morrison (Nos. 99-5, 
99-29); Brief of Amici Curiae Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights, et al., Morrison (Nos. 99-5, 
99-29); Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors, Morrison (Nos. 99-5, 99-29). 
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tive substantial effect on interstate commerce.1221 It is debatable 
whether the line must be drawn in this way as a matter of principle,1222 
but the Chief Justice's distinction had the political virtue of drawing a 
line that could prevent the nationalization of criminal and family law 
(areas he marked as limited to state rulemaking), without calling Title 
VII or the public accommodation precedents into question.1223 Nor was 
VA WA authorized by section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment; it did 
not meet the Boerne "congruence" standard, because the only permis­
sible congressional interest (forcing states to protect crimes against 
women) had little connection with the statutory means (creating a 
cause of action against people who engage in gender-based vio­
lence ). 1224 Reaffirming the Civil Rights Cases and abrogating the 
Brennan statement Uoined by six Justices) in Guest, the Chief Justice 
rejected the Solicitor General's argument that Congress could assert 
an interest in directly protecting against private violence under section 
5. 1 225 Again, the Court reaffirmed the VRA precedents but interpreted 
them as a ceiling rather than a floor for authorized congressional ac­
tion.1226 
Just as important as the Morrison Court's stronger insistence that 
Congress be limited by tightly defined federalism limits was its insis­
tence that sex discrimination jurisprudence be limited by the rules of 
the Court's previous race cases. The Chief Justice argued that if the 
Court allowed VA WA it would have to allow virtually any national 
regulation of family law, the core domain of the states. From a femi­
nist point of view, this was questionable; part of the lesson of V AW A 
was that state family law left women vulnerable to unspeakable vio­
lence, a fact attested to by three dozen state attorney generals. The 
Chief Justice's argument was analogous to arguing that Congress in 
the 1920s did not have the authority to enact anti-lynching legislation, 
because allowing that authority would have permitted virtually any na-
1221. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-11. Thus, the hotel and restaurant in Heart of Atlanta 
and McClung could be regulated because their discriminatory conduct occurred in connec­
tion with economic activity, but the guns and rape of Lopez and Morrison could not be. 
1222. Cf id. at 637-45 (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the economic-noneconomic 
activity distinction as ahistorical and unworkable). 
1223. Thus, the Court rejected Congress's detailed factual findings that gender-based 
violence has substantial economic consequences - not because the findings were question­
able, but because their methodology would, if accepted, provide Congress with a basis for 
regulating any area (or all areas) of criminal or family law. Id. at 614-19 (opinion of the 
Court). 
1224. For a broader reading of Boerne, see id. at 664-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Two of 
the four dissenting justices (Souter and Ginsburg) did not address the § 5 issue. 
1225. Id. at 621-25 (opinion of the Court). 
1226. Id. at 626-27 (distinguishing Katzenbach cases because Congress was regulating 
state actors). For similar treatment of the ADEA as not meeting the Boerne standard for § 5, 
see Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
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tional regulation of criminal law, another core domain of the states. By 
making the race cases the ceiling for Congress's power, the Court was 
imposing on Congress a model of discrimination that was not at all 
suitable for women's ongoing politics of protection and remediation. 
These problems recurred in Board of Trustees v. Garrett.1227 The 
issue was whether the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") 
could constitutionally impose obligations on the states pursuant to 
Bitzer, which in turn required that Congress enacted the ADA under 
its section 5 authority. The Solicitor General and the disability com­
munity's many amicus briefs argued that Congress had ample evidence 
cataloguing a systematic and horrendous history of state discrimina­
tion against people with disabilities - more than enough evidence to 
demonstrate that states have long operated under premises reflecting 
prejudice against or stereotypes about disabled people.1228 This evi­
dence, they argued, was sufficient to meet Boerne's congruence and 
proportionality test. Five Justices thought not. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court rejected most of the evidence as ir­
relevant, for it did not identify a pattern of irrational state discrimina­
tion in state employment, the kind of discrimination charged by 
Garrett.1229 More important, the Court held Congress to implementing 
the standard the Court had laid down in Cleburne, which held that dis­
ability was not a suspect classification but that prejudice-driven rules 
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 1 230 This was a retreat from the 
Court's stance in Morgan and perhaps also South Carolina, where the 
Court had treated its own equal protection "standard of review" as re­
flecting some deference to the political process, and so gave Congress 
leeway to go beyond the Court's own equal protection jurispru­
dence.1231 
Like Morrison, Garrett set limits on the Warren and Burger 
Courts' expansion of congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment. It is now unclear how much authority Congress has to 
1227. 531 U.S. 356 (2001); see also Colker & Brudney, supra note 1211 (anticipating the 
Court's restrictive moves in Garrett). 
1228. See Brief for the United States, Garrett (No. 99-1240); Brief of Morton Horwitz et 
al., Garrett (No. 99-1240) (describing history of state segregation and exclusion of disabled 
people); Brief of Amici Curiae Self-Advocates Becoming Empowered et al., Garrett (No. 99-
1240) (comparing the eugenics-driven regime of institutionalization and exclusion of the dis­
abled as analogous to Jim Crow). Interestingly, IBSMs of all sorts filed amicus briefs to show 
their solidarity in Garrett - including Lambda, the ACLU, NOW, and the Inc. Fund. 
1229. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369-74. 
1230. Id. at 367-68 ("[S]tates . . .  could quite hardheadedly - and perhaps hardheart­
edly - hold to job-qualification requirements which do not make allowance for the dis­
abled."). 
1231. See Colker & Brudney, supra note 1211 ;  Melissa Hart, Conflating Scope of Right 
with Standard of Review: The Supreme Court's "Strict Scrutiny" of Congressional Efforts to 
Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1091 (2001). 
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implement the politics of remediation for women, lesbigay people, the 
disabled, and other IBSMs. Clearer is the particular understanding of 
equal protection among the five Justices who made up the majorities 
in Morrison, Garrett, Adarand, and Shaw v. Reno. Also like Morrison, 
Garrett reflects an understanding of antidiscrimination law that is de­
rived from the race cases but views them ahistorically through the lens 
of the politics of preservation. These five Justices seem to understand 
the project of the Equal Protection Clause as purifying state decision­
making by driving out (or underground) irrational criteria. This is a 
thin domestication of the race cases, as it slights the great anti­
subordination goal of the Equal Protection Clause and allows the ra­
tionality goal to be easily evaded by an unrealistic intent approach. A 
twist added by Garrett and Cleburne is that the disability community 
has insisted on a model of rationality and anti-subordination some­
what different from those of earlier IBSMs. In contrast to the early 
civil rights, women's, and lesbigay people's politics of recognition, 
which focused almost entirely on race/sex/sexual orientation classifica­
tions that formally excluded their members from important state bene­
fits or obligations, the disability rights movement has early on focused 
on functional as well as formal discriminations. This IBSM views be­
nign neglect as just as big a problem for its members as formal dis­
crimination because of archaic stereotypes or prejudice.1232 The 
ADA's focus on "reasonable accommodation" illustrates the distinct­
iveness of the disability community's politics of recognition: society 
and employers are not treating us as equal citizens unless they take the 
trouble to accommodate our reasonable needs.1233 Equal protection 
precedents like Cleburne suggest that the Supreme Court has never 
quite understood this, but Garrett compounds the deficiency of the 
earlier case by limiting the ability of Congress to be responsive to this 
politics. 
At the dawn of the new millennium, therefore, the nationalizing 
agenda of the civil rights and other IBSMs has been incompletely re­
alized. Not only is the Supreme Court reluctant to expand upon mi­
norities' equality rights, but it has placed limits on Congress's ability to 
do so. As Table 4 illustrates, though, the "limits" cut back only from 
the most tolerant Warren Court precedents and remain much more 
liberal than those that would have applied in 1900 or even 1950. 
Moreover, and most surprisingly, the core limit on Congress's section 
1232. See Arlene Mayerson & Silvia Yee, The ADA and Models of Equality, 62 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 535 (2001). 
1233. I think there are some similarities between the disability community's model and 
the rule against pregnancy-based discrimination, which requires the employer to accommo­
date the pregnant employee's needs, even if just for a limited time. 
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5 authority - the state action requirement - has itself been expanded 
and in ways the Rehnquist Court has thus far respected. 
TABLE 4 
EVOLUTION IN CONGRESS'S AUTHORITY UNDER THE 
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 
Thirteenth 
Amendment, 
§ 2  
Fourteenth 
Amendment, 
§ 5: What 
Ends Can 
Congress 
Regulate? 
Fourteenth 
Amendment, 
§ 5: Level of 
Means Scru-
tiny 
The Civil Rights The Warren Court The Rehnquist 
Cases (1883) (1969) Court (2000) 
Narrow View. Liberalizing. No New 
Congress can only Congress can ab- Developments. 
abrogate statutes rogate any state 
historically associ- law or private 
ated with slavery practice that per-
and may be able to petuates slavery or 
bar some private its customs 
activity. (Jones). 
State Action Only. Beyond State Back to State 
Congress can only Action. Congress Action Only (Lib-
regulate official can regulate pri- erally Defined). 
action by the vate acts that de- Congress must fo-
states. prive people of cus on state action 
their civil rights (Morrison). But 
(Guest). Congress state action can 
can also regulate include private ac-
private action in- tions intertwined 
tertwined with the with the state 
state (Guest). (Section II.E.3). 
Not Addressed. Rational Basis Heightened 
Review. Congress Scrutiny. Con-
has wide leeway to gress's response to 
identify patterns of a pattern of consti-
constitutional vio- tutional violations 
lations and remedy must be "congru-
them prophylacti- ent and propor-
cally tional" (Boerne; 
(South Carolina). Morrison). 
3 .  State Responsibility for Discrimination 
The holding of the Civil Rights Cases, that the Fourteenth 
Amendment only regulates state action, has been relatively stable 
through the twentieth century. The state action requirement serves 
several constitutional purposes, including the protection of individual 
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liberty as well as the values associated with the political question doc­
trine and federalism. But its content has been anything but stable, and 
the primary force driving the evolution in state responsibility has been 
the race cases, which have pressed the courts to hand down decrees 
invading previously immune state and individual prerogatives.1234 For 
example, the suggestion made in the Civil Rights Cases that the 
Fourteenth Amendment is mobilized only against official state policies 
did not survive Moore v. Dempsey and other early NAACP challenges 
to unauthorized lawlessness by state officials. The assumption that 
ostensibly private actors were beyond the ambit of the Equal Protec­
tion Clause was interred by Nixon v. Condon, which held that the 
Texas Democratic Party was acting as the "organ" or "agent" of the 
state and therefore could be held accountable for race discrimination 
under the Fifteenth Amendment.1235 
The last of the Texas white primary cases, Terry v. Adams,1236 illus­
trates several doctrinal theories that have permitted the Court to at­
tribute public responsibility to ostensibly private actors in a wide array 
of cases, but without overruling the Civil Rights Cases. Even after 
Texas abandoned its campaign to exclude blacks from the Texas 
Democratic primary, it remained effectively segregated as a result of 
the activities of the whites-only Jaybird association; their endorsed 
candidates always won the primary. The Court held that the Jaybirds 
were imbued with enough state authority to be charged with violating 
the Fifteenth Amendment but produced several different opinions jus­
tifying the holding. Justice Clark (a native of Texas) invoked Condon 's 
and Smith v. Allwright's holding that when a state delegates a core 
governmental function to an institution, the latter should be treated as 
the state for constitutional purposes.1237 Justice Black, delivering the 
judgment of the Court, offered a variation on the delegation of public 
function theory: Texas's "duplication of its election processes" 
1234. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court 1966 Term - Foreword: "State Ac­
tion, " Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967); Wil­
liam Van Alstyne & Kenneth L. Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961). For a deeper 
theoretical discussion of state action, see LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, 
REMNANTS OF BELIEF 49-71 (1996). 
1235. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 84, 88 (1932); see also Brief for Petitioner at 14-19, 
32-37, Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1934) (1934 Term, No. 563) (making the same "or­
gan of the state" argument for Texas's post-Condon scheme, rejected by the Court in 
Cravey but accepted in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), which overruled Cravey). 
1236. 345 U.S. 461 (1953). See generally Ronna Greff Schneider, State Action - Making 
Sense Out of Chaos - An Historical Approach, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 737, 746-52 (1985). 
1237. Terry, 345 U.S. at 484 (Clark, J., concurring, joined by Vinson, C.J., and Jackson 
& Reed, JJ.) (following Al/wright, 321 U.S. at 664). This was plaintiffs' theory. See Brief for 
Petitioners at 16-25, Terry (1952 Term, No. 52) ("[T]he Jaybird Party has by custom and 
practice become a state institution through which sovereign power is exercised by the people 
of the county."). 
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through the Jaybirds amounted to "a flagrant abuse of those processes 
to defeat the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment . . . .  It violates the 
Fifteenth Amendment for a state, by such circumvention, to permit 
within its borders the use of any device that produces an equivalent of 
the prohibited election."1238 Justice Black's theory was more expansive, 
because of its focus on protecting constitutional purposes. 
The delegation of public functions idea had been the basis for the 
Court's holding that a company town is subject to First Amendment 
limitation of its ability to suppress religion and speech in Marsh v. 
Alabama,1239 handed down between Allwright and Terry. Civil rights 
advocates have been big fans of Justice Black's purposive, functional 
approach to the delegation theory in Terry and Marsh, but his ap­
proach has not been one that the Court has often felt comfortable in­
voking. 1240 Thus, the Burger Court has declined to extend Terry and 
Marsh to render the First Amendment applicable to shopping malls1241 
or to impose due process obligations on public utilities1242 or ware­
house operators authorized to seize and sell goods to satisfy out­
standing storage charges.1243 Today, Marsh and Terry would be most 
persuasive when the state delegates an "exclusive prerogative of the 
State" - like elections - to a private party.1244 In part because of 
Marsh and Terry, this does not happen very often. 
Justice Frankfurter's separate opinion in Terry focused on the par­
ticipation of state and local officials in the overall scheme to exclude 
blacks from the primary. 1245 There are two variations on Frankfurter's 
theory - joint participation of state officials and state encouragement 
or entanglement. Both have had broader application than the delega-
1 238. Terry, 345 U.S. at 469 (Black, J., joined by Douglas & Burton, JJ.). 
1239. 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (Black, J.). 
1240. For example, five Justices (Warren, Douglas, Harlan, White, Marshall) in Jones v. 
Mayer opined in conference that the housing developer could be considered a state actor 
under Marsh, Brennan Conference Notes for Jones, in Brennan Papers, supra note 129, Box 
I: 161 ,  Folder 1, but all abandoned it in their published opinions. See also Evans v. Newton, 
382 U.S. 296, 320-21 ( 1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the delegation of public func­
tions extension of the state action doctrine). 
1241. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (overruling Amalgamated Food Employ­
ees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1 968)). 
1242. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (finding that unlike voting 
(Terry), providing utility service is "not the exclusive prerogative of the State"). 
1243. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158-59 (1978) (distinguishing Terry and 
Marsh on the ground that they involved functions "exclusively reserved to the State," unlike 
resolution of commercial disputes). See generally Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal The­
ory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1 296 (1982). 
1244. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353. 
1245. "This is a case in which county election officials have participated in and con­
doned a continued effort effectively to exclude Negroes from voting." Terry v. Adams, 345 
U.S. 461 ,  476 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.). 
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tion of public functions theory embraced by the remainder of the 
Terry Court. The NAACP's great triumph in Shelley v. Kraemer,1246 
which Frankfurter enthusiastically joined, had suggested a state par­
ticipation theory for viewing state action expansively. Following the 
arguments made by the ACLU and the Solicitor General,1247 Chief 
Justice Vinson's opinion for the Court ruled that private agreements 
with racially restrictive covenants may not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but that state judicial enforcement of them are viola­
tions.1248 Although judges differ as to how broadly to read Shelley, 
most agree that it is an important state action precedent.1249 
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Terry went further than Shelley in 
suggesting that conspiracies (including secret ones) between private 
parties and public officials create constitutional violations involving all 
participants.1250 Like Shelley's theory, this has been influential. For ex­
ample, Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court in Guest found state ac­
tion on the basis of allegations that local officials were participants in 
the conspiracy to deny black people access to public facilities.1251 To 
the same effect was Justice Harlan's opinion in Adickes v. S.H. Kress 
& Co. 1252 Unlike the delegation of public function theory, the state 
participation theory has frequently been applied by the Court in non­
race cases1253 as well as race cases.1254 This is a potentially expansive 
understanding of the state action doctrine. 
1246. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
1247. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union at 12-27, Shelley 
(1947 Term, Nos. 72, 87, 290 and 291); Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 50-87, 
Shelley (1947 Term, Nos. 72, 87, 290 and 291). 
1248. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 12-13, 18-23 (discussed supra Section l.A.1-2). 
1249. Compare Linscott v. Miller Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 1971) (Coffin, C.J., 
concurring) (reading Shelley to mean courts will not enforce "any agreement discriminating 
against the exercise of a person's constitutional rights"), with Hardy v. Gissendaner, 508 F.2d 
1207, 1210 (5th Cir. 1972) (limiting Shelley to race cases). 
1250. Terry, 345 U.S. at 475-77 (Frankfurter, J.). 
1251 .  United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 756-57 (1966). This was also the holding of 
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966). 
1252. 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970). Harlan's opinion was a highly conservative reading of 
the Court's state action precedents. See id. at 188-203 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (sit-in 
cases require a more liberal approach to state action). 
1253. See, e.g. , Tulsa Prof'! Collection Serv. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988) (procedural 
due process); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (closely divided Court finds 
state action in complaint alleging that private parties conspired with local officials to obtain 
attachments of complainants' property without due process of Jaw; distinguishing Flagg 
Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), on ground that no public-private conspiracy was 
alleged); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980) (First Amendment); cf NCAA v. Tar­
kanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988) (closely divided Court rejects state participation theory in un­
usual context). 
1254. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) (invalidating trust arrangement 
preserving a park for use by whites only, on ground that state officials were involved in its 
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A state encouragement theory rests upon the notion that constitu­
tional responsibility is appropriate when there is a history of state in­
volvement with private discriminators such that the state might be said 
to have encouraged or condoned discrimination. In Burton v. 
Wilmington Parking Authority,1255 the Court held a restaurant ac­
countable under the Fourteenth Amendment for refusing to serve 
people of color, on the ground that a municipal parking authority as 
the restaurant's lessor had "so far insinuated itself into a position of 
interdependence with [the restaurant] that it must be recognized as a 
joint participant in the challenged activity. "1251i 
The NAACP developed a broad version of the state encourage­
ment theory in the sit-in cases, discussed in Section I.A.2.1257 The 
breach of the peace laws under which the protesters were arrested 
were race-neutral, and so the obvious state action was not clearly a 
violation of equal protection; the apparent discrimination, by the 
lunch counter managers, was not clearly attributable to the state. The 
Inc. Fund's theory started with the proposition that the lunch counter 
proprietors' segregationist policy was not "in obedience to personal 
taste or association," but followed by necessity from "custom" that 
characterized their communities; following custom, standing alone, 
could be state action according to the Civil Rights Cases.1258 Addition­
ally, southern polities were directly responsible for the prevalence of 
segregationist custom as a system of discrimination because of their 
apartheid laws.1259 
creation and administration); Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dirs. of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1956) 
(finding that the equal protection clause applies to private college receiving monies from a 
trust in which state agency is a trustee). 
1255. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
1256. Id. at 725. Four Justices (including Frankfurter) were unpersuaded, however, that 
the state's position as lessor constituted the kind of joint participation that lent any encour­
agement; one of the four went along with the judgment on the basis of a state law construed 
to require race-based discrimination in public accommodations. Compare id. at 726-27 
(Stewart, J., concurring), with id. at 727-28 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (rejecting Stewart's 
analysis as unsupported by the record), and id. at 728-29 (Harlan, J ., dissenting) (same). 
1257. On the sit-in cases generally, see Thomas P. Lewis, The Sit-In Cases: Great Ex­
pectations, 1963 SUP. CT. REV. 101 ;  Monrad G. Paulsen, The Sit-In Cases of 1964: "But An­
swer Came There None, " 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 137. 
1258. Brief for Petitioners at 20-21, Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (1961 
Term, Nos. 26-28) (invoking Civil Rights Cases, 1 09 U.S. at 3, 17, naming "custom" as one 
form of state action). 
1259. Brief for Petitioners at 21-23, Garner (1961 Term, Nos. 26-28). The Inc. Fund 
viewed every human action a complicated amalgam of private and public choice; for most 
businessmen, segregation of their lunch rooms was dominated by the customs and laws of 
the community and polity. Id. at 23-24. The Inc. Fund pressed this understanding of state 
action also in Brief for Petitioners at 10-17, Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 
(1962) (1962 Term, No. 71); Brief for Petitioners at 17, 26-29, Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 
(1963) (1963 Term, Nos. 9, 10 & 12). The primary authors of all three briefs were apparently 
Jack Greenberg and Charles Black, Jr. 
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At conference in the first lunch counter sit-in cases, only Justice 
Douglas supported the NAACP's theory; Justices Frankfurter, Clark, 
and Harlan spoke strongly against it.1260 But none of the Justices was 
willing to affirm the convictions of the protesters, and so the Court re­
versed for lack of sufficient evidence in Garner v. Louisiana. 1261 After 
Frankfurter left the Court, the Brethren were more willing to go along 
with the NAACP's arguments. In Peterson v. City of Greenville,1262 one 
of several sit-in cases decided in 1963, the Court ruled that Greenville 
could not enforce its trespass law against civil rights protesters who 
were asked to leave by a manager because of the "local custom" 
against serving black and white customers at the same counter. To the 
argument that discriminatory motives of the manager could not be at­
tributed to the city, Chief Justice Warren responded with the Inc. 
Fund's point that the city bore responsibility for the private discrimi­
nation because it also had an ordinance barring integrated service at 
restaurants.1263 The sit-in cases were the high point of the state encour­
agement theory. After 1969, the Court read the sit-in precedents nar­
rowly.1264 Without overruling the sit-in cases, the Court has not often 
expanded their ideas beyond the segregation context. For example, 
the Court has held that state regulation of private businesses, standing 
alone, does not constitute the kind of entanglement that triggers con­
stitutional obligations.1265 
1260. See Douglas Conference Notes for Garner (Oct. 20, 1961), in Douglas Papers, su­
pra note 192, Container 1269. 
1261. 368 U.S. 157 (1961); see id. at 176-81 (Douglas, J., concurring) (accepting the 
NAACP's broad state encouragement theory of state responsibility). Douglas reported that 
Frankfurter and Black strongly supported the right of a merchant to call upon the police to 
expel people of color who trespassed on his or her property; only Warren and Brennan were 
sympathetic to his position. William 0. Douglas, Memorandum re No. 26 - Garner v. Lou­
isiana, O.T. 1961, and companion cases, Nov. 6, 1962; see also Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 
288-316 (1964) (Goldberg, J., joined by Warren, C.J. & Douglas, J., concurring) (broad view 
of state responsibility to enforce antidiscrimination norm against public accommodations; 
arguing that the Civil Rights Cases were wrongly decided). 
1262. 373 U.S. 244 (1963). 
1263. Id. at 248; see id. at 253 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result) (the ordinance makes 
out "a prima facie case of invalid state action" that ought to be rebuttable upon showing that 
"the exclusion was in fact the product solely of private choice"); cf Lombard v. Louisiana, 
373 U.S. 267 (1963) (applying Peterson even though there was no segregationist ordinance, 
for municipal official encouragement of private racial discrimination was sufficient to estab­
lish state action). 
1264. Compare Brief for Petitioners at 10-17, Peterson (1962 Term, No. 71) (making 
both local custom and state ordinance points), with Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 
144, 170-71 (1970) (Harlan, J. , for the Court) (reading Peterson conservatively, along the 
lines suggested in text), with id. at 178-88 (Douglas, J . ,  dissenting in part) (reading Peterson 
to find state responsibility through a broader inquiry into state toleration as well as compul­
sion), and id. at 188-203 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (similar). 
1265. See generally David Strauss, State Action After the Civil Rights Era, 10 CONST. 
COMM. 409 (1993). Compare Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (finding that 
regulatory authority over establishment's liquor license does not render club a state actor), 
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As other IBSMs have joined the civil rights movement in chal­
lenging discrimination and censorship, they too have sought to expand 
state responsibility, usually relying on the theories suggested in the 
Texas white primary cases. For example, the organizers of the "Gay 
Olympics" ran afoul the United States Olympic Committee 
("USOC"), statutorily vested with ownership of the term "Olympics." 
The USOC refused to license the Gay Olympics to use the term. The 
supplicants' lawyer, Mary Dunlap, argued that USOC was a state ac­
tor on the basis of all the theories floated in Terry and, as such, vio­
lated the Equal Protection Clause because it allowed most groups to 
use the term "Olympics," but not the gay group. Reflecting a stingy 
understanding of state responsibility, a closely divided Court rejected 
Dunlap's arguments in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United · 
States Olympic Committee. 1266 Justice Powell's opinion for the Court 
agreed that the USOC was the statutory representative of this nation 
in the international Olympics movement - but this did not persuade 
him that the USOC performed functions that have "traditionally been 
the exclusive prerogative of the Federal Government."1267 Although 
the USOC and the federal government were entangled in a variety of 
ways, including lavish government subsidies and special privileges 
(like ownership of the Olympics term), Powell found no evidence of 
governmental encouragement or joint participation sufficient to at­
tribute responsibility to the federal · government for the USOC's 
antigay policy.1268 
As this brief tour of the leading cases suggests, the current state ac­
tion requirement is far more elaborate and elastic, depending on cir­
cumstances and the judges' disposition toward the particular constitu­
tional claim, than the barebones approach announced in the Civil 
Rights Cases. There are plenty of established loopholes to the earlier 
and Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (holding that pervasive state regula­
tion does not render a public utility a state actor), with Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 
466 (1973) (ruling unconstitutional a program lending textbooks to racially discriminatory 
private schools because "[a) State may not grant the type of tangible financial aid here in­
volved if that aid has a significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support private dis­
crimination"). But cf. Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 
U.S. 288 (2001) (private association of public and private secondary schools is state actor 
because of "pervasive entwinement" of public officials). 
1266. 483 U.S. 522 (1987). 
1267. Id. at 544 (quoting Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982)); see SFAA, 
483 U.S.  at 545 n.27 (USOC's "representative" function in world athletics "can hardly be 
called traditionally governmental"). Two Justices disagreed. Id. at 549-56 (Brennan, J . ,  
joined by Marshall, J., dissenting). 
1268. SFAA, 483 U.S. at 546-47 (rejecting state encouragement theory); id. at 547 n.29 
(rejecting joint participant theory). Four Justices disagreed. Id. at 548 (O'Connor, J., joined 
by Blackmun, J., dissenting in part); id. at 556-59 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dis­
senting). 
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understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment cannot apply to pri­
vate parties - and all of them originated in and have developed in the 
context of the Court's race cases. One of the last major state action 
cases of the century was, fittingly, a race case which provided the 
Court with an opportunity for doctrinal synthesis. A sharply divided 
Court ruled in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. 1269 that non­
government lawyers' deployment of peremptory challenges in civil 
cases are governed by Batson's interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause. Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court could have simply 
rested on the fact that the state's involvement in the jury selection and 
deliberation process is so pervasive that the state is responsible for 
private actions in that process.1270 
Instead, the opinion announced a contextual approach to state ac­
tion that is a conservative cousin to the Inc. Fund's theory in the lunch 
counter sit-in cases.1271 The most relevant context was historical, "over 
a century of jurisprudence dedicated to the elimination of race preju­
dice within the jury selection process."1272 Where racism has operated 
in matters of voting (Terry), juries (Edmonson), and property rights 
(Shelley), the Court has been particularly willing to find state action. 
(Recall the sliding scale approach in Section II.C.) In determining 
whether to attribute state responsibility to apparently private actors, 
Kennedy found it relevant to consider "the extent to which the actor 
relies on governmental assistance and benefits" (citing Burton); 
"whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental function" 
(citing Terry and Marsh); and "whether the injury caused is aggra­
vated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority" 
(citing Shelley). 1273 The opinion deftly wove together these three 
1269. 500 U.S. 614 (1991). 
1270. This was the theory advanced by the Brief Amicus Curiae of the ACLU in Sup­
port of Petitioner at 2-3, Edmonson (No. 89-7743) .  Petitioner's counsel adopted the ACLU's 
theory at oral argument. 203 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 199, at 299-300. It is interesting 
that the Court could have avoided the constitutional issue and rested on 28 U.S.C. § 1870. 
See Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU in Support of Petitioner et al., Edmonson (No. 89-7743) .  
1271 .  Jack Greenberg's and Charles Black's Brief for Petitioners at 48-49, Bell v. Mary­
land, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) (1963 Term, No. 12), argued that the arrest of protesters for refus­
ing to leave when managers requested was state action because the police and courts en­
forced the managers' racist preferences (Shelley), the racist customs were the product of 
state encouragement (Peterson), and the state's policy preferring property rights to liberty 
ones empowered racists over minorities struggling for equality. The brief then laid out a 
wide array of factors, including a substantive theory of the Equal Protection Clause, that 
courts should consider in deciding whether to attribute responsibility to the state. Id. at 50-
59; see also Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 1 10 U. PA. L. 
REV. 473 (1962); Mark Tushnet, Shelley v. Kraemer and Theories of Equality, 33 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 383 (1988). 
1272. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 618. 
1273. Id. at 621-22. For a similarly contextual inquiry finding state action in a nonrace 
case, see Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001). 
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themes to support its holding that the lawyer in a civil case is account­
able as a state actor. The state structures and runs the jury selection 
and trial process, which is a core function of the state; the legitimacy of 
that process is important to the legitimacy of the state itself. Under 
those circumstances, it is not unfair to require all the lawyers to adhere 
to equal protection standards during their participation in this ongoing 
state project. 1274 Edmonson suggests that in cases involving racial dis­
crimination, the state action doctrine entails a fair amount of flexibil­
ity, but is no clear signal as to how broadly the Court will apply its ex­
ceptions in other kinds of cases. 
F. The Imperial First Amendment 
The First Amendment was an anemic constitutional appendix in 
1900, but a flourishing heart of the Constitution by 2000. Indeed, the 
First Amendment has been imperial, as its ambit continually expanded 
throughout the century. Applied to protect bland political speech and 
some literature early in the century, the First Amendment picked up 
steam as the century progressed. Justices from a wide array of political 
allegiances now apply the amendment stringently to bar virtually any 
state censorship of expression - and the expanding array of activities 
that now count as expression. In addition to political speech and litera­
ture, the First Amendment today provides strong protection to libel, 
commercial speech, expressive conduct like marches and flagburning, 
sexual speech and publications, identity speech, and expressive asso­
ciations. 
Identity-based and other social movements contributed to this im­
perial First Amendment.1275 A strong First Amendment took shape af­
ter World War I to implement the concept that state censorship of 
speech and press is lethal to a pluralist democracy, because it under­
mines the search for truth through an open and critical process and 
contributes to inter-group hatred and fear.1276 Its immediate benefici-
1274. Speaking for four Justices, Justice O'Connor's dissent maintained that the law­
yer's strategic decisionmaking (including peremptories) is and ought to be a private "en­
clave" within the larger public process. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 633-34 (O'Connor, J., dis­
senting). 
1275. This explanation complements that of Ronald Coase, The Market for Goods and 
the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 384 (1976) (arguing that the Court protects the 
"free market in ideas" much more than that in economic goods because the First 
Amendment has a strong cheering section in the chattering classes Uournalists and law 
professors)), and was developed in a productive exchange I had with Professors Eugene 
Volokh and Robert Post in a joint AALS-APSA conference on constitutionalism in June 
2002. 
1276. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (the 
classic atticulation of this understanding); see DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS 
FORGOTTEN YEARS 299-380 (1997) (providing a conceptual history of this new understand­
ing and its penetration into judicial opinions during and after WWI); David Bogen, The Free 
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aries were publishers, workers, and socialists, but this pluralism-driven 
understanding of the First Amendment also protected people of color, 
birth control advocates, and even sexual radicals in their public cam­
paigns for progressive reform. Thus, by the 1970s, a strong First 
Amendment had an impressive constituency on the left. By the 1980s, 
the First Amendment was accumulating a constituency on the right, as 
countermovement groups found that it protected them against what 
they considered (over)enforcement of municipal and state laws 
adopted in response to identity-based politics of remediation. Zealous 
protection of people's right to express themselves in unpopular ways 
became a principle that progressives and traditionalists have come to 
agree on, through a giant pluralist logroll: in our live-and-let-live cul­
ture, most Americans are much more disturbed when the state censors 
their own identity expression than when the state fails to censor ex­
pression they don't like.1277 And Americans have internalized the view 
that their own freedom against censorship depends upon their support 
for a First Amendment that prevents censorship of speech they do not 
like. So long as the state protects both Ellen DeGeneres' and Phyllis 
Schlafly's rights to be provocative, these women, and those allied with 
them, are relatively satisfied. 
IBSMs and their countermovements have been involved in a dis­
proportionately large number of leading First Amendment deci­
sions, 1278 and have pioneered several of the First Amendment's impor­
tant expansions. Specifically, the civil rights movement persuaded the 
Court to protect expressive activity and association claims; gay and 
AIDS activists have been on the cutting edge of sexual speech claims 
which have decisively moved the First Amendment beyond its simple 
attachment to political speech; the TFV movement, conversely, has 
deployed the First Amendment to recognize new ways in which si­
lence is identity speech. Even as they have expanded its scope, IBSMs 
have exposed a central tension within the First Amendment's value 
Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 97 (1982); Donald 
Ragan, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., and the Clear and Present 
Danger Test for Free Speech: The First Year, 1919, 58 J. AM. HIST. 24 (1971). 
1277. The process is surely more complicated than the statement in text. It may well be 
that our nation's positive experience with a strongly anti-censorship First Amendment has 
helped create a culture that is live-and-let-live. See generally LEE BOLLINGER, THE 
TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986) 
(this is the core purpose of the amendment). 
1278. In addition to the cases discussed in this subsection, see, for example, 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (leading case for current version of 
clear and present danger test: racist, violent speech by KKK members cannot be punished 
unless it incites to immediate violations of law), overruling Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 
357 (1927); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (leading libel case, rejecting 
lawsuit by segregationists based on SCLC ad attacking their support of apartheid); Herndon 
v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (important precedent limiting clear and present danger test, 
reversing conviction of Communists for recruiting blacks to their radical cause). 
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system. Although the amendment is usually viewed as libertarian, pro­
tecting each individual's freedom to say what she wishes, after World 
War II the First Amendment's project was also deeply egalitarian, as­
suring equal treatment for unpopular viewpoints. To be sure, the two 
faces of the First Amendment are linked in the manner of the pluralist 
logroll described earlier: if I do not want the state to interfere with my 
expression, I have to be willing to forego state censorship of analogous 
expression I do not like. But the two faces of the First Amendment are 
also opposed, especially in group settings: your expression of identity 
can be through exclusionary speech and association that undermines 
my struggle for inclusion. My thesis is that the facile solution, always 
protecting liberty, is one that the Court has not always chosen and that 
does not solve the underlying conundrum. 
1 .  Beyond Speech and Assembly: Expressive Conduct and 
Association 
The First Amendment protects "speech," but not necessarily con­
duct. It protects "assembly" by individuals, and "speech" to persuade 
others to join, but does not necessarily invest organizations and asso­
ciations with constitutional rights. After World War I, the Supreme 
Court was usually willing to protect labor unionists and socialists to 
speak out and to solicit others to join their organizations.1279 But the 
Court was not willing to protect either conduct that left-wingers con­
sidered expressive, nor their organizations qua associations. The 
Court's idea of the First Amendment was highly individualistic and 
anti-totalitarian: the core case for protection was the Jehovah's 
Witness handing out leaflets and refusing to recite the Pledge of 
Allegiance. Relatively unprotected were lots of people doing things 
together ("mobs") - labor picketing, marching crowds, and secret or­
ganizations. The civil rights movement changed the paradigm. The 
race cases taught the Court that individual expression and episodic as­
sembly could not move apartheid. For a despised group to make nor­
mative progress, it was not enough to leaflet and assemble; large num­
bers of people had to mobilize, in disruptive actions like marches and 
sit-ins, and had to organize, in permanent associations like the 
NAACP. The Justices after World War II reflexively protected people 
of color from vicious southern suppression, and followed civil rights 
lawyers in protecting expressive conduct and association. These doc-
1 279. See, e.g. , Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (invalidating Texas statute limit­
ing freedom of labor organizers to persuade workers to join unions); De Jonge v. Oregon, 
299 U.S. 353 (1937) (rejecting application of criminal syndicalism law to individual who or­
ganized a meeting of Communist Party members, unless there can be a showing of illegal 
activity). 
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trinal innovations have proved lasting ones. Specifically, they facili­
tated the women's, gay, welfare, and disability rights movements that 
came later. 
The Communist Party cases of the 1950s suggested a wide berth for 
governmental regulation of "subversive" associations. "Subversive" is 
exactly how southern states viewed the NAACP, which they tried to 
drive out of their region by means of registration laws requiring the 
NAACP and other minority groups to turn over membership lists and 
other sensitive information.128° Challenging these laws, the NAACP 
presented itself not just as a collection of individuals acting upon their 
First Amendment assembly rights, but also as an expressive association 
devoted to the project of "eradicating color and caste discrimination 
from all facets of American life."1281 As such, the NAACP and its sup­
porting amici maintained that the association could not be subjected 
to "restrictions whose purpose and effect is to destroy [the organiza­
tion] or frustrate its activities."1282 This right of association went be­
yond the Speech and Assembly Clauses of the First Amendment. 
The Supreme Court recognized such a right in NAACP v. 
Alabama ex rel. Patterson.1283 "Effective advocacy of both public and 
private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably 
enhanced by group association," which is therefore protected under 
the First Amendment (applicable to the states through the Due 
Process Clause). " [S]tate action which may have the effect of curtail­
ing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny."1284 Con-
1280. See Murphy, supra note 124. See generally supra Section I.A.2. Florida, for the 
best documented example, established a series of legislative investigating committees that 
were originally aimed at exposing Communism and the NAACP in the state, see Gibson v. 
Florida Legislative Investigating Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963), but that early turned its obses­
sive attention to "homosexuals" and their infiltration of the state. See William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., Privacy Jurisprudence and the Apartheid of the Closet, 1 946-1961, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
703, 747-51 (1997). 
1281. Brief for Petitioner at 3, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 
(1958) (1957 Term, No. 91); see id. at 4-7 (detailed account of NAACP's ideology and or­
ganizational activities to advance it); see Brief of Amici Curiae [including ACLU] at 21, 
Patterson (1957 Term, No. 91) (distinguishing freedom of individuals to associate from the 
equally important freedom of a permanent association "to exist and conduct its activities 
free of unreasonable and oppressive government restrictions"). 
1282. Brief of Amici Curiae at 8, Patterson (1957 Term, No. 91). 
1283. 357 U.S. 449 (1958) , followed and reaffirmed in Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 
(1959); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigating 
Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963). 
1284. NAA CP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 460-61 .  Harlan added the "closest scrutiny" lan­
guage in response to Justice Douglas' complaint that the cases cited, such as American 
Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950) (narrow construction of a 
statute regulating labor unions), suggested ordinary scrutiny for state regulation of group 
activities. See Memorandum from Justice Douglas to Justice Harlan, Apr. 22, 1958, in 
Douglas Papers, supra note 192, Container 1186. The Justices subsequently read the case to 
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trary to the NAACP's presentation, however, the Court focused on 
the rights of the individual members not to have their names dis­
closed. 1285 This was not a plausible strategy for the Court in NAACP v. 
Button,1286 which involved a Virginia law prohibiting organizations like 
the NAACP from retaining and compensating attorneys who repre­
sented other persons in litigation as to which the NAACP did not have 
a direct interest. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court treated the 
NAACP exactly the way it presented itself, as an advocacy corpora­
tion having First Amendment rights of its own.1287 The NAACP's vari­
ous litigation campaigns - theretofore its only effective means for re­
dress of grievances in the South - were an essential part of its 
politically expressive activities and could not be burdened without the 
state's showing a compelling interest. 1288 Indeed, Brennan urged courts 
and legislators to err against censorship, lest associations not have 
"breathing space" they needed "to survive."1289 
At the same time it was defending its chapters against state intru­
sions, the NAACP's Inc. Fund was defending civil rights demonstra­
tors arrested by southern authorities for engaging in protest marches 
and lunch counter sit-ins. The Supreme Court threw out virtually all 
the convictions that came to them on appeal, usually based on lack of 
evidence or vaguely worded laws. 1290 The hardest cases were the ones 
with the most participants. In Edwards v. South Carolina,1291 the Court 
overturned breach of the peace convictions of 187 black students who 
had engaged in a peaceful protest march at the state capital. Before 
Edwards, the Court had held that group marches were subject to rea­
sonable state regulations, perhaps suggesting that such conduct was 
not entitled to the full protection of the "speech" and "assembly" 
require a state burdening private associations to show a "compelling" interest. Bates v. Little 
Rock, 361 U.S. 5 16, 524 (1960). 
1 285. Cf United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 , 46-47 (1952) (interpreting lobbying stat­
ute not to require disclosure of individual supporters who wished to remain anonymous). 
1 286. 371 U.S. 4 1 5  (1963). 
1287. Id. at 4 19-21 (describing the NAACP as an expressive association); id. at 428 
(NAACP has standing to assert its own interests, as well as those of its members). 
1288. Id. at 429-30 (civil rights litigation is core political expression); cf id. at 462-63 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (public interest in high professional standards for law practice justi­
fies the state regulation). Although not emphasized in the opinion, the Justices at conference 
saw the law as an effort to circumvent Brown. See Brennan Conference Notes for Gray, in 
Brennan Papers, supra note 129, Box I: 76, Folder 1 .  
1 289. Button, 371 U.S. at  445 (quoted and followed in  New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 272 (1964)). 
1 290. E.g. , Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262 (1963); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 
U.S. 157 (1961); Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1961). 
1291. 372 U.S. 229 (1963). 
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clauses.1292 A unanimous Court in Edwards dispelled any doubt that 
assembly, marching, song-singing, "harangues," and other forms of 
"peaceable" protest were protected under the First Amendment not­
withstanding its provocative nature and hostility from its audience.1293 
In Cox v. Louisiana,1294 the Court evaluated a more incendiary 
situation, where as many as 2000 civil rights marchers were ordered to 
disperse by the police in Baton Rouge. Reverend Elton Cox, the 
leader of the march, declined the request, and he was arrested for 
breach of the peace, obstruction of sidewalks, and interference with 
judicial proceedings. Carl Rachin's brief for Reverend Cox invoked 
Edwards for the proposition that the state could not make " 'criminal 
the peaceful expression of unpopular views. '  "1295 The state responded 
that " 'where clear and present danger of riot, disorder, or other im­
mediate threat to public safety, peace or order, appears, the power of 
the state to prevent or punish is so obvious.' "1296 Edwards did not pre­
sent such a danger; Cox's march did. Rachin responded, in part, that 
the "danger" was the police's reaction to Cox's integrationist ideas. He 
read the First Amendment to contain an antidiscrimination feature: 
"to permit a demonstration until it advocates ideas with which the 
authorities or the general public disagrees is a discriminatory applica­
tion of the law which contributes both an interference with freedom of 
speech and a denial of equal protection of laws . . . .  "1297 
Except for the breach of the peace conviction, which was covered 
by Edwards, the Justices were unusually tentative in their votes at con­
ference, largely because they believed there was a danger of hostility 
from white onlookers.1298 Yet they bit the First Amendment bullet and 
reversed on most charges. On the sidewalk obstruction charge, Justice 
Goldberg's opinion for the Court "reject[ ed] the notion urged by ap-
1292. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 
(1941); cf Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (divided Court protects provocative 
anti-Zionist, anti-Communist speech in a public auditorium, with hostile crowd outside). 
1293. Edwards, 372 U.S. at 235-36. Based on Edwards, the Court summarily reversed 
the other convictions of peaceful demonstrators from South Carolina. Henry v. City of Rock 
Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964); Fields v. South Carolina, 375 U.S. 44 (1963). 
1294. 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (Cox /); 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (Cox II). 
1295. Consolidated Brief for Apelian! at 12, Cox v. Louisana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Cox 
v. Lousiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (1964 Term, Nos. 24 & 49) (quoting Edwards v. South 
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963)). 
1296. Consolidated Brief for Apellee at 5, Cox I & Cox II (1964 Term, Nos. 24 & 49) 
(quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 308 (1940)). 
1297. Consolidated Brief for Apellant at 29, Cox I & Cox II (1964 Term, Nos. 24 & 49). 
At oral argument in Cox I, Rachin closed with this antidiscrimination goal of the First 
Amendment. 60 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 199, at 723-24. 
1298. Brennan Conference Notes for Cox (Feb. 21, 1964), in Brennan Papers, supra 
note 129, Box I: 1 13, Folder 6. 
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pellant that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same 
kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct 
such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as 
these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure 
speech."1299 Although reasonable police action could have been justi­
fied, it was not reasonable in the context of the Cox march, because 
the police had routinely allowed other marches and picketing to block 
public sidewalks. Adopting Reverend Cox's antidiscrimination goal 
for the First Amendment, the Court ruled that the state could not 
leave a law unenforced against expressive conduct and then spring 
into action against unpopular conduct no less expressiveY00 The Court 
held, finally, that the law barring demonstrations near a courthouse 
was constitutionally applied to the marchers. Unlike the other meas­
ures, this one was narrowly drawn and evenly applied to fulfill the 
public purpose of preventing the sort of mob influence on judicial pro­
ceedings that Justice Holmes had found to be denials of due process in 
the Leo Frank and the Phillips County cases.1301 
The NAACP's First Amendment cases established several propo­
sitions of law that have had enduring value for a variety of social 
movements as well as society and that have contributed to the devel­
opment of a tough First Amendment. First, the core values of the 
modern First Amendment - protecting political dissent - are impli­
cated when dissenters do so in groups, whether in institutions or just a 
big collection of people.1302 An expressive association makes an inde­
pendent contribution to the First Amendment's project of encourag­
ing robust debate about political issues and so has First Amendment 
protections apart from those of its members.1303 Those protections 
must assure the association "breathing space" to pursue its normative 
agenda. Second, conduct like marching and picketing can be expres­
sive; even though expressive conduct is not so strongly protected as 
pure speech, it can be regulated only for important public reasons and 
1299. Cox I, 379 U.S. at 555. 
1300. Id. at 556-58. 
1301. Cox /I, 379 U.S. at 561-64 (citing Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 347 (1915) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
1302. The statement in text was hardly new law, but the NAACP cases gave it more 
First Amendment bite. For a recent example, see NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 
U.S. 886 (1982) (holding that civil rights boycott of hardware store because of discriminatory 
practices cannot be the basis for an antitrust damages action). 
1303. This was new law as regards the Speech Clause, but under the Press Clause of the 
First Amendment the Court had long protected the expressive rights of companies - and 
the civil rights movement gave the Court its opportunity to issue its classic opinion in New 
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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cannot be regulated because of its content.1304 Third, the First 
Amendment not only protects against censorship of unpopular ideas 
but also protects against discriminatory enforcement of otherwise 
valid regulations. Even when the state does not openly engage in 
viewpoint discrimination, it may be readily inferred from past practice 
and other contextual evidenceY05 These First Amendment principles, 
battled for by the civil rights movement, have contributed to the abil­
ity of other IBSMs to mobilize. 
The nascent gay rights movement of the 1960s consisted of a small 
band of determined "homosexuals" who were directly empowered by 
the NAACP's victories. The leading association was Frank Kameny's 
Mattachine Society of Washington ("MSW"), which engaged in small 
protest marches and some federal court litigation that were never sup­
pressed by the federal authorities - much as the authorities hated the 
participants. Indeed, in 1963, a House subcommittee had hearings to 
deprive MSW of its local status as an educational institution - a mini­
witch hunt that went nowhere in large part because impartial counsel 
informed the subcommittee that it had no constitutional authority to 
penalize MSW because of its expressive activities.1306 In this prophylac­
tic way, the NAACP cases helped protect the struggling homophile 
movement, which scored many significant legal as well as cultural vic­
tories during the 1960s because of the force of their ideas and their 
factual presentations. After 1969, thousands of lesbigay people came 
out of their closets, marched, protested, and formed hundreds of asso­
ciations which reluctant state authorities were forced to recognize be­
cause of the civil rights cases. Lambda Legal Defense & Education 
Fund, Inc., lesbigay people's equivalent to the NAACP's Inc. Fund, 
won its first legal victory when it forced the New York courts to regis­
ter it as a gay-supportive legal assistance organizationY07 State and 
federal courts also applied the NAACP cases to protect gay people's 
1304. Although suggested in the Cox cases and Edwards, the leading authority for the 
proposition in text arose out of the anti-war movement. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 
367 (1968) (allowing the government to regulate draft-card burning); cf Texas v. Johnson, 
491 U.S. 397 (1989) (not allowing the government to prohibit flag-burning for political pro­
test purposes). 
1305. See, e.g., Police Dep't of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
1306. See Amending District of Columbia Charitable Solicitation Act: Hearings Before 
Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1963); David K. Johnson, "Homosexual Citizens": Washington's Gay Community Confronts 
the Civil Service, WASH. HIST., Fall/Winter 1994-95, at 44, 57-58 (account of these hearings). 
1307. In re Thom, 301 N.E.2d 542 (N.Y. 1973), remanded to 350 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 
1973). Even the most conservative states have been required to treat gay associations with a 
modicum of fairness. See Aztec Motel v. State, 251 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1971) (invalidating state 
law revoking charters of groups whose officers were involved in "organized homosexual­
ity"). See generally ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, at 112-16 (surveying gaylegal de­
ployment of NAA CP v. Alabama). 
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right to associate with one another in gay bars1308 and (most signifi­
cantly) to require state colleges and universities to recognize lesbian 
and gay student associations.1309 To this day, traditionalists continue to 
harass lesbigay groups and deny them routine benefits at public col­
leges and other institutions - and to this day even conservative judges 
will apply the right of association recognized in NAACP v. Alabama 
to overturn discriminatory state action against this feared minority.U10 
2. The Sexualized First Amendment 
As the NAACP cases reveal, the most celebrated First 
Amendment precedents of the twentieth century involved political ex­
pression and dissent, a triumph of the political pluralist ideology of the 
ACLU.131 1  By valorizing political speech, the ACLU and its allies early 
in the century acquiesced in and sometimes reinforced the American 
tradition of denigrating sexual speech, which was viewed as dangerous 
and disgusting - the epitome of irrationality, best left to morality and 
the bedroom. In the first decades of the twentieth century, any public 
discussion or depiction relating to human sexuality was culturally sus­
pect and constitutionally unprotected as obscene or indecent.1312 Com­
stockery was the regnant ideology among elite lawyers and tony 
judges. Resisters were few. Theodore Schroeder's Free Speech League 
called for the protection of sexual speech, as well as virtually any other 
kind of expression, but was eclipsed by the more moderate ACLU af­
ter World War 1. 1313 Margaret Sanger's 1919 Supreme Court appeal ar­
gued against state censorship of birth control information, but to deaf 
ears.1314 Most telling was New York's prosecution of the manager 
1308. One Eleven Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 235 
A.2d 12 (N.J. 1967); see also Randy Shilts, Big Business: Gay Bars and Baths Come Out of 
the Bush Leagues, ADVOCATE, June 2, 1976, at 37 (describing the boom in gay bars during 
1970s). 
1 309. The leading case is Gay Students Organization v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 
1 974), and others are discussed in Eskridge, Establishing Conditions, supra note 555, at 880-
83. 
1 3 10. See Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Pryor, 110 F.3d 1543 (11th Cir. 1997). 
1311. See RABBAN, supra note 1276, at 302-10 (describing the triumph of the ACLU 
approach over more radical approaches); SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN 
LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU (1990). 
1312. See, e.g. , Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 275-77 (1915) (holding that state may 
ban depictions of naked body); United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1879) (No. 14,571) (leading case on obscenity standard: state may ban depictions that have 
bad tendencies and tempt vulnerable minds). 
1313. See THEODORE SCHROEDER, "OBSCENE" LITERATURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: A FORENSIC DEFENSE OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (1911); see also RABBAN, supra 
note 1276, at 44-63 (describing Schroeder's philosophy and his Free Speech League). 
1314. Sanger and her lawyer did not explicitly rely on the First Amendment, which was 
not formally applicable to the states until Git/ow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925), but 
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(First Amendment lawyer Harry Weinberger) and cast of Sholom 
Asch's The God of Vengeance for obscenity, on the ground that the 
play depicted sexual license, including a love scene between two 
women.1315 After defendants were convicted and the show closed, 
Weinberger begged the ACLU to support an appeal, which the ACLU 
declined: "The issue in the case," wrote its director, "is not primarily 
one of freedom of opinion - it is one of censorship on the ground of 
morality." There was no chance of success and no point in "agitat­
ing."1316 The same ideology that closed judges' minds to Sanger's ar­
gument that women needed to know about contraception closed even 
progressive minds to the argument that sexuality outside of conven­
tional husband-wife marriages could be liberating for women and 
men. 
Ironically, Weinberger won his appeal without the assistance of the 
ACLU. Although federal and state officials continued to censor sexu­
ally explicit and pro-homosexual plays, movies, and novels through the 
1920s and 1930s - all without a peep out of the Supreme Court -
progressive lawyers and gender-benders were often able to challenge 
the censors with success in lower courts and even legislatures. Official 
censorship of bawdy and gay-friendly Broadway plays The Captive and 
Mae West's Sex in 1927; Radclyffe Hall's lesbian classic, Well of 
Loneliness in 1929; and Andre Gide's homosexually explicit autobiog­
raphy in 1935 were all overturned by New York appellate courts.1317 In 
the Second Circuit, Mary Dennett won her case against censorship of 
sex education materials, and Margaret Sanger won her case against the 
Comstock Act's suppression of birth control materials and informa­
tion.1318 Even the ACLU came around. Its longtime affiliate Max Ernst 
won the Second Circuit case which liberated James Joyce's Ulysees 
from federal captivity.1319 On the eve of the next world war, sexual-
her due process liberty arguments emphasized that withholding information and suppressing 
discussion of contraception had disastrous effects on public health and women's health in 
particular. Brief on Behalf of the Plaintiff-in-Error at 41-44, Sanger v. New York, 251 U.S. 
537 (1919) ( 1919 Term, No. 75); see id. at 47 (dissemination of information about contracep­
tion was allowed at common law and should be allowed under constitutional law as well). 
1315. See KAIER CURTIN, "WE CAN ALWAYS CALL THEM BULGARIANS": THE 
EMERGENCE OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN ON THE AMERICAN STAGE 25-42 (1987). 
1316. Letter from Roger Baldwin to Harry Weinberger (Oct. 1,  1 924) (on file with the 
Sterling Memorial Library Collection at Yale University), quoted and discussed in RABBAN, 
supra note 1276, at 311-12. 
1317. See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, at 47-49 (account, with references, of 
these and other examples of and resistances to censorship of lesbian- or gay-themed art). 
1318. United States v. One Package, 86 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936) (birth control materials); 
United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930) (First Amendment protects sex erluca­
tion materials). 
1319. United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934). 
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themed plays could open on Broadway, serious novels could be sold in 
the major cities, and the market for erotica was growing. 
After World War II, a hodge-podge of social groups and move­
ments vigorously opposed state censorship of sexual speech and press: 
Planned Parenthood and other birth control associations; literary fig­
ures (many of whom were lesbigay) and their attorneys; gay and les­
bian subcultures and the publishers that catered to them; and, in­
creasingly, the ACLU. The sexual revolution of the 1960s ensured 
wider social support for the emerging anti-anti-obscenity movement. 
The constitutional wall between protected political speech and unpro­
tected sexual speech was collapsing. Nowhere was its collapse more 
apparent than in the 1957 obscenity trial of Allen Ginsburg's sodomy­
soaked, rebel-rousing poem Howl. Ginsburg elegized the madness of 
the "best minds of my generation," the men "who bit detectives in the 
neck and shrieked with delight in police cars for committing no crime 
but their own wild cooking pederasty and intoxication." The state 
seized this mix of nonconformity and deviant sexuality because it was 
"filthy, vulgar, obscene, and disgusting." In People v. Ferlinghetti, 
Municipal Judge Clayton Horn ruled that the First Amendment pro­
tects "novel and unconventional ideas," even when they "disturb the 
complacent." In a striking expansion of the First Amendment's (po­
litical) pluralism trope, he continued:1320 
The People state that it is not necessary to use [vulgar] words and that 
others would be more palatable to good taste. The answer is that life is 
not encased in one formula whereby everyone acts the same or conforms 
to a particular pattern. No two persons think alike; we were all made 
from the same mold but in different patterns. Would there be any free­
dom of press or speech if one must reduce his vocabulary to vapid in­
nocuous euphemism? 
Horn's avant-garde opinion coincided with a similarly inspired consti­
tutional assault on obscenity at the U.S. Supreme Court. 
In Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California,1321 the 
Eisenhower Administration and the California Attorney General de­
fended obscenity laws by insisting that sexual speech is "worthless" 
from a First Amendment perspective, and its suppression essential to 
the maintenance of public morality.1322 The challengers and their 
amici, including the ACLU, mainly argued that obscenity laws over-
1320. See People v. Ferlinghetti, Decision of Oct. 3, 1957, reprinted in ALLEN 
GINSBURG, HOWL: ORIGINAL DRAIT FACSIMILE (etc.) 173-74 (Barry Miles ed., 1986). This 
1986 edition is the source for the other quotations in the text. 
1321. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (decided together with Alberts v. Cali­
fornia). 
1322. Brief for the United States, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (1956 
Term, No. 582); Brief for the Appellee, Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (1956 
Term, No. 61). 
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shot their mark because they were so vaguely worded.1323 California 
had included the circuit court opinion in One, Inc. (the early homo­
phile magazine case discussed in Section l.C.l) as an example of the 
depravity that would be unleashed if the state could not censor sexual 
expression - which Abe Fortas (representing a publisher) turned 
around to maintain that obscenity laws suppressed valuable ideas.1324 
Indeed, Fortas concluded, "Sex is a legitimate topic for free discussion 
in a mature society."1325 Representing Alberts, Stanley Fleishman not 
only argued that obscenity had constantly been deployed to suppress 
literary classics and "ideas of critical value to society,"1326 but that the 
First Amendment values of truth-seeking, democratic discourse, and 
tolerance were just as much at stake in sexual speech cases as in politi­
cal speech ones. "That 'mental obscenity' however constituted is rep­
rehensible and evil is itself but a point of view - an opinion - and, 
indeed, a very contested one, and the speech, depictions, and contem­
plations disapprobated under such thesis are merely expressions and 
manifestations of the contrary thought and ·view."1327 What he was 
doing was to show the Justices how their own focus on political speech 
was merely a "political" point of view, as to which the best rebuttals 
were the very materials the state sought to suppress. 
Only Justices Black and Douglas were persuaded by the challeng­
ers, and even they went nowhere as far as Fleishman.1328 Justice 
Brennan's opinion for the Court held that obscene speech is unpro­
tected by the First Amendment, but only if the state regulates "mate­
rial which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest," 
that is, "material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts."1329 This 
was a standard that protected speech and writings about birth control, 
1323. See Brief of the ACLU as Amicus Curiae, Roth (1956 Term, No. 582); see also 
Brief of Max L. Ernst Amicus Curiae, Roth (1956 Term, No. 582); Brief Amicus Curiae [for 
the Southern California Branch of the ACLU], Alberts (1956 Term, No. 61). 
1324. See Brief Amicus Curiae for Greenleaf Publishing Co. and HMH Publishing Co. 
at 24, Roth (1956 Term, No. 582). This remarkable brief was also signed by Charles Reich 
(later the nation's first well-known gay law professor) and Harry Kalven (later a leading 
First Amendment scholar). 
1325. Id. at 22. 
1326. Brief for the Appellant at 78-89, Alberts (1956 Term, No. 61). 
1327. Id. at 95; see id. at 94-105 (many other fascinating arguments, a treasure trove of 
First Amendment thinking). 
1328. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508-14 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (criti­
cizing the criminalization of speech or press because they provoke (common) sexual re­
sponses and insisting on a literal application of the First Amendment). 
1329. Id. at 487 n.20 (opinion of the Court) (invoking MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) 
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957), which limited proscribable obscenity to work that, "considered as 
a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in 
nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in 
description or representation of such matters"). 
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as well as the homophile journal One and other tame depictions of 
sexual nonconformity. 1330 Brennan's nice compromise opinion seems in 
retrospect naive - and institutionally expensive, for it engaged intel­
lectually helpless Justices in a twenty-five-year binge of substantially 
worthless First Amendment litigation to set the parameters of allow­
able speech about sexuality. 
In 1966, the Court overturned the suppression of the Memoirs of a 
Woman of Pleasure (Fanny Hill) , a ribald eighteenth century novel 
depicting a series of homoerotic and other unconventional sexual es­
capades.1331 Justice Brennan, who delivered the judgment of the Court, 
rescued Fanny Hill because it had social value as literature. Under­
neath the opinion was the author's view that "art" is "a purposive and 
rational endeavor addressed to the understanding," the mind of the 
audience - in contrast to "pornography," or "writings or pictures 
whose purpose is predominantly aphrodisical."1332 Thus, on the same 
day that the Court lifted the censorship of Fanny Hill it affirmed cen­
sorship of fifty paperback novels depicting "such deviations as sado­
masochism, fetishism, and homosexuality," whose literary appeal was 
(to the Court) outweighed by its prurient interest. 1333 The Court also 
that day upheld a conviction for peddling relatively tame erotica that 
the Court accepted as obscene largely because it "pandered" to im­
pressionable adolescents.1334 All these decisions carried dissenting 
opinions. Justice Douglas' dissent accepted the normative stance 
Fleishman and Fortas had urged in Roth, and that the nascent lesbigay 
liberation movement was pressing: the idea of benign sexual variation. 
Speaking to the Court's suppression of sado-masochistic erotica, 
Douglas said: 1335 
1330. See One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per curiam) (summarily reversing 
censorship on the basis of Roth); see also Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962) 
(overturning censorship of male physique magazines); Kingsley Int'! Pictures Corp. v. Re­
gents, 360 U.S. 684, 685 (1959) (invalidating state law barring depictions of "sexual immor­
ality, perversion, or lewdness . . .  as desirable" in movies, as this was viewpoint discrimina­
tion). 
1331. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney 
General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
1 332. See Memorandum of Mr. Justice Brennan In Re: The Obscenity Cases at 41 , in 
Brennan Papers, supra note 129, Box I: 96, Folder 3 (Administrative File, O.T. 1963). 
1333. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 505 (1966) (describing the censored materi­
als); see id. at 508 (affirming the censorship, even though the "normal" person would not be 
aroused by the materials; the materials can be censored if they have a prurient appeal to 
members of a "clearly defined deviant sexual group"). 
1334. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966). Justice Brennan's remarkable 
opinion accepted an argument based on pandering that the government did not make. See 
Brief for the United States, Ginzburg (1965 Term, No. 42), and drew dissents from Justices 
Black, Douglas, Harlan, and Stewart. 
1335. Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 491 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 431-
32 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Brief of the ACLU and the ACLU of Pennsylvania, 
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Man was not made in a fixed mould. If a publication caters to the idio­
syncracies of a minority, why does it not have some "social impor­
tance"? . . .  However plebian my tastes may be, who am I to say that oth­
ers' tastes must be so limited and that other tastes have no "social 
importance"? . . .  Catering to the most eccentric taste may have "social 
importance" in giving that minority an opportunity to express itself 
rather than to repress its inner desires . . . .  How can we know that this 
expression may not prevent antisocial conduct? 
Except for Douglas, the other Justices participating in the Memoirs 
trilogy in 1966 revealed no well-informed perceptions about the inner 
lives of sexual nonconformists. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, frank discussions and depictions 
of sexuality in novels, movies, and other media exploded.1336 Gay pub­
lications, more than any others, mingled erotica with ideas and opin­
ions. 1337 Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall were pre­
pared to relax the state's role as censor of sexual speech - but the 
Court moved in precisely the opposite direction, frequently in cases 
involving homoerotic materials. In Miller v. California,1338 the Nixon 
Justices plus Justice White upheld state suppression of "depictions of 
cunnilingus, sodomy, buggery, and other similar sexual acts performed 
in groups of two or more."1339 In the face of the substantially unsuc­
c�ssful history of censorship, Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the 
Court expanded permissible state regulation of obscene speech to in­
clude materials offensive to the moral standards of the local rather 
than national community.1340 Miller also suggested that states should 
be more specific as to exactly what kind of sexual depictions they were 
barring; this motivated twenty-two states to amend or revise their ob­
scenity laws between 1973 and 1977.1341 It also triggered a brief new 
wave of censorship, especially of gay publications, almost all of which 
the Burger Court upheld, sometimes in broadly written or even igno-
Amici Curiae at 30-37, Ginzburg (1965 Term, No. 42) (urging the Court to overrule Roth, 
whose vague standards allowed suppression of valuable speech). 
1336. And so did prosecutions and appeals to the Supreme Court. Between 1967 and 
1973, the Court summarily affirmed or reversed obscenity convictions based upon the Jus­
tices' own examination of the materials under the Memoirs test. See, e.g. , Redrup v. New 
York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (per curium). 
1337. See generally RODGER STREITMATIER, UNSPEAKABLE: THE RISE OF THE GAY 
AND LESBIAN PRESS IN AMERICA (1995). 
1338. 413 U.S. 15  (1973). 
1339. Brief for Respondent at 26, Miller (No. 70-73). 
1340. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30-34; see also Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973) (hold­
ing obscene a book describing a "variety of sexual contact, homosexual and heterosexual"); 
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (upholding closure of adult theatre). 
1341. See Brief for Appellant at 23-26, Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977) (No. 76-
415). 
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rant opinions. 1342 Notwithstanding these efforts, pornography grew like 
weeds in a vacant lot - and the cases eventually stopped coming to 
the Supreme Court, in part because most governments (including the 
federal government) reduced or abandoned their efforts to censor 
written materials and in part because local censorship efforts were 
easily evaded by national channels of communication such as mail 
service, telephone, and the internet. Suppression of written pornogra­
phy has been superseded by campaigns against pornographic films. 
These campaigns have emphasized channeling such movies into pri­
vate use (recall Stanley) or red-light zones. 
In Young v. American Mini Theatres,1343 upholding a zoning ordi­
nance restricting theatres showing "indecent" materials, the Nixon 
Justices fragmented on the issue of sexual speech.1344 Justice Stevens' 
plurality opinion announced, "even though we recognize that the First 
Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials 
that have some arguably artistic value, it is manifest 'that society's in­
terest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and 
lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political de­
bate. "1345 Speaking for four dissenters, Justice Stewart objected that 
the Court had consistently applied rigorous First Amendment scrutiny 
to sexually vulgar or offensive expression.1346 He objected to Justice 
Stevens' suggestion that sexual speech has no value. "The fact that the 
'offensive' speech here may not address 'important' topics - 'ideas of 
social and political significance' . . .  does not mean that it is less worthy 
of constitutional protection. 'Wholly neutral futilities . . .  come under 
the protection of free speech as fully as do Keats' poems or Donne's 
sermons. '  "1347 Concurring in the plurality's result, Justice Powell de­
clined to join Justice Stevens' effort to create a First Amendment 
1342. See Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 771-72 & nn.3-5 (1977) (White, J.) (upholding 
statute criminalizing depiction of "abnormal" sex and lumping together rape, sado­
masochistic sex, and same-sex foreplay and consensual intercourse) ;  Eskridge, Establishing 
Conditions, supra note 555, at 892-95 (describing the binge of antigay censorship and the 
Supreme Court's ongoing encouragement). 
1343. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
1344. This was the first time the Nixon Justices did not vote as a block in an obscene or 
indecent speech case. 
1345. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 70 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and White & 
Rehnquist, JJ.). 
1346. Id. at 84-85 (Stewart, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) 
(citing, for example, Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (display of nudity 
on a drive-in movie screen); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (protecting public dis­
play of jacket inscribed with "Fuck the Draft")). 
1347. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 87 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Winters v. New 
York, 333 U.S. 507, 528 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
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sliding scale, with sexual speech near the bottom.1348 In FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation, 1349 a similarly divided Court upheld an FCC order barring 
indecent radio programming during hours that children would be 
likely listeners. Like earlier regulatory decisions, these have had little 
discernible effect on the availability of sexually explicit material, 
which has grown tremendously. 
Responding to the inefficacy of censorship as well as continued 
ACLU and progressive objection to it, the Rehnquist Court has been 
protective of indecent speech. In Sable Communications v. FCC,1350 the 
Court allowed Congress to prohibit obscene commercial use of the 
telephone but unanimously invalidated the statute's prohibition of in­
decent commercial services.1351 Since Sable, the Court has routinely 
treated indecent speech as constitutionally valuable and has invali­
dated broad congressional efforts to regulate it, even when Congress 
has justified its regulations as needed to protect children.1352 It is clear 
from the caselaw that Congress can regulate obscene speech (though it 
is far from clear exactly what that entails) and can protect children 
from indecent expression (but only in laws that are narrowly tailored 
to achieve that goal and without unduly blocking adults from obtain­
ing such materials). 
Although gay rights groups have not brought these lawsuits, the 
gay-friendly ACLU has done so, more than atoning for its early sex­
negative history.1353 Additionally, the Court's protection of sexually 
1348. Id. at 73 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) ("I do not think 
we need reach, nor am I inclined to agree with, the holding . . .  that nonobscene, erotic mate­
rials may be treated differently under First Amendment principles from other forms of pro­
tected expression."). 
1349. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). As in Mini-Theatres, Justice Stevens suggested a sliding scale 
of First Amendment protection, depending on the overall value of the speech. Id. at 745-48 
(plurality opinion). Four Justices (Brennan, Stewart, Marshall & White) dissented. Id. at 
777; see also id. at 762 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Justices Powell and Blackmun 
concurred in the judgment. Id. at 755. 
1350. 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
1351. Id. at 124-26 (bar to obscenity okay); id. at 126-31 (bar to indecent speech not 
okay, distinguishing Pacifica Foundation); cf id. at 133-36 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall 
& Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that the bar to obscene speech was also unconstitu­
tional). 
1352. See Ashcroft v. The Free Speech Coalition, 122 S.Ct. 1389 (2002) (invalidating 
federal statute regulating images of children in sexually explicit positions on grounds of 
overbreadth, distinguishing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)); United States v. Play­
boy Entm't Network, 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (invalidating federal statute regulating "sexually 
explicit adult programming" by cable providers as content regulation which fails strict scru­
tiny); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (invalidating federal statute enacted to protect 
minors from encountering "indecent" or "patently offensive" communications on the inter­
net). 
1353. Since the presidency of Norman Dorsen, an early gay rights pioneer, the ACLU 
has been highly gay-friendly. Moreover, openly lesbian and gay voices, such as those of Nan 
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explicit speech has been of disproportionate importance to gaylaw, 
both because it has opened up valuable sources of information about 
same-sex intimacy for all lesbigay people and because it has helped 
normalize the idea of benign sexual variation generally.1354 The 
Rehnquist Court has also normalized and protected sexual speech in 
another, more explicitly gay-protective way. Because homosexuality 
(unlike sex or race) is not typically apparent upon casual observation, 
it is easier for the gay person to "closet" her or his sexual status, a 
phenomenon that has also made it hard for gay people to organize po­
litically. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was dangerous and even legally du­
bious for a gay person to "come out of the closet," but judges in the 
1970s started to recognize the importance of identity speech to gay 
people and to afford it protection under the First Amendment.1355 
The Rehnquist Court has probably settled the matter in dictum. 
Justice Souter's opinion for the unanimous Court in Hurley, the 
Boston parade case, situated its ruling that the parade organizers were 
promulgating a message when they excluded an openly gay contin­
gent, as the mirror image of the gay people's expressive conduct: "a 
contingent marching behind the organization's banner would at least 
bear witness to the fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or bisexual, 
and the presence of the organized marchers would suggest their view 
that people of their sexual orientations have as much claim to unquali­
fied social acceptance as heterosexuals and indeed as members of pa­
rade units organized around other identifying characteristics."1356 It 
would appear that coming out speech of all sorts is expression pro­
tected by the First Amendment. It remains to be seen whether the 
Court will someday accept the further argument David Cole and I 
Hunter (who founded the ACLU's Gay and Lesbian Rights Project), have been'prominent 
in the Union during this period. 
1354. See Jeffrey Sherman, Love Speech: The Social Utility of Pornography, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 661 (1 995); Scott Tucker, Radical Feminism and Gay Male Porn, in MEN CONFRONT 
PORNOGRAPHY 263 (Michael S. Kimmel ed., 1990). For an opposing gay viewpoint, see 
JOHN STOLTENBERG, REFUSING TO BE A MAN: ESSAYS ON SEXUAL JUSTICE (1989). 
1355. See Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974) (finding gay teacher's 
"coming out" protected by First Amendment, but not his earlier lies about his sexual orien­
tation); Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979) (interpreting 
state labor law's protection of employees for "political" expression to include gay people's 
"coming out" speech); Nan D. Hunter, Identity Speech and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695 
(1993) (tracing emergence of "open homosexuality" as a political claim). 
1356. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 
U.S. 557, 574 (1995); see also id. at 570 (noting that the GLIB's "participation as a unit in the 
parade was equally expressive . . .  in order to celebrate its members' identity as openly gay, 
lesbian, and bisexual descendants of the Irish immigrants, to show that there are such indi­
viduals in the community"). 
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have made, that expressive conduct also includes sodomy and other 
expressions of affection or love.1357 
3. First Amendment-Equal Protection Clashes: Defining Who We 
Are by Whom We Exclude 
So long as racial minorities, women seeking birth control informa­
tion, and lesbigay people were engaged in their politics of protection 
against state oppression, the First Amendment was an important ally. 
This changed once the minority's politics of remediation persuaded 
legislatures to adopt antidiscrimination laws. Supporters of the politics 
of preservation have assailed antidiscrimination laws as intrusions into 
their liberties, including their First Amendment rights to speak freely 
against "special privileges" to minorities, to engage in expressive con­
duct such as protests and parades, and to form expressive associations 
excluding minority persons. The Court's construction of strong First 
Amendment bright-line rules against state censorship of expressive 
conduct and association on the basis of content or viewpoint fits well 
with the preservationist response. Specifically, the First Amendment 
has been asserted as a shield against particular applications of laws 
penalizing hate speech, crimes motivated by hate or prejudice, and 
work environments that female employees consider hostile. Generally, 
courts have limited the reach of such legislation to the extent they cen­
sor people's ability to say what they believe, read what they want, and 
think what they will. Recall the failure of Professor Catharine 
MacKinnon's anti-pornography law to satisfy First Amendment scru­
tiny, notwithstanding her claim that speech and press regulated by the 
law had direct and serious third-party effects (Section l.B.3.b ) . The 
most interesting cases are the ones where an antidiscrimination law 
applies to limit traditionalists' right to expressive association. 
My thesis is that the expressive feature of identity politics brings 
into sharp relief both the censorial features of equality jurisprudence 
and the egalitarian features of free speech jurisprudence. They gener­
ate intractable clashes in the cases where an expressive association ex­
cludes people both because of who they are and because of what they 
signify - because who they are has expressive significance for the as­
sociation. The first big Supreme Court case was Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees.1358 The U.S. Jaycees was an organization fostering the 
development of "young men's civic organizations," drawing them into 
1357. David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-holding to Sodomy: First 
Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
319 (1994). 
1358. 468 U.S. 609 (1984), followed in Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'! v. Rotary Club of 
Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987). 
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community service, and inculcating them with "a spirit of genuine 
Americanism." Minnesota ruled that its public accommodation anti­
discrimination law applied to the Jaycees and required its local chap­
ters to integrate women. The U.S. Jaycees objected that the "core 
purpose" of their expressive association was for young men to get to­
gether and learn their "collective voice."1359 They read the right of as­
sociation recognized in the NAACP cases as reflecting the nation's 
commitment to pluralism as well as individual liberty. Because the 
state was seeking to dictate. and not just uncover the Jaycees' member­
ship, its intrusion was greater than that in NAACP v. Alabama.1360 As 
Phil Lacavora's amicus brief for the Boy Scouts put it, " [a]n essential 
ingredient of this right to join with others is the right to define the 
group's identity and purposes through membership criteria," which 
necessarily entails a "prerogative to exclude others from the 
group."1361 The state and supporting amici (including NOW, the Inc. 
Fund, the ACLU) questioned any effect of integration on the Jaycees' 
expressive enterprise and defended the desegregation of the Jaycees 
as necessary to the state's compelling interest in rooting out vestiges of 
sexism in public accommodations as well as state organs.1362 
The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with the state.1363 Justice 
Brennan's opinion for the Court read the NAACP cases as valuing 
"collective effort on behalf of shared goals" as "important in preserv­
ing political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression 
from suppression by the majority," but argued that this freedom is 
most strongly implicated when the association is small, highly selec­
tive, and focused on normative goals associated with its membership 
limitations.1364 Because the Jaycees were a large, unselective, and nor­
matively unfocused association, the antidiscrimination law imposed 
few burdens on its expressive features. And the state's "compelling in­
terest in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens justifies 
1359. Brief of Appellee at 1 1-13, Roberts (No. 83-724). 
1360. Id. at 13-15. "Where the purposes of these organizations are linked in their mem­
bership composition, the power sought by the State is the power to destroy those purposes." 
Id. at 14. 
1361 .  Brief of the Boy Scouts of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 
11, Roberts (No. 83-724); see also id. at 6-11 (providing a detailed history of the important 
role associations have played in America's social and political history). 
1362. See Brief Amicus Curiae of ACLU and Minnesota Civil Liberties Union in Sup­
port of Appellants, Roberts (No. 83-724); Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense 
and Education Fund, Inc. in Support of Petitioner, Roberts (No. 83-724); Brief of Amici Cu­
riae the National Organization for Women et al., Roberts (No. 83-724). 
1363. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun did not participate. Justice Rehnquist 
silently concurred in the Court's judgment. Justice O'Connor concurred in much of the ma­
jority opinion but presented her own rationale for the result. 
1364. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622-23. 
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the impact that application of the statute to the Jaycees may have on 
the male members' associational freedoms."1365 Concurring in the 
judgment, Justice O'Connor interpreted the NAACP cases as most 
strongly protecting only those associations whose activities were them­
selves expressive under the First Amendment, and providing little pro­
tection to associations whose activities were commercial or otherwise 
nonexpressive.1366 Because the Jaycees were closer to the commercial 
than to the expressive end of the scale, they had minimal associational 
rights that were being sacrificed by the concededly important antidis­
crimination policy. 
Roberts can be faulted for understating the censorial features of 
equality jurisprudence. Title VII tells private employers that they can­
not represent themselves as associations reflecting the values of race 
or sex segregation, and its anti-harassment guidelines require employ­
ers to police sexist and racist expression by their employees. Calling 
the association "commercial" (O'Connor) or "unselective" (Brennan) 
does not negate the fact that the state is censoring private expression 
and expressive association. The Roberts Justices did not fairly treat the 
central claim of the Jaycees and their friends the Boy Scouts, that the 
ability of Americans to form expressive associations entails the ability 
to exclude members whom the association believes (perhaps unfairly) 
would undermine its message and its internal cohesion. That does not 
mean the Jaycees should have prevailed in Roberts. As the state and 
its amici argued, the normative linchpin of the case was whether the 
state's interest in promoting women's equality is a compelling interest 
and justifies integration of associations like the Jaycees. The Supreme 
Court had confronted a similar claim more forthrightly in Bob Jones 
University v. United States,1367 which ruled that the fundamental inter­
est in eradicating racial discrimination justified the federal govern­
ment's refusal to provide tax exemptions to a college that excluded 
different-race couples on religious principle. 
What the Justices could not see in Roberts, they could see in 
Hurley. 1368 Had the Boston parade been a municipal event, the First 
Amendment would have protected lesbigay people's right to partici­
pate in the parade either as individuals or as a group, for the reasons 
1365. Id. at 623. 
1366. Id. at 634-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). "An associa­
tion must choose its market. Once it enters the marketplace of commerce in any substantial 
degree it loses the complete control over its membership that it would otherwise enjoy if it 
confined its affairs to the marketplace of ideas." Id. at 635-36. 
1367. 461 U.S. 574 (1983); see PHILIP B. HEYMANN & LANCE LEIBMAN, THE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF LA WYERS: CASE STUDIES 139 (1988) (background of the case). 
1368. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. , A Jurisprudence ·of "Coming Out": Relig­
ion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 
YALE L.J. 2411 (1997). 
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suggested above. But the state courts ruled that the parade was pri­
vate, and that makes a First Amendment difference: if a private group 
were trying to present a message that would be defeated or diluted by 
the presence of lesbigay participants, then its First Amendment rights 
are implicated, as the Supreme Court held in both Hurley (an expres­
sive conduct case) and Dale (an expressive association as well as 
speech case ). 1369 The Supreme Court was right to say that the presence 
of openly gay marchers or assistant scoutmasters could be understood 
as a derogation from some traditionalist messages, including "we tol­
erate homosexuals only if they are in the closet."1370 But it was wrong 
in both cases to stop with that conclusion. In both Hurley and Dale, 
the state was asserting a compelling interest in eradicating antigay dis­
crimination in important public accommodations and ensuring that 
lesbigay people not be excluded. Apparently, the Court in both cases 
assumed that this state goal went to the content of the private groups' 
expressive identity. Identity politics is a politics of presence; presence 
carries a message; therefore, exactly as the parade organizers and the 
Boy Scouts had argued in their briefs, a group cannot control its own 
expression unless it can control its own membership. 
But if the foregoing is correct, Roberts and Bob Jones were 
wrongly decided.1371 The majority in Hurley and, especially, Dale un­
derstated the subordinating features of the First Amendment. By pro­
tecting centers of social power in their efforts to exclude gay people 
because of what they supposedly represent, the First Amendment of 
Dale does what the Equal Protection Clause protected gay people 
against in Romer v. Evans - denial of important social rights because 
of stereotyping and prejudice. The state courts that were reversed in 
Hurley and Dale viewed the First Amendment as tolerating state 
regulations that interpreted antigay exclusions as going to status rather 
than expression - exactly the same as the Supreme Court did in 
Roberts and Bob Jones. 
Roberts, Bob Jones, Hurley, and Dale can best be understood and 
reconciled by reference to this Article's theory of IBSMs. For the tra­
ditionally stigmatized individual (the black person, the woman, the gay 
person), exclusion is always a matter of both status and message and 
1369. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576-77; Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-61 
(2000). 
1370. Dale was beclouded by serious question whether the Boy Scouts was an expressive 
association or was expressing any opinions as to gay people or homosexuality. See Dale, 530 
U.S. at 665-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
1371. Roberts can be saved if one accepts O'Connor's commercial-expressive contin­
uum, but it is incoherent. As the Court's recent cases recognize - another example of the 
imperial First Amendment - commercial speech is expressive. Roberts can also be saved if 
one accepts Brennan's exception for large unselective groups, but in that event Dale is 
wrongly decided. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 697 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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can therefore usually be analyzed as a matter of antidiscrimination law 
or First Amendment law. So the Court can usually say that women are 
excluded from all-male clubs for reasons having to do only with their 
status and not their message, or they can say the opposite. What moti­
vates one answer or the other is social norms and how far the IBSM 
has progressed in its politics of recognition. Race is such an officially 
irrelevant trait that judges will view race-based exclusions through 
equality lenses except in the most extreme cases (the KKK). Sex is a 
trait that remains relevant sometimes but not often, and so judges will 
be inclined to view sex-based exclusions through equality lenses. In 
both cases, by the way, the judicial task is made easier by the reluc­
tance of private associations to justify their exclusions as actual ex­
pressions of racism or sexism.1372 Private associations or their counsel 
are not so bashful in expressing their views that homosexuality is both 
relevant and really malignant.1373 To the extent that homosexuality is a 
trait that most judges tend to view as both salient and icky, they will 
view private exclusions through libertarian lenses. Accordingly, those 
judges who view sexual variation as malignant will be much more 
likely to side with liberty in liberty-equality clashes than judges who 
view sexual variation as tolerable or even benign. 
Ill. IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND META-CHANGES IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE AND JURISPRUDENCE 
Surely it is clear that IBSMs and their countermovements were 
critically important to constitutional doctrine in the twentieth century. 
This was equally true at the level of constitutional meta-discourse and 
jurisprudence. As much as any other socio-economic development of 
the century, the social movements surveyed in this Article were a 
moving force behind the big changes in the larger ways law professors, 
judges, and lawyers have understood and analyzed constitutional is­
sues. As I shall argue in this part, no theory of constitutional law can 
be adequate or successful which does not centrally involve IBSMs and 
their jurisprudence. These social movements and their countermove­
ments have been testing grounds that have deepened the insights and 
1372. Thus, Roberts would have been a harder case if the Jaycees had argued the fol­
lowing: we are an all-male group because we represent an ideology of sexism. Our funda­
mental organizing message is, "Business is for guys! Women belong at home (though they 
can be our guys' guests for lunch)." The Jaycees made nothing like this argument, and they 
won no votes at the Supreme Court. See 147 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 199, at 593-95, 
599 (during oral argument in Roberts, counsel for Jaycees could not name a single policy po­
sition or message that would be changed if women became members). 
1373. The Boy Scouts' attorneys (without any reference to the Boy Scouts of America's 
own official message) said this: "Believing that homosexual conduct, along with other sex 
outside of marriage, is immoral, Boy Scouting does not want to promote homosexual con­
duct as a form of behavior." Reply Brief for Petitioners at 5, Dale (No. 99-699). 
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revealed the deficiencies of the big jurisprudential schools of the twen­
tieth century - legal realism and legal process - and have generated 
a third, critical theory. 
Constitutional law in 1900 was originalist and formal in its meth­
odology, substantive but modest in its prohibitions, and largely served 
the interests of economic and social elites. The Supreme Court read 
the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause much more 
narrowly than their broad phraseology would have supported, but in 
what the Justices claimed was strict adherence to the original expecta­
tions of the ratifying states in 1791 and 1868, respectively.1374 The 
Court tolerated state censorship or discriminations that had firm roots 
in tradition. Episodically, the Court enforced the Contract, Takings, 
and Commerce Clauses against state or federal economic regulation, 
but for the most part the Court upheld most such laws. A nonactivist 
Court suited elite interests fine, as it protected the legal stability that 
was important to the flourishing of modern commerce, mega­
businesses, and finance. The Justices' episodic bouts of nonoriginalist 
activism came in cases in which the interests of socio-economic elites 
were immediately threatened, as in the income tax and Pullman strike 
cases of 1895.1375 
How different is constitutional law in the new millennium! The 
Court's methodology is unmistakably dynamic and policy-saturated. 
Although the Court's review is more proceduralist and less openly 
substantive than it once was, statutes fall like trees in timber season 
every time the Court sits. The Justices' activism knows no ideology: 
conservatives are just as activist as moderates. And the Court's activ­
ism has benefited oddball as well as ordinary people - ACT-UP pro­
testers and performance artists, members of the KKK as well as the 
NAACP, pregnant schoolteachers and men refused admission to pro­
fessional school, the elderly and the disabled who need a place to live, 
latino and black schoolchildren, parents and traditionalists wanting 
homosexual-free spaces, women seeking abortion and women pro-
1374. See, e.g., Colorado v. Patterson, 205 U.S. 454 (1907) (reading the First 
Amendment as only barring "prior restraints," which had been condemned by Blackstone 
and the colonists); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (reading the Equal Protection 
Clause as having no bearing on social or political rights); The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 
(16 Wall.) 36 (1893) (reading the Equal Protection Clause to impose heightened scrutiny 
only for race-based classifications); see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (broadly 
reading the Eleventh Amendment, well beyond its text, to reflect original expectations of 
the framers of the amendment and the original Constitution). 
1375. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (asserting federal Commerce Clause as basis 
for federal court injunctions suppressing the Pullman Strike); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & 
Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (invalidating the federal income tax, upon a wild theory that it 
was inconsistent with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4). See also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 
(1905) (liberty of contract), and cases applying Lochner. 
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testing their mission, cross-burners as well as flag-burners, lesbigay 
public school and university students. 
It is impossible to imagine this dramatic transformation without 
considering the role of IBSMs and their countermovements. The com­
plicated dialogue among their lawyers, the judiciary, and the country 
at large has driven these revolutionary developments in constitutional 
law and its accompanying theory and jurisprudence. Among the big 
normative legacies of these social movements are both justifications 
for and critiques of dynamic constitutional interpretation, the 
representation-reinforcing role of judicial review, and popular consti­
tutionalism. 
A Legal Realism, Social Movements, and the Living Constitution 
According to the conventional wisdom among legal historians, the 
originalist methodology dominating American constitutionalism dur­
ing the nineteenth century gave way in the twentieth to a "Living 
Constitution" pioneered by social evolutionary thinkers such as Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., Woodrow Wilson, and Louis Brandeis.1376 The 
doctrinal history developed in Part II of this Article supports the gen­
eral account of the twentieth century as an era of consciously dynamic 
constitutionalism but suggests that the pioneers were not just the 
Harvard- and Princeton-trained intellectuals, but were also lawyers 
and leaders of social movements whose members' interests were not 
represented among the original framers. Indeed, principles for the 
Living Constitution were laid out, perhaps for the first time, by 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Virginia Minor, and other women's suffra­
gists in the 1870s. As Adam Winkler has demonstrated, these early 
advocates for women's politics of recognition pione'ered the evolutive 
theory of law, whereby fundamental law in a democracy must change 
to accommodate the widening circle of citizenship. Arguing before a 
Senate committee in 1870, Stanton asserted women's constitutional 
right to vote on the basis of a broad reading of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Guarantee 
Clause of Article IV, and the Bill of Attainder Clause of Article I; al­
though none of these provisions explicitly assured women's rights, 
they had to be interpreted broadly in light of women's equal 
1376. See Howard Gillman, The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of 
the Notion of the "Living Constitution" in the Course of American State-Building, 11  STUD. 
AM. POL. DEV. 191 (1997); see also Morton J. Horwitz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISES OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 140-42 (1992); PAUL W. 
KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND H ISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY 77-89 (1992). 
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citizenship, and their general principles were undermined by excluding 
women from the franchise. 1377 
The suffragists' approach to law anticipated and may have influ­
enced the progressive constitutionalists , especially Holmes, who 
deemphasized history and custom and celebrated social policy as the 
proper grounding for evolving legal standards.1378 By the lights of the 
women's movement and the later civil rights movement, however, 
Holmes's evolutive approach to law was hardly sufficient. Their cen­
tral claim would have been that Holmes had a thin understanding of 
democracy and citizenship. Like other progressives, Holmes deferred 
to the operation of an often unrepresentative political process and 
most stringently criticized courts for standing in the way of the reforms 
desired by popular majorities.1379 Justice Holmes's opinion for a 
unanimous Court in Giles v. Harris was as presentist, policy-oriented, 
and deferential to the political process as his Lochner dissent - but is 
not the kind of Living Constitution that looks admirable in retrospect. 
Although Justice Brandeis, "the People's Lawyer," was a constitu­
tional dynamicist more in tune with the needs of ordinary people, his 
jurisprudence, like Holmes's, was cautiously evolutive and deferential 
to the normal political process.1380 As Justices on the Court, neither 
objected to decisions applying Plessy to allow racial segregation in 
public schools, for example.1381 While neither Holmes nor Brandeis 
had the kind of egalitarian constitutional vision the early suffragists or 
anti-apartheid thinkers had, they were open to updating the 
Constitution to protect women and people of color from harm. 
Attorneys for people of color and feminists in the first decades of 
the twentieth century were not as learned as Holmes and Brandeis, 
nor were they intimately familiar with the dynamically-inclined theo-
1377. Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the "Living Con­
stitution, " 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1456, 1479-83 (2001); see id. at 1482-1518 (carefully tracing this 
new form of argument in legislative and then judicial fora - and its rejection in the 1870s). 
1378. E.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 
469, 474 (1897), reprinted in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 186-87, 195 (1920); see 
Winkler, supra note 1377, at 1524-25 (circumstantial evidence that the suffragists' "new 
departure" directly influenced Holmes). 
1379. E.g., Lochner v. New York, 1 98 U.S. 45, 75 (1906) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see 
also Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908) (strongly criti­
cizing courts for interfering with legislative reforms). 
1380. See generally ALPHEUS T. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE (1946); 
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 1 15-40 
(2000); PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE (1984). 
1381. See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927), where the Court (including Holmes 
and Brandeis) upheld against equal protection attack the segregation of Chinese students in 
"colored" schools and treated it as settled that federal courts would not intervene in state 
and local decisions about how to manage their public schools. 
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ries of the legal realists that unfolded in the 1920s and 1930s.1382 But 
early IBSM lawyers like Moorfield Storey, Louis Marshall, and Morris 
Ernst were well-connected with current thinking among lawyers and 
scholars, and organizations like the NAACP and Planned Parenthood 
were advised and assisted by leading law professors such as Felix 
Frankfurter of Harvard and Edwin Borchard, Charles Black, and 
Fowler Harper of Yale. The big contributions of IBSM attorneys were 
to give legal voice to the needs and aspirations of the disempowered, 
to apply theories of living constitutionalism to the problems faced by 
women and minorities, and to enrich American thinking about what 
democratic constitutionalism ought to look like. 
The first two parts of this Article provide early examples of their 
dynamic methodology. Consider the common themes of Louis 
Brandeis's brief in Muller (1908), Jonah Goldstein's brief in Sanger 
(1919), and U.S. Bratton's brief in Moore v. Simpson (1923) .  None of 
these briefs pretended to be "discovering" the original meaning of the 
Due Process Clause or to be applying precedent.1383 There was little 
conventional legal analysis in the briefs. Instead, each document mas­
sively educated the Justices in what counsel believed were the most 
relevant factual materials - the harms to American women and fami­
lies due to overwork of female employees (Brandeis), state censorship 
of birth control information and devices (Goldstein and Sanger), the 
mob-driven and lawless operation of the Phillips County system of 
criminal justice (Bratton).1384 The premise was that the Court should 
apply the general libertarian policy of the Due Process Clause to ac­
commodate the current and valid needs of the nation's citizens. This 
was the key insight of dynamic constitutionalism: the general princi­
ples and policies embodied in various constitutional provisions must 
be applied in light of current social facts and the felt necessities of our 
citizens. As a practical matter, this meant that history took a back seat 
1382. The legal realists carried forward Holmes's project of understanding Jaw as an 
evolving response to social problems. See generally NEIL DUXBURY, PAITERNS OF 
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 65-159 (1995); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 
1927-1960 (1986). Although the realists did not focus on constitutional law as much as the 
common law, their view was that the Constitution evolved at the hands of judges, who 
sought to mask the evolution in shrouds of doctrine. E.g., Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution 
as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934). 
1383. Indeed, Brandeis's brief was crafting a way around the recent Lochner precedent, 
and Bratton's invited the Court to ignore the Leo Frank case. Although there was no con­
trary precedent, there was certainly no precedent supporting Goldstein's argument that 
women had a due process right to contraceptives. 
1384. The detailed factual materials were found in different spots in each .submission. 
Brandeis's entire brief was the social science and comparative law data. Goldstein's brief 
incorporated points documented in greater detail by the supplement written by his client, 
Sanger. Bratton's brief relied on the massively detailed record compiled for the Court by the 
appellants. 
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to social and political science.1385 A deeper premise of these and other 
social movement briefs was the notion that old constitutional policies 
needed to be updated to take account of the experience of minorities 
in the United States and that laws oppressing or subordinating the in­
terests of women and racial minorities were normatively unaccept­
able.1386 
Civil rights attorneys often won important constitutional prece­
dents with these kinds of arguments. Among the early landmarks were 
Guinn, Buchanan, Moore, Herndon, Powell, Norris, Chambers, 
Al/wright, and Shelley. All but Guinn swept beyond the expectations 
of the framers of the Reconstruction amendments, and most went 
against probable intent; at least three of the decisions overruled or 
narrowed Supreme Court precedents.1387 Although Justices authoring 
opinions in these cases did not openly embrace a Living Constitution, 
they emphasized the general (purpose) rather than specific (original) 
intent of the framers and distinguished away unhelpful precedents 
based upon the remarkable and compelling facts of the race cases. 
Equally important, the series of cases brought to the Court by civil 
rights organizations educated the Justices as to the overall situation in 
the South. Even before the school segregation cases (Gaines through 
Brown) were brought, civil rights groups showed the Justices in one 
appeal after another the multifarious . ways southern "law enforce­
ment" could deny people of color their right to vote and to hold prop­
erty and could convict them of crimes they did not commit. For each 
member of the Court, there was, at some point, a moment of recogni­
tion that there was no justice to be had for blacks in the South - and 
that increasing numbers of blacks were not going to stand for it any­
more. At the same time the NAACP was litigating the cases, it was 
seeking to change the political background against which they were 
evaluated, at first just by popularizing the abuses of apartheid but then 
by direct political action. The Association's key role in the Senate re­
jection of Judge Parker's nomination for the Supreme Court in 1930, 
and the subsequent defeat of numerous pro-Parker senators whom the 
NAACP targeted, served notice that it was no longer politically safe to 
1 385. See generally JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND 
EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE ( 1995). 
1 386. I emphasize that the point in text was not made in the early briefs. For people of 
color, the argument usually was that the liberationist policy of the Reconstruction amend­
ments had been lost in the Plessy era, and the Court needed to retrieve that lost policy. For 
women, I am surprised that little was made of the way in which the Nineteenth Amendment 
might represent a new constitutional development requiring a rethinking of other constitu­
tional policies. 
1 387. Moore either narrowed or overruled Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 ( 1915), see 
supra Section 1 1 .A.2; Allwright overruled Cravey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935), see supra 
Section I.A.1; Shelley substantially narrowed Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 ( 1926). 
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support judges who were friendly to apartheid.1388 In part because of 
the NAACP's normative prestige and political clout, the Justices 
named after 1930 were a remarkably pro-civil rights bunch, open to 
reinventing the Constitution to meet current social demands.1389 
The briefing and deliberation in Brown v. Board of Education 
were the apotheosis of dynamic constitutionalism (Section l.A.2). 
There was plenty of legal discussion in the Inc. Fund's briefs, but the 
supportive precedents were ones that the Inc. Fund itself had won 
with presentist pitches under the Equal Protection Clause. The Social 
Science Statement attached to the Inc. Fund's brief was one intellec­
tual fulcrum of the case for overruling Plessy. Arguing that educa­
tional segregation was based upon fantastic views of racial variation 
and had tangibly bad consequences for the country as well as for peo­
ple of color, the Social Science Statement sought to motivate the 
Court to assemble the little precedents into a big one.1390 The Solicitor 
General's brief was also openly present-oriented and set forth a sec­
ond conceptual fulcrum for reevaluating Plessy: apartheid was an em­
barrassment to the democratic principles underlying the entire 
Constitution and to American foreign policy during the Cold War.1391 
In an effort to buy time needed to reach consensus, Justice 
Frankfurter persuaded the Court to require further briefs, focusing 
particularly on the lessons of original intent. All sides came up with 
impressive research efforts, supplemented by law clerk Alex Bickel's 
excellent memo, which Frankfurter circulated to the Court.1392 It does 
not appear that any Justice was persuaded that the framers or ratifiers 
1388. See GOINGS, supra note 663, at 54-74 (NAACP's successful campaigns to unseat 
pro-Parker senators in 1930-36): 
1389. To wit: Cardozo (1932) was a sweet-natured liberal; Black (1937) was a closeted 
opponent of apartheid; Frankfurter (1938) had been an NAACP advisor; Douglas (1939) 
was a rabid realist and nonconformist devoted to civil rights; Murphy (1940) had created a 
civil rights division when he was Attorney General; Stone (promoted 1941) was a realist de­
voted to civil rights; Jackson (1941) was a conservative sometimes sympathetic to civil rights 
claims; Rutledge (1943) was a realist devoted to civil rights; Burton (1945) and Minton 
(1949) were former senators with pro-civil rights records; Clark (1949) was Truman's pro­
civil rights Attorney General. Only Byrnes (1941) was a segregationist. 
1390. See Social Science Statement, supra note 96; supra Section l.A.2. 
1391. See Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 2-8, Brown (1952 Term, Nos. 8, 101, 
191, 413, 448); id. at 3 ("For racial discriminations imposed by law, or having the sanction or 
support of government, inevitably tend to undermine the foundations of a society dedicated 
to freedom, justice, and equality."). For important background and details of the openly pre­
sentist support of the federal government to the anti-apartheid campaign, see MARY L. 
DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
(2000). 
1392. The Bickel memo was revised and published as Alexander M. Bickel, The Origi­
nal Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955) [hereinafter 
Bickel, The Original Understanding] (concluding that the framers did not believe the 
Fourteenth Amendment required immediate desegregation of schools but were open to the 
possibility over time). 
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of the Fourteenth Amendment, on balance, "intended" to render 
public school segregation constitutionally problematic, and the 
amendment was not so interpreted in the nineteenth century.1393 In the 
teeth of historical evidence that educational apartheid was not the 
object of the Equal Protection Clause, versus moral and social science 
evidence that such a policy had malignant consequences, the Warren 
Court emphatically chose the latter and dished off 100 years of history 
in a couple of sentences. 1394 Handed down the same day, Bolling inter­
preted the Fifth Amendment to bar school segregation in the District 
of Columbia, a result that would never have occurred to the framers of 
either that amendment (1791) or the Fourteenth (1868). 1 395 Appropri­
ately, Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Bolling made no mention of 
original intent. 
Brown and Bolling were a watershed. Not only were the briefs 
strongly presentist in orientation, but the Court's opinions were exclu­
sively so. That the Court's greatest and most legitimate constitutional 
decisions were rendered with no originalist support - and wide belief 
that original intent supported Plessy - called forth a generation of 
relatively open constitutional dynamism. An important academic de­
fense of the Living Constitution was penned by then-closeted gay 
Professor Charles Reich: " [I]n a dynamic society," the Constitution 
"must keep changing in its application or lose even its original mean­
ing. There is no such thing as a constitutional provision with a static 
meaning. If it stays the same while other provisions of the Constitution 
change and society itself changes, the provision will atrophy."1396 After 
Supreme Court Justices had signaled that they were a ready audience 
for these arguments, attorneys for people of color, women, and gay 
people urged the courts in case after case to update the Constitution 
to protect them from state oppression and to give teeth to their claims 
of equal citizenship. Not surprisingly, most of the Court's landmark 
individual rights decisions since Brown have ignored original expecta­
tions or any meaningful explication of pre-civil rights constitutional 
1393. See Kluger, supra note 17 (the Justices were not persuaded); see also J. MORGAN 
KOUSSER, DEAD END: THE DEVELOPMENT OF NINETEENTH CENTURY LITIGATION ON 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN SCHOOLS (1 986). 
1394. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954): The parties' discussion of the 
original materials "and our own investigation convince us that, although these sources cast 
some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are 
inconclusive." 
1395. The Fifth Amendment, of course, was adopted (1791 ) when slavery was still rec­
ognized in the Constitution. The Congress that voted for the Fourteenth Amendment (1 868) 
adopted statutes recognizing racial segregation in D.C. schools. 
1396. Charles A. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. 
REV. 673, 735-36 (1963). Although Professor Reich was seeking to explain the constitutional 
philosophy of Justice Black, which was pretty dynamic, he has told me that the Justice be­
lieved the article was more Reich than Black. 
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history as a basis for their holding. Instead, these decisions have been 
justified by what general constitutional principles or purposes would 
seem to require under present social circumstances. Or they have been 
justified by reference to precedents that themselves updated the 
Constitution through a present-minded purposivism. These kinds of 
arguments have been a common feature of Supreme Court decisions 
selectively incorporating various Bill of Rights provisions into the Due 
Process Clause (such as Gideon; Section II.Al); applying the Due 
Process Clause to strike down vague statutes (such as Papachristou; 
Section II.A.3); recognizing a right of sexual privacy (such as Griswold 
and Roe; Section II.B); sweeping away laws barring sexual and marital 
relations between people of different races (Loving; Section II.C); 
subjecting sex-based classifications (such as Craig; Section II.C.1) and 
affirmative action programs (such as Adarand; Section II.C.3) to 
heightened scrutiny; striking down obsolescent death penalty laws 
(such as Furman and Coker; Section II.D); examining state voting re­
strictions under strict scrutiny (such as the one-person, one vote cases; 
Section II.E.1);  expanding Congress's power to reach discriminatory 
conduct (Section II.E.2) and state responsibility for discriminatory 
acts of private parties (such as the sit-in cases; Section II.E.3); and pro­
tecting people's expressive conduct and association against state cen­
sorship (such as the NAACP and Boy Scout cases; Section II.F). 
The dynamic constitutionalism arguably legitimated by the race 
discrimination cases encouraged women's and gay people's movement 
lawyers not only to ignore original intent, but also to bypass the 
NAACP's painstaking case-by-case approach to winning new constitu­
tional standards. The contraception briefs written by Fowler Harper 
and Thomas Emerson, the sex discrimination briefs of Dorothy 
Kenyon and then Pauli Murray and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and the 
abortion briefs submitted by Sarah Weddington and others leap­
frogged the early civil rights strategy of starting with dramatic, fact­
based precedents (like Moore, Powell, Chambers, Sipuel) and building 
upon them in a series of cases leading up to a landmark decision rec­
ognizing a broad constitutional principle (Brown v. Allen and Fay, 
Gideon, Malloy and Miranda, Brown v. Board of Education) . The 
feminist briefs went straight for the landmark opinion; rather than 
ending up with Brown, they wanted to start with it. And their briefs 
followed the approach of the Brown briefs: they described present so­
cial realities (such as the central role for women in modern society and 
the malign effect of contraception bans and sex discriminations on 
their ability to enjoy their new role), posited one or more general con­
stitutional principles set at a high level of generality, and concluded 
that the outdated legal disability was inconsistent with the principle(s). 
As Ginsburg later described the process, movement lawyers were 
pushing the Court immediately toward a "[b]oldly dynamic interpreta-
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tion, departing radically from the original understanding" of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.1397 She was certainly correct, as the 
Reconstruction amendments were not aimed at eliminating any dis­
criminations against women, and their supporters had even betrayed 
women's rights in the course of their struggle; gay rights were not even 
on the cultural radar in that period. So the Supreme Court's decisions 
in Reed, Frontiero, Craig, Hogan, J.E.B. , and Romer v. Evans had no 
asserted connection to original constitutional expectations. Two land­
mark decisions did emphasize originalist history - Roe and Hardwick 
- but those exemplars of originalism only reinforce one's doubts 
about that project, because the history invoked by the Court in each 
case was slanted and simply wrong on many points. 1398 That these have 
been the most widely criticized of the Court's decisions in the last gen­
eration does not augur well for originalism as a legitimating mecha­
msm. 
More than a generation of judges and law professors have grown 
to maturity under the shadow of Brown and Griswold. Their dynamic 
methodology has called forth most of the great academic theories of 
judicial review for a generation, including the work of Charles Black, 
Alexander Bickel, John Hart Ely, Thomas Emerson, Kenneth Karst, 
and Catharine MacKinnon. What their work shares methodologically 
is not only its assumption of constitutional dynamism, but its deep dis­
cussion of what constitutional norms Brown and Griswold (and their 
progeny) best support. For the foregoing theorists the baseline is in­
clusion of the once-disparaged and marginalized as full participants in 
politics and society.1399 That was arguably not the framers' baseline in 
1868 as to people of color, and certainly not as to women and gay peo­
ple. As women's and gay people's rights occupy an increasing share of 
the Court's docket, the connection between original intent and the 
Court's decisionmaking will become only more attenuated. 
1397. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights 
Amendments, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 161, 161. 
1398. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 1 13, 174-77 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticiz­
ing the majority's misleading account and pointing to the longstanding state tradition regu­
lating and barring abortions); Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, supra note 601 (criticizing 
Hardwick's deployment of history). 
1399. See BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 140; JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); CHARLES L. 
BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Ox Bow Press 
1983) (1969); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); 
KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (1989); KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRESSION: VISIONS 
OF POWER IN THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION (1993); CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); Charles L. Black, Jr., 
The Lawfulness of Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960). 
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The Living Constitution has been a big success but has exposed ju­
dicial review to theoretical and practical difficulties, parallel to the dif­
ficulties faced by legal realist theory after 1935.1400 Most of the difficul­
ties are variations of a legitimacy problem: Can the rule of law be 
persuasively sustained when the Justices are free to ignore original ex­
pectations and even precedent when interpreting the open-textured 
individual rights provisions of the Constitution? Is judicial activism 
supporting civil rights any more legitimate than the discredited judicial 
activism supporting economic rights? Shouldn't dynamic constitution­
alism be the product of popular movements working to transform 
norms through constitutional amendments (or moments), rather than 
elite responses to minority lawsuits? These questions will occupy the 
remainder of this section. My argument is that this Article's history of 
IBSMs sheds novel light on these traditional topics. 
To begin with, the apparent triumph of dynamic constitutionalism 
has not meant the death of originalism. Indeed, dynamism and origi­
nalism form a dialectical relationship somewhat akin to that of (pro­
gressive) social movements and their (traditionalist) countermove­
ments. So even as the Warren Court viewed the Fourteenth 
Amendment differently than the framers apparently did, its most dy­
namic opinions (after Brown/Bolling/Cooper) called forth articulate 
dissents from the lawyerly Justices Frankfurter and Harlan,1401 and 
even the Warren Court's liberals were not so dynamic as to jettison 
the long-established state action requirement (the sit-in cases) or to 
extend heightened scrutiny to sex-based classifications (Hoyt). The 
tension between constitutional dynamism and originalism has become 
sharper since the Warren Court, for a simple reason. The Living 
Constitution has been associated so strongly with IBSMs that it was 
bound to become controversial once countermovements gained trac­
tion in national politics, as they have in response to the remedial 
measures pressed by the civil rights and women's rights movements 
and to the sexual conduct claims implicit in the pro-choice and gay 
rights movements. Supporters of privatized segregation, the anti-ERA 
campaign, and the pro-life and TFV movements argue in common that 
the Supreme Court has reneged on history and has violated the rule of 
law by interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment way beyond the origi-
1400. On legal realism's crisis of legitimacy, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS 
OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973). 
1401. See, e.g. , Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 449-80 (1968) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14-33 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Fay v. Noia, 
372 U.S. 391, 448-70 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266-330 
(1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672-86 (1961) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
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nal expectations of its framers.1402 Representatives of these counter­
movements now occupy important positions of power in Congress and 
the White House, as well as one-third of the seats on the Supreme 
Court. Whatever a scholar's or lawyer's motivation, he or she is as­
sured a responsive audience for any article or brief arguing that origi­
nal intent should be the linchpin for constitutional interpretation or, 
better yet, deploying such a methodology to support an interpretation 
favored by the countermovement. 
For this reason, originalist work has grown like weeds in a vacant 
lot since the (seeming) triumph of constitutional dynamism. Much of it 
has been quite bad, and some of the worst work has gotten the most 
attention. Robert Bork, a brilliant scholar of antitrust law, has shown a 
tin ear for constitutional history. His overblown attacks on Griswold, 
analytically vulnerable but politically unassailable, cost him a seat on 
the Supreme Court.1403 Infuriated but wiser from the experience, Bork 
shrewdly argued in The Tempting of America that the culture of con­
stitutional dynamism fostered by Brown is a threat to the rule of law 
but that Brown itself was defensible under the proper (originalist) 
methodology.1404 According to Bork, Brown could have rested on this 
syllogism: the goal of the Reconstruction amendments was equality for 
people of color; twentieth-century experience revealed that apartheid 
predictably yielded unequal schools (etc.) for the marked ("colored") 
race; with this new knowledge, what was not apparent to the framers is 
clear to us - segregated education (etc.) is inconsistent with the origi­
nal purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1405 Unfortunately, Bork's 
argument comes nowhere close to meeting the standard professional 
historians (or even law office historians) would require. Bork cited no 
evidence for his view of the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause. 
Historians have shown that the original purpose was much narrower. 
Rather than general equality for people of all races, the framers' ap­
parent purpose was to ensure equality only as to "civil rights" (to hold 
property, access to courts) but not as to social (associational) or politi­
cal (voting) rights. 1406 To reach Bork's result, you not only have to ig-
1402. Although the early massive resistance movement in the South gave original intent 
criticisms little emphasis in the 1950s, see BARTLEY, supra note 117, at 290-91, they became 
mainstays of the politics of preservation in the 1960s and afterward. 
1403. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1 ,  8-9 (1971 ). 
1 404. BORK, supra note 900, at 75-77, 143-45, 154-55. 
1405. Id. at 81 -82. Bork conceded that even if Brown was right, Bolling (requiring de­
segregation of D.C. public schools) was wrong under originalist premises. Id. at 83. 
1406. The House manager of the Fourteenth Amendment specifically assured fence­
sitters that the amendment would only cover "civil rights" and that civil rights "do not mean 
that all citizens shall sit on juries, or that their children shall attend the same schools." 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Wilson). Historians sup-
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nore strong evidence of the framers' specific intent (how they thought 
their amendment would apply), but also of their general intent (the 
purpose of the amendment). 
A more rigorous legal historicist, Michael McConnell, has de­
fended the result in Brown along specific intent lines. He maintains 
that in the 1870s there was much support in Congress for the view that 
the Fourteenth Amendment rendered public school segregation un­
constitutional and, from that evidence, argues that the Framers ex­
pected school segregation to fail.1407 Virtually no one has been per­
suaded by McConnell's learned account. Post hoc assertions by 
legislators in the 1870s about what they meant to do in the 1860s are 
not reliable evidence about the real deal made in 1868, and for most 
legal historians there is simply too much evidence that the moderate 
supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment believed it allowed segre­
gated schools.1408 So far, even the smartest originalist defense of Brown 
has not met historicist standards. And neither McConnell nor Bork 
has defended either Bolling or Loving as consistent with original 
meaning, nor could they easily do so. Because Brown/Bolling/Loving 
are universally accepted as key decisions in the constitutional canon, 
their incompatibility with originalism undermines the latter's claim to 
be the lodestar for constitutional interpretation.1409 Reaffirmation of 
port this civil/social/political rights distinction as a key one for the framers. E.g. , MICHAEL 
LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND 
RECONSTRUCTION, 1863-1869 (1974); EARL MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, 
AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869 (1990); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: 
FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988). 
1407. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 947, 1005-29 (1995) (presenting a brilliant and rigorous account of Senator Sumner's 
effort to provide a federal remedy for school segregation, an effort that, McConnell argues, 
had majority congressional support in 1874 and failed only because of Sumner's death and 
the Democratic victory in the elections that year). 
1408. See generally RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 22-27, 1 17-27 (1977); Alfred H. 
Kelly, The Congressional Controversy Over School Segregation, 1867-1875, 64 AM. HIST. 
REV. 537 (1959). For specific responses to McConnell, see Michael J. Klarman, Brown, 
Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 
1881 (1995) (critical analysis of the history as unpersuasive), and Earl M. Maltz, Originalism 
and the Desegregation Decisions - A Response to Professor McConnell, 13 CONST. COMM. 
223 (1996) (same). 
1409. The list of indefensible decisions is longer than just the anti-apartheid cases. A 
host of other foundational decisions are either hard to support or wrongly decided under 
originalist premises, including Mapp, Gideon, Malloy, and the other Bill of Rights "incorpo­
ration" precedents, compare Fairman, supra note 640 (advocating skepticism of any incorpo­
ration), with Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amend­
ment, 103 YALE L.J. 57 (1993) (criticizing Fairman's methodology); Roe and the subsequent 
abortion decisions, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 1 13, 174-77 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 
Fay and the Warren Court's habeas decisions, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 448-70 (1962) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting); the Court's one-person, one-vote decisions, see Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186, 266-330 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Reed, Craig, and the Court's sex dis­
crimination cases, see Ginsburg, supra note 1397 (celebrating the Court's dynamic reading of 
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Plessy would be, for most Americans, too high a price to pay for the 
Court to insist on pure originalism. A wide array of academics have 
questioned whether original-meaning constitutionalism is possible: 
judges are not capable of coming up with historicist accounts that an­
swer current constitutional issues and satisfy the standards of neutral 
historiography;1410 such an enterprise is conceptually impossible be­
cause changed circumstances render historical actors incapable of an­
swering the questions posed by present-day cases;141 1  originalist 
method cannot constrain judges, who can reach the result they want 
simply by changing the level of generality at which they ask the origi­
nalist questions, as Bork tried to do. 1412 Like Bork, the most dogmatic 
originalist Justices have often abandoned it as a methodology when it 
does not support the results suggested by the politics of preserva­
tion. 1413 
Yet originalism lives. And flourishes. 1414 In my view, it does not 
persevere because lawyers believe that original intent actually con-
equal protection in those cases); Furman, see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 376-82 (1971) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); Papachristou, see City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 , 102-06 
(1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Croson and Adarand, see Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Ac­
tion and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985); cf 
text accompanying notes 225-229 (Reagan Administration's rebuttal to NAACP's originalist 
arguments). I have not listed First Amendment decisions; outside of the religion clauses, 
original intent does not seem to have played a major role in this area generally. So the origi­
nalist scholar or judge faces the objection that he or she must reconcile his or her preferred 
method with the growing host of precedents inconsistent with it; she or he must have a the­
ory that takes account of stare decisis, which has proven a daunting task. 
1410. E.g. , Flaherty, supra note 2 (giving a detailed critique of the low standards of most 
originalist scholarship and judicial opinions). 
1411. E.g. , Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of lnterpretiv­
ism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983) [hereinafter Tushnet, Following the 
Rules]. 
1412. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
REV. 204 (1980); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Defini­
tion of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990). 
1413. Compare ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATIER OF INTERPRETATION (1997) (strongly 
advocating an originalist approach as the only legitimate constitutional interpretation), with 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.15 (1992) (Scalia, J.) (stating 
that evidence that framers would only have expected the Takings Clause to apply to physical 
takings is not dispositive as to regulatory takings today), and Adarand Contractors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(following the majority in ignoring evidence that affirmative action to help people of color 
was acceptable to the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
1414. Originalists have penned thoughtful responses to the anti-originalist claims made 
in the previous paragraph, see Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Con­
stitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 226 (1988), and 
some nonoriginalists have even switched sides, in part or entirely. See Randy E. Barnett, An 
Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45  LOY. L .  REV. 611  (1999) (tracing the renaissance of 
originalist or quasi-originalist argumentation within the legal academy). And there has been 
a renaissance of original meaning analysis in Supreme Court opinions, e.g., U.S. Term Lim­
its, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). Yet it is significant that evidence of original 
meaning has been of greatest value and interest to scholars and judges writing about issues 
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strains judges in the close cases. A more likely reason for the survival 
of originalism is symbolic and ·strategic. Original meaning remains, for 
many people, the most obvious methodology for applying a social con­
tract, especially a written one like our Constitution. Even though the 
cognoscenti understand the analytical problems with (and loopholes 
in) arguments from original intent, and understand that it cannot be a 
general theory of judicial review, originalist arguments retain a sym­
bolic power that dynamic arguments do not have - especially in a cul­
ture that is cynical and distrustful of state officials (including judges) 
and is therefore nervous about their exercising discretion. Original in­
tent arguments signal to judges and other public officials, adversaries 
and neutral parties, your movement's constituents, and other 
Americans that you are committed to the rule of law and its values. 
Such values include stability in constitutional rules or principles, his­
torical objectivity rather than judicial subjectivity in determining how 
they should apply to particular cases, the authority of previous consti­
tutional authors to bind judges and citizens to their prescriptions.1415 
Especially in this age of distrust, Americans think these are excellent 
ideals and insist that judges at least pay lip-service to them. 
Strategically, the lawyer or the judge ignores these ideals at her 
peril and therefore wants to tie her legal stance to this tradition (or at 
least to deny their inconsistency). Traditionalists were able to score 
points with moderates against the Warren Court because many of its 
rulings were unpopular and many made no serious effort to tie the�r 
results to tradition and original meaning. The Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts have been no more constrained by rule-of-law values than the 
Warren Court was, but they have more often sought to cover their 
tracks with originalist arguments. Even if the arguments do not satisfy 
professional historians, the choreography of the judicial opinion - the 
way it marshals its arguments - is apparently more important than 
the analytical rigor of the arguments.1416 George W. Bush can claim 
that Justices Scalia and Thomas are not "judicial activists" even 
of federalism and separation of powers - not individual rights that have been the focus of 
IBSM attention in the last century. Issues of free speech and association, cruel and unusual 
punishment, due process, and equal protection remain little encumbered by limits suggested 
by original constitutional meaning; most judges pay it little heed, and most law professors 
still do not research it. 
1415. Constitutional text is the best rule-of-law criterion, but the Constitution's individ­
ual rights provisions are too open-textured to serve that role in particular cases. Precedent 
(stare decisis) serves that role better in particular cases and conduces toward stability but (as 
we have seen in this study) has a tendency to depart from original constitutional meanings 
over time. Most rule-of-law constitutional theories take account · of text, original meaning, 
and stare decisis. 
1416. And neither is as important as the politics and etiquette of the opinion: Who won? 
Was the decision a wipeout for one side, or a compromise giving each social group some­
thing? Were the losers disrespected? 
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though they vote to strike down many laws without any plausible basis 
in original constitutional meaning, because they signal their respect for 
original intent and openly denounce constitutional dynamism. The 
masters of spin in post-realist America lead its politics of preservation. 
The perseverance of originalism, ironically, owes much to IBSM 
attorneys themselves and their academic allies. Civil rights attorneys 
in particular have long argued that the central purpose of the 
Reconstruction amendments was to reverse the subordination of 
African Americans and other people of color. Consistent with this he­
roic reading of the historical materials, Thurgood Marshall's Brown 
briefs made a detailed argument that its framers saw the Fourteenth 
Amendment as ensuring the full equality of the freed slaves and that, 
contrary to Plessy, state-enforced segregation had been shown, 
through precedents the NAACP had litigated, never consistent with 
actual equality (especially in education).1417 Note how similar 
Marshall's argument was to the one Bork would make thirty-five years 
later. As the Brown Justices understood, Marshall's argument was 
subject to the same objection as Bork's, that the framers did not un­
derstand "equality" as broadly as the civil rights movement did. 
Marshall could have responded that the framers did not insist that 
their understanding of equality had to remain the governing standard 
in the long rather than the short term.1418 This then becomes a coher­
ent originalist argument that takes account of the historical evidence 
- but of course this is a methodology differing little from the dynamic 
constitutionalism that lay at the heart of the Inc. Fund's politics of 
recognition and that Judge Bork passionately attacks. 
Once traditionalists revealed the rhetorical power of historicist ar­
guments, civil rights lawyers returned - after a post-Brown departure 
- to such arguments for their side. Ironically, their best original intent 
arguments have come in a line of cases that traditionalists usually win 
- the constitutionality of affirmative action. In Bakke, Eric 
Schnapper's brief for the Inc. Fund demonstrated that the Congresses 
adopting the Reconstruction amendments also enacted a number of 
statutes that conferred benefits in an explicitly race-based manner.1419 
That no one thought that race-based remedial legislation was prob­
lematic in the 1860s suggested that such laws should not be subject to 
1417. See Brief for Appellants at 67-120, Brown (1953 Term, Nos. 1, 2, 4, and 10) (gen­
eral purpose); id. at 120-89 (specific intent). 
1418. This was essentially the argument of Bickel, The Original Understanding, supra 
note 1392, at 59-65 (arguing that the framers intended to leave most segregation alone in the 
short term but to be open to constitutional change over time). 
1419. Brief of NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae at 
10-53, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811); see 
Schnapper, supra note 1409 (published version of the evidence assembled in the Bakke 
brief). 
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strict scrutiny in the 1980s. The Reagan Administration responded to 
these arguments in Wygant; Solicitor General Fried's amicus brief ar­
gued that Reconstruction's race-based laws represented only "com­
pensation for actual, identified victims of discrimination" and were 
therefore distinguishable from modern remedial measures, where 
there is not such a tight fit between identifiable victims and the race­
based government program.142° Fried's response mischaracterized 
some of the earlier statutes, one of which was for the benefit of all 
"destitute colored people in the District of Columbia," 1421 a class just 
as generalized as those benefiting from modern affirmative action. 
Fried's response also demanded an unrealistic standard for originalist 
evidence, for discussions and analogues 100 years ago will never be 
exactly like those of the present. Although accepting the Reagan 
Administration's position, Justice O'Connor's opinions in Croson and 
Adarand completely ignored the originalist arguments and were al­
most as dynamic as Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Brown. Even 
more openly dynamic and normative were the concurring opinions of 
the Court's two most outspoken originalists, Justices Scalia and 
Thomas.1422 
More important, academics allied with IBSMs have put forth vari­
ous hermeneutical theories that mediate the tension between past 
commands and present needs.1423 Charles Reich's defense of the Living 
Constitution as needed to prevent constitutional ossification is an 
early example. In the spirit of Reich's idea, the most popular theory of 
recent years has been Mark Tushnet's metaphor of translation: consti­
tutional law can be understood as a translation of directives issued in 
1420. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14-16, 
Wygant (No. 84-1340). 
1421. Res. 4, 40th Cong., 15 Stat. 20 (1867) (appropriating $15,000 "for the relief of 
freedmen or destitute colored people in the District of Columbia"). 
1422. Both Justices concurred for purely presentist reasons, having to do with their own 
theories of race-based stigma. See Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 
(1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 240-41 (Thomas, 
J. , concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In Croson, Justice Scalia did consider 
originalist evidence and from it concluded that state race-based programs ought to be con­
sidered more suspicious than federal ones, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 
469, 521-24 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment), a conclusion that the Court 
adopted over Scalia's dissent in Metro Broadcasting and that the Court (including Scalia) 
renounced in Adarand for reasons of coherence with precedent (except for Metro Broad­
casting, which was being overruled). This may be an example of "bait and switch" origi­
nalism: the judge latches onto any originalist argument that supports his bottom line, and 
then ignores the same evidence in cases in which evidence does not support his preferred 
position. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 249-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
1423. For an introduction, see INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A 
HERMENEUTIC READER (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988); Symposium, Le­
gal Interpretation 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985). 
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the past to circumstances unanticipated by the authors.1424 For Brown, 
Tushnet's question is not, How would the framers have treated public 
school segregation? The better questions are, What is the best ana­
logue, at the time of the framing, for the practice now challenged? 
How would the framers have treated the analogue? One might 
(debatably) say that public education by the 1950s was so important to 
our political culture that it resembled the access to courts that 
Americans in the 1860s believed to be a core civil right. (Again, note 
the similarity of the translation argument to Bork's originalist defense 
of Brown.) 
Constitutional translation requires normative judgments as well as 
a sophisticated understanding of historically situated analogues. Both 
form the basis for Anne Goldstein's and my historicist criticism of 
Hardwick, which relied on the long-standing pedigree of laws crimi­
nalizing "homosexual sodomy." Contrary to Justice White's anachro­
nistic opinion, sodomy laws were not aimed at same-sex or "homosex­
ual sodomy," which was not a regulatory concept until the late 
nineteenth century.1425 Translated into modern concepts, general sod­
omy laws like Georgia's were aimed at three things: (1) sexual assault 
(especially by adults against minors), (2) sexual pleasure not tied to 
sincere procreative effort, and (3) natural law gender roles within mar­
riage. 1426 The first, and primary, goal of sodomy laws does not justify 
their being applied to consensual sodomy, the conduct in Hardwick. 
The second and third goals were considered normatively appropriate 
in 1868 but are problematic after Griswold/Eisenstadt (goal 2) and 
Frontiero/Craig (goal 3). The Due Process Clause needs to be read in 
light of those recent cases, which h.ave transformed the constitutional 
landscape to problematize the original goals of those laws. 1427 
The last step in a historicist argument against Hardwick depends 
on a normative fulcrum, whereby values acceptable in the past can no 
longer count as constitutional justifications. Finding and defending 
that fulcrum are key moves in constitutional hermeneutics. The most 
famous is Bruce Ackerman's idea of synthesis, whereby old intentions 
are reinterpreted in light of new norms and principles instantiated by 
"constitutional moments." The Reconstruction amendments (1866-71) 
1424. Tushnet, Following the Rules, supra note 1411, at 800-01. For a listing of scholars 
who have followed Tushnet's use of the translation metaphor, see Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity 
in Translation, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1 165, 1171 n.32 (1993). 
1425. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, supra note 601, at 1081-86. 
1426. See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, at 161-64. 
1427. To the extent that the purpose of sodomy laws now includes the state's expression 
of antigay moral sentiments, the purpose created by Justice White in the teeth of the statute 
he was upholding, that purpose is at least problematic under Romer v. Evans. See id. at 149-
51. 
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were one such moment, the New Deal's triumph over the Old Court 
(1937-38) was another.1428 Ackerman's synthetic argument for Brown 
is a normative two-step: step one starts with the norms instantiated by 
Reconstruction, which step two updates to accommodate New Deal 
norms. Like the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Plessy 
Justices could plausibly accept in 1896 that the state was not responsi­
ble for private prejudices or capable of enforcing social equality, but 
the advent of the modern regulatory state requires a broader view of 
state responsibility for private prejudices and social inequality, exactly 
as the Court recognized in Brown.1429 Applying a cognate notion of 
synthesis, Reva Siegel argues that a better sex discrimination jurispru­
dence can be crafted by reading the Fourteenth Amendment through 
the lens of the Nineteenth Amendment, which she views as an impor­
tant constitutional moment where the polity rejected the separate 
spheres norm.1430 Once the Constitution has recognized women as full 
citizens (Nineteenth Amendment), the Fourteenth Amendment must 
be updated to assure women full equality, with particular attention to 
equality within the household as well as in public life. 
Just as the twentieth-century experience with IBSMs suggests 
skepticism about simple originalist theories, it suggests skepticism 
about synthetic theories whose fulcrum is a single legal event, whether 
it be the Nineteenth Amendment (Siegel) or the Court's switch-in­
time to avoid New Deal Court-packing (Ackerman). There is no rea­
son the Nineteenth Amendment has to be read broadly: it was as easy 
to implement as it was hard to pass, but its broader significance de­
pended completely on what normative engagement accompanied it -
very little until the 1960s. Likewise, I see little normative bite to the 
switch-in-time, for reasons that Barry Cushman has developed in per­
suasive detail,1431 but considerable bite to the fact that the voters en­
dorsed FDR and his New Deal in four presidential elections, which 
enabled FDR to transform the Court with nine appointments. 
The history in this Article suggests a different synthetic theory of 
constitutional change - and a legal realist theory for limited judicial 
activism. Leaving normative justification and modification for the next 
section, the descriptive theory posits constitutional protection as pri­
marily a function of the political progress a minority group has 
1428. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 49-50 (1991). 
1429. Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 
531-36 (1989). 
1430. Siegel, She the People, supra note 237, at 965-68. 
1431. See CUSHMAN, supra note 657. 
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made. 1432 So long as the minority is socially despised and not politically 
organized, it will be subject to pervasive state segregation into inferior 
spheres of the culture, with more aggressive policies of suppression 
adopted if mainstream society becomes fearful of the minority. So 
long as the victim group is completely powerless, the Supreme Court 
will not protect it against suppression, but courts will sometimes pro­
tect individual victims under the libertarian provisions of the 
Constitution (due process, free speech). Thus, courts imposed proce­
dural protections in criminal cases that distanced the polity from the 
worst abuses of apartheid and the postwar anti-homosexual panic. 
Indeed, from a legal realist point of view, politics is the main con­
straint on an activist Court. 1433 Any Supreme Court decision or series 
of decisions viewed as challenging a national equilibrium in favor of a 
norm or against a despised group will be subject to likely political dis­
cipline.1434 Knowing this (and probably sharing the views of fellow 
Americans anyway), the Supreme Court will not overturn big meas­
ures that strike the Justices as lastingly popular, no matter how lawless 
they seem.1435 
If the minority survives and is able to organize effectively against 
its suppression, there will be a shift from a segregation regime toward 
some kind of public tolerance of the minority. Supreme Court Justices 
may be a little in advance of the political process (as they were for 
blacks) or a little behind the times (as for lesbigays), but sooner or 
later they will accommodate constitutional doctrine to reflect new 
norms as regards the minority, for the same political reasons.1436 Liber-
1432. The political and institutional agenda of the Court and the traditions of the provi­
sion being construed are also important variables, but as to IBSM issues they are molded by 
the variable emphasized in the text. 
1433. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term 
- Foreword: law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV . 23 (1994) (setting forth this realist 
theory). 
1434. There are many possible disciplines: (1) impeachment of Justices, (2) jurisdiction­
stripping laws, (3) constitutional amendments, (4) budget cuts to starve the judiciary admin­
istratively, (5) defiance or refusal to support implementation of judicial decrees, (6) stacking 
the Court with new Justices opposed to the unpopular ruling. Options (1)-(5) are not often 
exercised, but their threat may serve a deterrent purpose, especially the threat of noncom­
pliance. Option (6) is often exercised and certainly disciplines the Court in the medium term. 
1435. The best examples of this point are the Court's acquiescence in the Kulturkampf 
against Mormon polygamy, notwithstanding apparent violations of core First Amendment 
rights. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (polygamists and persons advocating polyg­
amy can be denied right to vote); Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890) (allowing confiscation of Mormon Church prop­
erty); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (religiously motivated bigamy can be a 
crime). 
1436. Thus, the Court was willing to take a strong stand for awhile against southern 
apartheid, so long as they believed the rest of the nation was supportive; took a much 
stronger stand when the political climate grew strongly supportive during the Great Society; 
and then beat a slow retreat as national politics gradually lost interest in implementing 
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tarian texts will protect the minority against more criminal prosecu­
tions (Due Process Clause) and state censorships (First Amendment), 
and the Equal Protection Clause will for the first time be available to 
the minority. Constitutional protection will sometimes come wholesale 
(entire laws or regimes will fall) rather than just retail (specific indi­
viduals will be freed from excessive state persecution). The challenge 
for the state, including judges, in this transition is to accommodate the 
minority and to encourage it to assimilate, but without alienating tra­
ditionalists alarmed by the new status of a group they still dislike or 
distrust. Even under a regime of tolerable variation, the state will 
adopt "no promo" policies, whereby the majority expresses its disap­
proval of conduct repugnant to it. So long as there is a vigorous poli­
tics of preservation supporting the state, judges will tend to uphold no 
promo policies, as the Supreme Court did as regards abortion, homo­
sexuality, and racial integration. Even when there is no stable political 
equilibrium as to such an issue, widespread political support favoring 
laws mildly disrespecting a "questionable" minority will affect the 
Court's judgment: the Justices themselves probably share the views of 
their fellow citizens, and even if they do not, they will rarely be willing 
to risk much of the Court's political capital to protect minorities in a 
big way until public opinion shifts. 
The gay rights and abortion movements are currently stuck in the 
tolerance zone, but the social movements seeking rights for people of 
color and women have for the most part moved to the next level, nor­
mal politics. Having persuaded the community that their trait varia­
tions ought be deemed irrelevant for most regulatory purposes, these 
movements have become part of the political system, which will enact 
laws seeking remediation of discriminatory mores to which the state 
has contributed. At this point, the normative burden has shifted: 
Justices who drag their feet will be subject to political lampooning, 
and those who join the triumphant minority's public rhetoric will be 
lauded. Constitutional protections become cleaning up operations, 
removing outlier discriminations and fine-tuning the terms of clashing 
group interests. Once a minority group has become a part of normal 
politics, the judiciary will generally enforce remedial laws with enthu­
siasm, occasionally trimming back laws that go too far and protecting 
Brown. As for women's rights issues, the Court pounced on outlier laws like the Connecticut 
contraception law (Griswold), the Idaho inheritance law (Reed), the Oklahoma beer law 
(Craig), the Mississippi nursing school law (Hogan), and the VMI segregation policy (Vir­
ginia) - all easy kills - but balked at challenges to pregnancy discrimination (Geduldig), 
veterans' preferences (Feeney), and exclusion of women from armed forces registration 
(Rostker). The Court's original enthusiasm for Roe v. Wade has waned as the pro-life move­
ment has waxed (and notwithstanding wide popular support for Roe). About the only sig­
nificant progay decision the Supreme Court has ever handed down struck down a squirrelly 
initiative (drafted by amateurs) adopted by a narrow margin in a small-population, outlier 
state and after an incendiary antigay campaign (Evans). 
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traditionalists against undue invasions of their liberties. Table 5 below 
encapsulates the role of judicial review in the ongoing politics of 
IBSMs. 
TABLE S 
LEGAL REGIMES AND JUDICIAL ROLE IN THE LIFE CYCLE OF AN 
IBSM 
Marginalized Marginalized Group 
Group That Has Group Mobilizes Assimilated into 
Not Mobilized Normal Politics 
[l] Apartheid [3] Tolerance [5] Remedial Re-
Regime. Laws Regime. Courts gime. Anti-
Traditionalist discriminating assure minority discrimination 
Citizens Not against minority rights to protest laws adopted and 
Fearful and segregating (NAACP). Mi- enforced. State 
it from the norm. nority gains leg- subsidies or rules 
Judiciary acqui- islative repeal or helping the mi-
esces (Plessy) judicial invalida- nority. Courts 
but insists that tion of state dis- clean up outlier 
rule of law apply criminations discriminations 
(Guinn). (Brown, Craig). (Loving, 
Griswold). 
[2] Terror Re- [4] No Promo [6] Compromise 
gime. Private Regime. Equality Regime. Tradi-
Traditionalist violence against moves more tionalists' ongo-
Citizens Are minority, with- slowly and bows ing hostility to 
Fearful out state inter- to arguments minority pro-
ference. State that the state not tected in private 
violence against promote nontra- enclaves 
the minority may ditional conduct (Milliken, 
be slowed down (Maher, Bellotti) . 
by courts Hardwick, Dale). 
(Moore, Powell). 
According to my analysis above, the shifts described in Table 5 can 
be defended on originalist as well as realist lines. Bickel's and Bork's 
dynamic purposivism, Reich's and Tushnet's idea of translation, 
Black's structuralism, Ackerman's synthesis can all plausibly connect 
the judicial decisions in the table with the normative projects launched 
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The originalist counterar­
guments that could be plausibly made (such as a requirement that con­
stitutional innovation be justified by specific traditions accepted at the 
time of an amendment's framing) are of the same form that would de­
feat Brown, Bolling, Loving, and other foundational decisions that no 
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one dares to question. Whichever way you tum, the Living 
Constitution prevails. It either trumps or cannibalizes narrowly de­
fined original meaning theories. 
B .  Legal Process and Pluralist Theories of Judicial Review 
Table 5 describes a dynamic political system in which the Supreme 
Court episodically intervenes. Such a system is open to normative 
question: What is the purpose of the political system described in the 
table? Given that purpose, what role can the Supreme Court compe­
tently and legitimately play? Should the Court defer to other institu­
tions that are more competent or legitimate in their decisionmaking? 
These are the same kinds of questions that assailed the legal realists in 
the 1930s. Early legal process thinkers like Harlan Fiske Stone, Felix 
Frankfurter, Lon Fuller, Willard Hurst, and Henry Hart accepted the 
inevitability of dynamic lawmaking but cautioned that such lawmaking 
must be informed by the properly derived policies and principles of 
law and cabined by the institutional limitations of the judiciary.1437 
Like the legal realists, the early process theorists were critical of the 
Supreme Court's activism in the Lochner era. Decisions striking down 
labor legislation were not well-grounded in the purposes and historical 
principles of the Due Process Clause, were too often ignorant of eco­
nomic matters as to which legislators and agencies were more expert, 
and undermined the ability of legislatures to solve social problems and 
mediate between contending employers and unions. In short, they in­
sisted that the Supreme Court not intervene in the political process 
without sound normative justification and recognition of its institu­
tional limitations.1438 Since the New Deal, Justices have been perva­
sively influenced by legal process thinking, which has generated sev­
eral different theories of judicial review, all of them directly 
responding to the constitutional challenges posed by IBSMs during the 
century. 
The norms that gained traction in the twentieth century were 
based on democracy and pluralism. By democracy, I mean governance 
1437. For an introduction to these thinkers and their philosophy, see William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal Proc­
ess, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (1958 tent. ed.). 
1438. A classic exemplar of justified legal process activism was Justice Brandeis's opin­
ion in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which overruled a long line of 
choice of law precedents, in part because they were not workable and undermined important 
procedure policies of coherence, and in part because they were in tension with the norms of 
the new century's positivist understanding of federalism. Although Erie overruled prece­
dents and was probably inconsistent with original intent, it is widely regarded as an excellent 
decision due to its complex understanding of the role of the judiciary in a federal system and 
its deft effort to correct an intolerable policy. 
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by representatives freely elected by the citizenry that is both respon­
sive and accountable to them.1439 By pluralism, I mean a political sys­
tem whose goal is the accommodation of the interests of as many sali­
ent groups as possible, without disturbing the ability of the state and 
the community to press forward with collective projects.1440 Pluralist 
democracies can and do function without judicial review, as the 
United Kingdom did for centuries. Because an elected legislature with 
sophisticated deliberative and factfinding resources is more reliable 
and more legitimate in solving problems and accommodating groups, 
judicial review might be initially suspect in a pluralist democracy.1441 
Reasons like these were advanced against the Old Court's periodically 
stringent review of economic legislation, and against the view associ­
ated with some of the legal realists that whatever the courts did was 
"law." 1442 The early critics of Brown and Griswold also made these 
points: because those decisions were not plausibly based upon tradi­
tional legal materials (constitutional text, original intent, precedent), 
the Court was illegitimately casting itself as a "super-legislature" with 
the power to trump state legislative policy judgments with which the 
Justices personally disagreed. 1443 
Starting no later than the New Deal and continuing through the fin 
de siecle, IBSMs and later their countermovements spurred judges 
and scholars to re-justify activist judicial review in the post-Lochner 
era. The dilemma scholars and judges faced throughout the century 
was that democratically elected legislatures were the best organs to 
accommodate social change but that legislation, especially at the state 
and local levels, was usually not responsive to IBSMs. Thus, judicial 
1439. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 125 (1956); 
Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, What Democracy Is . . .  And Is Not, J. 
DEMOCRACY, Winter 1991, at 75. 
1440. These features of pluralism are articulated and defended in ROBERT A. DAHL, 
PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT (1967); 
THEODORE J. LOW!, THE END OF LIBERALISM 51 (2d ed. 1979) (describing "interest group 
liberalism"); Nicholas R. Miller, Pluralism and Social Choice, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734 
(1983). 
1441. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND D ISAGREEMENT 212-13, 267-68 (1999) (argu­
ing against judicial review, consistent with the old U.K. model); James B. Thayer, The Origin 
and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893) 
(urging deferential judicial review on the ground that disagreements are best worked out in 
the legislative process). 
1442. See generally PURCELL, supra note 1400; ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY 
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1991). 
1443. E.g. , Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 520-21 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); 
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1959) (criticizing Brown as desirable but unprincipled). Barry Friedman's ambitious project 
of historicizing the countermajoritarian difficulty is relevant here. Friedman is skeptical of 
this concern. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the Pathol­
ogy of Constitutional Scholarship, 95 NW. L. REV. 933 (2001). 
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deference to the political process seemed risky from the perspective of 
the pluralist system as a whole. Risks of too much deference included 
alienation of large numbers of people from lawful politics and the en­
trenchment of bitter inter-group hatreds, either of which could lead to 
violence and turmoil. This tension between the ideal and the real in 
the ongoing context of constitutional cases involving the rights of mi­
norities generated several great theories of judicial review. At the 
same time, the experience of IBSMs and their countermovements ex­
posed flaws in each theory. 
The most famous constitutional theory of the last century is the 
theory suggested by footnote 4 of Justice Stone's opinion for the Court 
in United States v. Carotene Products Co. 1444 Stone's opinion upheld an 
economic regulatory law under a highly deferential standard of re­
view. Footnote 4 posited that the "presumption of constitutionality" 
required by democratic pluralism did not hold for: (1) laws violating 
the clear commands of a "specific prohibition" in the Constitution, 
such as those rules in the Bill of Rights that are applicable to the states 
through the Due Process Clause; (2) laws restricting "those political 
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of 
undesirable legislation"; and (3) laws "directed at particular religious . 
or national or racial minorities," with the additur that "prejudice 
against discrete and insular minorities" that curtails "the operation of 
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minori­
ties" ought to be policed by the courts. 
Not only was Justice Stone thinking of civil rights cases when he 
drafted the footnote, but his colleagues on the New Deal Court found 
its philosophy congenial with the way they viewed cases involving ra­
cial and religious minorities, as David Bixby has documented.1445 By 
1938, the New Deal Justices were aware that people of color were po­
litically excluded and denied fundamental rights in the South and be­
lieved that this state of affairs was fundamentally inconsistent with the 
principles of democracy that the United States claimed to represent in 
opposition to Nazi and Communist totalitarianism. 1446 The three para­
graphs of Carotene's footnote 4 corresponded neatly with the three 
kinds of civil rights cases the Justices had already seen from the South: 
(1) The procedural due process cases (Moore, Powell, Brown v. 
Mississippi) reflected violations of "specific prohibitions" in the 
1444. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (citations omitted). 
1445. Bixby, supra note 657, at 764-66; see Lusky, supra note 912 (compatible account 
from the law clerk who helped draft footnote 4). 
1446. See generally RICHARD PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS (1999) 
(American constitutionalism in 1940s-1950s sought to assure ourselves as well as other coun­
tries that our nation is a true democracy); PURCELL, supra note 1400 (offering general ac­
count of legal intellectual concern that American practice, especially in the South, did not 
live up to democratic ideals). 
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Constitution by southern states against defendants of co�or. (2) The 
right to vote (Guinn and Herndon) and free speech (Lowry) cases also 
represented violations of specific constitutional provisions but more 
fundamentally involved judicial efforts to disrupt local political lock­
ins. (3) African Americans were the template from which Stone cre­
ated the category "discrete and insular minorities," whose political 
marginalization the Court had already seen in equal protection cases 
(Buchanan, Norris, Gaines). In short, the pre-1938 civil rights cases 
formed the basis upon which the New Deal Court suggested the out­
lines for a new kind of individual rights activism just as it was aban­
doning the old liberty of contract activism. 
The Carotene model suggested by the civil rights movement was a 
proceduralist approach that could be defended on both rule of law and 
institutional competence grounds.1447 Carotene-based judicial review 
sought to (1) prevent deployment of the criminal justice system to bru­
talize minorities, (2) disrupt local political lock-ins, and (3) dismantle 
prejudice-based laws denying fundamental rights to minorities unrep­
resented in the political process. These were tasks well-suited to 
judges whose training and expertise were procedural. The Supreme 
Court was like a referee for the pluralist system, again a role congenial 
to life-tenured quasi-cloistered judges, and a role that rhetorically 
avoided charges the Court was a "super-legislature." Not least impor­
tant, Stone's theory of judicial review had a connection not only to the 
Constitution's particular provisions, but also to its structure and over­
all purpose. The civil rights movement inspired the Justices to create 
the great legal process theory of judicial review. As we shall now see, 
however, IBSMs also revealed the Achilles' Heel of the theory, 
namely, its inability to operate without a subtle substantive under­
standing of pluralist politics and a normative vision of what results the 
process is permitted to yield. 1448 
Exactly how aggressive a referee a Carotene Court should be was a 
matter wholly unresolved in 1938.1449 The Inc. Fund and the ACLU 
not only supplied the Court with a steady stream of cases justifying ju­
dicial correction of dysfunctional local democracies, but they set forth 
a theory justifying a broader judicial intervention than the Justices 
contemplated in 1938: as the Inc. Fund presented the matter, apart-
1447. See ELY, supra note 1399, at 88-104. 
1448. For the genesis of this critique, see Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: 
The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980) (re­
viewing ELY, supra note 1399), and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1090-91 (1982). 
1449. See Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Mi­
norities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287 (1982) (arguing that footnote 4 was aimed at hysterical, transitory 
persecution of minorities, not at the structural features of local governance such as apart­
heid). 
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heid was an interconnected system of racist rules and practices deeply 
inconsistent with both pluralist democracy and equal citizenship for 
people of color; episodic attention to the consequences of apartheid 
was insufficient, and so the Court, the only branch of government free 
from the political influence of southern bosses, should strike at its 
roots with broad antidiscriminatory and prophylactic rules. With the 
elevation of Earl Warren as Chief Justice, the Supreme Court was 
prepared to implement Carolene in a bigger way, starting with Brown 
I, which was in turn the model for an activist version of Carolene. 
Chief Justice Warren's opinion sweeping away public school segrega­
tion (1) enforced the core guarantee of the Equal Protection Clause, 
the centerpiece of the Reconstruction amendments; (2) overturned a 
regime that kept black people politically marginalized (education was 
a key feature of the politics of recognition); and (3) implicitly served 
notice that prejudice-based laws harming racial (discrete and insular) 
minorities would be carefully scrutinized (a process that followed im­
mediately). Strict scrutiny for race-based classifications under the 
Equal Protection Clause swept away formal apartheid, permanently. 
After 1962, the Court moved toward an aggressive implementation of 
Brown II: not just desegregation, but systemwide integration became 
the goal. Similarly, the Justices' due process (incorporation) decisions 
imposed on state law enforcement a comprehensive set of defendant­
protective rules, including new prophylactic rules, and came close to 
terminating the death penalty in the United States. The Warren 
Court's expansive application of the First and Fifteenth Amendments 
protected minority mobilization in the South, which helped prepare 
the way for the Voting Rights Act. 
The Warren Court's activism was an aggressive Carolene jurispru­
dence, defended after the fact by John Hart Ely (a law clerk for War­
ren) as properly "representation-reinforcing." Yet the triumph of rep­
resentation-reinforcement was part of its undoing - well before Ely 
defended it! Once formal apartheid was dismantled and people of 
color started voting, the operation of democratic pluralism actually got 
better, and therefore would seem to need less refereeing.1450 Put less 
sanguinely, once the Warren Court's Carolene jurisprudence (and the 
Great Society's legislation) purged the South of mob-dominated show 
trials, statutory apartheid, easy-to-prove suppression of minority vot­
ing and expression, it was not clear what more a referee Court should 
do. The Court's liberals (Warren, Douglas, Brennan, Fortas, Marshall) 
wanted to do more, based upon substantive theories of racial justice 
and politics advanced by the Inc. Fund and the ACLU. For example, 
1450. So long as its members can vote, a discrete and insular minority has many political 
advantages in a pluralistic system. See Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carotene Products, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985) [hereinafter Ackerman, Beyond Carotene]. 
2380 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:2062 
civil rights counsel argued that apartheid had lasting legacies that 
should render problematic educational and other policies that dispar­
ately impacted on people of color. Liberal Justices were receptive to 
this argument, but in seeking to implement it they were looking less 
like referees and more like liberals. This was happening at the very 
point when liberalism passed its political peak. And the Warren Court 
gave way to the Burger Court in 1969-71.  
Consistent with the pragmatic politics of preservation that put 
them on the Court, the Nixon-appointed Justices embraced a more 
conservative legal process jurisprudence, associated with the older 
Felix Frankfurter, John Harlan, Alexander Bickel, Paul Bator, Philip 
Kurland, and others. Pluralists like the liberals, conservative process 
thinkers gave more emphasis to traditional rule of law values and legal 
methodologies, were more skeptical of the institutional capacity of the 
judiciary and more deferential to state and local governments, and 
emphasized traditionally libertarian rather than egalitarian norms. 
They supported Brown but believed, given the Court's institutional 
limitations, that it was an exceptional exercise of judicial activism and 
that the Court had little ability to implement a social program of inte­
grated schools.1451 The conservative process thinkers were strongly 
critical of the Court's subsequent representation-reinforcing decisions, 
especially in the reapportionment, criminal procedure, habeas corpus, 
and lunch counter sit-in cases. 1452 The Burger Court emphasized the 
first two Carolene roles for judicial review, namely, to enforce the rule 
of law against local violations and to disrupt political lock-ins and cen­
sorships. Following the leads of Harlan and Bickel in particular, the 
Burger Court gave a less activist reading to the third role, protecting 
minorities against prejudice-based laws. The Court deployed the 
Carolene formulation as its justification for not extending heightened 
scrutiny to classifications based on age (Murgia) and disability 
(Cleburne). For both substantive and institutionalist reasons, the 
Court adopted a hard-to-meet discriminatory motive test before it 
would strictly scrutinize laws having a disparate racial impact 
(Hackney, Davis). 
1451. See Arthur Garfield Hays Conference: The Proper Role of the United States Su­
preme Court in Civil Liberties Cases, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 457, 476 (1964) (Bickel's remarks) 
(prophesying that several cases like Brown in a single year would spell doom to the Court). 
1452. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF 
PROGRESS (1970); Paul Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963); Philip B. Kurland, Egalitarianism and the Warren 
Court, 68 MICH. L. REV. 629 (l 970); see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 473 
(1 968) (Harlan. J. , dissenting); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 ,  15-21 (1964) (Harlan, J., dis­
senting); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 253 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring in 
the result and dissenting in part); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 449-63 (1963) (Harlan, J . ,  dis­
senting); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266-330 (1963) (Frankfurter, J., joined by Harlan, J., 
dissenting); id. at 330-49 (Harlan, J. , dissenting). 
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Carotene's armageddon was not the election of Richard Nixon, 
however. Its inadequacies as a general theory were revealed by the 
constitutionalization of women's rights. Women's demands for invali­
dation of laws restricting access to contraceptives and abortions and 
deploying sex-based classifications did not easily fit within the 
Carolene framework. (1) There was no constitutional provision, apart 
from the Nineteenth Amendment (applicable only to voting), that 
specifically guaranteed women's rights, and the original meaning and 
history of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses provided lit­
tle support for abortion rights or strict scrutiny of sex-based classifica­
tions. (2) Since 1920, when women gained formal access to the politi­
cal process, there have been few state efforts to interfere with 
women's exercise of the franchise, political activity on behalf of their 
causes, or publication of their books and literature. (3) Women are 
neither insular nor a minority of the population. Their main complaint 
is that the law reflects archaic "stereotypes," rather than invidious 
"prejudices." Why should the Court not leave the remediation of such 
laws to the normal democratic process? Indeed, there was evidence 
that the legislative process was working adequately when Court struck 
down abortion laws and sex-based classifications.1453 
From most legal process points of view, the Burger Court's opin­
ions in Frontiero/Craig and Roe/Danforth were more activist than the 
Warren Court's decisions in cases like Brown, Baker, and Loving.1454 
Both sets of decisions aggressively construed open-textured constitu­
tional provisions against the weight of original intent and precedent, 
but at least the Warren Court decisions could plausibly rest upon the 
representation-reinforcing philosophy of Carotene. The Burger Court 
decisions were responsive to the women's liberation movement with­
out having a justifying constitutional theory. And the decisions 
seemed inconsistent with the deference the Court was showing state 
and local legislatures in its race discrimination cases. A more cautious, 
Bickelian process approach could have applied Reed's rational basis 
with bite to sex discrimination cases until the fate of the ERA had 
been determined and could have wiped the nineteenth century abor-
1453. See ELY, supra note 1399, at 164-70 (arguing that on the whole Carotene's third 
prong does not justify heightened scrutiny of sex-based classifications); John Hart Ely, The 
Wages of Crying Wolf" A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (arguing that a 
woman's right to an abortion is a substantive right for which there is no constitutional basis). 
An Ely-type argument might be made that statutes adopted before women had the right to 
vote (such as the Texas abortion Jaw in Roe) might be closely scrutinized, but that caveat 
would not have applied to the recent laws struck down in Frontiero and Doe (Roe's com­
panion case). 
1454. The Warren Court's penumbra! opinion in Griswold might also be questioned 
along the lines in text. Griswold might be defended, as Justice White thought, on rational 
basis Jines: its broad ban was too disconnected from any rational state objective. 
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tion laws off the books on grounds of vagueness and obsolescence, 
while avoiding decision on the newer statutes. 
So neither liberal nor conservative representation-reinforcement 
theories of judicial review can easily justify the Burger Court's sex dis­
crimination and abortion decisions. That is not necessarily fatal to 
such theories; they may be right and the Court's practice wrong. Al­
though Roe v. Wade remains one of the Court's most controversial de­
cisions, its central holding - that women have a liberty interest in de­
ciding what to do about their pregnancies - has proven robust in the 
face of determined attack and even the appointment of six Reagan­
Bush Justices.1455 The sex discrimination decisions have been for the 
Burger Court what the anti-apartheid decisions were for the Warren 
Court: almost universally celebrated dispositions instantiating a great 
principle and becoming foundational precedents, notwithstanding 
their questionable legal foundations. The constitutional theory that 
best supports these Burger Court decisions is, in the retrospective 
project of this Article, the same substantive theory that ultimately jus­
tifies the Warren Court's race decisions. It is a theory about rationality 
in public policy and about respecting the individuals in all groups ac­
tively participating in the nation's pluralist politics. Just as the civil 
rights movement persuaded the nation's public culture that racial 
variation ought to be considered benign from a policy perspective and 
that people of color must be respected as full and equal citizens, so the 
women's movements have persuaded the nation's public culture that 
sex or gender variation ought to be considered benign from a policy 
perspective and that women must be respected as full and equal citi­
zens. 
Lesbigay people present more theoretical twists. Like people of 
color and unlike women, gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals have been 
brutalized by the criminal justice system, censored by the state, and 
excluded from numerous state benefits and obligations because of 
prejudice. But lesbigay people face prejudice and discrimination more 
explicitly tied to specific conduct than either women or people of color 
have traditionally faced. Unlike women or racial minorities, sexual 
minorities have not been the intended beneficiaries of any constitu­
tional text. Unlike other minorities, lesbigay people have traditionally 
been anonymous and dispersed as a matter of state policy supporting 
the sexual closet; only after large numbers of them have become dis­
crete (openly gay) and insular (concentrated in gay ghettoes) has this 
1455. See ELIZABETH ADELL COOK ET AL., BETWEEN Two ABSOLUTES: PUBLIC 
OPINION AND THE POLITICS OF ABORTION 31-68 (1992) (analyzing comprehensively the 
data through 1992). 
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group been able to protect its members in the political process.1456 The 
Carotene model, whether liberally or conservatively conceived, cannot 
be applied to gay rights cases without a substantive response to gay 
people's politics of recognition: Is sexual variation normally benign as 
a matter of public policy? Should lesbigay individuals be respected as 
full and equal citizens? Driven by repugnance as much as principle, a 
majority of the Burger Court Justices answered "no" to both questions 
and therefore were unwilling to give lesbigay people the benefit of 
women's sexual privacy cases (Hardwick) or of Carotene-based 
heightened scrutiny for discriminatory laws (Rowland) . Ironically, it 
has fallen to the conservative Rehnquist Court to handle gay rights 
cases in a mature way. The Court's opinion in Evans suggests a tenta­
tive move toward the substantive norms that are being adopted in 
many states: sexual orientation is not relevant to rational state policy 
in most cases, and lesbigay people are now part of the larger pluralist 
system and therefore must be treated with respect.1457 
The future of Evans depends, however, not just on lesbigay peo­
ple's politics of recognition, but also on TFV people's politics of pres­
ervation, now well-represented on the Court. The same can be said of 
the future of Casey and Roe, the most controversial legacies of 
women's politics in constitutional law. Three cases, all decided June 
28, 2000 (three of the last four cases decided by the Court in the last 
Term of the century I am examining), illustrate the contours of the 
current debate: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,1458 invalidating the ap­
plication of an antidiscrimination law that required the Boy Scouts to 
tolerate openly gay scoutmasters; Stenberg v. Carhart,1459 applying 
Casey to invalidate a state partial-birth abortion law; and Hill v. 
Colorado,1460 upholding a state law barring close contact with anyone 
entering a health care facility. Typical for a Court with internal divi­
sions for abortion and lesbigay rights issues, the cases do not fit into an 
obvious doctrinal or even political pattern, beyond the trite observa­
tion that Justice O'Connor was in the majority for all three.1461 They 
1456. See Ackerman, Beyond Carolene, supra note 1450; Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist 
Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don 't 
Tell, " 108 YALE L.J. 485 (1998). 
1457. Greatest progress toward the norms in text have been made in the states of the 
Northeast, surrounding the Great Lakes, and on the Pacific rim. See ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY 
PRACTICE, supra note 626, at 234-35 (mapping of different state policies toward gay people). 
1458. 530 U.S. 640 (2000), discussed supra Sections l.C.3.c and 11.F.3. 
1459. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
1460. 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
1461. The Court rejected First Amendment speech claims in Hill but accepted them in 
Dale. Constitutional text was relevant but ultimately not controlling in both those cases but 
was irrelevant in Carhart (the nontextual right to privacy). Precedent was ambiguous in all 
three cases; the Court followed the closest precedent in Carhart, 530 U.S. at 930-31 ,  and dis-
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do, however, illustrate several themes that have emerged from more 
than a half century of the legal process Court's grappling with IBSMs 
and identity politics.1462 
As has been the case for some time, neither the Justices nor the 
winning advocates defended the Court's constitutional activism in 
representation-reinforcing terms. The democratic process was not sys­
tematically dysfunctional for the two cases in which the Court struck 
down laws. There can be little doubt that pro-choice groups and the 
parents and religious organizations who supported the Boy Scouts had 
fair recourse to state organs in Nebraska and New Jersey to seek, and 
likely obtain, at least partial remedies for their normative com­
plaints.1463 Although religious groups and right-to-lifers half-heartedly 
presented themselves in Dale and Hill as unpopular minorities,1464 it 
would have been a mockery of Carotene's third paragraph (prejudice 
against discrete and insular minorities) to compare politically correct 
disdain for traditionalists with the terrorizing prejudice visited upon 
people of color during apartheid, and the Justices wisely avoided any 
comparison. The only decent representation-reinforcement argument 
run by anyone in these three cases was by Justice Scalia in Hill. He ar­
gued that the Court was stacking the deck against advocacy by peace­
ful pro-life people: Casey and (that day) Carhart prevented them from 
seeking legislation against even the most horrible "murder" of fetuses, 
and with Hill the Court disallowed their next-best recourse, peaceful 
persuasion of women entering abortion clinics. 1465 It is significant that 
Scalia was invoking such arguments in dissent (only Justice Thomas 
tinguished the closest in Dale, 530 U.S. at 658-59. Traditionalists lost in Hill and Carhart but 
won in Dale. The pro-choice movement won in Hill and Carhart, on quite narrow grounds in 
both cases. All of the decisions called forth passionate dissents. 
1462. The Rehnquist Court, by the way, is no less a legal process Court than the New 
Deal, Warren, or Burger Courts. Five of the current Justices (Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Gins­
burg, and Breyer) are alumni of the Hart and Sacks "Legal Process" course at the Harvard 
Law School, and at least two others (Stevens and O'Connor) are clearly steeped in that tra­
dition. Like the Burger Court, but more so, the current Court follows conservative legal pro­
cess rhetoric but is quite activist. 
1463. In Carhart, the pro-choice challengers might well have obtained substantial relief 
through litigation in state court. See 530 U.S. at 990-1005 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that majority's interpretation of the state law was incorrect as a matter of plain meaning). In 
Dale, the state court's interpretation finding the Boy Scouts to be a "public accommodation" 
was probably way beyond the legislature's original expectations and could have been the 
basis for a narrow, perhaps compromise, amendment to the law. 
1464. See Brief of National Catholic Committee on Scouting et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner at 4-15, Dale (No. 99-699) (arguing that law undermines ability of 
Scouting to inculcate the religious viewpoints of its sponsors); Brief Amici Curiae of the 
American Center for Law and Justice and the Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission Sup­
porting Petitioners at 3-4, Dale (No. 99-699) (arguing that lower court forced minority group 
to "subscribe to the currently fashionable view that sexual morality is irrelevant to a person's 
character"). 
1465. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 762-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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went along) and with majority-taunting sarcasm. This has now become 
the Rehnquist Court norm. As affirmative action and discrimination 
on the basis of sex, gender, and sexuality have overtaken old­
fashioned race-based discrimination against minorities on the Court's 
constitutional docket, Carotene (derived from the early race cases) 
and representation-reinforcement theories (devised to support the 
Warren Court's activism in later race cases) have become largely ir­
relevant to the Court's decisionmaking and have fallen to the status of 
debating points scored in dissenting opinions. 1466 Even the Rehnquist 
Court's voting rights jurisprudence - from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. 
Gore - is at best a pastiche and at worst an inversion of 
representation-reinforcement theory .1467 
These three cases illustrate what have been the governing features 
of the Rehnquist Court's individual rights jurisprudence. No longer 
the bold perfecter of democracy, as Ely claimed for it, the Court now 
sees itself as a case-by-case protector of individual liberty and cautious 
manager of pluralist competition in American politics. That the cur­
rent Court is so Bickelian is a function of a docket saturated with 
highly charged issues of identity politics. The proliferation of identity 
politics cases at the Court was an inspiration for Alexander Bickel's 
passive virtues theory, whereby the Court should avoid premature 
adjudication of constitutional issues by (1) refusing to take review or 
grant certiorari in cases where there is no consensus as to intensely 
contested matters; (2) dismissing the appeal of such cases on grounds 
of ripeness, mootness, standing, or political question rather than on 
the merits; or (3) deciding the merits on narrow grounds, such as statu­
tory interpretation or a common law fact-specific constitutional con­
struction.1468 These strategies remain relevant, even as IBSMs have 
changed. Perhaps because it involved the hottest issue of the Term 
(partial birth abortion), the doctrinal debate in Carhart was the most 
Bickelian: Justice Breyer for the majority emphasized that the strike 
was based on technicalities (the law did not have a sufficient exception 
to save the life of the mother and was written too broadly), while 
Justice Thomas for the dissenters urged that the statute could have 
1466. Notably, where the Rehnquist Court has been most activist - the affirmative ac­
tion and racial gerrymandering cases - representation-reinforcement arguments have 
strongly cut against the activism and have shown up, if at all, in dissenting opinions. Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 244-45 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Shaw v. 
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. 469, 553-55 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 
U.S. 616, 675-77 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (using sarcastic deployment of representation­
reinforcement theory to taunt majority in sex-based affirmative action case). 
1467. Thus, Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), and Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996), 
overturned bipartisan efforts of the first Bush Administration and North Carolina 
Democrats to remedy a century of black underrepresentation in Congress. 
1468. BICKEL, supra note 140, at 169-98. 
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been saved by a narrowing construction.1469 Like Carhart, Dale and 
Hill were written more as common law decisions building up toward 
doctrine rather than declaring it all at once, a "minimalist" style that 
the Rehnquist Court has wisely deployed for cases in which fiercely 
contested identity issues fall on both sides.1470 
The cases decided June 28, 2000, also illustrate the current Court's 
libertarianism. In Dale, the Court overrode local egalitarian efforts to 
integrate openly lesbigay people into public life with a broadly liber­
tarian reading of the First Amendment protecting even ambivalent 
and incoherent speech and expressive association.1471 In Carhart, the 
Court reaffirmed rules against state burdens on women's freedom to 
choose abortions, notwithstanding the gruesome parade of horribles in 
the pro-life briefs and the chief dissenting opinion. 1472 In Hill, the 
Court allowed the state to restrict the liberty of pro-life advocates -
but only because the law sought to protect the liberty of unwilling lis­
teners, namely, women seeking abortions.1473 While all of these resolu­
tions were hotly contested, they do point to a larger phenomenon sug­
gested by my history of IBSMs and constitutional law: while the 
Court's most inspirational opinions have been the equal protection 
ones, its. littler libertarian decisions (and some big ones like Roe) un­
der the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment have been at 
least as important in shaping the experience of women, people of 
color, and lesbigays today. The Court's libertarian activism has also 
been supportable by reference to the Court's comparative compe­
tence, the assurance that its judgments will be respected, and the struc­
ture as well as particular provisions of the Constitution.1474 
1469. Compare Carhart, 530 U.S. at 930-46, with id. at 989-97 (Thomas, J . ,  dissenting). 
1470. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term - Foreword: One Case at a 
Time, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996) (supporting the Court's "minimalist" decisions Evans, the 
VMI case, and other controversial identity politics cases). 
1471. Compare Dale, 530 U.S. at 666-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing Boy Scouts' 
claim that its expressive association entails antigay membership), with id. at 655-56 (opinion 
for the Court) (Boy Scouts' message, though not crystal clear, was expressive enough to 
merit First Amendment protection). 
1472. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 983-89 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
1473. Hill, 530 U.S. at 714-18 (Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court); id. at 737-38 (Souter, J., 
concurring). 
1474. The statement in text is an inversion of Ely's famous, and brilliantly articulated, 
argument that the Constitution is more or less empty of substance (it is "constitutive" !) ,  
which is an interpretivist hint that judicial review should focus on process. To the contrary, 
the Constitution is saturated with substance, and most of it is libertarian! The Constitution 
makes it exceedingly hard for the state to deprive you of your liberty in criminal proceedings 
and flatly bars the state from invading your speaking liberty, your religious liberty, your lib­
erty of assembly and association, your liberty to publish, your liberty to own property, your 
liberty of contract, your liberty to bear arms, and other unspecified liberties perhaps assured 
by the Ninth Amendment. The purpose of the federalist structure, the national separation of 
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The June 28, 2000, cases also illustrate the Supreme Court's strat­
egy for managing pluralist competition. As I read its cases, the Court 
invites minority groups to bring their politics of protection and recog­
nition into court, upon the promise that judges will immediately pro­
tect group members from unlawful (and sometimes unfair) treatment 
and may, at some future time, sweep away state discriminations 
against the group.1475 The constitutional jackpot would be something 
like Brown, but winning Frontiero/Craig is almost as big a deal. Even 
cases like Evans (gay people) and Cleburne (the disabled) encourage 
group members to keep coming back for more constitutional protec­
tions. Moreover, the Court's equal protection cases seek to remove 
certain kinds of lawmaking and political rhetoric from the public 
agenda. Although affirmative action continues to thrive in universities 
and administration of public programs, politicians know that they can­
not simply adopt race-based quotas. Openly racist or sexist proposals 
have disappeared from normal politics. Even "coded" proposals may 
be vulnerable under Washington v. Davis. Evans does not make no 
promo homo policies out of bounds for normal politics but does post a 
warning that antigay initiatives and statutes are constitutionally vul­
nerable if their proponents openly appeal to antigay stereotypes and 
prejudices, as the proponents of Colorado's Amendment 2 did.1476 
Consistent with pluralism's preference for moderating inter-group ri­
valries, the Rehnquist Court's motive-based inquiry in equal protec­
tion cases probably has some effect in toning down rhetoric in 
minority-traditionalist clashes. 
The free speech, association, and due process decisions manage 
pluralism in a different way, by assuring each identity-based group, 
traditionalist and not, that the Court will firmly protect its ability to 
speak out and organize to express its normative agenda.1477 As the 
Dale briefs emphasized, a core feature of American society and poli­
tics has been group formation and expressive association.1478 The 
Court considers this an important value that should be firmly pro-
powers, and the bicameralism and presentment requirements for lawmaking are largely lib­
ertarian. Habeas is protected for libertarian reasons. 
1475. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 656-59 (Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court) (reaffirming anti­
discrimination norm reflected in public accommodations laws); Hill, 530 U.S. at 716-18 
(Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court) (reaffirming "right to be let alone" as a right the state must 
enforce to protect unwilling female listeners). 
1476. See Eskridge, No Promo Homo, supra note 598 (providing examples of the law 
channeling discourse away from open prejudice or stereotypes). 
1477. Hill, 530 U.S. at 714-15 (reaffirming pro-life protesters' freedom to leaflet, speak 
out, and carry signs on the streets and sidewalks); Dale, 530 U.S. at 647-49 (granting strong 
protection for liberty of expressive associations). 
1478. See Brief for Petitioners, Dale (No. 99-699) (arguing that vibrant history of volun­
tary associations as a root of American democracy). 
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tected, whatever the ideology of the group. The limit, just as firmly en­
forced, is that an advocate cannot force his views or himself onto un­
willing audiences or opposed advocates and cannot yoke the state into 
his project of closing off the fundamental liberties of others.1479 Unlike 
dumb precedents from years past (Plessy, Hoyt, Hardwick) , the cur­
rent precedents make it clear that the Justices have heard and under­
stood the perspectives of each side in the culture wars and are unwill­
ing to dismiss either one entirely (a passive virtue). In Dale, for 
example, not only did the gay plaintiff find a brilliant articulator of his 
dilemma in Justice Stevens, but the Chief Justice's majority opinion 
agreeing with the Boy Scouts made a number of overtures to lesbigay 
people's politics of recognition. 1480 
The foregoing thesis (pluralism) can be tied to the thesis of the first 
section (dynamism) to provide a final retrospective for the doctrinal 
developments traced in Part II. IBSMs fueled a great dynamism in 
constitutional law, starting with the Due Process Clause and First 
Amendment and culminating in the creation of a highly dynamic 
Equal Protection Clause. The Court's decisions have been responsive 
to the most fundamental needs of minority groups, first protecting 
their members against some state violence and then contributing to 
the sweeping away of once-pervasive discriminations against the 
groups. But once minorities and women were substantially assimilated 
into normal politics, at the same time countermovements have arisen, 
the Court has created new doctrines to protect the most fundamental 
needs of both kinds of groups and to keep group conflict within the 
bounds of a moderating pluralism. Table 6 below summarizes the 
Court's doctrinal developments along these lines. 
1 479. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 715-18 (protection of unwilling audience); Dale, 530 U.S. at 
647-57 (protection of integrity of expressive association). 
1 480. Dale, 530 U.S. at 660 (agreeing with Justice Stevens that "homosexuality has 
gained greater societal acceptance" but respectfully arguing that social disagreement with 
the Boy Scouts should not affect their First Amendment rights); see also id. at 650 (stating 
that people will differ as to whether "homosexual conduct" is consistent with being "morally 
straight"); id. at 653 (referring to Dale as "one of a group of gay Scouts" open about their 
sexual orientation); id. at 656-56 & n.2 (relying on Evans as to antidiscrimination laws and 
ignoring Hardwick notwithstanding its possible relevance to the Scouts' disapproval of "ho­
mosexual conduct"). But cf. id. at 643-44, 652, 655 (repeated references to Dale as an 
"avowed homosexual," suggesting that the Chief Justice still has a modest learning curve as 
to neutral parlance in gay rights cases). 
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TABLE 6 
THE IMPACT OF IBSMS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 
Protection Against Towards Equal Assimilation of 
Brutalization of Citizenship for IBSMs into 
Minorities, 1920s- Minorities and Nonnal Politics, 
40s Women, 1950s-70s and Accomodation 
of Traditionalists, > 
1970s 
Anti-Censorship. Expressive Conduct Imperial First 
The state ought not and Association. Amendment. First 
First suppress ideas State must allow Amendment ex-
Amendment (Well of Loneli- minorities public tends to speech 
Jurisprudence ness), information space for political about sexuality 
(contraception protest through (One) and sexual 
cases), or radical marches, sit-ins, etc. speech (ACLU 
proposals (Sanger (Cox). State cannot cases), but also 
and Goldman). suppress expressive serves as limitation 
organizations on anti-
(NAACP cases). discrimination laws 
(Dale). 
Procedural Due Substantive Due Structural Due Pro-
Process. Minority is Process (Privacy). cess (Localism). In 
Due Process entitled to the pro- The right to privacy defense of liberty, 
Jurisprudence tections of the rule protects against Court limits na-
of law, especially government tional IBSM regula-
procedural protec- snooping into peo- tion (Morrison). 
tions in criminal pie's personal lives Recognizes privacy 
cases (Moore, (Griswold, Stanley, interest in parental 
Powell, Norris). Roe, Hardwick dis- control of children's 
sen ts). rearing (Casey; 
Troxel). 
Rational Basis Heightened Scru- Classification and 
(Minimal) Scrutiny. tiny. Court develops Motive. The Court 
Equal Traditional equal "strict scrutiny" in tries to tone down 
Protection protection accepts race cases (post- identity-based 
Jurisprudence regulatory distinc- Brown per cu- politics, keeping 
tions so long as riams); "intermedi- remedial measures 
they have some ate" scrutiny in sex on a short leash 
plausible rationale cases (Craig); "ra- (Adarand). Appeals 
(Plessy, Goesaert). tional basis with to "animus," even 
bite" in disability as against gays, dis-
(Cleburne) and sex- couraged (Evans). 
ual orientation 
(Evans) cases. 
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C. Constitutional Skepticism and Popular Constitutionalism 
The Supreme Court's pluralist strategy in the twentieth century 
has induced IBSMs to devote much of their energy to constitutional 
litigation. Inspired by the "success" of the civil rights movement, 
IBSMs since World War II have focused on the courts as the primary 
expression of their constitutional vision. The results of this constitu­
tionalism, described in Parts I and II, have been inevitably disap­
pointing for these social movements, and bitterly disappointing for 
progressives or radicals within each movement. Court-based constitu­
tionalism has been most satisfactory (or least unsatisfactory) during 
the period when the social movement's main concern has been a poli­
tics of protection for its members against a brutalizing state. In those 
circumstances, the nascent social movement is too weak to challenge 
its members' oppression outside the channels of state authority; with 
national as well as local political processes inadequate as forums for 
such challenges, the courts with their libertarian bias are often the 
only plausible forum for resistance within the parameters of the liberal 
state. Courts have also been receptive to IBSMs' claims for equal citi­
zenship, albeit only after a long process for most groups. Most frus­
trating, once each IBSM emerged as a mass movement and made the 
politics of remediation its central public goal, the judiciary has proven 
to be an unreliable, frequently useless, and possibly counterproductive 
state organ. During this disappointing process, dissenting voices from 
within the social movement have questioned the prominence of law­
yers and their assimilationist agenda and the efficacy of their court­
centered strategy. 
Disillusionment with the constitutional consequences of the IBSM­
Court dialogue has swept legal academia, as it has become more di­
verse. It has done so under the umbrella of critical theory.1481 Like re­
alism and legal process, critical theory understands constitutional law 
dynamically. Like legal process, critical theory is normative, but in 
ways its thinkers consider deeper, less arid, and more socially produc­
tive than legal process. 1482 The deep disappointment within minority 
1481. By "critical theory," I include critical legal studies, which flourished in the 1970s 
and 1980s; critical race theory initiated by Derrick Bell's work; radical legal feminism, pow­
erfully represented by the work of Catharine MacKinnon; and queer theory, skeptical of 
categorical thinking about sexuality, gender, and the law. The last three schools are most 
directly the products of IBSMs and centrally involved with the constitutional doctrines they 
have stimulated. 
1482. Critical legal studies scholars seem to have felt some kind of Oedipal rage against 
their legal process teachers (Hart, Sacks, Bickel, Wellington, Wechsler, Bator) and made the 
legal process school their specific and repeated target, Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1437 
at cxix-cxxi, sometimes unfairly, id. at cviii-cx. Critical race, radical feminist, and queer theo­
rists - the focus of this section - are not obsessed with legal process theory in that way but 
reject its premises, as revealed in their critiques of constitutional doctrines justified in legal 
process terms. 
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and progressive communities has given rise to a range of legal theo­
retical responses, ranging from progressives' dropping out of constitu­
tional law (constitutional skepticism) to taking constitutional law from 
the judiciary and returning it to the people (popular constitutionalism).  
My theory of IBSMs and constitutional law suggests intractable di­
lemmas for both the constitutional skeptic and the popular constitu­
tionalist. Let us start, however, with critical theory and its many deep 
connections to IBSM discontent. 
1. Inefficacy: Disappointment with the Court's Pragmatic and 
Institutionalist Responses to the Politics of Recognition and 
Remediation 
Advocates of equality for people of color, women, and lesbigay 
people have been dismayed with many of the Supreme Court opinions 
affecting each group and disappointed that even the victories have ar­
guably done their beneficiaries little tangible good. There has been no 
more sweeping constitutional triumph for a politics of recognition than 
the Inc. Fund's school desegregation cases (Brown I and Bolling) . And 
there has been no more disappointing story than the nation's sorry 
implementation of Brown II. There are many accounts of this tragedy. 
Within mainstream law, the dominant narrative has been Lewis 
Powell's: locally controlled neighborhood schools are the most sensi­
ble way to do public education; busing and consolidation are doomed 
to educational as well as political failure; we will be stuck with de facto 
segregation so long as white people prefer living in substantially seg­
regated neighborhoods.1483 The Topeka school system litigated in 
Brown illustrates this pattern: a generation after the Court's decision, 
the system remained overwhelmingly segregated, because of housing 
patterns.1484 This is the first limitation of judicial endorsement of a mi­
nority group's politics of recognition: as a practical matter, the Court is 
much more effective in stopping or slowing down bad state action than 
it is in forcing state actors to behave in affirmative ways or in changing 
1483. This was Powell's argument in his Swann amicus brief and his separate opinion in 
Keyes, discussed supra Section I.A.3.a. More sophisticated variants of this argument are de­
veloped in, for example, JEFFRIES, JUSTICE POWELL, supra note 171, at 330-31 (stating that 
the combination of Swann's allowance of busing and Milliken's disallowance of interdistrict 
remedies doomed desegregation efforts); ROSENBERG, supra note 91, at 105-06 (arguing 
that Brown II decrees have been substantially ineffectual). 
1484. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 671 F. Supp. 1290, 1296 (D. Kan. 1987) (denying complaint 
seeking integration), rev'd, 892 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1989), vacated, 503 U.S. 978 (1992) (va­
cating circuit court demand for integration in light of Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992)); 
see also Mary Dudziak, The Limits of Good Faith: Desegregation in Topeka, Kansas, 1950-
1956, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 351 (1987). All of the school districts involved in the Brown­
Bolling litigation are now overwhelmingly segregated by race. See RAYMOND WOLTERS, 
THE BURDEN OF BROWN: TH IRTY YEARS OF DESEGREGATION (1984). 
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the behaviors or attitudes of private citizens. The Court really is the 
least dangerous branch. 
Scholars have hotly debated how big a limitation this is and how 
one should respond to it,1485 but several points are hard to deny. How­
ever dedicated the Court might be to equal rights for a minority, its 
work will have much greater impact if supported by lower courts and 
by the political branches. Little desegregation occurred between 1955 
and 1966, in large part because the Supreme Court was uncertain as to 
how enthusiastically district judges would follow its lead and whether 
the Eisenhower Administration would back it up. Actual integration 
occurred all over the South between 1966 and 1971, in large part be­
cause the Johnson Administration and the Warren Court both pressed 
school districts to take affirmative action to integrate (and districts 
risked losing needed federal money if they did not). The Court's sex 
discrimination cases were easier for the nation to swallow because 
they were congruent with legislative reforms in states all over the 
country. The most successful effort to recognize same-sex unions came 
in a state (Vermont) where the judiciary set a new baseline (equal 
rights for same-sex couples), which the legislature then backed up with 
a thoughtful legislative compromise.1486 Contrariwise, if the political 
branches set themselves against equal rights for a minority group, the 
Court will pull its punches or will try to avoid those issues altogether, 
for reasons Dan Kahan has suggested in (formal) detail. 1487 Heroic 
judges who vigorously enforce principles of justice in the teeth of in­
tense community opposition and uncertain support from other institu­
tions have not been able to generate lasting reforms, as the Hawaii 
same-sex marriage debacle suggests. 1488 
The practical limits of what judges can do to advance a social 
group's politics of recognition or (especially) remediation strongly af-
1485. Compare ROSENBERG, supra note 91, at 107-56 (arguing that Brown had no posi­
tive impact advancing racial equality and contributed to heightened southern resistance), 
with Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History, supra note 115 (arguing that Brown had many 
positive contributions, including inspiring civil rights activists). 
1486. Compare Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 886 (1999) (holding state cannot discriminate 
against same-sex couples; remedy left to legislature), with 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91 (cre­
ating new institution, "civil unions," for same-sex couples). See generally ESKRIDGE, 
EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 626, at ch.2 (account of the litigation and legislative re­
sponse). 
1487. Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Prob­
lem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000). 
1488. Justice Steven Levinson's opinion in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), 
held the state same-sex marriage bar to be sex discrimination subject to heightened scrutiny. 
His forward-looking opinion got little support from the governor or the legislature, which 
knifed it with a bill putting the matter on the 1998 ballot, where same-sex marriage went 
down to big defeat. See ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 626, at 15-42 (detailed 
account of the shot-down Hawaii trial balloon). 
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fects what judges will do, once they become aware of those practical 
limits. Where private citizens as well as elected officials mobilize 
against judicial remedies, courts will back down. Thus, after the 
Hawaii voters and legislators rejected same-sex marriage by large 
margins, the previously bold Hawaii Supreme Court instantly declared 
the matter closed.1489 An earlier example was the Supreme Court's 
twelve-year dodge of the different-race marriage issue. Attitudes over 
time are also important. If a traditionalist countermovement recruits 
lots of people to invest their time in political opposition to a minority 
right, the Supreme Court is likely to pull back. Thus, Roe v. Wade has 
been ineffective for many women because it generated a lot of politi­
cal opposition, which has been able to enact abortion-discouraging 
laws that are now usually upheld by Justices appointed by Presidents 
elected with pro-life support.1490 Brown has been ineffective for people 
of all colors wanting integrated schools, because de facto 
(re )segregation has occurred, and Courts populated by Republican 
Justices have (increasingly) restricted the authority of lower courts to 
insist on actual integration.1491 
Derrick Bell has advanced an "interest-convergence" theory for 
this disappointment: "The interest of blacks in achieving racial equal­
ity will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of 
whites."1492 The analytic of the present Article suggests why this is so, 
not just for blacks but also for latinos and other people of color, 
women, and lesbigay people. Any significant redistribution of eco­
nomic entitlements or social status within society is going to stimulate 
tremendous political opposition, and such redistributions to a stigma­
tized identity-based group will trigger some countermovement. If the 
Court views itself as a manager-maintainer of pluralism, it will be re­
luctant to "take sides" in a serious national clash between two well­
organized and intensely motivated groups. The Court is typically will-
1489. See Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999) (summarily reversing trial judge's 
finding that the same-sex marriage bar violated the state constitution and interpreting the 
popular constitutional amendment broadly). 
1490. No promo abortion laws include bars to state funding of abortions; gag orders 
prohibiting state-paid doctors from discussing abortion with their patients; parental consent 
or notification (with judicial bypasses now) laws for minors seeking abortions; short waiting 
periods; detailed and normatively loaded informed consent disclosures. All of these restric­
tions have been upheld. See Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Rust v. Sulli­
van, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Webster v. Reproductive Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Maher v. 
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
1491. E.g. , Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992). 
1492. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523-24 (1980). Bell further argues that Brown was the 
product of white America's concern that apartheid was undermining our position in the Cold 
War and was holding back economic development in the South. Id. at 524-25. For detailed 
support of Bell's thesis as to Brown, see DUDZIAK, supra note 1391. 
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ing to take sides only against social movements or countermovements 
it views as localized or loser-movements in the long run, my point in 
the previous section. Hence, for contested issues - affirmative action, 
abortion regulation, antigay laws and initiatives - the Court's incen­
tive is to make no decisive doctrinal pronouncement until it is clear 
how cultural debate is going to be resolved. (Brown was timed about 
right, because the Court knew there was a national consensus that 
open apartheid was an embarrassment.1493 Hardwick's timing could not 
have been worse, because the Court's clumsy strike for tradition came 
as lesbigay people were persuading the national culture that homo­
sexuality is at least a tolerable [rather than malignant] variation.) Until 
that happens, the Court's best strategies are to refuse to take cases re­
quiring it to make hard choices, to compromise the hard choices, or to 
issue narrow, fact-bound opinions in those cases. 
2. A More Aggressive Politics of Remediation: Missed Opportunities 
for a Politics of Transformation 
A deeper reason for IBSM disappointment with the fruits of their 
constitutional politics has to do with ideological divisions within the 
social movements themselves. Minority experience under a terrorizing 
regime is far from monolithic. At any given time, some members of 
the minority accept their lot, some are immobilized by shame or anger, 
others dream of being treated like the majority, and yet others want 
little to do with the majority. As a social movement takes shape to re­
sist the regime, (1) most members of the minority group, the tories and 
bystanders, want nothing to do with it;1494 (2) radicals want to trans­
form society based on their identity-generated normative vision;1495 
and (3) integrationists want to be assimilated as equals into society and 
law. If the social movement gains momentum, usually through skir­
mishes with the state and publicity for its grievances, group 1 shrinks 
1493. The Court knew that because there had been highly favorable responses to its 
earlier trial balloons (such as the three anti-apartheid decisions in 1950); Justices like 
Warren and Frankfurter had fine political instincts suggesting the time was ripe; and both 
the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations (very different in other respects) had filed 
strong amicus briefs unequivocally arguing that racial segregation was unconstitutional. 
1494. Tories are minorities who agree with the majority's assessment that their identi­
fying trait sets them apart - women who believe that their place is naturally in the home, 
people of color who accepted apartheid, and self-loathing homosexuals, many of whom are 
homophobic. Bystanders are sympathetic to the social movement but do not want to be in­
volved, for reasons of fear, competing priorities, or doubts about the movement's likely suc­
cess. 
1495. Examples of early IBSM radicals include Emma Goldman, an extreme pacifist 
who proclaimed women's utter need to be sexually and economically free from men and 
marriage; Marcus Garvey, an early black nationalist; and Harry Hay, a sexually liberated gay 
man who was the main founder of the Mattachine Society. 
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and group 3 grows, with group 2 fluctuating. Group 3 tends to assume 
disproportionate control of the IBSM, in large part because minority 
professionals are likely to be integrationist, and they have the leisure 
time, intelligence, money, and energy to work for the movement's ad­
vancement.1496 Among minority professionals, lawyers are particularly 
prominent because they have a comparative advantage in under­
standing and plotting against the most tangible basis for the minority's 
disadvantages: the law. Whether representing minority defendants in 
criminal proceedings, filing constitutional challenges to state exclu­
sions and discriminations, or drafting reform bills, lawyers were big 
players in the century's IBSMs.1497 Indeed, the lawyers' successes are 
instrumental in the growth of the social movement: before sympa­
thetic bystanders will join in a social movement, they need some proof 
that the movement is going to be successful and not too risky for them 
as a personal matter; victories in court or (better) the legislature are 
solid and well-publicized signs of (intermediate) success, and some 
signal that the law will protect bystanders who get involved.1498 
The lawyers and their allies are integrationists by inclination, and 
the more their social movement becomes committed to constitutional 
litigation the more integrationist it will be. The Aristotelian logic of 
equal protection law makes this likely: to win an equal protection case, 
the complainant must show that she and her disadvantaged group are 
"like" the people or group advantaged by the law's classification. 1499 So 
the Inc. Fund, the ACLU's Women's Rights Project, and Lambda 
have argued that race/sex/orientation are irrelevant to law and public 
policy and that people of color/women/lesbigays are similarly situated 
to whites/men/straights. As Part I suggested, this stance is fundamental 
1496. One might be tempted to say - but I do not - that most minorities, like most 
other Americans, have been conservative in their preferences and satisfied with the status 
quo but for its discrimination against them; the ethos of the melting pot may be pervasive. 
1497. Former ABA President Moorfield Storey was the NAACP's first head, Thurgood 
Marshall probably its most famous leader. Lawyers such as Pauli Murray, Dorothy Kenyon, 
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg were major leaders in the modern wave of feminism. After the 
nonlawyer Sanger, lawyers like Harriet Pilpel and Morris Ernst dominated Planned Parent­
hood. The modern lesbigay rights movement had as its most prominent leaders the quasi­
lawyer Frank Kameny and lawyers Tom Stoddard and Nan Hunter. The ACLU is thor­
oughly dominated by lawyers. 
1498. Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 3, at 451-52, 460-67; see DENNIS CHONG, 
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 103-40 (1991) (analyzing the civil 
rights movement as an "assurance game": once enough people join the movement and it  
seems assured of success, everyone wants to join). 
Social movements had other options than constitutional litigation - grass-roots organ­
izing, nonviolent protests, disruption, and even violence - and most deployed all but vio­
lence. As IBSM leaders could see, American social movements that did not work through 
the law tended to be terrible failures (e.g., the IWW, KKK, Communism). 
1499. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
215-34 (1989). 
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to their politics of recognition. Although the lawyers' focus on such a 
politics had the effect of marginalizing radical voices within each 
movement, these voices were raised in objection as the social move­
ment appealed to masses of people. For example, non-integrationist 
black nationalist thought, valorizing African heritage and identity, re­
mained powerful throughout the century. Some of the founders of the 
NAACP were black nationalists like W.E.B. DuBois, who grew disaf­
fected with the organization as it became increasingly integrationist.1500 
As the NAACP's and the SCLC's politics of recognition was being 
achieved, the civil rights movement fragmented into a variety of dif­
ferent voices as to the wisdom of the politics of recognition and the na­
ture of the next step - the politics of remediation. Speakers as differ­
ent as Harold Cruse, Malcolm X, Stokely Carmichael, and Charles 
Hamilton objected that the African-American community had an in­
tegrity worth preserving - and that integration into an unappreciative 
white-constructed community would be a calamity.1501 The same thing 
occurred among feminists and gay people: once lawyer-led social 
movements made advances toward formal equality, representing an 
integration of women and openly lesbigay people into the marketplace 
and the public sphere, critical voices argued that fundamental differ­
ences were being ignored and distinctively feminist and queer voices 
were being silenced. 
In short, even if lawyer-led IBSMs were completely successful in 
persuading the Supreme Court to carry forth their politics of recogni­
tion and remediation (which they have not been) and the Court were 
able to do so effectively (which it has not), there would still · be 
mounting dissatisfaction within the "beneficiary" groups. This disaf­
fection has inspired a generation of critique among law professors -
critique that has gone beyond discontent within the social movements 
and has illuminated public law. One line of critique has focused on the 
failure and perhaps the inability of judges to accept minority under­
standings of equality. The NAACP's briefs challenging race discrimi­
nation posed three interconnected models of equality: a rationality 
model, positing that race was irrelevant to proper goal-oriented public 
policy; an anti-subordination model, maintaining that race-based clas­
sifications were aimed at ensuring that blacks remained in a subordi­
nate position and that this was unjust; and a pluralism model, arguing 
that race-based exclusions created destructive animosity among ex-
1500. See MANNING MARABLE, W.E.B. DUBOIS: BLACK RADICAL DEMOCRAT 75-98 
(1986). 
1501. STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS 
OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA 54-55 (1967); HAROLD CRUSE, THE CRISIS OF THE NEGRO 
INTELLECTUAL (1967); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 767-71 (re­
covering black nationalist thought as an ideological counterpoint to integrationism). 
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eluded peoples. From the NAACP's point of view, the Fourteenth 
Amendment embodied all three understandings. In Brown, the 
Supreme Court ambiguously seemed to agree, and Loving fully 
adopted the NAACP's theory: the irrational classification was part of 
a program that subordinated people of color based upon a divisive 
philosophy of white supremacy. The disparate impact and affirmative 
action cases, however, saw more conservative Courts privilege the ra­
tionality model and slight the anti-subordination model. 1502 
Critical scholars have faulted the Court for sacrificing the anti­
subordination goal for other goals of the Fourteenth Amendment. A 
second line of critique maintains that the anti-subordination goal, 
properly understood, requires a radical politics of remediation: when 
the state has long discriminated against and even persecuted human 
beings because of traits now recognized as benign, the effects on the 
mores and attitudes of the community will linger long after the formal 
persecution and discrimination end; a constitutional provision that, lit­
erally, requires the state to afford the equal protection of its laws to all 
persons ought to be read to impose a responsibility on the state to do a 
lot more than end the formal discrimination.1503 This is an elementary 
principle of remedial justice: if A has contributed to B's harm, it is not 
enough for A to cease harmful conduct; A also has a moral responsi­
bility to help B correct the harm through reparations and new institu­
tions. This is also the principle of Brown, as interpreted in Green and 
Swann: it was not enough for state and local governments to repeal 
rules requiring racially segregated schools; the governments were obli­
gated to create a whole new "unitary" school system structured in 
ways that would actually advance the interests of African Americans. 
As the temporal distance from apartheid has increased, however, the 
Court has been less willing to impose affirmative remedial obligations 
on school boards or other state actors. Critical race scholars have la­
mented this development.1504 
Feminists have been perhaps even more radical. Consider dis­
crimination on the basis of pregnancy, which the Court held was not a 
form of sex discrimination.1505 As in other disparate impact cases (but 
with less justification), the majority Justices viewed the discrimination 
1502. But the anti-subordination model has hardly disappeared. From Alex Bickel to 
Clarence Thomas, critics of affirmative action claim that it contributes to prejudice and 
stereotypes against people of color. And the Justices seem to believe that otherwise rational 
policies having an unintended differential impact on people of color do not contribute to 
their subordination the way policies targeted at them would do. 
1503. See ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM (1994). 
1504. See, e.g., Anthony Cook, The Temptation and Fall of the Original Understanding, 
1990 DUKE L.J. 1163 (reviewing BORK, supra note 1404); Lawrence, supra note 185. 
1505. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
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through the lens of rationality, but their liberal feminist critics insisted 
that it be viewed through the anti-subordination lens as well. As 
Wendy Webster Williams explained it, the goal of the feminist legal 
movement "has been to break down the legal barriers that restricted 
each sex to its predefined role and created a hierarchy based on gen­
der. " 1506 She and her allies documented in their briefs to the Court and 
their subsequent testimony before Congress, how employer discrimi­
nation based on pregnancy are a fundamental barrier to women's ad­
vancement in the workplace. So-called difference feminists go even 
further than Williams and argue that state and private employers 
should adopt rules providing extra support and benefits to pregnant 
women, as a needed first step to remedy disadvantages women face in 
the workplace. 1 507 Radical feminists such as Catharine MacKinnon 
suggest that difference as well as liberal feminists are too timid. In­
stead of arguing that women should not be penalized for their preg­
nancy or should be helped out a little, feminists should be challenging 
the legal and cultural regime which renders pregnancy special.1508 This, 
she argues, is the fundamental flaw in equal protection law: man is the 
measure of all things. Feminists should insist that gender neutrality is 
an oxymoron if calibrated from such a metric. 
Critical thinkers assail the failure of integrationists to seek major 
changes in the institutions minorities are clamoring to enter. That is, 
rather than limiting their energies to a politics of incremental remedia­
tion, minorities and their organizations ought to be engaging in a poli­
tics of (radical) transformation. Minorities must challenge the melting 
pot ideal and insist on a creole or even separatist regime where minori­
ties can retain their distinctiveness. Feminist and gaylegal theories of 
the family provide an excellent example of this critique. Although 
most feminist family law reforms have sought to assure women better 
treatment within marriage (the end of coverture, erosion of the mari­
tal rape exemption), more radical voices like Emma Goldman have 
maintained that the institution of marriage itself was problematic from 
a feminist perspective. The voices of marriage critics remained mar­
ginal in the women's rights movements for most of the century but 
have resurfaced in academic work about family law. In that venue, the 
politics of recognition has been arguably disastrous for women, whose 
1506. Wendy W. Williams, Equality 's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treat­
ment/Special Treatment Divide, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 331 (1984-1985). 
1507. Compare Brief of Amici Curiae Coalition of Reproductive Equality, Guerra (No. 
85-494) (urging Court to uphold state law requiring employers to grant women extra leaves 
on account of pregnancy), with Brief of Amici Curiae National Organization for Women et 
al., Guerra (No. 85-494) (arguing that the law was a sex discrimination that should be reme­
died by extending the same benefits to men). 
1508. For MacKinnon 's general critique of liberal and difference feminism, from which I 
derive the account in text, see MACKINNON, supra note 1499, at 220-22, 225-27, 244-45. 
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political leaders supported no-fault divorce and whose constitutional 
lawyers won men equal treatment in the rules of alimony. These and 
other privatizations of marriage law have been on the whole bad for 
many women and terrible for some.1509 Feminist and lesbigay scholars 
of family law have responded with proposals for transformation of the 
field. Rather than giving women the same choices as men in an institu­
tion where women's choices are often going to be rotten ones, these 
critics propose that the institution be radically changed or abandoned. 
Martha Fineman, for example, argues that the state should not subsi­
dize horizontal (romantic) relationships at all and should instead shift 
its support to vertical ( caregiving) ones.1510 
Lesbigay people's longstanding constitutional demand for the re­
moval of state refusals to recognize same-sex marriages has produced 
a rich critical literature in opposition. The feminist and queer theory 
critiques of same-sex marriage rely on several kinds of critical argu­
ments broadly applicable to other legal issues. Just as women have not 
flourished in the institution of different-sex marriage, Nitya Duclos 
argues that the costs of marriage will exceed its benefits for many 
same-sex couples.151 1 Even more skeptical of same-sex marriage are 
Paula Ettelbrick and Nancy Polikoff, who argue that lesbigay efforts 
to join in marriage are not only misguided but coercive. That is, state 
recognition of same-sex marriage would be a state signal valorizing 
only those kinds of relationships among gay people, thereby further 
marginalizing lesbian couples who disapprove of the institution's pa­
triarchal past, gay men who prefer multiple partners, and lesbigay 
people who for whatever reason are not coupled.1512 This is tragic, the 
critics maintain: gay liberation started out as a powerful normative cri­
tique of sex negativity and traditional gender roles, a critique that 
1509. See ALLEN M. PARKMAN, NO-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? 71-109 
(1992); LENORE L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985). 
1510. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL 
FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228-33 (1995); accord RUTHANN 
ROBSON, SAPPHO GOES TO LAW SCHOOL 153-70 (1998). 
1511 .  Nitya Duclos, Some Complicating Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage, 1 LAW & 
SEXUALITY 31, 52-55 (1991); see David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of 
Same-Sex Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. 
REV. 447 (1996). I have suggested that the same-sex marriage movement ought to be most 
attentive to Duclos's critique and remain open to pressing for a menu of new institutions and 
not just entry of same-sex couples into existing institutions. ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY 
PRACTICE, supra note 626, at 225-29; see id. at 83-126 (comparative law survey of new state 
institutions for recognition of romantic relationships all over the world). 
1512. See Paula Ettelbrick, Since When ls Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK, 
Fall 1989, at 1-2, reprinted in ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, SEXUALITY, supra note 420, at 817-18; 
Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Mar­
riage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REV. 
1535 (1993). 
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would be blunted or even inverted if the product of that movement is 
adding recruits to patriarchal marriage ! 1513 
A critical analysis of same-sex marriage, therefore, is that it would 
benefit a small number of the lesbigay community, would positively 
harm others, and would represent a sacrifice of the radical, transfor­
mative goals of the early movement. One can make the same kinds of 
criticisms of the lawyer-driven politics of other social movements. 
Once abortion rights became tied to a "right to privacy," rather than 
antidiscrimination jurisprudence, critics argue that it has been easier 
for the state to refuse funding needed by poor and working class 
women and to allow parental control of minor women's exercise of the 
right. 1514 Also, critics suggest it has been an uphill battle to persuade 
people that abortion rights are essential to women's citizenship in per­
haps the same degree that men enjoy presumptive rights not to be im­
prisoned by the state. Likewise, critical race theorists point out that 
school desegregation has inured to the benefit of only some African 
and Hispanic Americans and has done no good, and perhaps much ill, 
for the majority of the black and latino population. Even when there 
has actually been integration, it has typically been on white terms: 
black and latino children are assimilated into white schools teaching 
white culture - and then are immediately tracked into separate pro­
grams that stigmatize them as less educable. Although Brown II and, 
especially, Swann have been the occasion for creative educational re­
forms, critics argue that this has been the exception and not the rule. 
Note the tension between the two critiques of the politics of reme­
diation. On the one hand, courts do not go far enough to remedy a bad 
situation; on the other hand, movement lawyers have not asked for 
enough change in the status quo. My study of IBSMs suggests that 
critical scholars have not sufficiently learned the lesson of post-1968 
America: its citizens are strongly resistant to any significant realloca­
tion of economic or even dignitary entitlements, especially when ac­
complished by unelected Justices. If the NAACP or the ACLU had 
laid out a radical agenda of reparations for black people and the aboli­
tion of marriage for women, they would have been laughed out of 
court and the legislative process, even in the 1960s. Asking for far-out 
1513. But see Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & 
SEXUALITY 9 (1991) (asserting that same-sex marriage would be a continuing deconstruc­
tion of traditional gender roles). 
1514. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under the Law, 100 
YALE L.J. 1281 (1991); Robin West, The Supreme Court, 1989 Term - Foreword: Taking 
Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 79-85 (1990); Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Self­
less Women in the Republic of Choice 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1584 (1991). For a most 
thoughtful response, see Anita L. Allen, The Proposed Equal Protection Fix for Abortion 
Law: Reflections on Citizenship, Gender, and the Constitution, 18 HARV J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 
419 (1995). 
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remedies would have discredited progressives' appeal for their moder­
ate demands and might have yielded even more of a backlash than the 
IBSMs already faced. In the early 1990s, same-sex marriage - as as­
similationist and conservative a request as one can imagine - was not 
only deemed unacceptably radical, but it triggered the greatest antigay 
legal backlash of the twentieth century. Radical change does not come 
in the United States except on little cat's feet, softly and incrementally. 
A third, and most interesting, line of critique stands outside the 
foregoing dilemma. This critique maintains that a lawyer-led politics 
that yields formal recognition without meaningful remediation is not 
only empty and fraudulent, but also counterproductive. By invalidat­
ing apartheid and other open forms of race-based discrimination, but 
refusing to extend Brown to de facto school segregation, state policies 
impacting severely on communities of color and indifferent to their 
plight, or even the obvious-to-everyone racist operation of the death 
penalty in this country, the Supreme Court has arguably legitimated 
those practices - allowing white America to think that it has done 
something about the "race problem," and does not have to be con­
cerned with "lawful" practices that are just as subordinating as those 
struck down.1515 
The critics are right that victory in court does not assure an IBSM 
that its normative agenda will be advanced.1516 The abortion rights 
movement did not triumph after Roe v. Wade; in the wake of a tre­
mendous pro-life countermovement after Roe, even many pro-choice 
now concede that abortion itself is a terrible thing. Conversely, defeat 
in court may be energizing for the social movement. The gay rights 
movement was invigorated by Bowers v. Hardwick. Far from shaming 
lesbigay people and legitimating police arrests of "homosexuals" for 
"sodomy," the Supreme Court's clumsy opinion brought thousands of 
lesbigay attorneys out of their closets and galvanized a determined 
campaign that is nullifying those laws state-by-state. Although most 
perceptive, these critics (like Bickel before them) seem to overstate 
the legitimating impact of Supreme Court decisions. I should need a 
lot more proof to believe that Brown and Loving significantly contrib­
uted to the legitimacy of policies with ongoing race-based effects. Be-
1515. Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673 (1992) (argu­
ing that IBSM "victories" in Brown and Miranda were empty legal triumphs that actually set 
back progressive politics); see Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination 
Through Antidiscrimination Law: School Segregation Law: Promise, Contradiction, Ration­
alization, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 71, 86 
(Derrick Bell, Jr. ed., 1980); Alan David Freeman, A Critical Review of Supreme Court 
Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978). For a very strongly worded statement of this per­
spective, see Sidney Wilhelm, The Supreme Court: A Citadel for White Supremacy, 79 MICH . 
L. REV. 847 (1981) (book review). 
1516. See ROSENBERG, supra note 91; MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION 
AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
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fore Brown and Loving, there was no discourse at all about the legiti­
macy of policies having race-based effects. 
One lesson of my current study is that it is only the great success of 
the civil rights and women's politics of recognition that has made pos­
sible serious debate, and squabbling, about the remediation project. 
Unfortunately, my study also suggests a final, and highly ambiguous, 
perspective on the politics of remediation. An important effect of in­
tegrationist victories is that they create deeper divisions within the mi­
nority group: some will benefit greatly from integration and will tend 
to assimilate into mainstream culture; others will remain marginalized, 
perhaps re-viewing themselves along new axes (such as class or dress 
code rather than sexual orientation, for example); some will be even 
worse off than they were before. Ultimately, a successful politics of 
recognition would mean the melting away of the minority's trait as a 
culturally significant marker, with new traits replacing the old ones as 
stigmatizing. That "problem," if problem it be, is a long way off, how­
ever. 
3. A Deeper Politics of Protection: Court-Based Constitutionalism as 
an Impediment to Combating Private Violence Against Minorities 
From a social movement perspective, the most troubling critique of 
the politics of recognition is that it has not gotten to the bottom of the 
deep problems faced by people of color, women, and lesbigays. 
Constitutional equal protection has trimmed away state laws and poli­
cies that are openly racist or sexist and a few that are antigay, but has 
done too little to attack the root problem: people are still racist, sexist, 
and homophobic in their prejudiced feelings and (to a lesser extent) 
their stereotypical cognitions, and a lot of such people act on those 
feelings and cognitions, to the detriment not only of minorities but of 
all Americans. As Kim Crenshaw puts it, " [w]hite race consciousness, 
in a new [post-Brown] form but still virulent, plays an important, per­
haps crucial, role in the new regime that has legitimated the deterio­
rating day-to-day material conditions of a majority of Blacks."1517 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not a lot to say about that in its con­
stitutional decisions. Such silence is hardly inevitable. Although most 
of the Constitution addresses only "state action," there is ample 
precedent for considering many exercises of hegemonic private power 
as state action.1518 And the Thirteenth Amendment, which reaches pri-
1517. Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Le­
gitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REY. 1331, 1 378-79 (1988). 
1518. See supra Section 11 .E.2. For a simple example, there is no logical reason that 
Shelley v. Kraemer cannot stand for the proposition that the state is involved whenever the 
exercise of private prejudice depends upon the availability of courts or the police to enforce 
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vate actors, can be interpreted much more broadly than the Court has 
done. Robin West has argued from the text and history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that its Equal Protection Clause obliges the 
state to protect women and minorities against private violence.1519 The 
formal successes of a minority's politics of recognition cast in bold re­
lief the work needed for a genuine politics of protection as part of the 
remedial process. Most of that work has to be accomplished by legisla­
tion. If this obligation were taken seriously, as it sometimes is at the 
behest of identity groups, the legislative agenda would include not just 
antidiscrimination laws, but also laws providing extra penalties for 
hate crimes and regulating hate speech, aggressively pursuing harass­
ment in schools and workplaces, and attacking violence within the 
home. Progressives have done their homework, justifying these kinds 
of measures and getting many enacted. 
To their shock, the Supreme Court now stands as an impediment 
to legislative efforts to protect women and minorities against private 
violence. A Court packed with neo-federalists, libertarians, and repre­
sentatives of traditionalist countermovements is, not surprisingly, a 
Court willing to curtail the operation of antidiscrimination laws. Thus, 
under the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has invalidated the 
Dworkin-MacKinnon ordinance providing victims of pornography 
with a claim for relief;1520 barred the application of sexual orientation 
antidiscrimination laws to parades and associations excluding openly 
lesbigay participants;1521 invalidated a hate crime law targeting race-, 
gender-, and sexuality-oriented violence;1522 and partly overturned an 
injunction protecting women seeking to avoid pro-life harassment 
when they seek assistance from abortion clinics. 1523 The same Justices 
have construed the same First Amendment to allow the state to censor 
federally funded doctors from informing their female patients about 
abortions that they need,1524 women expressing themselves through 
exotic dancing,1525 and school newspapers from informing high school 
students about the facts of pregnancy.1526 Few believe that a Court that 
its authority to discriminate. See Mark Tushnet, Shelley v. Kraemer and Theories of Equal­
ity, 33 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 383 (1988). 
1519. See ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 125-27 (1994). 
1520. Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff d mem., 475 
U.S. 1001 (1986). 
1521. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Hurley v. GLIB, 515 U.S. 557 
(1995). 
1522. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
1523. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
1524. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
1525. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
1526. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
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assures traditionalists the right to trumpet homophobic messages 
would protect gay people speaking about their identity in the armed 
forces. From a progressive point of view, the imperial First 
Amendment is part of a colonizing Constitution. 
The federalism decisions are also regressive from a progressive 
point of view. Minority groups have successfully petitioned Congress 
to deliver on West's conception of equal protection, but many of the 
federal antidiscrimination laws have been trimmed back or nullified 
on grounds of federalism. The most famous casualty is the Violence 
Against Women Act, which fell under the Court's newly restrictive 
understanding of Congress's Commerce Clause and Fourteenth 
Amendment remedial powers. That feminists had massively docu­
mented the economic effects of violence against women and the fail­
ure of states to protect against gender-motivated violence did not 
seem to matter to the Court majority, making Morrison (potentially) 
as much of a dignitary shock to the women's movement that Hardwick 
was to gay rights. In a similar manner, the Court carved the states out 
of the remedial scheme of the Americans with Disabilities Act,1527 and 
would presumably do the same to the proposed Employment 
Nondiscrimination Act protecting against sexual orientation discrimi­
nation in the workplace. There may be votes on the Court for ex­
empting states from coverage under Title Vll.1528 Even the Equal 
Protection Clause has been turned against progressive remedial ven­
tures in the affirmative action cases. 
The progressive project of deploying the state to oppose and pe­
nalize private racism, sexism, and homophobia is deeply at odds with 
the Constitution as the Supreme Court has conceived it, especially 
since the appointment of Justice Rehnquist (1971). " [T]he 
Constitution not only fails to protect against [race, sex, and sexual ori­
entation] subordination, but it also fails to exhibit neutrality toward it: 
it nurtures precisely those patterns and practices that are most injuri­
ous to the economic opportunities, the individual freedoms, the inti­
macies, and the fragile communities of those persons already most de­
prived in the unequal and unfree social world in which we live."1529 
This tension between progressive constitutionalism and Supreme 
Court constitutionalism is not going to go away and may well get 
worse as the Court's personnel changes. What should progressives and 
critical thinkers be pressing for? This is a genuine dilemma, the most 
serious one facing IBSMs in the new millennium. 
1527. Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
1528. The current nine Justices are unlikely to find a majority for this position, but shifts 
in personnel (replacing Justices Stevens or Ginsburg with a countermovement conservative) 
could change this calculus overnight. 
1529. West, Constitutional Skepticism, supra note 7, at 777. 
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Giving up on the Constitution - becoming constitutional law 
drop-outs - is an unattractive option, because court-driven constitu­
tionalism can thwart legislation and community action that progres­
sives favor.153° Continuing to engage in the various constitutional poli­
tics progressives favor (especially the deeper politics of protecting 
against private prejudice and violence and of transforming public and 
private institutions) seems unrealistic with the current crop of Justices 
and their likely replacements.1531 These unappealing options have 
given rise to progressive support for various forms of "popular consti­
tutionalism,'' whereby constitutional law is taken away from the courts 
and returned to the people.1532 The project of this Article has been to 
suggest that the various constitutional politics engaged in by identity­
based social movements and their countermovements are a form of 
popular constitutionalism - albeit unsatisfactory from a progressive 
point of view. 
More popular constitutionalism may be a good idea but is hardly a 
progressive panacea. The history of antigay initiatives is instructive. In 
the 1970s and 1980s, the voters approved a large majority of them, 
usually after campaigns openly appealing to antigay prejudices and 
stereotypes.1533 Although Evans holds that there are limits on how far 
the electorate can go in excluding lesbigay people from normal poli­
tics, lower courts have applied the Court's decision leniently. 1534 The 
effect of these defeats was not to squash gay rights activism. Gay peo­
ple redoubled their efforts, and their fundraising. Between 1977 and 
1993, antigay initiatives were accepted by voters seventy-seven percent 
of the time; since 1993, a majority of such initiatives have been de­
feated.1535 They were defeated in large part because progay alliances 
persuaded most voters that lesbigay people were relatively normal, or 
1530. This is something like the attitude of scholars West calls constitutional skeptics. Id. 
at 765-66. 
1531. In 1992, West described the constitutional faithful as engaged in a project that is 
"utterly futile, deeply utopian, absolutely necessary, terribly risky, and one of the most 
imaginative, fecund, and important, and shared enterprises presently ongoing in the legal 
academy." Id. at 798. Only the importance of the enterprise seems to have changed ten years 
later. 
1532. See, e.g., RICHARD PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE": A CONSTITUTIONAL 
POPULIST MANIFESTO (1994); TUSHNET, supra note 1516; Bruce Ackerman, The New Sepa­
ration of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633 (2000) (urging more plebiscitary constitutional­
ism). 
1533. See text accompanying notes 636-646 (discussing antigay initiatives, including the 
one invalidated in Evans). 
1534. E.g., Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 
(6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 943 (1998). 
1535. My estimate for post-1993 initiatives comes from Hans Johnson, the gay rights 
activist who engineered defeats for them in Idaho (1994) and Kalamazoo, Michigan (2000). 
The 1977-93 figures are from Gamble, supra note 600, at 251, 258. 
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at least no threat to the polity. But the process of persuasion relied 
heavily on "we are just like you" tropes. In my view, popular constitu­
tionalism can indeed contribute to the evolution of antidiscriminatory 
social norms - but it will decidedly not be an instrument for radical 
social change that helps minority groups. In most instances, I should 
expect popular constitutionalism to be more (rather than less) assimi­
lationist than court-oriented constitutionalism. 
A further caution regarding popular constitutionalism is the final 
lesson I shall draw from my lengthy study. It is fashionable on both the 
Left and Right to denigrate judges as biased, imperial, or impotent. 
This impulse has been an inevitable backlash against lawyers' and law 
professors' excessive enthusiasm for judges as heroes. They are not 
heroes. But judges, especially those on the nation's highest court, 
bring to identity issues the virtues of intelligence, procedural wisdom, 
and as much impartiality as life tenure can give a human being. In 
reading thousands of pages of oral arguments, internal memoranda, 
and conference notes for the Supreme Court in IBSM cases, I was 
most impressed by all the Justices' seriousness and the ability of most 
of them to grow beyond the perspectives they brought to the Court. 
William Brennan, for example, arrived at the Court with prudish views 
about sexuality and probably negative ones regarding homosexuality; 
by the time he retired, he had learned a lot about sexuality in America 
and was the Justice gay people feel best understood their grievances. I 
saw different kinds of thoughtful maturation in the attitudes of Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., Charles Evans Hughes, Felix Frankfurter, 
Robert Jackson, John Harlan, Potter Stewart, Harry Blackmun, Lewis 
Powell, John Paul Stevens, and Sandra Day O'Connor, to name only 
those Justices whose evolution struck me the most.1536 
To be sure, the responsibility for changing social norms regarding 
racial, sex and gender, and sexual variation in the United States does 
not lie with judges; it lies with the people energized by one or more 
identity-based social movements. Within that huge limiting principle, 
however, there is every reason to expect that thoughtful judges will 
continue to contribute, episodically and generally, to the possibility of 
a progressive constitutionalism. Judges can contribute to that project 
by protecting certain fundamental liberties of all people under the 
Due Process Clause; ensuring the conditions for a robust politics of 
recognition and remediation, under the auspices of the First 
Amendment; and channeling inter-group conflict through the assimila­
tive discourse of the Equal Protection Clause. No one can predict the 
1536. Unfortunately, the attitudes of other Justices seemed to harden during their serv­
ice on the Court. I am thinking of the later Hugo Black, Tom Clark, Byron White, and 
Warren Burger. At least one Justice, Charles Whittaker, broke down from judicial service on 
the Court. 
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contours of identity politics, or even the identity categories that will 
become significant, in this new century. I can only predict that iden­
tity-based social movements and their countermovements will con­
tinue to feed the Supreme Court interesting cases that will drive con­
stitutional doctrine into new and unexpected directions. 
